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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the development of 
Soviet-American strategic arms diplomacy from the early 
1970s to the late 1980s. It argues that bargaining activity 
during this period produced an evolving set of operative 
principles, or a "methodology" of strategic arms diplomacy, 
which has bridged particular agreements and has tended to 
drive policymakers into recurring patterns of choice 
throughout the process. It further argues that compliance 
behavior has played a key role in stimulating adjustments in 
bargaining methodology, because both sides have pursued 
successive negotiations against a background of accumulating 
experience under the terms of older agreements.
Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation's central 
arguments and discusses the links between compliance 
behavior and bargaining methodology. Chapter 2 identifies 
factors that may have compliance-enhancing and -inhibiting 
effects, and argues that treaty-constrained behavior is best 
viewed as a product of ongoing interactions among these 
factors. Chapter 3 explains why Soviet and U.S. compliance 
practices since 1972 are prone to conflicting assessments, 
and why these conflicts make it difficult to prove or 
disprove competing hypotheses regarding the motivations 
behind such behavior on the Soviet side. This chapter also 
assesses the historical record in light of the several 
factors discussed in Chapter 2 and identifies the presence 
of certain "structural" frictions in the Soviet-American 
context which were not previously considered.
The study then explicates the rule-making process. For 
analytical purposes it defines an agreement as a composite 
of: framework rules, which represent the internal structure 
of restraint; scope rules, which are criteria for including 
or excluding weapons; and verification rules, which govern 
procedures for monitoring compliance and sorting out 
problems. After discussing the formative stages of the 
bargaining process in Chapter 4, patterns of rule-making in 
each category are analyzed. Chapter 5 demonstrates that a 
systematic progression in framework rules governing force 
concentration is juxtaposed against sharp discontinuities in 
those governing force modernization. Chapter 6 concludes 
that the inevitable trade-offs between preserving 
flexibility for oneself versus thwarting treaty 
circumvention by the other side has led to recurring 
patterns in scope rule selection. Chapter 7 discusses trends 
in verification rule-making and the significance of 
glasnost. Chapter 8 evaluates the impact of bargaining 
dynamics and compliance behavior upon the rule-making 
process from the SALT to the START eras.
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FROM SALT TO START:
COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
BARGAINING METHODOLOGY IN 
SOVTET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC ARMS DIPLOMACY, 1972-1989

1.
INTRODUCTION
Soviet-American arms control has been described 
variously as an exercise in prudence, a dangerous delusion, 
and a ploy by the superpowers to codify the arms race. Shorn 
of all such labels, however, arms control is first and 
foremost a process of diplomacy. By "process" I mean a 
situation of ongoing bargaining between the two governments 
that aims at producing agreed rules on the size and 
character of their respective military postures. While this 
diplomacy of rule-making is often complex in its technical 
detail, the underlying problems of equality, reciprocity, 
and flexibility have always been simple to identify, even if 
difficult to resolve. As this process has played out over 
time, one can see the imprint of certain cumulative effects, 
both on the rules themselves and on the patterns of 
bargaining that led to their creation.
Since the early 1960s both sides generally have 
negotiated in a step-by-step fashion, selecting out issues 
like nuclear testing or biological weapons, which appeared 
ripe for accord and promising in terms of paving the way for 
more extensive controls. This sort of approach also typifies 
negotiations on strategic offensive and defensive weapons, 
though more for reasons of practical necessity than policy 
preference. In fact, during the early stages of their
13
dialogue, both sides acted as if they were striving for 
comprehensive strategic accords, only to strike bargains 
where they could in the interest of achieving results within 
realistic time frames. The products of these efforts are a 
series of treaties, accords, and communiques which stand as 
milestones along the path of diplomacy: the 1972 Anti- 
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; the 1972 Interim Agreement 
on Offensive Weapons (SALT I); the 1974 Vladivostok Accord; 
the 1979 Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II); 
and, by the end of 1989, a general framework for a first 
phase of strategic arms reduction (START).^
The negotiations spanning these agreements provide not 
only a rich menu for research but also, alas, much grist for 
controversy. Part of the problem, surely, is our close 
proximity to the subject. Two plus decades of living under 
the terms of major strategic agreements simply is not a long 
time in historical terms; we are still hostage to unfolding 
events that may change the way we interpret the arms control 
experience. Moreover, any fair-minded retrospective on the 
process would have to concede its disorderly aspects.
 ^ For a good discussion of the step-by-step 
approach, see Albert Carnesale, "Introduction: A Framework 
for Analysis," in Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass, 
eds.. Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight 
(Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger Press, 1987), pp. 1-6. The 1987 
treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) is an 
important part of this sequence of accords, although, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 6, it does not cover weapons 
that conform to usual Western definitions of "strategic" 
systems.
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Looking back, historians of the future will almost certainly 
observe that Soviet-American strategic negotiations of the 
1970s and 1980s were productive in fits and starts, very 
much unlike a "process" in the sense of a steady progression 
from one point to another.^ These historians may also 
conclude that U.S. and Soviet leaders rarely sought a 
particular agreement simply on its own merits, but rather as 
a way to put domestic political opponents on the defensive, 
to shore up alliance commitments, or to be seen as a 
peacemaker in the eyes of world opinion. Fred Ikle has 
called this phenomenon "negotiating for side effects," but 
his characterization downplays the importance of these 
factors.3 Explicitly political aims, such as drawing Moscow 
into a "web" of international relationships or putting 
Washington on the public relations defensive, generally have 
been at the core rather than the periphery of arms control 
negotiations.
Finally, a future historiography of Soviet-American 
strategic arms diplomacy will almost certainly highlight the
In other contexts, however, the lack of an orderly, 
incremental process is not necessarily a barrier to 
progress. As Thomas S. Kuhn has argued, great advances in 
the natural sciences generally were not the product of 
incremental progressions but the result of unsettling sea- 
changes (or "paradigm shifts") in the basic working 
assumptions of a given field. The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1970).
 ^Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York, 
N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 43-58.
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cycles of euphoria and disappointment that typified expert 
assessments of the negotiations at various points along the 
way. Events that were seen at the time as diplomatic 
breakthroughs did not always prove lasting. More often than 
not, they simply refocused attention on new or unsolved 
problems, creating in their wake tensions between the 
parties and a requirement to find new solutions. Appraisals 
by experts and pundits of these events generally followed 
this pattern of initial optimism leading to subsequent 
disappointment and criticism.
From the late 1970s, when the emerging SALT II 
agreement ran into serious domestic difficulties in the 
United States, throughout most of the 1980s, the dominant 
theme in many public commentaries was one of deep pessimism. 
"Arms control has essentially failed," wrote Leslie Gelb in 
a widely cited 1979 article.^ Soviet-American negotiations, 
he argued, "have done little more than to codify the arms 
race." To some observers, like Gelb, the proximate reasons 
for failure were political attacks on the process by left- 
and right-wing critics and inflated public expectations 
which the grinding pace of negotiations could not satisfy.^
 ^Leslie H. Gelb, "A Glass Half Full," Foreign Policy, 
No. 36 (Fall 1979), p. 21.
 ^Thus, for example, Barry M. Blechman argued that the 
basic problem of pursuing arms control in the American 
political system stems from the tendency of policymakers and 
others to obfuscate differences between arms control as a 
modest technical objective (i.e., to stabilize deterrence) 
and more grandiose disarmament aims (i.e., to foster 
fundamental change in political relations), and the fact
16
According to many proponents of this view, arms control was 
not flawed in concept but rather executed imperfectly or 
wrongly understood. Philip Farley has characterized 
superpower arms control as "an experiment that has just 
begun, not one that has been tried and found wanting."*
Other observers have interpreted the problem quite 
differently. Conservative critics lay most of the blame for 
the failures of arms control at the doorstep of the Soviet 
Union. Accordingly, the agreements of the 1970s were 
"fatally-flawed" because Soviet leaders sought and obtained 
unfair advantages or lulled the United States into a false 
sense of security.^ As Richard Perle has argued: "There is 
no doubt that the Soviets have proven remarkably adroit at 
exploiting ambiguities in arms control agreements to proceed 
with activities that it was the intent of one of the parties 
—  us —  to preclude by treaty....the Soviets have not 
hesitated to mislead us, deliberately and all too
that arms control has little appeal to the traditional 
constituencies that would support more far reaching changes 
in Soviet-American relations. See "Do Negotiated Arms 
Limitations Have a Future?" Foreign Affairs. Vol. 59, No. 1 
(Fall 1980), pp. 117-118.
* Philip J. Farley, "Harvard's Skewed Analysis," Arms 
Control Todav. Vol. 18, No. 1 (January/February 1988), p.
30.
 ^A thorough history and critical analysis of the 
"lulling effect" argument is found in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 
"Lulling and Stimulating Effects of Arms Control," in 
Carnesale and Haass, eds.. Superpower Arms Control. pp. 223- 
274.
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successfully."® Others have attributed the disappointing 
results of arms control more to the bargaining process 
itself. Senator Malcolm Wallop and Angelo Codevilla have 
scathingly attacked the arms control process for fostering 
dangerous illusions about the Soviet Union and 
"delegitimizing" hard questions about how the Soviet Union 
would use its strategic power. As they argue; "...by the 
wondrous substitution of procedure for substance... American 
arms controllers transformed in their own minds a mortal 
enemy into a partner with equal interest....This line of 
thought does not axiomatically deny that one day we might 
have to deal with a Soviet Union intent on actually using 
its weapons to its own advantage. But it pushes that day out 
of the mind's practical reach."*
Criticisms of the process are not the exclusive 
preserve of doctrinaire conservatives. Many others fault the 
negotiations for not keeping up with new technologies or for 
channeling the arms race in new directions. Bruce Berkowitz 
has characterized arms control as a "self-extinguishing 
process" that breaks down completely when "the participants 
find themselves mainly deploying weapons that are not easily
® See statement of Richard Perle in U.S. Congress, 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Soviet Treatv Violations. 
98th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1984), p. 7.
* Malcolm Wallop and Angelo Codevilla, The Arms Control 
Delusion (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1987), pp. 48-49.
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controlled."^ According to Berkowitz, arms control has 
provided an "artificial incentive for a conservative 
military bureaucracy to become innovative" and the resulting 
weaponry has created a situation that is far worse than 
would have been the case without arms control.^ Other 
observers do not take such a grim view, but simply stress 
the modesty of arms control accomplishments. As Albert 
Carnesale and Richard Haass put it: "If history teaches 
anything, it is that arms control has proved neither as 
promising as some had hoped nor as dangerous as others had 
feared.
At the outset of the 1990s, the prospects for arms 
control are being buoyed by a spirit of renewed optimism. 
Negotiations have been swept along in the wake of dramatic 
improvements in superpower relations and the accession to 
power of a reform-minded Soviet leadership under Mikhail 
Gorbachev. Given all the tensions which plagued bilateral 
relations during the early 1980s, it still seems remarkable 
that Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan were able to transform the 
arms control component of the Soviet-American relationship 
from symbolic posturing to concrete bargaining. The INF 
Treaty was the first major step in that transformation.
Bruce D. Berkowitz, Calculated Risks (New York, 
N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 49-51.
Ibid. , p. 29.
Carnesale and Haass, "Conclusions: Weighing the 
Evidence," Superpower Arms Control. p. 355.
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Under its terms, the Soviet Union accepted numerically 
asymmetrical reductions, the complete elimination of a major 
operational weapon system —  the SS-2 0 missile —  and the 
controlled presence of on-site inspectors at former missile 
bases, support facilities, and production plants on the 
territories of each side. Steps of this magnitude were 
simply unthinkable prior to Gorbachev. Summing up a 
widespread view, former U.S. Ambassador Raymond Garthoff 
observed that the INF Treaty "relegitimates the arms control 
process after nearly a decade of neglect and unjustified 
charges of failure.
Interestingly, however, as the Gorbachev leadership and 
the Bush Administration have begun to expand the range of 
negotiations, new voices of dissent are being heard, 
questioning whether formal bargaining can keep pace with 
public expectations and increasingly rapid political change. 
"Arms control is essentially a form of centralized 
regulation," observes John Mueller, "and carries with it the 
usual defects of that a p p r o a c h . H e  continues: "...arms 
reductions will proceed most expeditiously if each side 
feels free to reverse any reduction it later comes to 
regret. Formal disarmament agreements are likely simply to
See statement of Raymond L. Garthoff in U.S. 
Congress, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, The INF Treatv. Part 3, 100th Cong., 2nd sess. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1988), p. 65.
John Mueller, "A New Concert of Europe," Foreign 
Policy, No. 77 (Winter 1989-90), p. 6.
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slow and pedantify this p r o c e s s . O t h e r s  have pursued this 
line of criticism in questioning the new enthusiasm for 
conventional arms negotiations in Europe. Lawrence Freedman 
has warned that conventional arms control is becoming an 
"over-bureaucratized monstrosity" that risks being overtaken 
by e v e n t s . T o  avoid this outcome, Kenneth Adelman has 
urged adoption of "evolving, parallel" policies. "Reductions 
initiated by their side," he argues, "that are below our 
levels in key categories would be matched by us, and vice- 
versa....This is a dynamic approach, one that recognizes 
rapid changes in Eastern Europe and in economic conditions. 
The formal number-crunching approach must end in a static 
formula.
In the search for major arms reductions, therefore, the 
events of our current period, though dramatic, cannot be 
said to represent a decisive boost for the formal bargaining 
process; new challenges and criticisms are emerging. A good 
deal of caution is required in venturing broad historical 
judgments on the success or failure of arms control 
diplomacy based on its conduct during particular periods of 
time. No single event —  be it a breakthrough or breakdown -
Ibid. , p. 9.
Lawrence Freedman, "The Politics of Conventional 
Arms Control," Survival. Vol. XXXI, No. 5 (September/October 
1989), p. 395.
Kenneth L. Adelman, "Bush Wasn't Tough Enough,"
The New York Times. December 5, 1989, p. A35.
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- can forever redeem or condemn the process in any 
categorical sense. Everything depends on the goals and 
contents of the negotiations and the capacity of both sides 
to keep the bargaining process attuned to the requirements 
generated by larger trends in relations. Indeed, as a 
statement about superpower politics, the real significance 
of the past two decades is not that arms control has somehow 
"succeeded" or "failed" in meeting specified goals but that 
it has endured for so long through bad times and good. 
Writing in 1973, John Newhouse predicted that strategic arms 
diplomacy would become a semi-permanent part of superpower 
relations —  "at times a real negotiation, at times a 
dialogue carried on just to sustain the process" —  and 
events since then have shown the essential correctness of 
his v i e w . W h a t  is more, certain internal dynamics in the 
bargaining process have had important shaping effects upon 
the framework and content of agreements from SALT to START.
THE CORE ARGUMENTS
Since the days of Nixon and Brezhnev, public audiences 
have become accustomed to hearing U.S. and Soviet leaders 
herald a new arms agreement as a dramatic new departure, a 
step that compensates for the deficiencies or fatal flaws of 
past efforts. Such claims should not be surprising.
John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Storv of SALT (New 
York, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), p. 267.
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Politicians are often inclined to orchestrate public 
opinion. Yet, political rhetoric notwithstanding, many 
substantive features of impending or recent agreements have 
more in common with earlier ones than is commonly supposed. 
It is a good working hypothesis that treaty provisions do 
not materialize out of thin air, as if the strenuous 
exercise of goodwill could somehow spontaneously create 
agreement on substance. Rather, the choices that both sides 
make with respect to the content of new accords are shaped 
significantly by the results of trial and error that 
occurred in earlier years, under older agreements. Thus, 
while particular treaty provisions may be new, in many cases 
they are also a logical consequence of various rules that 
have evolved from previous arms control experience. This 
experience includes not only the negotiating record of past 
agreements but also the compliance performance of each side 
observed during an agreement's lifetime.
Generally, treaty-constrained behavior is analyzed in 
narrow legalistic terms, with the aim of proving or 
disproving specific allegations of Soviet or American 
cheating. This tendency reflects the fact that the natural 
reaction of any observer to initial evidence of a compliance 
problem would be to ask: "well, has the other side cheated 
or not?" Yet, while it is obviously important to test 
particular charges of noncompliance, most observers tend to 
leave it at that. The result is to miss the larger
23
significance of the compliance problems that have been 
encountered in bilateral arms control to date. Beyond simply 
scrutinizing specific problems, it is important to look more 
closely at the impact of compliance and noncompliance on the 
general evolution of arms control bargaining methodology.
As a point of departure, Soviet-American strategic arms 
diplomacy is best viewed as an historical process extending 
forward in time from the early 1970s to the present day and 
beyond into the foreseeable future. As noted above, the 
focus of the process is rule-making. But how does the 
creation of one rule bear upon successive ones?
Specifically, are there evident patterns of continuity and 
change in the bargaining over rules? And how have disputes 
over treaty compliance affected the evolution of strategic 
arms agreements?
The context of the bilateral arms control process is a 
self-interested bargaining situation. To be sure, both sides 
have long shared a compelling interest in avoiding 
instabilities (however perceived) that could drag both into 
unwanted conflict.^' And both sides in the current climate
The common tendency to strive toward minimizing 
self-endangering risk is in some ways similar to the 
"live-and-let-live" phenomenon of tacit cooperation which 
occurred at times during the trench warfare of World War I . 
As explicated by Robert Axelrod, in static situations where 
opposing troops were dug-in at close quarters to each other, 
both sides sometimes fell into a pattern of reciprocal 
restraint (e.g., firing with a clear intention not to harm, 
or not firing at all), much to the frustration of local 
commanders. See Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New 
York: Basic Books, 1984), pp. 73- 87.
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appear to see strong political and economic benefits in 
moving toward lower levels of force posture. At the same 
time, each side has engaged in negotiations fundamentally as 
a consequence of its own interests; neither has consciously 
sought to do the other any favors in the first instance, and 
both have been extremely sensitive to the risk of forfeiting 
uncompensated advantages.^* The analysis here presumes these 
realities as the driving forces behind diplomatic behavior 
and seeks to focus instead on the substantive aspects of 
that diplomacy which have shaped the scope and contents of
It is vitally important here to stress the self- 
interested character of the negotiating relationship. Most 
popular perceptions of arms control, certainly those that 
predominated in the United States prior to SALT, were 
quintessentially liberal in the sense of viewing the 
enterprise as an expression of shared interest among states 
to choose order and restraint over war or coercion. The 
American international law perspective has fueled this 
conception. As Louis Henkin states in the opening line of 
How Nations Behave (New York: Praeger, 1964): "In relations 
between states, the progress of civilization may be seen as 
movement from force to diplomacy, from diplomacy to law."
(p. 3). Yet, the kind of arms control activity we have 
witnessed to date, arguably even under Gorbachev, tends to 
belie the notion of a thoughtful progression from 
lawlessness to restraint on the basis of shared interests or 
values. Each side has approached —  and indeed 
(notwithstanding occasional rhetoric to the contrary) 
justified —  arms control in the pursuit of national 
interests. A noted expert on Soviet strategic policy, Howard 
Stoertz, has offered a useful perspective on the Soviets' 
view of the process: "...the Soviets... enter arms 
negotiations as traders seeking to limit specific U.S. 
programs at minimum cost... rather than as partners who share 
positive goals with us. If the United States can recognize 
this reality, we may be better able to avoid either euphoria 
or disillusionment, to accept modest but useful limitations, 
and to work slowly toward a safer... strategic relationship." 
Howard Stoertz, "Observations on Soviet Negotiating 
Practice," in Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, A Game For High 
Stakes (Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger, 1986), p. 46.
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strategic agreements over time.
The central thesis of this study is that one can see in 
the evolution of Soviet-American strategic arms diplomacy 
from SALT to START identifiable patterns of change and 
adjustment within boundaries set by divergent strategic 
interests and a competitive bargaining situation. This 
process generally has been incremental in character. At an 
initial stage, both sides introduced new rules into their 
strategic relations —  rules set forth in the 1972 ABM 
Treaty and the SALT I Interim Agreement. These rules ushered 
in a period of adjustment and change; both sides found 
themselves on a steep "learning curve." The historical 
record shows that the result of this process was neither a 
complete breakdown of the rules nor perfect compliance, but 
a contained set of problems that generated tensions and 
clarified weaknesses in the structure and constraining 
effects of the rules. Compliance problems triggered a series 
of diplomatic interactions, which, in the search for 
solutions, led to alterations in strategic behavior or to 
modifications in the rules, often in the context of new 
agreements (e.g., SALT II, INF, and prospectively, a new 
START agreement). The important point to stress, however, is 
that the rule-making process itself did not proceed in a 
vacuum; it changed in identifiable ways as a result of 
compliance disputes. Both sides negotiated new agreements 
against the background of past compliance successes and
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problems.
Thus, I will argue that the product of ongoing Soviet- 
American diplomatic interactions over the control of 
strategic arms since the early 1970s has been a gradually 
expanding set of operative principles —  in effect, an 
evolving methodoloav of arms control diplomacv —  that 
bridges particular agreements, and that tends to drive new 
participants on each side into recurring policy choices as 
the bargaining process plays out over time. The term 
"methodology" may be defined as a body of procedures, rules, 
or working concepts employed by a science, art, or 
discipline in the solution of a problem.Because bilateral 
negotiations have resulted in certain routinized procedures 
and concepts for dealing with problems, both of negotiation 
and subsequent compliance, "methodology" is an apt way to 
describe the output of the process.
One can see the tangible results of this phenomenon in 
the 1987 INF Treaty. Although its novel aspects are clear 
enough, many of the treaty's rules covering such things as 
the key definitions (e.g., what is a "cruise missile"), the 
mechanics of counting, and even the measures for improving 
verification by national technical means (e.g., opening 
hatches on the garages of SS-25 mobile launchers at 
prearranged times to permit observation by satellites) are 
the results of varying degrees of trial and error that
Webster's International Dictionary, 3rd Edition.
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occurred in earlier years. And, to extend the argument 
further, many of the treaty's more innovative rules —  
including those governing on-site inspections —  may not 
work as well as planned. So there will be new compliance 
controversies and new outcomes, probably in the form of new 
agreements. Each step is a phase in the process.
In making these arguments I would not venture to 
suggest that the process could play out indefinitely solely 
as a result of internal dynamics. Alas, Keynes' dictum that 
"in the long run, we're all dead" applies to arms control 
too. The fate of agreements on naval armaments —  the 
"strategic" weapons of the interwar period —  are proof that 
no bargaining process can outlive its historical period. 
However, so long as the impulse to negotiate continues, the 
process of rule-making generally will work in the fashion 
described here.
The Effects of Compliance Behavior
Given the importance of compliance and noncompliance to 
the rule-making process described above, the first part of 
this investigation will examine the essential 
characteristics of treaty-constrained behavior in an arms 
control setting. Part I includes Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 
explicates various factors that may act to reinforce or 
inhibit compliance with agreements and speculates about the 
interactive effects of these factors. Chapter 3 lays out the
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historical record of Soviet-American compliance behavior in 
order to provide a basis for assessing the significance of 
various compliance problems in relation to the evolution of 
bargaining methodology taken up in the several chapters of 
Part II.
As noted above, compliance problems and the methodology 
of the bargaining process are linked through a serious of 
dynamic adjustments. What form do these adjustments take? It 
stands to reason that whenever states introduce new rules 
into their relationship, they enter a transitional period in 
which their strategic behavior "catches up" to agreed 
standards. Several considerations will influence whether 
this transition is easy or difficult.
First, do the rules prescribe a substantial departure 
from existing forms of strategic behavior? Clearly, 
agreements calling for major reductions in deployed weapons 
or prohibitions on testing, etc., would necessarily require 
more significant alterations in standard operating 
procedures than preclusive agreements that ban activities in 
which neither side has ever engaged.
Second, how clear are the rules and is there common 
agreement on how to interpret them? Treaty provisions that 
leave room for conflicting interpretations are necessarily 
going to be harder to implement than those where the norms 
and taboos emerging from an agreement are made explicit.
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Third, are the rules balanced and fair in terms of 
their constraining effects? If one side or the other finds 
itself burdened by unexpected disadvantages as a result of 
an agreement, there will be pressures not to implement or 
abide by that agreement. And even if the rules are deemed 
fair, it may also be hard to sustain a healthy agreement if 
one side has to make a substantially greater adjustment in 
order to attain compliance.
Fourth, are there incentives for the parties to take 
the rules seriously or disincentives to cheating? There is 
no obvious reason why two parties will view an agreement 
with equal degrees of seriousness. If the costs of 
violations —  accruing from exposure through verification 
techniques or from offsetting responses —  are seen by one 
side or the other as being small relative to the benefits, 
sustaining compliance could become a real problem.
To illustrate these adjustments in an everyday 
situation, imagine that you live near the line between two 
large municipalities, for our purposes, cities "A" and "B". 
There are all kinds of hazardous intersections on the 
streets that run along or through the city limits of each 
side. Then suppose that the two city councils decide to put 
in stop signs at all these intersections. On the first day 
after the signs are put in, as you are driving along, will 
you stop when you get to the line? Well, it depends. There 
are all sorts of reasons to think that compliance might be
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hard. First, you are not used to stopping and so you might 
speed through one of the intersections without noticing the 
stop sign. Or some of the signs may be poorly placed or 
obstructed by graffiti. Or it may be that city "A" does not 
require its car owners to have headlights or windshield 
wipers, and so, relative to drivers from city "13, " you may 
have a harder time seeing the signs clearly. Or if you were 
taught to drive by a taxi driver, you probably opposed the 
stop signs in the first place because they infringe upon 
your natural right to put other drivers at risk. So you may 
be tempted to cheat occasionally at intersections until the 
costs of violations begin to mount up. On the other hand, 
compliance might be a lot easier to achieve in other 
circumstances. Generally, if you are a cautious driver who 
slows down at dangerous intersections, stopping would only 
be a slight extension of habit. Or if you were the one who 
complained about these intersections in the first place, you 
will have a stake in the success of the new rules.
The basic point here simply is that the degree to which 
new rules are internalized by the parties involved will 
depend on a number of factors involving the clarity and 
constraining effects of the rules and the motives of those 
who must live by them. This, in turn, raises the obvious 
question of the possible outcomes. One can imagine three 
kinds. First, there could be a complete breakdown of the 
rules. After a month or two, the two cities may decide to
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take the stop signs down, either because they created more 
problems than they solved, or because the costs of 
enforcement were too high relative to benefits. Second, on 
the other extreme, there can be perfect compliance. Everyone 
is happy and enforcement costs are low. Third, there can be 
a high degree of compliance, but also a contained set of 
problems whose resolution may require further action.
Perhaps the two cities will enlarge some of the signs or 
replace them with yield signs at certain corners.
In general, this third outcome has been the norm with 
respect to the arms control experience at issue in this 
analysis. Some types of rules agreed to at early stages of 
the process did not work as well as was hoped. The ensuing 
problems set off diplomatic exchanges, which in turn led to 
modifications of a rule or of subsequent behavior, usually 
but not always in the context of follow-on agreements. As a 
result, the rule-making process itself was affected in 
demonstrable ways. Compliance problems clarified how the 
rules were inadequate and where the deals struck in the 
bargaining process were put at risk. Thus, as the parties 
have engaged in further rule-making, they have done so 
against the background of past successes and failures. 
Overall, this experience has had a channeling effect —  it 
has shaped and narrowed the menu of plausible bargaining 
choices over time and, as noted earlier, it has had a 
coopting effect on new players, pushing them into
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discernible patterns of choice, even in situations where the 
goals of the agreement in question were quite different 
(e.g., arms limitation versus arms reduction).
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Any study that attempts to explicate the dynamic 
adjustments described above must impose some order on the 
diverse array of rules that have emerged from 
Soviet-American negotiations since the initial stages of the 
bargaining process. A conceptual scheme chosen for this 
purpose inevitably will be somewhat abstract; one simply 
cannot generalize about real world behavior without 
sacrificing some of its more incongruous, irrational 
qualities that do not fit into neat categories. The critical 
issue here is one of degree. Is the conceptual structure so 
simple as to ignore basic factors that affect the patterns 
of behavior being observed, or is it reasonably inclusive of 
all key factors, sacrificing detail mainly at the margins? 
Clearly, some risk of oversimplification is worth taking if 
in the process we extend the possibilities for systematic 
thought about the real world and for adducing lessons that 
can be applied profitably, both to the arms control process 
itself and to other investigations of international 
political behavior.
Let us start with the rules themselves. A commonsense 
appreciation of rules in any bargaining context would see
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them as part of a larger structure —  an agreement —  
designed to further some overarching principle. In most 
agreements, the overarching principle is inferred from the 
basic obligation spelled-out in the first article following 
the preambular clauses. The Article I formulation of the 
1972 ABM Treaty is a good example. It states in part that in 
accordance with the rules contained in the agreement, each 
side undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of 
national territory and not to provide a base for such a 
defense.^
To be sure, the rules themselves are not all alike; 
they need to be crafted in different ways in order to thwart 
every conceivable avenue for undermining the overarching 
principle of an agreement. So the question to be posed is 
this: If a complex agreement, like the ABM Treaty, could be 
"unpacked," how should the rules that constitute the 
agreement be sorted out? In other words, are there generic 
categories into which the various rules would fall? To 
answer this question, one can begin by attempting to draw 
parallels with domestic legal systems. In his seminal work 
on legal philosophy. The Concept of Law. Professor H.L.A. 
Hart defined a legal system as a "complex union" of primary
Article 1, para. 2, of the ABM Treaty, in U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agreements. 1980 Edition (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1980), 
p. 139.
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and secondary r u l e s . H a r t  saw defects in conceiving of the 
legal foundations of modern social structures as simply a 
set of basic obligations, however defined, without reference 
to the problems of adjusting or updating their content. He 
therefore developed the idea of a supplementary set of rules 
to accomplish this purpose. To quote Hart: "...while primary 
rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must 
or must not do, secondary rules are all concerned with the 
primary rules themselves. They specify the ways in which the 
primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, 
eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation 
conclusively determined.
Hart's framework offers a reasonable point of departure 
for this analysis. By extension, it is reasonable to 
conceive of arms control agreements as a kind of complex 
union of various types of primary and secondary rules. Each 
of the agreements to be explicated here contains rules that 
limit types and capabilities of weapons, including their 
development, testing, deployment, or use, as well as other 
types of rules that specify, to use Hart's words, the ways 
in which the primary rules may be varied, eliminated, or the 
fact of their violation conclusively determined. A good 
example of a secondary arms control rule is found in Article
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1961), p. 111.
Ibid. , p. 92.
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XIII of the ABM Treaty which calls for the creation of a 
Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) , within which the 
parties will, among other things, consider questions 
regarding compliance and discuss proposals for improving the 
treaty.^
One drawback of applying Hart's model in the arms 
control context is that it is not much help in identifying 
the various types of primary rules that may exist. To do 
this, we need to put ourselves in the position of the arms 
control negotiators. Typically, by the time formal talks 
are underway, the overarching principle has already been 
agreed to by the political leaderships on each side. In the 
late 1960s, for example, both sides had begun to accept the 
fact that there was no real hope in the foreseeable future 
of constructing significant area defenses against ballistic 
missiles, and each appeared increasingly anxious to avoid 
being lured by the other into costly, ineffective ABM 
deployments. Thus, by the time formal talks opened in 19 69, 
the leaders on each side had more or less accepted the 
possibility of comprehensive restrictions on ABM defenses, 
and they directed their negotiators to figure out how to do 
it.
In the ABM negotiations, and in many others since then, 
the participants on each side have attempted to construct
Article Xlll, para 1, The ABM Treaty, in U.S. ACDA, 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, pp. 141-142.
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two types of primary rules. First, they create what can be 
called framework rules. These define the quantitative and 
qualitative attributes of the weapon systems or activities 
—  or the so-called "units of account" —  to be limited or 
b a n n e d . I n  the 1963 test ban treaty, for example, the unit 
of account is nuclear weapon test explosions or any other 
nuclear explosions. For test explosions in the atmosphere, 
the permitted number was set at zero; for explosions 
underground, the number was set at infinity. In the ABM 
Treaty, there are several units of account: ABM launchers, 
interceptors, radars, deployment areas, and test ranges. As 
Chapter 5 will discuss, the critical issues at stake in 
developing framework rules are: What aspects of military 
capability do both sides want to control? Should they be 
banned or allowed in restricted numbers? And, perhaps most 
importantly, what kinds of provisions should govern the mix 
of residual numbers and the tempo of technical innovations 
within special categories of systems?
This last point —  on technical innovation —  is worth 
stressing. Framework rules do more than just define the 
bargaining chips of the negotiation; they also aim to cordon
The term "unit of account" itself is not new. For 
background on how units of account for arms control have 
been chosen in the past, see report prepared by Joel S. Wit 
for the U.S. Congressional Research Service, printed in U.S. 
Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fundamentals 
of Nuclear Arms Control. Part III; Structuring Nuclear Arms 
Control Proposals and Agreements. 99th Cong., 1st sess. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1985), pp. 2-31.
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off the most obvious routes for undermining the value of the 
bargaining chip. In the case of the ABM Treaty, for example, 
the treaty, as amended, sets a threshold of 100 launchers 
and interceptor missiles at one deployment area as the 
maximum allowable ABM capability. Yet one can imagine any 
number of ways to expand the capability of the deployment 
area without actually violating the numerical limit. One 
could store extra missiles on site and deploy new launch 
systems that could be rapidly reloaded after an initial 
salvo. Or one could build new interceptors with multiple 
independently-guided warheads (MIRVs). Thus, the central 
limits in the ABM Treaty are supplemented with other 
framework rules that, for example, prohibit systems for 
rapid reload and MIRVed interceptors. The basic idea is to 
ensure that once a unit of account is agreed, any action 
that would in effect alter the constraining power of that 
unit is identified and declared off-limits.
The second category of primary rules that figure 
prominently in negotiations can be called scope rules. In 
the process of defining the currency for negotiation, the 
two sides usually have to elaborate criteria for including 
or excluding weapons or capabilities from the scope of an 
agreement. This may seem like a straightforward issue until 
one considers the kinds of annoyances that can arise when 
some of the systems or practices that each side wants to 
limit also have applications that each may want to exempt
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from restriction. For example, large radar installations 
that can help to provide early warning of strategic attack
—  which is a perfectly legitimate function —  can also help 
provide a base for an ABM defense of national territory, 
something prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Correspondingly, 
modern sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) that both sides 
deploy with conventional warheads for anti-ship missions can 
in theory be reconfigured to deliver a lighter, vastly more 
powerful nuclear warhead against strategic targets at 
distances of up to 2,500 kilometers. Constraining the latter 
capability, which is properly part of a strategic nuclear 
arms agreement, cannot be easily done without constraining 
the former capability, which is not. Choices such as these
—  the bane of all negotiations on scope rules —  reflect 
the perennial balancing act that negotiating parties must 
perform, attempting to maintain flexibility for themselves 
while thwarting circumventions by the other side.
The main task of the negotiator in developing scope 
rules is to draw up a roadmap of guidelines for dealing with 
weapons that do not fit into neat categories. The roadmap 
usually identifies a three-fold choice. First, both sides 
can include all the dual-use systems in an agreement, though 
at the price of curtailing exempted applications and 
sacrificing some operational flexibility. Soviet SS-11 ICBMs 
were included in SALT I although a number were targeted on 
Europe and Asia. Second, both sides can choose to exclude
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all the systems, though at the price of possibly opening up 
the agreement to circumvention. In SALT II, it was finally 
agreed that Soviet Backfire bombers would be excluded from 
direct restraints even though they have a marginal 
capability for intercontinental attack. Third, both sides 
can figure out a way to split the difference between 
conflicting desiderata. So, for example, large radars are 
permitted for early warning purposes under the ABM Treaty 
but only when located on the periphery of national 
territory, oriented outward. Or air-defense (anti-aircraft) 
weapons are allowed but cannot be tested in an ABM mode. 
Again, the basic idea with scope rules is to help define 
ordered choices in cases where some of the systems or 
activities that each side wants to limit also have 
legitimate exempted uses.
A third set of rules are essentially the secondary 
rules that Hart describes in his model. In general, these 
are designed for verification and compliance problem-solving 
purposes. In this analysis, they simply will be called 
verification rules. Here, the negotiator's task is more 
self-evident: to safeguard each side's ability to verify 
compliance with the primary rules; to confirm that both 
sides are counting treaty-limited forces in the same way; 
and to ensure that there are agreed methods for sorting out 
disputes over interpretation or other problems. All of the 
agreements analyzed in this study include verification rules
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that have operated with varying degrees of effectiveness.
In Part II of this study, I intend to show how each set 
of rules evolved through an iterative process of 
negotiation, and how the logic structure implicit in the 
choices made by both sides resulted in an emerging 
methodology for dealing with new problems —  such as 
limiting multiple-warheaded (MIRVed) missiles, new forms of 
concealment, cruise missiles, etc. —  that preoccupied 
Soviet-American negotiations over a period of years.
As a prelude to this part of the analysis. Chapter 4 
examines the origins of the bargaining process, focusing on 
the factors which shaped the attitudes of both sides toward 
the negotiations and the kinds of problems and opportunities 
these factors presented for rule-making. In Chapters 5, 6, 
and 7, I describe the kinds of framework, scope, and 
verification rules which were established at the outset of 
negotiations, and examine the different positions that each 
side sought to advance in the bargaining process. In each 
case, I analyze the compliance problems that emerged in the 
operation of the rules in question; what these problems 
indicated about the effectiveness of the agreements; how 
both sides reacted to the problems; and the extent to which 
the substance of the bargaining process changed as a result 
of these problems and efforts at resolution.
In a concluding section. Chapter 8, I consider the 
overall impact of bargaining dynamics and compliance
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problems on the rule-making process
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PART I:
TREATY COMPLIANCE IN AN ARMS CONTROL SETTING
"If an arms control rule is broken, 
the most that the community can 
do is to destroy the rule."
Roger Fisher
"Throwing out the law because the 
criminal has violated it does not 
promote order."
Richard Barnet

2.
THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR
The specter of promises made and broken has long been a 
source of deep tension in East-West relations. From the 
Western perspective the Cold War itself was sparked by a 
compliance problem, being in part a byproduct of the 
collapse of the wartime agreements between the allied powers 
concerning Germany and Eastern Europe and the ensuing 
struggle over Europe and Asia. While this struggle was 
rooted fundamentally in conflicts of geopolitical interest 
and ideology, the lexicon of treaty noncompliance —  i.e., 
cheating, deception, "breaking the rules" of international 
conduct, etc. —  ran like a dark thread through much of the 
public discourse of the period. Many in the United States 
especially saw in Soviet diplomatic behavior an impulse to 
cheat that existed quite independently of any possible 
congruence of interest between East and West on the 
substance of negotiations. It was, in the eyes of many, a 
natural extension of Soviet domestic governance.^ Breaking
 ^Alexander Daliin and Gail Lapidus have dubbed this 
perspective the "essentialist" school of thought. See 
"Reagan and the Russians: United States Policy Toward the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," in Kenneth Oye, Robert 
Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds.. Eagle Defiant (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1983), pp. 206-207. Of course, the idea that 
domestic pathologies affect foreign policy behavior is not 
simply a matter of academic speculation. When former 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger debated with the 
British historian E.P. Thompson at Oxford in 1984, he took 
issue with Thompson on the question of whether the morality 
of Soviet and American foreign policy should be judged in
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the law abroad may come easier when one rules with an ironi 
fist at home.
Against this background of suspicion, every postwar 
U.S. administration which has attempted to negotiate with 
the USSR has had to run a gauntlet of problems created by 
concerns about past or potential Soviet treaty 
noncompliance. In the summer of 1946, acting on the 
instructions of President Truman, Clark Clifford, then a top 
White House aide, drafted a "comprehensive statement" on 
Soviet foreign policy. As part of this project, Clifford 
canvassed the major executive branch bureaucracies for their 
views. He received from the State Department a long list and 
analysis of Soviet violations of international agreements, 
which he used extensively in making the argument that Soviet 
foreign policy aims were fundamentally hostile and that the 
United States "should entertain no proposal for disarmament 
or limitation of armaments as long as the possibility of 
Soviet aggression exists."^ Reportedly, Truman was deeply 
influenced by the Clifford report during the months
domestic terms. He said: "It seems to me we are [discussing 
internal conditions] —  we have to be. Because it is those 
conditions which give rise to a foreign policy and give rise 
to the ability to judge the moralities of that policy." See 
"Remarks of the Hon. Caspar Weinberger at the Oxford Union 
Debate, February 27, 1984," News release from the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, 
Washington, D.C., p. 6. (mimeo).
 ^Quoted in Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Sixtv Years on the 
Firing Line (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), p. 229. The 
report is contained in an appendix to Krock's memoir.
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preceding the enunciation of containment policies.^ During 
1963, the Kennedy Administration, anxious to secure 
ratification of the limited test ban treaty, had to contend 
with charges of Soviet cheating on past agreements. A 
Department of Defense pamphlet, published in 1962, entitled 
Alert: Soviet Treaty Violations, was widely distributed in 
Republican circles during the summer of 1963 and caught the 
attention of senior White House officials.* The pamphlet 
enumerated treaty violations by the Soviet Union of its non­
aggression pacts with neighbors, the Kellog-Briand 
agreement, the Four-Power arrangements over Berlin, and a 
dozen or more other pledges and formal commitments.
Likewise, during the 1970s, the Nixon, Ford, and Carter 
Administrations found themselves confronted with an ongoing 
stream of allegations by conservatives of Soviet violations 
of SALT-related agreements and a U.S. cover-up of those 
violations.^ Then, in the early 1980s, the tables were
 ^ Ibid., p. 225. See also Richard M. Freeland, The 
Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthvism (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1974), p. 67 and fn 56 on p. 369.
* U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Treaty Violations 
—  Alert No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Armed Forces 
Information and Education, 1962), 11 pp. The report was 
forwarded from Larry O'Brian to Mike Manatos, White House 
staff, under a cover note dated August 7, 1963. Lyndon B. 
Johnson Library.
 ^ For a representative sample, see David S. Sullivan, 
"The Legacy of SALT I: Soviet Deception and U.S. Retreat," 
Strategic Review. Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 26-41; 
Senator Jake Garn, "The Suppression of Information 
Concerning Soviet SALT Violations by the U.S. Government," 
Policy Review. (Summer 1979), pp. 11-32; Elmo R. Zumwalt 
Jr., and Worth Bagley, "Soviets Cheat, and We Turn Our
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turned as the Reagan Administration formally charged the 
Soviet Union with numerous treaty violations and, with the 
prodding of some conservative members of Congress, initiated 
the practice of releasing annual reports on Soviet 
noncompliance beginning in 1984.* Even with the central 
involvement of the president in public accusations of 
noncompliance, there continued to be a drumbeat of 
unofficial charges through the end of the Reagan era that, 
in the final analysis, the Administration was not willing to 
endorse.
Given the hue and cry stemming from charges and 
countercharges of cheating, it is remarkable that such 
charges actually have had little lasting impact on policy 
decisions in Washington or Moscow on whether to pursue new 
types of arms control. Since the negotiating efforts of the 
1950s, purported violations of past agreements have never 
been a major obstacle to a prospective deal that both sides 
really wanted. With hindsight, one can see clearly that the 
incidence and/or resolution of compliance disputes has been 
tightly coupled to the ups and downs of political relations 
overall. Thus, when relations were deteriorating, as in the
Backs," The Washington Star, August 10, 1975, p. 11.
* The President's Unclassified Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements. The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, (mimeos), January 23, 1984, 
February 1, 1985, December 23, 1985, March 10, 1987,
December 2, 1987, December 2, 1988, and February 27, 1990. 
Hereinafter cited as President's Report on Noncompliance.
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early 1980s, noncompliance loomed as a serious stumbling 
block. Conversely, during periods of time when relations 
were improving —  in the mid-1960s, the early 1970s, and the 
late 1980s —  leaders on both sides generally were able to 
defuse problems or fence them into manageable levels.
Sometimes the shifts have been dramatic. Between 1984 
and 1987, President Reagan declared several times that 
"Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter" that undermined 
"the confidence essential to an effective arms control 
process...." He also stated that "compliance with past arms 
control agreements is an essential prerequisite for future 
arms control agreements."^ Yet, by the Fall of 1987, and 
without anything close to full resolution of alleged Soviet 
or U.S. treaty violations, Reagan and Soviet leader 
Gorbachev completed work on the INF Treaty, receiving much 
acclaim from European leaders, the U.S. Congress, and the 
American public in the process. In the period from 1987 to 
1989, important steps were taken on both sides to resolve 
outstanding compliance disputes; but the impulse to reach 
new agreements came first, pulling solutions to compliance 
issues along in its wake.
Generally, policymakers have sought to immunize arms 
negotiations from treaty compliance issues in three ways. 
First, they have on occasion taken issue with the charges
 ^President's Report on Noncompliance. March 10, 1987,
p. 2.
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themselves, arguing that particular allegations of Soviet 
cheating were unjustified, or that the problems in question 
were minor ones and were being solved through quiet 
diplomacy. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made 
essentially these arguments in an effort to quell persistent 
accusations of Soviet treaty violations in Congress and the 
press during 1974 and 1975.® Similarly, during the latter 
stages of the SALT II negotiations in 1978, the Carter 
Administration found it necessary to issue a public report 
on SALT I compliance which concluded that there were no 
grounds for asserting unresolved Soviet violations of past 
agreements.*
Second, policymakers on occasion have taken the 
position that the new treaties under negotiation were 
substantial improvements over past efforts. Thus, in 
congressional testimony, then Secretary of State George 
Shultz defended the Reagan Administration's decision to 
proceed with the INF Treaty, in part because it incorporated 
"some lessons we learned the hard way," including more 
precise language and stronger verification than its
® Press Conference of Secretary of State Henry A. 
Kissinger, Washington, D.C., December 9, 1975, cited in 
Roger P. Labrie, ed. SALT Handbook: Kev Documents and 
Issues, 1972-1979 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute, 1979), pp. 345-353.
* U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Compliance With SALT I Agreements. Special Report No. 55 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1979), 6 pp.
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p r e d e c e s s o r s A s  part of this strategy, officials usually 
have attempted to decouple progress in one area from the 
resolution of compliance problems in another. So, for 
example, as Shultz urged the Senate's consent to 
ratification of the INF Treaty, he also indicated that the 
United States would not proceed with any further obligations 
regarding strategic defense programs until the now infamous 
Krasnoyarsk early warning radar, which was widely seen as a 
Soviet breach of the ABM Treaty, had been "dealt with 
satisfactorily.
Finally, policy officials have argued that new 
agreements could be expected to perform reasonably well in 
cases where both sides clearly saw the agreement as being in 
their mutual interest. As Shultz observed in the INF Treaty 
hearings: "The basis for the negotiations in the first place 
is that the parties seek an outcome that is in their mutual 
interest. The Soviets would not have assumed the obligations 
contained in the INF Treaty if they had not found its terms 
satisfactory."^^ Other officials have taken the same 
approach. Secretary of State Dean Rusk observed in 1962:
Statement of Secretary of State George P. Shultz in 
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The 
INF Treatv. Part 1, 100th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, 
B.C.: U.S. GPO, 1988), p. 26.
Ibid.. p. 27. As noted in Chapter 3, the Soviet 
Union has since admitted the violation and indicated that 
the radar station would be dismantled without compensation.
Ibid. . p. 26.
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"Despite the fact that the Soviets callously ignore or 
repudiate treaties and promises that no longer serve their 
interests....we still must bear in mind that the Soviets are 
willingly observing many of their international obligations 
and can be reasonably expected to continue in the future, as 
long as they are convinced it is to their advantage to do 
so.
Because particular compliance controversies often have 
a fleeting quality, they have generated much cynicism in the 
United States and elsewhere. Many observers take the view 
that compliance problems have been chronically distorted by 
anti-Soviet ideologues as a way to discredit arms control. 
Others have observed that Soviet countercharges have been 
inspired mainly by a desire to keep the "scorecard of 
violations" even. There is some truth to these perceptions. 
Some of the long "laundry lists" of charges leveled at 
Soviet practices since 1984 rest on strained or even 
spurious interpretations of the evidence and/or the relevant 
treaty language.^ It is also true that those who have been 
most deeply involved in pressing the compliance issue within 
the United States have often been the fiercest opponents of
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, quoted in Alert: 
Soviet Treatv Violations, p. 11.
A number of such instances are pointed out in Thomas 
K. Longstreth, "Report Aims to Sabotage Arms Control," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. January 1985, pp. 29-34.
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new agreements.^ Huge bureaucratic battles in the U.S. 
executive branch have been fought over how to characterize 
compliance problems and how to resolve them.
On the whole, however, it would be wrong to treat 
compliance problems as if they were mainly the 
hallucinations of a few conspiracy theorists and ideologues. 
To point to obvious exaggerations is fair enough; but there 
is ample experience to show that the operation of complex 
agreements has a great potential for drawing both sides into 
acrimonious disagreement. Just as arms control has become a 
semi-permanent part of Soviet-American relations, compliance 
problems have become a commonplace feature of arms 
diplomacy. Why this should be so raises a host of important 
questions for arms control theory and practice. If each side 
freely entered into an agreement in the first place, what 
kinds of factors would lead to the erosion of its limits?
Are there recurrent patterns in the ways that both sides 
have become embroiled in disputes over compliance? Is it 
possible to tell the difference between visible frictions 
associated with the self-interested behavior of two 
adversaries occurring within the confines of an agreement 
and those frictions which may suggest a more systematic 
effort by one side or the other to subvert an agreement?
A brief, critical report on some of the 
personalities involved is found in Jonathan Rich, "Arms 
Control and the Compliance Mafia," F.A.S. Public Interest 
Report, December 1984, pp. 6-7.
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To deal with these questions, this chapter will explore 
the types of factors that can influence the dynamics of 
compliance behavior for better or worse. Then, the next 
chapter will examine the historical record to see where 
frictions have developed, how they have been interpreted by 
different schools of thought, and whether the record tends 
to alter or reinforce our general understanding of 
treaty-constrained behavior.
FACTORS BEARING UPON TREATY-CONSTRAINED BEHAVIOR
Scholarly inquiry into the treaty compliance phenomenon 
represents a diverse literature within international 
relations. Many of the best known works were not spawned by 
actual agreements but by the explosion of academic interest 
in arms control that occurred during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, a full decade before SALT. Significant 
contributions were made by Richard Barnet, Donald Brennan, 
Hedley Bull, Richard Falk, Morton Halperin, Fred Charles 
Ikle, and Thomas Schelling, among other scholars.There
Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (New 
York; Praeger, 1961); Donald Brennan, ed., Arms Control, 
Disarmament, and National Security (New York: George 
Braziller, 1961) ; Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict 
(Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1960) ; Fred 
Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, and "After Detection —  
What?," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 39, No. 2 (January 1961), pp. 
208-220; Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin,
Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The Twentieth Century 
Fund, 1961); Richard J. Barnet and Richard A. Falk, Security 
In Disarmament (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1965).
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have also been significant contributions by political 
scientists and international law scholars, which address 
arms control treaty compliance questions as part of larger 
investigations into the nature and operation of 
international agreements. Scholars in this category include 
Richard Bilder, Abram Chayes, Roger Fisher, Louis Henkin, 
and Oran Young.
In general, discussions of treaty compliance within 
this literature display two notable characteristics. First, 
there has been a widespread tendency to explicate the 
dynamics of treaty-constrained behavior in utilitarian 
terms: as the product of rational calculations of costs and 
benefits, whether perceived by unitary actors or complex
Abram Chayes, "An Inquiry Into The Workings of Arms 
Control Agreements," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 5 
(March 1972), pp. 905-969; Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 
(New York: Praeger, 1968); Roger Fisher, "Constructing Rules 
That Affect Governments," in Brennan, ed., Arms Control. 
Disarmament and National Securitv. and Fisher, Improving 
Compliance With International Law (Charlottesville, Va.: 
University of Virginia Press, 1981); Oran R. Young, 
Compliance and Public Authoritv (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1979); Richard B. Bilder, Managing the 
Risks of International Agreement (Madison, Wis.: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1981). Within the larger field of 
international relations, there is a rich literature on 
international regimes and the nature of cooperation in the 
absence of centralized authority. Notable works include: 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and 
Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) ; Axelrod, The 
Evolution of Cooperation; and Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation 
Under Anarchv (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
On the whole, however, this literature is more preoccupied 
with the conditions giving rise to cooperative forms of 
international behavior rather than with the characteristics 
of compliance behavior once formal agreements have been 
achieved. It is not, therefore, germane to this 
investigation.
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organizations. Hence, a party to an agreement would probably 
not engage in violations so long as it perceived the 
benefits of imposing restraints on an adversary to be 
greater than the costs incurred by having restraints imposed 
on itself. This does not mean that all inducements to 
compliance were thought to be positive. Parties could be 
deterred from violations if the costs of cheating —  
including the risks of being exposed prematurely through 
verification, the lapse of restraints on one's adversary, 
etc. —  outweighed the benefits of cheating.
A second characteristic of the literature has been the 
absence of any implicit or explicit agreement on what 
considerations ought to influence the way in which values 
are assigned to the cost and benefit sides of the compliance 
equation. On the whole, scholars tended to talk past each 
other. It does not simplify too much to say that those who 
appeared intrigued by the idea of arms control as a way to 
maximize self- interest and to avoid shared risks gave great 
weight to factors reinforcing compliance, whereas those who 
focused more attention on possible Soviet aims and behavior 
saw reasons to think that compliance might be difficult to 
achieve or maintain. In any event, this debate —  if one 
could call it that —  carried on through these works was 
largely prospective in nature. It focused on agreements that 
did not yet exist and the basic utilitarian model itself was
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not challenged J®
The obvious point of departure for studying compliance 
is a treaty or some form of explicit exchange of promises 
between states. Negotiations leading to treaties are often 
deemed to be the arms control "process." In fact, what 
happens afterwards is just as important if not more so. As 
one negotiator has put it, "treaties are not perpetual 
motion machines which, once set in motion, run without 
further attention. Rather, treaties are like other complex 
and delicate human inventions; they require maintenance."^ 
The key variables in keeping an agreement intact are a 
thoroughgoing knowledge of the various factors that may 
enhance or inhibit compliance in any given case and taking 
steps to tilt the balance in favor of the status quo 
represented by an agreement. Correspondingly, a conceptual 
model of compliance should seek to explain behavior under 
treaty provisions as a product of these reinforcing and 
inhibiting factors.
Henkin (How Nations Behave, p. 46) disparages the 
pure utilitarian model as "a cynic's formula," but goes on 
to assess compliance behavior in the general area of 
international law in essentially utilitarian terms (pp. 
45-83), underlining the point that "law observance, not 
violation, is the common way of nations."
Robert Mikulak, "Possible Improvements in the 
Biological Weapons Convention," unpublished paper presented 
at a symposium on "Biological Research and Military Policy," 
Annual Meeting of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, May 26, 1984, p. 4.
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Reinforcing Factors
In general, scholars have identified five kinds of 
reinforcements to compliance with international obligations. 
The first and most obvious factor is convergent 
self-interest. For adversaries that enter into reciprocal 
forms of arms restraint, the most persuasive argument 
favoring compliance may be quite simply that it is a 
preferable situation to any feasible alternative —  be it 
fleeting superiority, a two-sided competition of indefinite 
duration, or a one-sided arms race that the other side 
eventually wins. Admittedly, one cannot ignore attributes of 
good faith, moral imperative, or personal rapport with one's 
counterpart that may influence a particular leader's 
decision to honor agreements. On balance, though, 
calculations of self-interest are political judgments that 
the advantages of sticking with an agreement would outweigh 
the gains of deviating from the status quo.^° It is the 
convergence of self-interest which holds agreements 
together. One does not have to be an academic to come to 
such a judgment. Senator Frank Lausche and General Maxwell 
Taylor exchanged views on this point in 1959 during hearings 
on the nuclear test ban:
Sen. Lausche: . . .(D)o I understand it to be your 
belief that the only time you can rely on such an 
agreement is when it is self-serving to each of the
Young, Compliance and Public Authoritv. p. 18.
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signatory parties?
Gen. Tavlor; That is certainly the situation.
Sen. Lausche; Then it is your belief, on the basis of 
that statement, that so long as the situation and the 
agreement would be serving the interests of the 
Soviets, you could rely upon them in the performance of 
the agreement?
Gen. Tavlor; I would say that is correct.
Sen. Lausche; Well, that is at least one of the 
attitudes to be considered in approaching the 
question...of their compliance.^
A second factor often cited as an inducement to 
compliance is deterrence. States comply with agreements 
because they fear that noncompliant behavior might prove 
c o s t l y . T h e  risk of violation, they reason, could involve 
other parties imposing sanctions or other countervailing 
measures, including reciprocal noncompliance, or even 
abrogating an agreement in an extreme case. Conceivably, 
noncompliance could also damage relations with third parties 
and adversely affect a wider array of interests.
Clearly, the deterrence argument rests very much on the 
effectiveness of the verification system. Almost by
U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Disarmament and Foreign Policv. 86th 
Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1959), pp. 
134-135.
Fisher, "Constructing Rules," pp. 57-58.
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definition, there can be no deterrence without some threat 
that surreptitious attempts at violations would be detected 
in a timely fashion. Yet, as Ikle and others have pointed 
out, detection alone is hardly a sufficient condition.The 
potential violator must also believe that detection by the 
other side would result in the denial of the benefits of 
noncompliance. In part, this means that there must be a 
threat of exposure, as distinct from simply detection. In 
other words, the evidence must be convincing to third 
parties and public opinion in order to substantiate charges 
of noncompliance. Above all, there must be a high 
probability attached to the likelihood of response by the 
injured party.
There are a variety of ways to make the threat of 
response more credible. Schelling has argued that it is 
essential "to leave as little room as possible for judgments 
or discretion in carrying out a t hreat. I d e a l l y , this 
would mean that the types of response initiatives would be 
set in advance rather than pulled together in an ad hoc 
fashion.^ One way of doing this could be to make the 
linkage between violations and responses of various types 
more explicit. Within a treaty framework, for example, 
states may link certain types of noncompliance that
Ikle, "After Detection —  What?," p. 221.
Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p. 40. 
Fisher, Improving Compliance, p. 41.
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"jeopardize supreme national interests" to use of the 
withdrawal provisions or to a general decision to suspend 
compliance.^* Defining and authorizing a penalty in 
advance, before an issue is raised, as Roger Fisher argues, 
"would appear to have greater legitimacy than one which is 
made at the last minute in an effort to deter a particular 
move.
A basic uncertainty surrounding the deterrence argument 
is that we can never be sure when and how well it "works." 
Deterrence is essentially a nonempirical concept. If a state 
did not violate an agreement last month, was it because it 
was deterred from doing so or simply because it had no 
desire to do so? We can neither fully prove nor disprove 
assertions that deterrence works in any given case.
A third factor often cited as a reinforcement to treaty 
compliance is the need to assure foreign policy flexibility. 
Unless a state is completely autarkic (which is rare, even 
for revolutionary states), it will seek to advance its 
foreign interests through international agreements to 
varying degrees. Compliance with these obligations is a 
norm of international conduct that, over time, becomes a
For example, the Kennedy Administration took the 
position during the test ban ratification hearings in 1963 
that in the event the Soviets renewed atmospheric nuclear 
testing, the United States would be released from its 
obligation not to conduct such tests irrespective of any 
move to withdraw formally from the treaty. See Bilder, 
Managing the Risks, p. 162.
Fisher, Improving Compliance, p. 41.
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prerequisite for doing diplomatic business. Government 
officials are generally anxious to maintain agreements if 
they perceive their legitimacy and credibility to be at 
stake. In a sense, commitments create options. Schelling has 
observed that "what makes many agreements enforceable is 
only the recognition of future opportunities for agreement 
that will be eliminated if mutual trust is not created and 
maintained, and whose value outweighs the momentary gain 
from cheating in the present instance."^® Authors such as 
Henkin have likened a country's record of compliance to a 
business credit-rating.^ In this view, a reputation for 
honoring promises underwrites a foreign policy that seeks to 
secure advantages through international negotiations and 
agreements.
A fourth factor with compliance-enhancing effects may 
be the need for domestic credibility. For many of the same 
reasons discussed above, government leaders often recognize 
that treaty compliance can underwrite a strategy of domestic 
politics —  for example, to garner political support, to 
legitimize existing policies, to outflank domestic 
opposition (whether in the electorate at large, in Congress, 
or in the politburo), or to shift the onus of noncompliance 
to other parties in the event that problems emerge in the 
treaty regime. Conversely, it is possible that domestic
Schelling, Strategv of Conflict, p. 45. 
Henkin, How Nations Behave, p. 48.
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costs could be incurred by precipitate noncompliance. Roger 
Fisher comments: "Explicit international engagements that 
get tied up in governmental policy become more difficult to 
escape....The government buys popular enthusiasm, 
conviction, and support for present policies at the cost of 
limiting the freedom of action with which it can change 
them.
Finally, a fifth factor reinforcing compliance may be 
organizational routine. While government leaders see 
compliance as a way to enhance their authority, the complex 
organizations they direct may crave it for consistency. The 
major imperative for any bureaucracy is to achieve a degree 
of consensus over the direction of policy which, once 
charted, defies the whims and eccentricities of individual 
policymakers or politicians. Like a supertanker at sea, the 
inertial force behind a given course in a large organization 
becomes substantial. Rules, guidelines, and standard 
operating procedures that are created to implement policy 
and control its effects will also develop an independent 
staying power. And because bureaucracies invariably take 
their cue from present or past policies, the pressures for 
conformity are also substantial. Individuals or groups who 
choose not to support existing policies incur the risk of 
being excluded from the decision-making process or being 
considered disloyal.
Fisher, Improving Compliance, p. 154.
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According to this viewpoint, which has been argued most 
cogently by Abram Chayes, the negotiation process leading to 
an agreement is an important consensus-building tool within 
governments. In general, all of the relevant participants 
must bargain among themselves and agree with the final 
outcome before an agreement becomes official state policy. 
Once this process has taken place, all of the defects 
normally associated with bureaucratic behavior —  rigidity, 
conformity, lack of imagination, etc. —  become virtues from 
the arms control s t a n d p o i n t T h e r e  will be institutional 
resistance to deviating from set standards, not necessarily 
because the standards are substantively optimal, but because 
they promote order. Rules make it possible "to coordinate 
the fragmentary tasks and specialized functions of many 
people in a large organization."^^ The noncompliant acts of 
a few would undermine this consistency. To shift direction, 
in fact, would require adopting noncompliance as the status 
quo. Such an outcome would be very problematic, if this 
argument is correct. Governments could not easily sustain 
official illegality in one area without risking the general 
discipline that is critical to the overall effectiveness of 
the organization. Dissident groups within the government 
would be inspired to mount rear-guard action, to chisel away
Chayes, "An Inquiry Into Arms Control Agreements,"
p. 935.
Ibid.
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at past decisions, or to drag out new policy reviews. As 
Richard Bilder contends, the idea that "nations enter into 
international agreements with the idea of cheating or 
tricking the other party assumes a Machiavellian rationality 
and flexibility of which most governments are not capable in 
the real world.
Countervailing Factors
Why, then, is noncompliance an issue at all? Is it 
simply that agreements are just as prone to Murphy's law as 
other forms of human activity? No doubt they are. But any 
serious effort at explanation must start by looking at the 
context of relations between the parties to arms control 
treaties. As it developed in the 1960s, contemporary arms 
control theory sprang from the premise that antagonism 
between nuclear-armed adversaries might not be complete —  
that such states could at times perceive a limited 
convergence of self-interest in reducing the risks and 
burdens of arms competition and could act cooperatively in 
accordance with that perception.Whatever the results of 
specific cooperative actions, however, the assumption of 
conflicting interests always remained. Those engaged in arms
33 Bilder, Managing the Risks, pp. 9-10
Schelling and Halperin, Strategv and Arms Control. 
cited in Morton H. Halperin, "Arms Control: A Twenty-Five 
Year Perspective," F.A.S. Public Interest Report. Vol. 36, 
No. 6 (June 1983), p. 3.
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control theorizing were never seriously preoccupied with the 
question of whether limited forms of security cooperation 
might have some larger salutary effects on the ideological 
or geostrategic conflicts between adversarial states. While 
larger effects were not excluded a priori, the focus of the 
theory was to provide a basis for understanding the 
incentives behind limited forms of cooperation in managing 
risks in the absence of more comprehensive solutions. Thus, 
from the compliance standpoint, the presence of certain 
inducements to cooperation, though significant, was never 
taken to mean that compliance tendencies would prevail 
overall. There would always be some tension given the larger 
clash of interests.
Specifically, even if parties to freely-negotiated 
agreements perceive a self-interest in complying at some 
level, one can conceive of at least four types of 
countervailing pressures that could undermine agreements or 
pull them apart. First, there is the ever-present risk of 
incomplete agreement, either with respect to the actual 
language of various provisions or to a treaty's putative 
effects. The implicit assumption in much of the foregoing 
discussion was that parties generally reach full consensus 
in the process of gaining agreement. But there is no logical 
reason that this should always be so. To the contrary, in a 
competitive bargaining situation, it is quite likely that in 
some key areas the parties will have paved over
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disagreements with ambiguous language or simply "agree to 
disagree." And even if there are no substantive 
disagreements, they may each want to preserve some 
flexibility while at the same time conveying the impression 
of restraint.
How serious are these problems? If the disagreements 
are clearly noted, the treaty as a whole might still work 
satisfactorily within its narrowed scope. Furthermore, it is 
possible, as Chayes notes, that parties may seek to avoid 
exploiting ambiguities in an agreement for fear of 
undermining the other side's confidence in the treaty or 
having to accept the onus for a breakdown.However, 
problems can arise when deliberately ambiguous language 
conveys the mistaken impression of full agreement. Actions 
that might otherwise constitute clear violations become 
shaded by opposing interpretations over the meaning of 
certain provisions. Thus, as Ikle notes, when Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill expressed concerns to Truman in 1945 over 
the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, he spoke of 
"misinterpretations" rather than violations of the Yalta 
agreements.^* The vagueness surrounding the major wartime 
accords made it more difficult for the Western allies to 
agree on a means to pressure Stalin over the future of
Chayes, "An Inquiry Into Arms Control Agreements,"
p. 937.
Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, p. 10.
66
Poland and Eastern Europe. Soviet noncompliance was not a 
clear cut issue in the context of the Yalta agreements 
which, as Admiral Leahy observed, were "susceptible to two 
interpretations.
A second complicating factor for treaty compliance is 
the possible impulse of one party or the other to 
"free-ride" on the agreement. In classical economic theory, 
free-riding involves a situation in which some parties enjoy 
the benefits of a collective good without necessarily 
bearing any of the burdens incurred in providing that good. 
Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser have applied the concept 
to alliance theory to explain the tendency of small parties 
to free-ride on the fact that larger countries normally bear 
a disproportionate share of the burdens involved in 
providing the collective goods (i.e., defense or deterrence) 
that help maintain a balance of power.
Similarly, as Young has argued, free-riding could exist 
in the arms control sphere.^' A treaty can be thought of as 
a kind of collective good which contains a set of 
compromises. In this package of compromises, one side has
Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: 
The Viking Press, 1951), p. 51.
Mancur Olson, Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser, "An 
Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and 
Statistics. (August 1966), cited in Olson, The Logic of 
Collective Action (Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University Press, 
1971), p. 36.
Young, Compliance and Public Authority, p. 32-33.
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traded away some advantages against those held by the other 
side in the search for mutual restraint and stable 
deterrence. However, if either party calculates that it 
could recoup at least some of its foregone advantages at the 
margins without provoking the other side into response, it 
may elect to engage in a strategy of piecemeal or selective 
violations aimed at improving its relative position under an 
agreement. This appears to be consistent with the 
interpretation of Soviet compliance behavior that Secretary 
Shultz offered: "The pattern of Soviet behavior is not one 
of wholesale violation of arms control treaties. Their 
violations have been selective and sp e c i f i c . W h e t h e r  such 
behavior reflects a conscious policy choice or is simply the 
product of incremental ad hoc decisions is open to question. 
If it is the latter, it is hard to describe the result as a 
"pattern" in any sense which conveys the idea of coherent 
and centralized decision-making. As noted above, Bilder has 
argued that a carefully orchestrated campaign of cheating 
presupposes a Machiavellian logic on the part of states that 
is probably not feasible in practice. Ikle takes the 
contrary view: "...a potential violator might enter into 
agreements solely in order to seek gains by violating them. 
He would calculate that there would always be a chance of 
his escaping detection or that 'restorative measures' might 
be delayed or frustrated for political reasons. And if he
U.S. Congress, The INF Treaty. Part 1, p. 27.
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lost out on these chances, a mere return to the status quo 
would leave him no worse off than before he entered into the 
agreement. The violator, in fact, would be playing a 
profitable game: 'Heads you lose, tails we're even.'
The third complicating factor for sustained treaty 
compliance may arise with shifts in the perceived balance 
and fairness of an agreement. The free-riding phenomenon 
points to one obvious problem, but there are others that 
could stem from broader changes in power relationships 
occurring outside the scope of an agreement. To start with, 
the treaty's distribution of burdens and benefits could 
itself be unfair and hence unstable in the face of changes 
in the international political sphere. This is certainly the 
case with agreements that were imposed after a war by 
victorious powers upon the vanquished. Martin Wight observed 
that such agreements were "never more than temporarily 
successful. For example, under the Treaty of Paris of 
1856, which ended the Crimean War, Russia was obliged to 
dismantle her naval bases along the Black Sea coast; but 
fourteen years later, as the rest of Europe was preoccupied 
with the Franco-Prussian War, Russian leaders saw an opening 
and denounced the Black Sea clauses.Germany's decision to
Ikle, "After Detection —  What?," p. 231.
Martin Wight, Power Politics (London: Penguin Books 
Ltd., 1978), p. 248.
Ibid.
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reoccupy the Rhineland in the mid-193 0s was a similar act of 
defiance. Such agreements often become objects of scorn 
domestically and may lose legitimacy internationally.^^
Even with freely-negotiated accords, however, 
complications may arise through political or technological 
changes that could depreciate the value of an agreement. 
Examples of this phenomenon are legion. The provisions of 
the 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty that call for expanded 
technical assistance to support peaceful nuclear energy 
programs have lost much of their value for current or 
would-be parties because such assistance can generally be 
obtained by non-NPT parties directly through various 
suppliers competing in the nuclear export market. Likewise, 
the constraining power of existing restrictions on weapons 
deployment in space —  a composite of the 1963 Limited Test 
Ban Treaty (which outlaws nuclear explosions in space), the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty (which bans nuclear weapons in 
orbit) and the 1972 ABM Treaty (which, as traditionally 
defined, bans the testing, development, and deployment of 
space-based ABM systems and components) —  has declined with
The Versailles settlement is a good example. During 
the interwar years, a significant segment of British public 
opinion came to regard German resentments toward Versailles 
as well warranted. Actions by Hitler to revitalize German 
military power that might otherwise have been perceived as 
threatening to British interests (and were, in fact, so 
regarded by senior military officers) were rationalized by 
some politicians as throwing off the oppressive shackles of 
Versailles. For a brief discussion, see Michael Howard, War 
and the Liberal Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1981), pp. 97-98.
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the development of advanced non-nuclear technologies for the 
satellite attack mission. It is also true that political or 
technological changes could enhance an agreement's military 
significance in unanticipated and possibly unwelcome ways. 
So, for example, the arms control significance of the 1972 
Biological Weapons Convention, which bans all BW-related 
efforts except for research on defensive measures, has 
suddenly increased as new biotechnologies make it possible 
to produce genetically-engineered toxins that are more 
diverse and many times more lethal than existing chemical 
agents. And work being conducted under the auspices of the 
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) on the 
nuclear-pumped X-ray laser may in time face a major barrier 
in the provisions of the LTBT that prohibit nuclear testing 
in space —  a restriction that was not publicly foreseen 
when the treaty was signed in 1963.
Changes of the kind described here are bound to affect 
the incentives of each side to maintain strict observance of 
their treaty commitments. Treaty negotiators obviously are 
not clairvoyants and cannot predict every eventuality that 
might stress a treaty regime over an extended period of 
time. It is precisely this problem that explains why 
treaties normally include provisions for periodic review 
conferences or, in the case of the SALT agreements, an 
explicit allowance for SCC representatives to consider 
"possible changes in the strategic situation which have a
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bearing" on treaty obligations.^
The fourth and final complicating factor for treaty 
compliance lies in the existence of potential domestic 
hazards to a treaty regime. It was assumed in some of the 
preceding discussion that the consensus-building effects of 
treaty negotiation can create substantial pressures in favor 
of the new status quo. No doubt this is true; but perhaps 
only to a degree and only for a finite period of time. It is 
also possible that this very process of consensus-building 
could result in a rivalry between winners and losers (i.e., 
those whose advice was followed or not). Almost by 
definition, losers operate from the premise that the costs 
of a prospective treaty exceed gains irrespective of the 
other side's compliance. So what happens if the losers 
persist in their dissent? Because treaties are generally 
seen as political prizes by leaders who sign them, the 
domestic opposition on either side may have some incentive 
to disparage a treaty or even to make it a rallying point 
for dissent if it appears that too much was given away.^^ 
Thus, continued U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty and
Article XIII, para Id, The ABM Treaty, U.S. ACDA,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements. p. 142.
Henkin points out that the division of powers 
resulting from separate branches of national government, as 
in the U.S. case, can be an impediment to compliance. How 
Nations Behave, p. 71. Yet, in light of congressional 
efforts to uphold the ABM Treaty and the informal SALT 
regime during the Reagan years, it is also possible to argue 
the converse —  that the separation of powers has in fact 
been a force favoring compliance.
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informal observance of the SALT limits on offensive arms was 
constantly called into question during the early years of 
the Reagan era, in part because many of the individuals 
chosen by the President for senior positions in the 
administration had actively opposed those agreements as 
private citizens or congressional aides during the 1970s. In 
this and other cases, profound divisions over the direction 
of national policy could be exacerbated by agreements. The 
issue of ratifying the 193 0 London Naval Treaty, for 
instance, sparked off a domestic crisis in Tokyo over 
Japan's strategic position in Asia that ultimately led to 
the ousting of the civilian government by the military and 
to the eventual collapse of the agreement.
SUMMING UP
As the foregoing suggests, the mere fact that parties 
perceive some interest in entering into agreements is no 
guarantee that their cooperation will be immune to frictions 
from a variety of sources. In thinking about compliance 
dynamics, therefore, treaty-constrained behavior is best 
viewed as the product of constant interactions between 
pressures that have centripetal and centrifugal tendencies. 
In this simple model, the factors of convergent 
self-interest, deterrence through verification and response, 
diplomatic or domestic flexibility, and organizational
Wight, Power Politics, p. 248.
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inertia all can act in a centripetal way as the "glue" which 
holds an agreement together. On the other hand, the hazards 
of incomplete agreement, free-riding incentives, shifts in 
the balance and fairness of particular accords, and the loss 
of domestic support could exert powerful centrifugal 
pressures, triggering problems and pulling agreements apart. 
Given the adversarial setting of most arms control 
agreements, it is logical to suppose that both forces could 
exist together, just as the orbital motion of objects in 
space is dictated by the interaction of the two forces.
This conception of compliance is rather at odds with 
the notion that a state's domestic governance or general 
foreign policy orientation —  whether it is status-quo 
(i.e., "law abiding") or revisionist —  are the key factors 
in determining its approach to living within the terms of 
agreements. But such a notion is questionable to say the 
least. Even if we grant that states may engage in diplomacy 
for reasons that could be malign (i.e., to lull the other 
side into a false sense of security) as well as benign, it 
does not necessarily follow that compliance behavior will 
invariably reflect one tendency or the other. It is the 
substance of the agreement itself which is most important. 
Compliance behavior is based less on altruism or respect for 
the law than on cold, self-interested calculations of 
benefit and cost —  calculations that may well oscillate
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over a period of years.^® It is very hard to imagine that if 
a status-quo state really believed that an agreement had 
become detrimental to its interests, it would be more likely 
to continue its adherence to that agreement than a 
revisionist state faced with the same situation.Or, to 
turn it around, if a revisionist state really believed an 
agreement was proving useful as a constraint on perceived 
threats to its territory, it is hard to imagine that it 
would be more likely to risk the agreement by cheating than 
a status-quo state faced with the same situation.
In the end, because compliance decisions involve some 
ongoing consideration of costs and gains, gauging a treaty's 
durability is never a closed issue. At any given moment one 
needs to ask: Is it the centripetal or centrifugal forces
Certainly U.S. incentives to maintain the current 
rules governing strategic defensive forces have ebbed 
relative to 1972, while somewhat ironically, Soviet 
incentives.to achieve a strengthened framework of 
restrictions on strategic offensive forces, which were 
questionable in the early 1970s, appear to have increased.
1 will nevertheless cede the possibility that its 
preferred mode of exiting from an unwanted treaty might well 
be more sensitive to public opinion and customary 
international law, and thus could involve efforts to vitiate 
the agreement through reinterpretation or the use of the 
standard withdrawal clause on the grounds of supreme 
national interests. A revisionist state might be relatively 
more prone to simply break-out without much thought to 
offending opinion. It is also true that the character of a 
state's internal governance will play a role in its ability 
to "perceive" what its own interests really are. In a system 
with a highly participatory form of government, like that of 
the United States, consensus on national interest and policy 
direction is bound to be harder to achieve than in a 
non-democratic form of government.
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which exert the greater pressure, on balance? If centrifugal 
tendencies appear stronger, the result could be a dramatic 
breakdown of the treaty or else a withering away of its 
usefulness or even its replacement by a wholly new strategic 
situation (e.g., the oft-cited desire of some advocates for 
a defense-dominant world). Conversely, if centripetal 
tendencies appear stronger, the result may be to keep both 
sides engaged in a process of adjusting the treaty regime to 
new political or technological realities and addressing 
compliance frictions through problem-solving diplomacy and 
new forms of restraint. In this latter case, compliance 
problems, while troublesome and possibly damaging unless 
dealt with promptly, can serve as an engine of change. "That 
which does not kill me," Nietzsche once said, "only makes me 
stronger.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols (London: 
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1968), p. 23.
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3.
EVALUATING THE SOVIET-AMERIGAN RECORD
What kinds of problems have emerged in the operation of 
Soviet-American strategic arms agreements since 1972? And 
what does this experience reveal about the various factors 
cited in the last chapter as being influential in 
determining treaty-constrained behavior?
As argued below, the historical record is very complex 
and subject to conflicting interpretations. Analytical 
extrapolations based upon the record are therefore subject 
to important limitations. Specifically, they do not help to 
establish anything very concrete about intentionality on the 
Soviet side. Although we can infer certain proximate causes 
and effects from observing individual problems —  e.g., a 
dispute over activity "X" was triggered by conflicting 
interpretations of treaty provision "Y” or had the effect of 
allowing one side or the other to free-ride on treaty 
provision "Z" —  the record of observed behavior alone is 
not an adequate basis for proving or disproving competing 
hypotheses regarding what the Soviets may have intended in 
particular cases. Even so, the record does contribute 
significantly to our understanding of compliance dynamics as 
it pertains to both sides. It highlights some of the factors 
already cited for their compliance inducing or inhibiting 
effects; and it points to additional factors which were not
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previously addressed.
THE EXISTING REGIME; STRESSES AND STRAINS
The network of rules governing U.S. and Soviet 
strategic defensive and offensive force postures dates back 
to the early 1970s. On the defensive side, the 1972 ABM 
Treaty, with modest amendments, continues to provide the 
basic foundation for regulating U.S. and Soviet activities. 
It embodies mutual agreement to forgo indefinitely 
large-scale deployments of anti-missile defenses, which at 
the time were widely seen as technically infeasible and 
dangerous from the standpoint of stimulating further 
increases in offensive weaponry beyond planned levels. The 
treaty allows small-scale deployments (initially at two 
sites, later reduced to one site for each) but constrains 
them in terms of spatial criteria, location, and numbers of 
ABM components (interceptors, launchers, and radars) to 
strategically-trivial levels.^ The two sides also erected a 
number of barriers to ABM development and testing programs,
 ^ Criteria for permitted ABM deployments are 
spelled-out in Article III of the ABM Treaty, see U.S. ACDA, 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements. p. 140. The radius 
for the deployment area on each side is set at 150 km, and 
each area may contain no more than 100 launchers and 100 
interceptors. Thresholds are also set on the size and 
number of ABM radars in deployment areas. For a useful 
discussion of how "strategically-trivial" is defined in the 
context of ABM restraints, see Ashton B. Carter, "The 
Structure of Possible U.S.-Soviet Agreements Regarding 
Missile Defense," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and James A.
Schear, eds.. On the Defensive?; The Future of SDI (Lanham 
Md.: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 141.
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ostensibly to prevent the establishment of "a base" for 
future deployment of non-trivial ABM defenses: the treaty 
prohibits development, testing, and deployment of ABM 
systems or components that are not fixed, land-based 
systems;^ non-ABM systems like anti-aircraft interceptors 
and radars are not to be given ABM capabilities or tested in 
an ABM mode; and new radars for early-warning of missile 
attack are limited to locations along the periphery of 
national territory, oriented outward, so they cannot 
contribute significantly to ABM defense. The treaty 
expressly permits the modernization and replacement of ABM 
systems, but it limits development and testing activities to 
current or additionally agreed test ranges. It also 
prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of rapid 
reload systems, interceptors with multiple warheads, or 
launchers with the capacity for simultaneous launch of more 
than one missile interceptor at a time. Finally, it 
proscribes the transfer of ABM systems or components to 
other states and bans the deployment of systems or 
components outside of national territory.
Since 1972, each side has pursued ABM Treaty compliance
 ^Under the treaty's traditional interpretation, this 
rule applies to both existing "conventional" ABM systems and 
components (i.e., launchers, interceptors, radars) as well 
as to future systems or components based on "other physical 
principles," like directed-energy weapons or sensors. Under 
a more permissive reading, which was advanced by the Reagan 
Administration, future exotic forms of ABMs are exempted 
from the restrictions on the development and testing of 
non-fixed systems.
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matters with the other on numerous occasions. Specific 
issues are summarized in Table 3-1. On the U.S. side, the 
dominant concern has been whether permitted development and 
testing activities in the Soviet Union were stretching or 
breaking parts of the treaty designed to provide insurance 
against "breakout" —  i.e., rapid deployment of a 
significant nationwide ABM defense. Since the treaty came 
into effect, the Soviets have engaged in a steady, 
substantial research and development (R&D) effort aimed 
mainly at improving their "conventional" (i.e., 
nuclear-tipped) rocket interceptor systems. They have 
modernized their permitted Moscow-area ABM deployment with 
new interceptors and radars, engaged in development of a 
rapidly-deployable ABM system with possible applications for 
nationwide defense, and developed new generations of 
anti-aircraft interceptors with limited capabilities against 
ballistic missiles/* The United States raised questions 
about various aspects of these programs during the mid-1970s 
but refrained from issuing formal charges of noncompliance 
until early 1984, several months after it detected the 
construction of an early warning radar illegally sited near 
Krasnoyarsk, on the interior of the Soviet Union. In 1985 
and subsequently, the Reagan Administration leveled a more
 ^The Soviet Union reportedly has completed expansion 
of its existing Moscow ABM system up to the maximum 
permitted level of 100 interceptors and launchers. See, 
e.g.. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
Militarv Balance 1989-1990 (London: IISS, 1989), p. 34.
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T a b l e  3-1
ABU TREATY COMPLIANCE ISSUES: 1972-1989
ISSUE PROBLEM ACTION STATUS/OUTCOME
Soviet Activities 
Cited by
the United States
- Concurrent 
SAM/ABM testing 
(1973-4, 1980s)
whether anti-aircraft 
radars are being 
illegally tested in 
an "ABM mode"
US raises concern 
in 1975; asserts 
"probable" violation 
beginning in 1984
evidence ambiguous; 
guidelines adopted in 1978 
and 1985 to clarify permitted 
concurrent operations
- Deactivation of 
ABM Test Launchers 
(1974)
whether procedures used 
in dismantling excess 
launchers accord with 
SCC rules
US points out 
inaccuracies in 
notification and 
dismantling procedures
no further problems 
reported
- Concealment of 
treaty-limited 
activity (1974)
whether concealment 
activities deliberately 
impede verification
US points out an 
"expanding pattern* of 
concealment that might 
impede verification
"expanding pattern* of 
concealment stops expanding 
after US complaint
- ABM Test Ranges 
(1975)
whether Kamchatka 
range is a "new" 
ABM test range
US questions activities 
at Kamchatka; no 
violation charged
USSR indicates that test range 
existed at time treaty was 
signed; both work out criteria 
for establishing new ranges
- Krasnoyarsk radar 
(1984)
whether a large phased 
array radar (LPAR) is an 
early warning radar in 
the wrong location
US asserts violation USSR claims radar is allowed 
but halts construction in 1987; 
offers to trade for Thule & 
Flyingdales radars or reaffir­
mation of ABM Treaty, finally 
admits violation and agrees to 
dismantle
- Rapid Reload ABM 
systems (1985)
whether Galosh and 
Gazelle launchers 
have a "rapid reload" 
capability
US asserts "serious 
concern"
evidence ambiguous; no explicit 
agreement on definition of 
"rapid reload"
- Mobility of ABM 
components 
(1985)
whether smaller ABM 
radars are intended to 
be permanently fixed 
types or not
US asserts "potential" 
violation
evidence ambiguous; previous 
administrations assessed 
radars as not being mobile
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T a b l e  3-1, c o n t i n u e d
ISSUE PROBLEM ACTION STATUS/OUTCOME
- Upgrading of SAM 
interceptors to 
ABMs (1985)
whether SA-12 missile 
has capability to counter 
tactical ballistic 
missiles or strategic 
ones
US asserts concern evidence insufficient to 
judge; tactical anti- 
ballistic missiles (ATBMs) 
are permitted
- ABM Territorial 
Defense (1985)
whether aggregate of 
activities since 1984 
suggests that USSR is 
preparing nationwide 
ABM system
US asserts that USSR 
"may be' preparing 
nationwide defense
no unique evidence presented; 
judgment turns on evaluation 
of other issues
- Gomel Radars 
(1987)
whether ABM radars 
are deployed outside 
agreed test ranges
US asserts violation Soviets host US inspection 
in late 1987; US restates 
finding; in 1989 US says radar- 
are dismantled; charge dropped
US Activities 
Cited by
the Soviet Union
- Malmstrom ABM 
radar dismantling 
(1974)
whether partially 
constructed radar was 
dismantled in accordance 
with agreed procedures
USSR questions 
procedure
US supplies data in response 
to query; issue not pursued 
further
- Shemya Island 
radar (1975, 
1980s-)
whether LPAR on 
Shemya Island is 
for ABM purposes
USSR suggests that radar 
is not permitted at 
specified location
US states radar is 
covered under treaty's 
exemptions for LPARs;
USSR revisits issue in 1980s
- PAVE PAWS 
radars (1978-)
whether coastal 
early warning radars 
provide base for ABM 
defense
USSR requests 
clarification; 
later charges 
violation
US supplies data to indicate 
that radars are for early 
warning; later modifies radars 
to reduce interior coverage 
of United States; USSR revisit 
issue in 1980s
- SCC rules on 
confidentiality 
(1978-)
whether US press 
accounts of treaty 
compliance violate 
privacy rule
USSR complains 
about press 
coverage, US 
official statements
US asserts that SCC rules do 
not bind press coverage or 
statements in national capital
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T a b l e  3-1, c o n t i n u e d
ISSUE PROBLEM ACTION STATUS/OUTCOME
- ABM Territorial 
Defense (1985)
whether SDI program 
constitutes illegal 
preparations for 
a territorial defense
USSR asserts problem; 
Soviet legal experts 
claim a violation
US asserts SDI is permitted 
research, not a base for 
nationwide defense
- Homing Overlay 
Experiment 
(1985)
whether ICBM booster 
is tested in an ABM 
mode, and for MIRV 
capability
USSR asserts 
violation
US holds that booster 
was decommissioned and 
observably different from 
an ICBM
- Thule/Fylingdales 
early warning 
radars (1986)
whether new LPARs at 
these locations are 
permitted upgrades 
of existing facilities
USSR asserts 
violation
US rejects trade for 
Krasnoyarsk radar; asserts 
radars are permitted; offers 
to host Soviet inspection in 
1989
- SDI-related 
nuclear testing 
(1986)
whether nuclear tests 
in Nevada are illegally 
conducted out of ABM 
test ranges
USSR asserts 
violation
US holds that nuclear 
testing is permitted 
research that is not bound 
by test range provisions
- Delta 180 
Experiment 
(1986)
whether test vehicles 
in space are ABM capable 
or tested in an ABM 
mode
USSR questions 
compliance aspects 
of experiment
US asserts that test vehicles 
are not ABM components and 
experiment did not involve 
testing in an ABM mode
Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Briefing on SALT I Compliance, 96th Congress, 1st 
sess. (Washington, D.C.; U.S. GPO, 1979), pp. 48-55; The President's Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncoepliance 
With Arms Control Agreements, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (miieos), January 23, 1984, February 
1, 1985, December 23, 1985, March 10, 1987, December 2, 1987, December 2, 1988, February 27, 1990; "Odious Smear 
Blitz," TASS Statement, January 24, 1984, reprinted in "U.S. Charges of Treaty Violations Rebutted," Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, January 25, 1984, pp. AA-4-5; "The United States Is Violating Its International 
Commitments," Izvestiya, January 30, 1984, reprinted in "U.S.S.R. Aide Mémoire To U.S. on Arms Violations,"
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, January 30, 1984, pp. AAl-5; "A TASS Statement," News and Views From the 
U.S.S.R., Soviet Embassy, Information Department, December 30, 1985; Thomas Longstreth, "Soviet Countercharges," 
Arms Control Today, March/April 1984, pp. 10-11; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and 
Compliance With Agreements (mimeo), February 11, 1987; The Arms Control Association, "Analysis of the President's 
Report on Soviet Noncompllance With Arms Control Agreements," Arms Control Today. April, 1987, pp. 1A-6A; Matthew 
Bunn, "ABM Treaty Compliance: Star Wars Tests on Shaky Ground," Arms Control Today (April 1988), pp. 11-19; U.S. 
Congress, House of Representatives, Report by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Support 
to Arms Control 100th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1987); "Kremlim Apology," The New York 
Times, October 25, 1989, p. A12; author's interviews.
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serious accusation that Soviet programs, taken in aggregate, 
suggested that the U.S.S.R. "may be preparing an ABM defense 
of its national territory."^ The Bush Administration has not 
altered these findings, although, as noted below, the Soviet 
Union under Gorbachev has made some effort to resolve 
certain problems on its side, most notably the Krasnoyarsk 
radar.
Soviet criticisms of U.S. behavior have focused mainly 
on the SDI program. U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
programs were relegated to a fairly low priority during the 
1970s. Under pressure from Congress, the Defense Department 
deactivated the one permitted ABM deployment site, at Grand 
Forks, North Dakota, after 1975.^ American R&D work 
concentrated mainly on developing basic technologies for 
"hard site" defense of missile silos but stopped short of 
integrating basic components —  radars, interceptors, etc., 
—  into a fully functioning prototype system. With the 
advent of SDI, spending for BMD increased substantially 
during the 1984-87 period, and priorities shifted toward 
development of new technologies for a multilayered defense 
to intercept attacking ballistic missiles in all phases of 
flight. The emphasis accorded to "exotic" technologies 
(i.e., directed energy weapons and sensors) and space-based
 ^ President's Report on Noncompliance. March 10, 1987,
p. 4.
 ^William J. Durch, The ABM Treatv and Western Securitv 
(Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 9-10.
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concepts in SDI contrasted sharply with the dominant role 
given to conventional land-based ABM systems in Soviet 
engineering development. As noted in Table 3-1, the Soviets 
have complained about various activities within the SDI and 
have charged that the overall program is a direct violation 
of the treaty's prohibition against providing a base for 
nationwide defense. They have been particularly scathing in 
their criticism of U.S. efforts to give greater scope to SDI 
by advancing in 1985 a new, more permissive interpretation 
of the treaty that would allow work on non-fixed (i.e., 
space-based, air-based, or land mobile, etc.) exotic systems 
and components to proceed through the stages of development 
and testing.*
With respect to offensive forces, Soviet-American 
negotiations generally have aimed at defining approximate 
parity at fairly high levels of destructive power. (This 
would be true even of a phase 1 START regime that envisaged 
cuts of between one-third and one-half in strategic 
warheads.) Relative to the defensive regime, which addresses 
only anti-missile weapons, the rules governing offensive 
posture are broader in scope, covering long range bombers 
and some intermediate-range systems with limited reach
* Then Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshal Sergi Akhromeyev 
attacked the U.S. reinterpretation as a "deliberate deceit" 
that "distorts the essence of the ABM Treaty." Pravda. 
October 19, 1985, cited in Edward L. Warner, 111, "SDI and 
the Existing Regime," in Nye and Schear, eds.. On the 
Defensive? . p. 117-118.
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against strategic homelands, in addition to intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs) J  But they are also much more modest in the 
kind of constraints they levy on deployment and 
modernization. Under the 1972 SALT I Agreement, both sides 
agreed to an interim freeze of five years on the numbers of 
ICBM and SLBM launchers and allowed some latitude for 
deployment of additional sea-based missile forces as 
replacements for older ICBM or SLBM launchers. The agreement 
imposed modest constraints on the upgrading of launch silos 
and prevented increases in planned deployments of delivery 
systems, but ongoing work on new MIRVed missiles on each 
side generally was not affected and overall warhead levels 
rose dramatically throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. The 
1979 SALT II Agreement spelled-out equal ceilings in major 
categories of offensive forces, constrained the MIRVing of 
current or new ballistic missiles to then-existing levels 
through flight-testing rules, and limited each side to one 
"new type" of ICBM. Short-term bans were imposed on 
deployment and testing mobile ICBMs and on the deployment of 
certain types of cruise missiles. Nonetheless, major 
asymmetries in the mix of forces, including Soviet 
advantages in ICBM throwweight (i.e., the lifting capacity
 ^The ABM Treaty imposes only indirect restraints on 
air-defense weapons —  i.e., they cannot be given an ABM 
capability or tested in an ABM mode. As we shall see in 
Chapter 6, the place of SAM systems in the ABM Treaty was a 
contentious one during the negotiations.
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of individual missiles) and U.S. advantages in sea-based and 
bomber forces, were allowed to stand. The major development 
since the late 1970s has been the 1987 INF Treaty, which 
provides for the elimination of about 2,400 Soviet and 
American INF missiles by the early 1990s.
As with the defensive regime, both sides have grappled 
with numerous compliance issues ranging from minor 
ambiguities to formal charges of violations. The problems 
raised by each side are summarized in Table 3-2. It is 
significant that during most of the period in question, the 
SALT agreements themselves were only being observed 
informally, which added much tension and acrimony to 
consideration of compliance problems. SALT I expired in 1977 
but each side agreed to observe its limits pending a new, 
more comprehensive agreement. SALT II was not ratified by 
the United States after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
and the incoming Reagan Administration pronounced it 
unacceptable. Even so, by June 1982 the Administration had 
adopted the position that it would take no action to 
undercut SALT I or SALT II provided the Soviets exercised 
equal restraint.® This situation lasted until May 1986 when 
Washington announced that, in response to several
® On May 31, 1982, on the eve of the START 
negotiations. President Reagan declared: "As for existing 
strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions 
which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal 
restraint." Remarks by the President at Arlington National 
Cemetery, Weeklv Compilation of Presidential Documents. Vol. 
18, No. 22 (June 7, 1982), p. 730.
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T a b l e  3 -2
OFFENSIVE ARMS AGREEMENTS COMPLIANCE ISSUES; 1972-1989
ISSUE PROBLEM ACTION STATUS/OUTCOME
Soviet Activities 
Cited by
the United States
SALT I
- III-X silos 
(1973)
whether new silos 
are for ICBM or 
other purposes.
US asks for 
clarification
USSR supplies data to show 
that silos are for command 
and control purposes; issue 
not pursued further
- Conceal lent 
activities 
(1974)
whether concealment 
at production and 
test ranges impedes 
verification.
US charges that 
"expanding pattern" 
of concealment might 
impede in future.
"expanding pattern" of 
concealment stops 
expanding
- SS-19 ICBM 
(1975)
whether SS-19 
is prohibited as 
a "heavy" ICBM.
US asserts SS-19 is 
inconsistent with its 
(unilateral) definit­
ion of a "light" ICBM
USSR points out that missile 
is permitted; distinction 
between "light" and "heavy" 
ICBMs is agreed in SALT II
- SS-7/8 silo 
dismantling 
(1976)
whether USSR failed 
to meet deadline 
on silo dismantling
US sees potential 
violation, asks USSR 
to delay sea-based 
deployments until 
silos removed
USSR complies; 
problem resolved
- mobile ICBM 
deployments 
(1985)
whether SS-25 uses 
facilities that were 
deactivated at former 
SS-7 bases
US initially asserts 
no violation in early 
1985; asserts violation 
in late 1985
USSR claims it is using only 
structures whose dismantling 
was not required at sites 
in question
- Conversion of 
SSBN (1985)
whether reconfiguration 
of a Yankee class sub­
marine to a SLCM- 
carrying sub accords 
with rules on deactivat­
ion of SSBNs
US sees no violation 
but asserts that 
threat posed by SLCM 
carrier is "similar" 
to that posed by 
a former SLBM sub
only one conversion made; 
other Yankees apparently 
withdrawn from seryice 
completely
T a b l e  3-2, c o n t i n u e d
ISSUE PROBLEM ACTION STATUS/OUTCOME
SALT II
- SS-16 ICBM
(1984)
whether mobile SS-16s 
are illegally deployed 
at a test facility
US asserts "probable" 
violation
USSR apparently removes 33-16 
related equipment during 1985; 
issue not pursued further
- SS-25 ICBM 
(1984)
whether testing and 
deployment of SS-25 is 
prohibited under 
"new type" rules
US asserts "probable" 
violation in 1984 and 
a definite violation 
in 1985
USSR claims SS-25 is 
a permitted modification of 
an older ICBM
- Encryption of 
Telemetry 
(1984)
whether Soviet 
encryption of missile 
test data illegally 
impedes verification
US asserts violation Washington summit communique 
(1987) indicates agreement 
that future telemetry will be 
broadcost unencrypted under a 
START treaty
- Strategic Nuclear 
Delivery Vehicle 
Limits (1985)
whether Soviet SNDV 
levels exceed 
permitted threshold 
(2504)
US asserts violation USSR denies claim; issue hinges 
on status of two dozen or so 
Bison bombers that were to be 
converted to tanker aircraft
- Backfire 
bombers (1985)
whether production 
rate and temporary 
deployments to arctic 
bases violate SALT II 
understandings
US asserts that 
arctic basing is 
"inconsistent" with 
understandings; that 
data on production 
rate are ambiguous
evidence to suggest production 
rate decreased to slightly 
below threshold of 30 per 
year
- Concealment of 
Missile/Launcher 
Association (1985)
whether Soviets 
deliberately concealed 
association between 
SS-25 and its launcher 
during testing
US asserts violation USSR claims that launchers 
are not concealed during 
actual tests
INF Treaty
- Transits of missiles
on launchers (1988)
whether movement of 
SS-20s from operating 
bases to other facilities 
was procedurally correct
US asserts that transits 
of missiles on launchers 
is a violation
Although USSR notified 
transits, it agrees to 
adjust practices after US 
complaints
- Non-declared 
Treaty-limited items 
(TLI) (1988)
whether the USSR failed 
to declare all TLIs during 
updates of data-exchanges
US asserts violation USSR resolves issue 
by declaring TLIs
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T a b l e  3-2, c o n t i n u e d
ISSUE PROBLEM ACTION STATUS/OUTCOME
- Movement of 
training launchers 
(1988)
whether failure to notify 
transits of training 
launchers violates 
notification provisions
US asserts violation USSR agrees that such 
notifications are 
required
- Siting of TLIs 
scheduled for 
elimination 
(1988)
whether missiles were 
stored improperly outside 
declared facilities, and 
whether missiles were 
wrongly located at site 
declared ready for elim­
ination
US asserts violation USSR agrees to adjust 
boundaries of elimination 
site; and US indicates it 
will reinspect deployment 
site declared ready for 
elimination
US Activities 
Cited by
the Soviet Union
SALT I
- ICBM Shelters 
(1973-, early 
1980s)
whether environmental 
shelters deliberately 
impede verification
USSR complains in 
1970s; claims violation 
in 1980s
US modifies shelters in mid- 
1970s; agrees to discontinue 
use after 1979
- ICBM launcher 
deactivations 
(1975)
whether Atlas & 
Titan I launchers 
are capable of 
being reconstituted
USSR asserts some 
ambiguity; requests 
clarification
US supplies data to indicate 
status of launchers; issue 
not pursued after 1975
SALT II
- deployment of 
sea- and ground- 
launched cruise 
missiles (1983)
whether deployment of 
SLCMs and GLCMs after 
expiration of SALT II 
protocol (banning deploy­
ment) is permitted
USSR claims a failure 
to solve cruise missile 
issue as intended by 
the protocol
protocol expired after 1981; 
US asserts protocol is bindin 
only until expiration date
- Intermediate- 
range missiles 
(1983)
whether deployment of 
Pershinq Ils and GLCMs 
in Europe is permitted
USSR asserts violation 
of noncircumvention 
provisions
US claims INF not subject to 
SALT provisions, being dealt 
with in separate negotiation
- Midaetman 
ICBM (1984)
whether Midqetman 
program is permitted 
under "new type" 
rules
USSR asserts that 
Midqetman is a "pre­
programmed" violation 
of SALT II
US asserts that Midqetman 
is not to be tested or deploy 
until after expiration of 
agreement, and is a response 
to Soviet SS-25
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- Anti-satellite 
testing (1984)
whether US ASAT 
tests are permitted 
under rules on 
verification
USSR asserts that ASAT 
testing indicates 
intention to violate 
provisions on non­
interference with 
verification means
US denies claim; testing is 
not prohibited; issue is not 
pursued further
INF Treaty
- Cruise missile 
conversions 
(1989)
whether diversion of 
unassembled GLCM 
parts to SLCM pro­
duction violates 
requirement to eliminate 
GLCMs
USSR officials say there 
is "every reason" to 
charge a violation
US says components 
in question were never 
assembled into GLCMs, 
and thus do not count 
as GLCMs under the 
elimination requirements
Sources: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Soviet Compliance With 
Arms Control, 100th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1987), pp. 245-259; Edward L. Warner III,
"SDI and the Existing Arms Control Regime," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and James A. Schear, eds., On the Defensive?:
The Future of SDI (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1988), p. 127.; International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Military Balance 1987-1988 (London: IISS, 1987); R. Jeffrey Smith, "Defense Dept. Applies New Hath to 
Missiles," The Washington Post. February 8, 1989, p. A25; see also sources cited in Table 3-1; author's interviews.
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uncorrected Soviet violations, it would no longer be bound 
by SALT agreements in future decisions on strategic force 
structure.* The United States maintained technical 
observance of SALT II until November 1986, when it deployed 
its 131st bomber equipped with air-launched cruise missiles 
(ALCMs), breaching a key sublimit of SALT. Since that 
time, further breaches have been held in check by 
congressional authorizations restricting spending on systems 
that would exceed SALT limits.
From the U.S. perspective, the most problematic Soviet 
activities since the 1970s have centered on SALT'S rules for 
controlling qualitative improvements and for safeguarding 
verification. As it happened, the two SALT agreements of 
1972 and 1979 were negotiated just prior to the onset of new 
Soviet development programs for ICBMs; in each case, the 
replacement of older by newer, more capable missiles, while 
not violating the numerical ceilings, created controversies 
over whether the Soviets were in full compliance with rules 
on upgrading forces. In addition, the fact that Soviet MIRV 
programs (and corresponding U.S. ones) proceeded apace
* On May 27, 1986, President Reagan stated that future 
weapons decisions would be based on the "magnitude of the 
threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards 
contained in the SALT structure, which has been undermined 
by Soviet noncompliance." Michael R. Gordon, "Reagan 
Declares U.S. is Dismantling Two Nuclear Subs," The New York 
Times, May 28, 1986, pp. Al, A12.
Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Exceeds Limit Set in 1979 
Accord on Strategic Arms," The New York Times. November 29, 
1986, p. Al.
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within SALT allowances had a corrosive impact on political 
support for the agreements. With respect to verification, 
U.S. complaints focused on concealment practices at 
production areas and test ranges, including the denial of 
most test data transmitted from missiles in flight to ground 
receiving stations, which made monitoring by satellites and 
other systems vastly more difficult.
Soviet criticisms of U.S. behavior have been more 
incremental and give some appearance of being conceived 
mainly (though not wholly) as countercharges to American 
complaints of Soviet wrongdoing. As noted in Table 3-2, the 
Soviets complained on several occasions about the impeding 
effects on verification of environmental shelters placed 
over some ICBM silos during routine maintenance and 
renovation. They also criticized on compliance grounds 
various modernization initiatives for U.S. land-based 
missiles, especially the new, single-warhead mobile ICBM, 
the Midqetman. Some of their more vociferous attacks were 
aimed at U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and 
Pershinq II ballistic missiles which were deployed in Europe 
beginning in 1983 as part of NATO's decision to augment 
intermediate-range forces. These weapons were characterized 
by the Soviets as a serious circumvention of SALT II that 
upset the strategic balance.
Since the entry into force of the INF Treaty, a number 
of compliance issues have flared up. The United States
93
complained about apparent violations on the Soviet side in 
procedures governing the removal of INF missiles from 
deployment areas to elimination sites, while the Soviets 
raised questions about a Pentagon plan to redirect certain 
cruise missile components previously earmarked for GLCMs 
into the production program for S L C M s . B o t h  sides also 
experienced difficulties in reaching accord on 
instrumentation for the "portal" monitoring facilities at 
production locations. From outward appearances, however, 
both sides have worked hard to resolve these problems, and 
neither had charged any substantial violation of the treaty 
by the end of 1989.
CONFLICTING ASSESSMENTS OF THE RECORD
Although no longer the stumbling block to negotiations 
that it appeared to be only a few years ago, the compliance 
record summarized in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 remains a 
contentious issue in retrospective analyses of strategic 
arms control. This is especially true in the United States. 
During the late 1980s, a number of politicians, officials, 
and other observers came to judgments on Soviet practices 
that were sharply opposed. Former Secretary of State George
See President's Report on Noncompliance. The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, (mimeo), December 2,
1988, pp. 12- 15; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Defense Dept. Applies 
New Math to Missiles," The Washington Post. February 8,
1989, p. A25.
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Shultz called Soviet performance "far from perfect.
Senator Robert Dole, the Senate Minority Leader, has termed 
it " d i s m a l . F o r m e r  Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 
characterized it as "troublesome."^^ On the other hand. 
General John Chain, formerly director of the State 
Department's bureau of politico-military affairs, told a 
Congressional committee: "If you take the body of the 
treaties in a macro sense, they [the Soviets] have complied 
with the large majority of the treaties. And a former 
deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
Spurgeon Keeny, said: ..."the overall record of Soviet 
compliance has been remarkably good during an extremely 
difficult period.Disagreements of this magnitude were 
echoed by analysts of differing persuasions who exhaustively 
studied parts or all of the Soviet compliance record.
U.S. Congress, INF Treatv. Part 1, p. 26.
Ibid. , p. 8.
U.S. Congress, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Arms Control, International Security, and Science, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Implications of Abandoning 
SALT. 99th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 
1986), p. 3.
Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Aide Says Soviet Has Kept 
Most Arms Pacts," The New York Times. January 10, 1986, p. 
A3.
Comments of Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., "Briefing on the 
Administration's Report on Soviet Compliance With Existing 
Arms Control Treaties," Press Release, The Arms Control 
Association (mimeo), March 12, 1987, p. 3.
Among those who point to a major pattern of Soviet 
violations: William R. Harris, "Soviet Maskirovka and Arms
Control Verification," in Patrick J. Parker and Brian D.
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U.S. compliance has also been a contentious issue, both 
in the United States and elsewhere, although the range of 
viewpoints is narrower. The Reagan Administration asserted 
in 1987 that Soviet allegations regarding U.S. behavior were 
completely without merit and represented an effort to 
"invent countercharges" as a way to blunt legitimate U.S. 
concerns.^ Former U.S. officials such as Ambassadors Robert 
Buchheim and Sidney Graybeal have corroborated this point to 
a degree by observing that Soviet diplomats have been very 
sensitive to "the image of balance" and a desire to "keep 
the scorecard even" in their compliance dealings.^* At the 
same time, while agreeing that most Soviet charges strain
Dailey, eds., Soviet Strategic Deception (Lexington, Ma.; 
Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 208-221; Brian D. Dailey, 
"Deception, Perceptions Management, and Self-Deception in 
Arms Control: An Examination of the ABM Treaty," in Parker 
and Dailey, eds., Soviet Strategic Deception, pp. 225-259; 
Colin S. Gray, "Moscow Is Cheating," Foreign Policv, No. 56 
(Fall 1984), pp. 141-152. Those who take issue with the 
critics include: Michael Krepon, "Both Sides Are Hedging,"
Foreign Policv. No. 56 (Fall 1984), pp. 153-172; Gloria 
Duffy, ed., Compliance and The Future of Arms Control 
(Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger, 1988); Catherine Girrier and 
Allan Krass, Disproportionate Response: The Politics and 
Practice of Treatv Compliance (Cambridge Ma.: Union of 
Concerned Scientists, 1987); The Arms Control Association, 
"Analysis of the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance 
With Arms Control Agreements," Arms Control Todav. April 
1987, pp. 1A-12A.
U.S. ACDA, Adherence To and Compliance With 
Agreements. (Washington, D.C.: ACDA Office of Public 
Affairs, February 11, 1987), Attachment 2, p. 1.
See comments by Ambs. Buchheim and Graybeal in U.S. 
Congress, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Briefing on SALT I Compliance. 96th Congress, 1st 
sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979), pp. 30-31.
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reasonable interpretations of treaty language, these and 
other experts are reluctant to rule all Soviet charges out 
of order. Graybeal, for instance, testified that Soviet 
complaints about the use of shelters over ICBM silos raised 
a "real and legitimate" compliance question.Others have 
argued that the ABM Treaty does not provide a "strong legal 
base" for the radar installations at Thule and 
Fylingdales.^^ There is also concern that U.S. 
justifications for certain SDI experiments have weakened the 
ABM Treaty. According to former U.S. officials Brent 
Scowcroft and William Perry, among others, the propriety of 
some of these experiments rests upon "fine distinctions 
between components and subcomponents that are not specified 
in the ABM Treaty, and upon effective criteria that measure 
BMD potential against a future 'responsive' offense rather 
than existing Soviet forces....These criteria are not 
mutually agreed upon measurements. We would probably not 
accept them as justifications by the Soviets if they chose 
to conduct similar activities.
In a sense, it should not be surprising that there is 
no clear convergence of views in debates surrounding 
compliance. Disagreements, in part, are a natural reflection
Ibid. , p. 11.
Aspen Strategy Group, The Strategic Defense 
Initiative and American Securitv (Lanham, Md.: University 
Press of America, 1987), p. 41.
Ibid. , p. 43.
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of the fact that the record is very complex and simply does 
not lend itself to one unified, inerrant interpretation of 
historical truth. Analysts ostensibly drawing from the same 
set of data arrive at widely divergent assessments. Why is 
this so? And is it possible to differentiate those 
assessments which fall within the range of reasonable 
disagreements about the record from those which stray beyond 
the bounds of any legitimate interpretation?
Areas of Agreement
As a starting point, it is worth pointing out several 
aspects of the compliance record that are not essentially in 
dispute. First, and most obviously, "compliance issues" are 
not the same thing as "violations." Diplomatic interactions 
over compliance have encompassed a broader array of issues 
than simply occurrences of actual or potential breaches of 
treaty language. Nine of the 42 cases summarized in Tables 
3-1 and 3-2 involved clarifications or notifications where 
one side or the other sought data to reduce ambiguities in 
compliance assessments or to establish precautionary rules 
for future c o n d u c t . A t  a minimum, this indicates 
occasional efforts by one side or the other to preempt
These cases include: Deactivation of ABM Test 
Launchers (USSR), ABM Test Ranges (USSR), ABM Radar 
Dismantling (US), Shemya Island (US), III-X Silos (USSR), 
Concealment Activities, 1974 (USSR), Conversion of SSBN 
(USSR), Altas and Titan Launcher Dismantling (US), 
Conversion of Cruise Missiles (US).
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problems before they escalated to the level of public 
recriminations.
Second, in those cases bearing more directly on 
compliance, instances of clear-cut violations by either side 
have been very infrequent. Tables 3-1 and 3-2 show 
twenty-seven instances in which one side or the other warned 
about violations or potential violations. Yet, in only a few 
cases —  such as the Krasnoyarsk radar, dismantling 
procedures for older ABMs and ICBMs, and INF missile 
transits/elimination —  does the preponderance of evidence 
clearly overrule any plausible interpretation of an action 
as actually or potentially compliant within the meaning of 
relevant treaty provisions. (And some of these, it should be 
stressed, were minor technical violations, subsequently 
restored.) In most other cases there is some room for 
disagreement, either with respect to intelligence on the 
activity itself (e.g., the SS-16 case or the SA-5 radar 
testing issue) or to the application of the rules (e.g., 
SDI-related testing), which allows one party or the other to 
proclaim its compliance. This is one reason why a 
non-trivial number of cases are characterized in hedged 
terms, as "probable" or "potential" violations, or matters 
of "serious concern." The tentative nature of many 
verification judgments stem from uncertainties that are 
intrinsic to intelligence assessments.
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A third, related observation is that many of these 
compliance problems were "built into" agreements during the 
bargaining process. In some cases, treaty provisions simply 
do not address specific contingencies or fully define all 
the operative terms. So, for example, with respect to 
telemetry encryption, how extensive must encryption be 
before it "impedes" verification? Or, in the case of the 
reloading of ABM launchers, how rapid must "rapid" reloading 
be before it becomes a prohibited act? Or, in the case of 
mobile ABMs, how transportable must radars and launchers be 
before they are no longer components intended for 
"permanently fixed" deployment? In other cases treaty 
language may be prone to differing interpretations. Both 
sides, for example, disagree over how to calculate the 
throwweight of the SS-25 missile, a key issue in 
establishing Soviet compliance with the "new-type" rules of 
SALT II. They also dispute whether the new U.S. radar 
stations at Thule and Fylingdales are allowed as 
modernization of existing facilities or prohibited as 
deployments of early warning radars outside national 
boundaries. As these examples indicate, a treaty can be 
silent or speak with conflicting voices. Either way, it 
becomes more difficult for the verifying party to sort out 
reasonable from spurious justifications offered by the other 
side in defense of problematic activity.
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Fourth, the record shows that U.S. compliance concerns 
generally have been triggered by visible, if ambiguous 
Soviet activities rather than by traces of large-scale 
covert cheating programs. It is quite true that extensive 
concealment and denial activity has accompanied many Soviet 
strategic programs. In several cases (e.g., encryption, 
flight test operations, etc.) the scale of such activities 
has encroached on arms control limits. But none of these 
activities fairly can be said to have involved attempted 
concealment of significant levels of forces or activities 
that were flatly prohibited. Indeed, in almost all the cases 
concerning allegations of Soviet violations or potential 
violations, the offending conduct had to do with the scale, 
location, or performance characteristics of forces or 
activities that were expressly allowed under an agreement.
Finally, there is widespread consensus that, with few 
exceptions, the "value added" to military capabilities by 
individual violations or potential violations has been quite 
marginal compared to the significance of permitted force 
improvements over the same period of time. Certainly, with 
respect to offensive forces, the unique military benefits of 
actions such as deployment of the SS-25s, the possible 
covert deployment of SS-16s, or the array of concealment
The one potential exception is the alleged 
deployment of SS-16 mobile ICBMs at the Plesetsk missile 
test range, which, if true, would have constituted a 
violation of the deployment ban on the SS-16 in SALT II.
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activities of concern to each side, are all very small 
compared to the permitted deployments of MIRVed ballistic 
missiles and ALCM-equipped bombers which have boosted 
overall force loadings from a few thousand on each side to 
approximately twelve thousand warheads apiece since the 
mid-1970s. On the defensive side, value-added comparisons 
are less certain given the absence of deployment 
infrastructures with a nationwide "reach.” Still, no one has 
seriously argued that disputed individual activities on 
either side have come anywhere close to the scale of effort 
required to establish a base for effective nationwide 
defense.^ Radars, for example, are often cited as the 
"long-lead time" items in any defensive system. But none of 
the radar projects which have drawn both sides into disputes 
thus far —  Krasnoyarsk, Thule and Fylingdales, or the PAVE 
PAWS enhancements —  contribute decisively to either side's 
capacity to build an effective nationwide ABM defense. While 
they do augment early warning of missile attack, they are 
clearly not optimized for ABM battle management functions
Even the Reagan Administration refrained from 
claiming that Soviet ABM breakout would be in any sense 
"effective." The fact that no crash programs have been 
undertaken on ICBM penetration-aides (pen-aides) on the U.S. 
side would suggest a lack of concern over the military 
implications of this possible breakout. Other commentators 
have been less complacent. Manfred Hamm has argued: "...the 
Soviets are on the verge of acquiring all the major elements 
for the potential to wage nuclear war against the United 
States at tolerable cost." See "Soviet SALT Cheating: The 
New Evidence," Memorandum 31 (Washington D.C.: The Heritage 
Foundation, 1983), p. 1.
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and could not of themselves sustain defenses in the face of 
readily available and cost-effective countermeasures. A few 
extra SLBMs or cruise missiles from existing inventories 
would suffice to put these radars at risk.
Areas of Disagreement
Each of the foregoing observations, though not 
seriously contested in most appraisals of the record, has 
become interwoven with more contentious interpretations in 
ways that bear close examination. One bone of contention 
concerns the utility of diplomacy in ironing out or 
preempting problems. No one disputes that both sides have 
consulted on numerous occasions regarding ambiguous 
activities. The divisive question is: to what effect? Those 
who portray the overall record in positive terms point to 
evidence that Soviet representatives generally were 
forthcoming in clarifying activities on their side, and in 
adjusting or halting offending activity in response to U.S. 
complaints.The cooperative spirit ceased when the U.S. 
renounced the SALT process after 1980. Those who take a 
pessimistic view, however, do not credit the SCC with any 
successes. Some critics argue that the Soviet Union never 
really met U.S. concerns, delaying responses or promising 
remedial steps that were never taken, and that "remedies"
Comments of Amb. Sidney Graybeal in U.S. Congress, 
Briefing on SALT I Compliance, p. 17.
103
amounted to the United States accepting what had been done 
in violation.Others contend that the SCC gave the Soviets 
a venue for mounting spurious countercharges, which deterred 
U.S. representatives from raising issues in the first place. 
Still others allege that the SCC provided a way for the 
Soviet Union to test the sensitivity of American 
intelligence capabilities by seeing whether telltale signs 
of offending activity would trigger U.S. protests in the 
SCC.^® Former U.S. officials with SCC experience vigorously 
dispute these characterizations, but the debate continues. 
Some critics have even charged that the Soviets have 
selectively restored their compliance in a few areas (e.g., 
removing SS-16 equipment, slowing Backfire production 
marginally) as part of their overall noncompliance strategy, 
to attenuate U.S. responses while consolidating gains 
through cheating.^'
Analysts with opposing perspectives also divide on the 
quality of duplicity represented in the compliance problems 
which have occurred. Again, there is no dispute over the 
paucity of clear-cut violations. The question is: who bears
See Remarks of Amb. Paul Nitze, U.S. Congress, 
Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The 
SALT II Treatv. Part 1, 96th Congress, 1st sess.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979), p. 493.
Harris, "Soviet Maskirovka," p. 214-217.
William R. Harris, "Arms Control Treaties: How Do 
They Restrain Soviet Strategic Defense Programs?," Orbis, 
Vol. 29, No. 4 (Winter 1986), pp. 705-707.
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responsibility for the shortcomings of agreements, the 
fuzziness of treaty language in certain areas, etc.? Critics 
contend that the USSR obtained unfair advantages by 
insisting on vague language as part of a deliberate 
strategy. As former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
told President Reagan: "From the beginning, many felt that 
the Soviets used the arms control process to obscure their 
planned offensive buildup, weaving into the fabric of SALT I 
and the ABM Treaty the loopholes and ambiguities that they 
would later rely on to becloud or extenuate their 
violations."^" Thus, some pessimists extend this line of 
argument to make the claim that Soviet negotiators engaged 
in deceptive bargaining practices and falsified data in 
order to lure the United States into accepting unequal 
provisions and loopholes in treaty language.
Those with a less pessimistic view, however, reject 
such claims and point to other causes. Many of the 
ambiguities contained in agreements, they contend, are a 
reflection of the fact that certain types of prohibitions 
(i.e., on rapid reload, etc.) were intrinsically difficult 
to define and were not an indication of sloppy negotiating 
by the United States. They argue that U.S. negotiators also
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Memorandum 
to President Reagan (unclassified), November 15, 1985, 
Subject: "Responding to Soviet Violations Policy (RSVP) 
Study, (mimeo), p. 1.
Sullivan, "The Legacy of SALT I," p. 36.
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sought general language or exemptions to protect options —  
such as the development of tactical anti-ballistic missiles 
(ATBMs), deployment of INF to Europe, or deployment of large 
radars for verification purposes —  and they are not 
inclined to criticize the Soviet Union for "jumping through" 
U.S. inspired loopholes.(We will return to this issue in 
Chapter 6.) Finally, these individuals see no evidence to 
sustain the charge of deliberate deception. They point to 
instances in the negotiating record where the Soviets were 
careful not to take positions that would have raised 
legitimate questions about their behavior.
There is also disagreement over what significance 
should attach to the retirement of older strategic weapons. 
For some analysts, indications of malign Soviet intent
As a group of former U.S. officials, including 
William Hyland, Walter Slocombe, and Joseph S. Nye, has 
argued: "Where the United States has sought to protect 
specific U.S. program initiatives, it has tended to seek 
language which explicitly permits the
initiative.... Occasionally, however, the U.S. preference for 
general language is due to a manifestation of the old legal 
maxim inclusio unius exclusio alterius. i.e., to prohibit 
certain specific actions is, by implication, to permit 
others. Particularly where it is literally impossible to 
set forth all potential violations, the United States has 
sought either a general prohibition cast in terms of effect, 
not method...or stressed that a list of specific 
prohibitions is not all inclusive...." Carnegie Panel on 
U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, Challenges to 
U.S. National Securitv (Final Report), (Washington, D.C.: 
CEIP, 1983), p. 50.
For example, on the question of the SS-19 
deployment, see Walter Slocombe, "A SALT Debate: Hard But 
Fair Bargaining," Strategic Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 
1979), pp. 24-25.
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suggested by compliance problems are very much reduced by 
the active steps taken by the Soviet side to maintain 
compliance with SALT Agreements, specifically by 
deactivating over 1,200 ICBM and SLBM launchers since the 
m i d - 1 9 7 0 s . Others stress that in the wake of the 1972 
agreements, the process of implementing new plans for 
strategic weapons programs on the Soviet side moderated 
considerably.^* In contrast, the critics give little 
credence to the idea that those deactivations reflected any 
real constraints on Soviet force posture. The removal of 
older systems, they contend, was already planned as part of 
modernization and improvement programs that led to 
substantial warhead increases. Correspondingly, they reject 
the contention that SALT'S limits forced any restructuring 
in Soviet strategic acquisition plans. Richard Perle has 
argued: "There is no significant difference between their 
forces today, and what their forces would have been without 
SALT.
According to the Arms Control Association, Soviet 
SALT-required deactivations through 1985 included 1007 ICBM 
and 233 SLBM launchers. See Countdown on SALT II 
(Washington, D.C.: The Arms Control Association, 1985), p. 
23. Other analysts put the figure of SALT-required 
deactivations at 500 to 600 launchers.
John Steinbruner, "U.S. and Soviet Security 
Perspectives," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. (August 
1985), p. 92.
Statement of Richard Perle, in U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet Compliance With Arms 
Control Agreements. 100th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1987), p. 22.
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Pessimistic analysts also assert that the minor 
military value of most individual violations is no reason 
for complacency. To a far greater degree than their 
opponents, these analysts are prone to attribute strategic 
implications to perceptions of political weakness. Colin 
Gray argues: "The argument that Soviet treaty violations are 
not militarily important is wrong....A Soviet decision that 
U.S. political will is not to be taken seriously would have 
major military implications. Much additional military muscle 
would be required to offset a perceived deficiency in 
American r e s o l v e . I t  has also been argued that optimistic 
assessments fail to account for the interactive effects of 
small scale violations, and that the Soviets may take a very 
expansive view of the kinds of violations that would be 
militarily useful to undertake.^®
Incriminating and Exonerating Interpretations
Ultimately, there is no perfect way to disentangle 
these disputes on the basis of some ostensibly fair-minded 
reading of the record. In deciphering the meaning of past
Gray, "Moscow Is Cheating," p. 149.
For example, Carnes Lord contends: "...given the 
Soviets* emphasis on nuclear war-fighting as opposed to 
deterrence and their apparent belief in the utility of 
strategic defense, it should not be surprising if their 
notion of military significance [of violations] is broader 
than that of the United States." See "Verification and the 
Future of Arms Control," Strategic Review. Vol. 6, No. 2 
(Spring 1978), p. 29.
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events the opaqueness of Soviet governance imposes 
substantial problems for compliance assessment. 
Reconstructions of Soviet behavior must be based almost 
entirely on the observable output of Soviet decision-making 
—  the forces in being, their operational configuration and 
supporting infrastructure. The inputs that form the basis of 
policy, such as ideological mindset, planning objectives, or 
bureaucratic inertia or incoherence, are extremely difficult 
to weigh.Often, the result is that the historical record 
tends to support exonerating as well as incriminating 
interpretations of Soviet motives in particular cases.
To illustrate this point, consider the ABM/SAM 
concurrent testing issue cited in Table 3-1. U.S. concerns 
in this case revolved around the repeated use of SA-5 
air-defense radars during ABM testing in 1973 and 1974 at 
the ballistic missile test range near Sary Shagen in 
Kazakhstan. In early 1975, U.S. representatives at the SCC 
expressed concern that such activity might be inconsistent 
with Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty, which inter alia bars
The only available insights on the inputs to Soviet 
planning are those contained in emigre reports, which 
themselves are notoriously difficult to authenticate. For 
instance, according to Arkady Shevchenko, in the wake of the 
Soviet decision to sign the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko instructed the 
military not to abandon its production of BW. Breaking With 
Moscow (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985), p. 179. Joseph 
Douglass draws entensively on emigre research in his 
interpretation of Soviet arms control behavior, Whv the 
Soviets Violate Arms Control Treaties (New York: 
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988).
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the testing of non-ABM components in an ABM mode. During the 
SALT I talks, U.S. negotiators had pushed hard to obtain 
this provision in order to preclude circumvention of the 
treaty through the covert upgrading of SAM systems, which 
were not limited, into ABMs. The Soviets had resisted such a 
constraint initially, on the grounds that non-ABM systems 
had no place in the agreement, and in part perhaps because 
they understood that such a limitation would give U.S. 
intelligence services a legal claim to collect data on their 
SAM defenses. In any event, they eventually acquiesced to 
the collateral constraint on testing "in an ABM mode" in the 
face of stiff U.S. insistence.
When queried on the matter, Soviet officials stated 
that the SA-5 system was not being tested against strategic 
ballistic missiles but was employed by test range personnel 
to monitor air traffic in the general vicinity of the Sary 
Shagen facility. Such an explanation appears plausible for 
several reasons. The Soviets have long held that they should 
be able to track unidentified aircraft close to the test 
area, which is not far from the Sino-Soviet border. In 
addition, some uses of non-ABM radars at test ranges were 
clearly permissible. Both sides reached a common 
understanding in the negotiations on allowing non-phased 
array radars to be used for "range safety or instrumentation
° See discussion on radar restraints in Gerard Smith, 
Doubletalk; The Storv of SALT I (Lanham Md.: University 
Press of America, 1985), pp. 307-318.
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purposes."^ A source familiar with the talks has observed 
that the Soviets had a need for a continuous wave (CW) 
instrumentation radar at their test ranges, and the SA-5's 
radar was the only system in the inventory which could be 
used for this purpose.These considerations provide grist 
for an exonerating interpretation —  that the Soviets, as 
claimed, were tracking airborne activities in and around the 
range, not making prohibited measurements on ballistic 
missiles.
Yet, incriminating interpretations also have been 
developed to explain Soviet behavior. The Soviets were well 
aware of U.S. concerns regarding the SA-5 radar. Indeed, it 
was precisely because of the SA-5 system that the United 
States, despite Soviet resistance, had pressed for the 
Article VI provision in the first place. Moreover, although 
the Soviets acquiesced to Article VI, they specifically 
declined to accept any of the criteria tabled by the United 
States for defining testing in an ABM mode. Given these 
considerations, the fact that they reportedly pursued 
concurrent ABM/SAM activity for up to 18 months before U.S. 
officials complained arguably could be read as a desire to
U.S. ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 
pp. 144-145.
Jan Lodal, "Verifying SALT," Foreign Policv. No. 24 
(Fall 1976), p. 46.
They did not expressly reject them either, however. 
For further discussion, see Chapter 6.
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test United States readiness to insist on strict observance 
of treaty provisions (negotiated at U.S. insistence) 
addressing SAM upgrade. It has also been suggested that SA-5 
radars could have been turned on at appropriate moments as a 
way to test the sensitivity of U.S. electronic intelligence 
(ELINT) collection systems. Although probing action of this 
kind was not barred by the treaty, it could have suggested a 
desire to reap intelligence benefits through the adroit use 
of a treaty provision. Finally, some observers contend that 
Soviet personnel were engaged in the illegal use of the SA-5 
radar —  that is, to make measurements on target reentry 
vehicles during the testing of ABM interceptors —  and 
deliberately took advantage of the exemptions to cover their 
illegal actions.^" As suggested by the Reagan 
Administration's charge of a "probable violation," the 
intelligence was inherently ambiguous. Short of observing 
the SA-5's radar scope at opportune moments, it is unlikely 
that U.S. intelligence could ever have made a clear-cut 
determination. Nonetheless, one does not have to accept the 
U.S. charge of noncompliance to conclude that there was good 
cause for concern. This concern evidently was serious enough 
to persuade the Soviets to halt their offending activity.
Brian D. Dailey, "An Examination of the ABM Treaty,"
p. 247.
Even here, however, there continues to be debate 
over whether the activity really ceased for more than a 
short period of time. Although the Reagan Administration 
provided no public evidence to show renewed instances of 
possible concurrent ABM/SAM testing, some analysts have
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Another notable example, and one where the intelligence 
is much clearer, concerns the SS-7/8 ICBM launcher episode, 
noted in Table 3-2. Here, the Soviets were required under 
SALT I in 1976 to dismantle a number of ICBM launchers as 
they put to sea a corresponding number of new SLBMs on board 
Delta class submarines. Early in the year, U.S. intelligence 
reported that although the missiles had been removed from 
the launchers in question, only 10 of the 51 launchers had 
been dismantled and that the Soviets were likely to miss the 
deadline. The United States decided to raise the issue at 
the next scheduled meeting of the SCC. Before this was done, 
however, the Soviet side acknowledged the problem and 
provided the U.S. side with data on the situation that 
essentially corroborated American intelligence. The issue 
was resolved when, at U.S. request, the Soviets delayed 
moving their newest SSBN into sea-trials for three months, 
until dismantling procedures had been completed.
The Soviet Union's willingness to acknowledge a glaring 
problem and to cooperate in resolving it has been cited as a 
positive feature of the compliance record in the pre­
charged that the Soviets only stopped temporarily. The fact 
that SCC representatives continued negotiations up to the 
mid-1980s on clarifications regarding the extent of 
permitted SAM radar activities at test ranges would suggest 
some continuing concern over instances of concurrent 
testing, but it is unclear whether this fell within the 
category of the Administration's charges of a "probable" 
violation.
U.S. Department of State, Compliance With SALT I 
Agreements. p. 3.
113
Gorbachev era. But if indeed it was a mistake, how could 
they have fouled up so badly in the first place? Reportedly, 
the missiles had been removed from their launchers for some 
time so that dismantling activities could have begun months 
in advance of the d eadline.The Soviets blamed their 
inability to meet the deadline on unspecified "technical 
difficulties" but gave no further explanation. Exonerating 
interpretations have portrayed the incident largely as a 
matter of internal slippage. According to one account, 
unusually severe winter weather prevented Russian 
construction crews from completing their demolition work on 
time.^® It has also been suggested that the Soviet military 
simply may have failed to carry out their orders in the 
specified time frame and did not alert their civilian 
authorities until it was too late.^’ Incriminating 
interpretations point to other possibilities. President 
Reagan's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control (GAC), 
in a controversial report, stated that Soviet behavior in 
this instance "was probably not inadvertent, but rather was 
part of a deliberate Soviet effort to challenge U.S. arms
Lodal, "Verifying SALT," p. 46.
John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence 
Analvsis and Soviet Strategic Forces (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 241.
Lodal, "Verifying SALT," pp. 4 6-47.
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control verification capabilities.Another account 
suggests that the Soviets deliberately left some of their 
SS-7 launchers on operational status in order to maintain 
coverage of strategic targets until newer missile forces 
were deployed.^
As these examples indicate, even when there is 
substantial agreement on the facts of specific cases, the 
absence of detailed knowledge of policy inputs in the 
presence of contending hypotheses regarding Soviet behavior 
virtually guarantees that judgments will run in different 
directions. Relative to U.S. behavior, where at least the 
reasoning behind specific actions generally is clear (even 
if contentious or the result of bureaucratic wrangling), the 
historical record simply does not speak clearly with respect 
to Soviet intentions. It is extremely difficult to prove or 
disprove arguments that a given problem was triggered by a 
general policy to cheat on inconvenient agreements; or by ad 
hoc decisions to violate in some cases but not others; or by 
a general practice to violate as a response to real or 
perceived U.S. malfeasance; or some mix of each. Nor can one 
prove or disprove that Soviet noncompliance was the product 
of unauthorized cheating at lower levels or even deliberate
General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and 
Disarmament, A Quarter Centurv of Soviet Compliance 
Practices Under Arms Control Commitments; 1958-1983, in 
William C. Potter, ed., Verification and Arms Control 
(Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 245.
Harris, "Soviet Maskirovka," p. 216.
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actions by top leaders disguised to appear as though the 
problems were simply bureaucratic in nature.
Bounding the Disagreements
Although disagreements over past or present Soviet 
intentions are bound to persist, the record still provides 
important clues for assessing the strengths and weaknesses 
of opposing interpretations of Soviet compliance behavior. 
Clearly, the record looks positive when one compares Tables 
3-1 and 3-2 against the general degree of compliance that 
has existed under the ABM, SALT, and INF agreements. In 
purely quantitative terms, a ratio of 42 problems to 
hundreds of operative rules is quite small; when comparing 
only those problems which are violations or possible 
violations to the full array of rules, the ratio becomes 
smaller still. Such quantitative measures, of course, do not 
capture the military significance of compliance versus 
noncompliance. Here too, however, a positive reading of the 
record is supported. As violations or possible violations, 
the Krasnoyarsk radar, the SS-2 5 ICBM, and concealment 
practices which impede verification are usually cited as the 
most strategically significant. Yet the military gains 
accruing to either side look marginal compared to the 
observed limits —  on the MIRV potential of large ICBMs, on 
numbers of delivery systems, or on permissible ABM 
deployments —  that constrain both sides in significant
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ways.
In this respect it is a major defect of most 
pessimistic interpretations to assert that the restraints in 
place were not consequential because the Soviet Union or the 
United States had no intention of building beyond them. Even 
if strategic plans circa 1972 were not significantly 
curtailed, future plans were also at i s s u e . I t  is only 
prudent to assume that the Soviets could have made a 
decision to replicate the Moscow ABM system on a nationwide 
basis starting in the mid- to late-1970s, had they chosen to 
do so, in the face of greater than expected threats from 
U.S. offensive forces. During most of the 1960s, the 
dominant expectation in the United States was that the 
Soviets would deploy upwards of 10,000 ABM interceptors on a 
nationwide basis by the end of the 1 9 70 s. W h i l e  those 
estimates may have assumed full development of the SA-5 as 
an ABM system, which proved not to be the case, planned 
upgrades to the Moscow system were almost certainly in the 
pipeline by the early 1970s. Correspondingly, on the 
offensive side, the Soviets could have replaced all their
As Walter Slocombe has argued: "As is often the case
with arms control agreements, the most significant effect of
the SALT I agreement may have been in preventing future 
developments which were not yet planned, but which would
have been a source of great concern had they later been
adopted." See "A SALT Debate," p. 23.
"Comment" of Paul H. Nitze, in Foreign Policv. No.
16 (Fall 1974), p. 16. See also Congressman Les Aspin, 
"Debate Over U.S. Strategic Forecasts: A Mixed Record," 
Strategic Review. Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1980), p. 24.
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then-current ICBMs, not just their large SS-9s, with "heavy" 
missiles, or fully exploited their throwweight with MIRV 
loadings, or built greater numbers of ICBM launchers in the 
face of U.S. ABM deployments.^^ Thus, while it may be 
legitimate to question whether arms control did in fact 
constrict then-current acquisition plans to any appreciable 
degree, it does not reasonably follow that all constraining 
effects were absent. To assert otherwise is to ignore the 
interactive aspects of strategic planning.
Pessimistic interpretations suffer from other notable 
flaws. Looking at the evidence, it is hard to sustain the 
charge that all loopholes, exemptions, or ambiguities in 
treaty language were crafted into agreements by the Soviet 
Union to hoodwink the United States. A fair characterization 
would be that U.S. negotiators generally did care more about 
precision, in part to assure verification rights, and in 
some cases Soviet opposition to proposed constraints or 
definitions stemmed from a desire to protect a program, such 
as the SS-19 ICBM. But loopholes were manufactured by both 
sides and there were few illusions on either side regarding 
what their effect would be.^ Consequently, while frictions
All the attention paid to the force multiplying 
effects of MIRV tend to obscure the fact that increasing the 
numbers of launchers could be very important to the Soviets 
in response to any U.S. ABM deployment with a boost phase 
component.
For example, U.S. officials involved in SALT knew of 
the existence of the SS-19 program prior to the completion 
of SALT I. However, many analysts feel that the U.S. should 
not have resorted to the issuance of unilateral
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over incomplete agreement on some treaty language did set 
the stage for controversies later on, it is difficult to 
discern anything uniquely malign in a general pattern of 
self-interested behavior in which both sides engaged.
The SCC also comes in for unduly harsh treatment by 
critics. Although it was hardly a panacea, the SCC's 
performance overall tends to belie Caspar Weinberger's 
caricature of it as "an Orwellian memory hole into which 
U.S. concerns were dumped like yesterday's g a r b a g e . B o t h  
sides did exchange substantial amounts of data to clarify 
issues of concern like the function of the III-X silos and 
the status of deactivated ICBM and ABM launchers. Effective 
criteria were negotiated for activities such as the 
dismantling of systems, concurrent operations of ABM and SAM 
systems, and testing "in an ABM mode." Episodes of 
stonewalling and the vituperation that marred SCC 
proceedings in the early 1980s were much more a byproduct of 
stormy relations overall than a sign of some fatal flaw in
interpretations of treaty langauge, essentially restating 
positions that the Soviets had already rejected, because 
these gave the impression to Congress of greater restraint 
than was actually the case. There were also problems of 
intelligence estimation. The constraints on increases in 
silo size negotiated at U.S. insistence were less useful 
than expected because U.S. analysts apparently 
underestimated the size of new missiles which could be fired 
from modestly enlarged silos. See U.S. Congress, Report of 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Principal 
Findings on the Capabilities of the United States to Monitor 
the SALT II Treatv. 96th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979), p. 3.
Weinberger, "Responding to Soviet Violations," p. 9.
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the concept itself.
As much as some pessimistic claims about the record are 
overstated, however, they should not be confused with 
criticisms that are fairer in other respects. It is entirely 
legitimate to fault the USSR for probing into the gray areas 
of agreements and engaging in activities that, given any 
reasonable reading of treaty language, it knew would run a 
clear risk of triggering American protests. Whether the 
Soviets acted out of a belief that they had to exercise 
legitimate rights aggressively —  to conceal anything not 
clearly forbidden, to use SAM radars at ABM ranges, to erect 
a radar at an ABM test range that they had not expressly 
designated, etc. —  or out of a desire to test U.S. resolve 
can never be known. But the effect of this behavior, 
whatever its purpose, was to vitiate the cooperative spirit 
of arms control and to cast Soviet motives in a bad light.
Soviet motives look even darker when considering the 
array of explanations they developed to justify questionable 
behavior. Although insignificant in purely military terms, 
the Krasnoyarsk radar was very damaging politically. The 
justification that the radar was permitted as a spacetrack 
facility was so untenable that the Soviets eventually had to 
drop it. It is hard to avoid the impression that the Soviets 
thought they could squeeze the United States into accepting 
a fait accompli. Their explanations of the SS-25 —  that it 
was a permitted modification of an older ICBM, the SS-13 —
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came closer to plausibility but only in the sense that the 
SS-25 was a new system which they attempted to engineer 
(possibly unsuccessfully) within the 5 percent tolerances 
allowed by the SALT II agreement. The Soviets undertook this 
action in full knowledge that it would contradict claims by 
the Carter Administration regarding the putative impact of 
SALT II on Soviet modernization choices.
On the U.S. side, several problematic aspects of 
compliance behavior are noteworthy. One shortcoming in the 
early stages was a habit of specifying unilateral criteria 
for Soviet compliance where prior efforts to achieve agreed 
formulations had failed. While the Soviet Union, not 
unreasonably, felt little obligation to honor U.S. 
interpretations that were more restrictive than agreed 
positions, such interpretations created the impression of 
greater restraint than was actually the case and planted the 
seeds of future controversies. It is also legitimate to 
fault U.S. compliance behavior in certain cases for 
undermining efforts to insist on strict observance by the
During the SALT II ratification process. Carter 
Administration officials argued that the "new-type" rule for 
ICBM modernization would force the Soviets into some hard 
choices. As then Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said: 
"...they [the Soviets] will have to choose either a 
replacement for their existing single warhead land-based 
missile, the SS-11, or another new missile with up to ten 
warheads.... They cannot, under SALT II, develop both of 
these." U.S. Congress, Hearings before Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, The SALT II Treatv. Part 1, pp. 103-104. 
In fact, however, with deployment of the SS-24 (with 10 
warheads) and the SS-2 5 (1 warhead), this is precisely what 
the Soviets did.
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Soviet Union. Former U.S. Air Force Under Secretary Antonia 
Handler Chayes commented; "We have set bad precedents that 
have affected their [Soviet] behavior. For example, the 
problem of the environmental shelters, though not an act of 
deliberate concealment on our part, very likely contributed 
to the stepped-up concealment practices we witnessed on 
their side throughout the 19 70 s. Fi n a l l y ,  as noted 
earlier, the United States on occasion sought to justify its 
own R&D behavior in terms of compliance standards which were 
not mutually agreed and which probably would have provoked 
criticism in the United States if they had been used by the 
Soviets to justify similar activities.
Overall, the record examined here reveals a mixed 
picture. There has been less than perfect compliance but the 
yardsticks for distinguishing "good" from "bad" compliance 
turn out to be very subjective. The overall framework of 
quantitative limits of SALT survived the mid-1980s intact.
In the main, both sides observed the numerical limits. 
Moreover, both sides cooperated in clarifying parts of the 
regime where ambiguities created problems. Offending actions 
were halted or altered if there appeared to be a political 
incentive for doing so. The Soviets' stated intention to 
dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar would be, if carried out, a
Remarks by former U.S. Air Force Under Secretary 
Antonia Handler Chayes, Workshop on "The Verification 
Debate," sponsored by the Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard University, on September 11, 
1984, Washington, D.C.
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dramatic illustration of this. Finally, the record provides 
no persuasive support for the contention that the problems 
experienced to date have threatened the basic viability of 
the regime.^’ Actions indicative of a breakout strategy 
would include a broad range of compliant as well as 
noncompliant activities, such as the testing and deployment 
of MIRV loading greatly in excess of present levels, testing 
of penetration aides (e.g., decoys, chaff, etc.), the crash 
development of fully mobile ABM systems, mass production of 
ABM interceptors, etc., and other steps to prepare for 
nationwide deployment of ABMs over a time frame of several 
years. There is nothing in the public record to suggest that 
any of these things has occurred.
On the other hand, the record does reveal the extent to 
which assessments on compliance have been caught up in 
controversy over the expected results of agreements. The 
regime which has emerged since the 1970s necessarily 
involved the matching of constraints to each side's military 
posture with a view to achieving some anticipated effect 
(e.g., to achieve "parity," to force trade-offs in
U.S. rhetoric on SDI during the 1984-1988 period was 
threatening to the regime in the sense that it suggested the 
precursor of a national policy decision to scuttle the ABM 
Treaty, unilaterally if need be, pending adequate technology 
development. Actual technology development has lagged far 
behind the rhetoric, however. On the Soviet side, both 
technology and rhetoric have lagged. It is very hard to 
attribute a breakout as opposed to a hedging rationale to 
Soviet deployment programs, given that their current 
technology base for ABMs essentially corresponds to that 
achieved by the U.S. during the 1970s.
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modernization, to constrain MIRVing, etc.). These 
anticipated effects generated expectations, and weapons R&D 
or deployment activities which upset those expectations have 
had a corrosive effect on the regime. Where activities 
actually ran counter to agreed language, the issue of 
violations was clear and direct; but this seldom happened. A 
more common occurrence were activities which, while not 
directly violating agreed language, did jar expectations. 
Here, the relevant issue is that of circumvention —  i.e., 
an agreement yielded less than expected results because one 
side or the other found a way to evade restrictions. 
Exploitation of loopholes falls into this category. Finally, 
and relatedly, the compliant aspects of certain activities 
were justified on the basis of interpretations that 
distorted or contradicted any reasonable reading of the 
rules. Thus, for example, the Krasnoyarsk radar and the 
SS-25 ICBM were defended as legal by the Soviet Union on the 
basis of treaty interpretations which were plainly at odds 
with what the United States reasonably expected would 
h a p p e n . U . S .  justifications for the testing of 
space-based SDI components under a broad interpretation of 
the ABM Treaty has been at odds with what the Soviets, not
Of course, even the disappointment of unreasonable 
expectations can be corrosive, as in the case of the SS-19, 
where the actual constraining effects of the upgrading 
provisions in the SALT I Interim Agreement were oversold by 
the Nixon Administration and, to a degree, overbought by the 
Congress.
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to mention the U.S. Senate, reasonably thought would happen 
under that agreement. The general lesson here is that treaty 
provisions and expectations about their impact must be kept 
in line with each other. If the two diverge, compliance 
disagreements are bound to ensue, with or without the 
incidence of actual violations.
REAPPRAISING COMPLIANCE DYNAMICS
Does the record discussed above shed any light on the 
incentive structures which were identified in Chapter 2 as 
being the driving factors, for better or worse, behind 
treaty-constrained behavior? It is difficult to answer this 
question in any clear and decisive way. The mix of 
influencing factors pulling one way or another on 
governmental decision-making almost certainly has changed 
over time. There is no logical reason why the confluence of 
factors favoring compliance on either side in the early 
1970s, during the heyday of detente, should be precisely the 
same as those favoring compliance during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, when relations grew stormy. From the Soviet 
standpoint, it might be reasonable to suppose that as the 
diplomatic payoffs (i.e., expanded trade. Western 
technology, etc.) from SALT agreements began to evaporate in 
the later 1970s, the strategic logic of compliance and 
perhaps the deterring effects of U.S. verification played a 
greater role in shaping their incentives to stick by
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existing agreements; but given the opacity of the Soviet 
system, these calculations would be very difficult to 
measure, both in an absolute sense and relative to any 
incentives pulling policymakers in the other direction, 
toward violations.
Furthermore, the type of behavior which could indicate 
the presence of compliance inducements poses an analytical 
obstacle. The SALT-era treaties, as distinct from the INF 
Treaty or prospective START agreements, did not mandate 
major changes in force structure or preexisting patterns of 
behavior. Thus, good compliance was largely (though not 
wholly) the byproduct of avoidance behavior —  i.e., 
refraining from actively violating agreements —  rather than 
affirmative behavior —  i.e., adjusting behavior in some 
affirmative way (say, by dismantling weapons) in order to 
assure compliance. Yet various meanings can always be read 
into avoidance behavior. Does the absence of violations 
reflect a perception of strategic self-interest, or the 
deterring effects of verification, or simply the persistence 
of bureaucratic routine? On any given day, any of these 
explanations might be possible.
Despite these limitations, one can still draw some 
reasonable inferences based on retrospective analyses. It 
has been well established that the Kremlin leadership was 
attracted to SALT for a variety of domestic political and 
diplomatic reasons. The leadership under Brezhnev, it has
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been argued, craved parity with the United States, and saw 
SALT as enhancing its domestic and international prestige 
because of the opportunity to deal with the United States as 
an equal. It has also been argued that Soviet leaders wanted 
to create the appearance, if not the fact, of 
Soviet-American collusion against China, and that they 
wanted to exploit SALT to undermine congressional support 
for military spending.^ Such incentives, while not perhaps 
dispositive, would have constituted strong inhibitions 
against substantial noncompliance in the early stages of 
SALT.
More recently, the preeminent factor working in favor 
of Soviet compliance has been apparent concerns about U.S. 
moves to undermine Soviet notions of strategic stability, 
especially in the realm of strategic defense. The most 
remarkable manifestation of this was Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze's October 1989 speech to the Supreme Soviet, in 
which he acknowledged that the Krasnoyarsk radar station was 
"an open violation" of the ABM Treaty and confirmed prior 
Soviet statements that the radar would be dismantled without 
compensation, thus restoring Soviet compliance. In coming to 
terms with this issue, Soviet leaders sought to remove an
For Shevchenko's view, see Breaking With Moscow, 
pp. 201-202. Accounts by Kissinger, Smith, and others make 
clear the extent of Soviet obsession with China and the 
repeated efforts of Soviet officials to craft agreements 
that would have an explicitly anti-Chinese dimension. See, 
for example, Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 
Ma.: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 548, 554, 1152.
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embarrassing contradiction between their own weak defense of 
the radar station and their desire to strengthen the ABM 
Treaty as a way of controlling U.S. SDI developments. Thus, 
an act of contrition that seemed scarcely likely in the 
mid-1980s was driven ultimately by a sense of larger 
strategic stakes in preserving existing limitations. 
Shevardnadze's words made this quite clear: "All these 
years, we have been working hard to keep the ABM Treaty as a 
foundation for strategic stability....And all the while, 
there stood the station, the size of an Egyptian pyramid, 
representing, to put it bluntly, a violation of the ABM 
Treaty. At last we resolved this issue and announced we 
would dismantle the station. This has brought some 
discontent in the country, as if we were forgoing our own 
interests. In fact, we are saving the ABM Treaty and opening 
the way to the conclusion of the treaty on strategic 
weapons. . . .
On the American side, the constellation of factors 
favoring compliance has not been as clear as one might 
imagine. Given the substantial build-up in force levels that 
SALT allowed, the strategic advantages of SALT were very 
much in dispute, especially among those who argued that SALT 
was cosmetic at best and damaging to U.S. security. Still,
Michael Dobbs, "Moscow Condemns '79 Afghan 
Invasion," The Washington Post. October 24, 1989, p. Al; see 
also "The Kremlin Apology: Excerpts from Speech," The New 
York Times. October 25, 1989, p. A12.
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the influence of strategic inducements became more 
pronounced in the post-1981 period. When some in the 
incoming Reagan Administration argued that the SALT 
agreements should be discarded, counterpressures began to 
develop almost immediately, mainly from military and 
intelligence officials. Air Force Gen. Richard Ellis, then 
in charge of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, summed it up 
quite succinctly: "The Chiefs want a continuance of the 
adherence regime rather than deal with breakout on the 
Soviet si de .M ea nw h il e, State Department officials, 
including then Secretary Alexander Haig, argued vociferously 
that diplomatic considerations, specifically the need to 
maintain cohesion in NATO in the face of mounting public 
criticism on the pending INF deployments, dictated some sort 
of continued compliance with SALT.
As it turned out, the policy of maintaining informal 
compliance with SALT agreements, which was adopted in 
mid-1981, was not inconvenient for the most part. In this 
sense, the purported strategic and diplomatic inducements to 
compliance loomed even larger because there were no 
immediate opportunity costs in terms of U.S. force 
enhancement. The Reagan Administration did not face the 
dilemma of having to choose between desired strategic 
programs and maintaining agreed restraints until Trident
Strobe Talbott, Deadlv Gambits: The Reaaan 
Administration and the Stalemate in Arms Control (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), pp. 224-225.
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submarine deployments began to push U.S. MIRVed ballistic 
missile levels toward the 1,200 threshold in 1985 
Interestingly, once the SDI program began to gain some 
momentum in 1985, the administration's move to reinterpret 
the ABM Treaty suggested a variation on the informal 
compliance theme; to hold conventional Soviet ABM programs 
in check with the treaty while redefining other parts of the 
treaty in order to gain some latitude for space-based 
testing of exotic ABM components and systems. This was 
something akin to having one's cake and eating it too.
As for compliance-inhibiting factors, throughout the 
period at issue here a number of centrifugal tendencies have 
been apparent. First, there have been recurring disputes 
over treaty provisions where compliance criteria were murky 
or subject to self-serving unilateral interpretations. 
Telemetry encryption, the SS-19 ICBM deployment, the Thule 
and Fylingdales radars, ABM component mobility, and SAM 
upgrade are all issues which fall into the category of 
problems arising from the lack of complete and precise 
agreement. This experience confirms an observation made by
^ The first affirmative U.S. move to stay within the 
SALT II framework occurred in June 1985, when President 
Reagan elected to deactivate an older Poseidon class 
submarine to make way for the USS Alaska. a Trident 
submarine, and so to remain within the sublimit of 1,2 00 
MIRVed ballistic missiles. See Gerald M. Boyd, "Reagan Says 
U.S. Will Keep Abiding By '79 Arms Pact," The New York 
Times. June 11, 1985, p. Al, AlO. Further Poseidon 
deactivations were made, but, as noted earlier, the policy 
of formal observance ceased in mid-1986.
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Abram Chayes in his 1972 analysis of arms control 
agreements. Chayes described a gray zone of doubtful 
conduct, or a "penumbra”, surrounding the core limits of 
agreements, which can result from "a familiar failure to 
define precisely enough, either from inability or political 
necessity, the prohibited conduct." Thus, he said: "...the 
combination of a core of clearly prohibited conduct and a 
more doubtful surrounding penumbra may sometimes provide a 
tempting setting for feints and p r o b e s . . . I n  fact, as the 
record shows, ambiguous treaty language was a magnet of 
sorts for compliance problems; it did not deter them.
What about free-riding tendencies? Taken in isolation, 
many of the problems cited above could be viewed as an 
effort to gain marginal advantages without provoking the 
other side into a response. The main items are those which 
fall on the Soviet side, such as the Krasnoyarsk radar and 
the SS-25, although SDI testing within the broad 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty proffered by the United 
States could also be read as a desire to bend treaty 
constraints without breaking them. Even so, as argued in 
Chapter 2, it is one thing to point to individual 
occurrences as symptoms of a problem, but quite another to 
infer from those occurrences a deliberate strategy of 
free-riding. On the U.S. side. Congress has effectively
Chayes, "An Inquiry Into Arms Control Agreements,"
937.
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estopped the Executive Branch from taking advantage of the 
broad interpretation in its SDI testing activities; thus, 
the issue is moot. As for the Soviets, the verdict on their 
behavior during the early 1980s remains unclear. There is no 
evidence which categorically proves or disproves that 
particular events were linked together in a skillful, 
centrally coordinated strategy of free-riding. It is equally 
plausible to believe they simply reflected a certain 
lassitude in Soviet compliance behavior —  that is, an 
unwillingness on the part of higher authorities to modify 
activities being conducted at lower levels simply to avoid 
or correct a compliance problem, especially when to do so 
might end up being costly or overly generous in terms of 
avoiding offense to American sensibilities.^
The friction-inducing potential of shifts in the 
distribution of burdens and benefits from agreements emerges 
very clearly in the record. On the U.S. side, the extensive 
development of Soviet MIRV capabilities in the wake of the 
SALT I agreement undermined the domestic legitimacy of the 
SALT process at both ends of the political spectrum and 
helped to create constituencies committed to a radical 
restructuring of the dialogue. Likewise, progressive U.S. . 
moves toward the end of the decade to confront the Soviets
^  Thus, for example, Krasnoyarsk was a good location 
for an EW radar, despite the ABM Treaty's provisions, and 
finding alternative sites for achieving the analogous 
capability would have entailed substantially greater cost 
and inconvenience.
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on trade, human rights, and third world instabilities —  in 
effect, denying the Kremlin leadership some of its 
sought-after diplomatic benefits —  may have emboldened 
certain domestic critics to challenge SALT advocates within 
the upper echelons of the Soviet bureaucracy.^^ And within 
the military sphere, NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy 
U.S. INF forces in Europe in spite of Soviet efforts to 
preclude this through the non-circumvention language of SALT 
II marked a defeat for Soviet diplomacy and almost certainly 
vitiated an important potential benefit of the agreement in 
Soviet eyes.
To be sure, shifts in the expected payoffs of 
agreements did not automatically lead to compliance 
misbehavior. Their more immediate effect was to generate 
domestic hazards to the regimes in question. A prime example 
of this is seen in the strategic defense arena. For over a 
decade after the ABM Treaty came into force, U.S. planners 
faced a dilemma over how to react to ongoing R&D efforts by 
the Soviets aimed at improving their technology base in 
traditional, ground-based ABMs. Reflecting the situation in 
1972, the treaty gave both sides leeway to continue R&D on 
fixed, land-based ABM components (i.e., radars, 
interceptors, launchers), yet it dealt quite stringently
Shevchenko, for example, claims that the members of 
the Soviet Central Committee were constantly critical of 
Brezhnev's dealings with the United States during the late 
1970s. See Breaking With Moscow, p. 298.
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with non-fixed and (especially) space-based ABM components 
by banning their testing, development, and deployment.
As noted earlier, however, only the Soviets took 
maximum advantage of the permissive aspects of the treaty. 
They developed a new generation of ABM interceptors and 
radars, and continued to modernize and fill-out their 
existing defensive system in the Moscow region within the 
bounds set by the treaty. ABM work in the United States, 
which was justified mainly as a hedge against Soviet 
breakout, atrophied as a result of resistance in Congress, 
public lack of interest, and guilt by association with the 
seemingly endless debate over U.S. land-based ICBMs. A major 
consequence of this situation was a significant shift in 
relative advantage in ABM breakout capability. Whereas in 
the early 1970s the United States possessed a "lead-time" of 
several years over the Soviet Union in deployable 
technologies for large-scale missile defense, by the early 
1980s it found itself lagging behind by several years.
The shift in "lead-time/lag-time" differentials was a 
source of much frustration in the U.S. R&D community and 
among conservatives in Congress. Among other things, it 
spurred controversy over Soviet intentions and led to a 
situation in which any new Soviet ABM development that 
skirted close to the ambiguous edges of the treaty inspired 
press leaks and allegations of treaty violations and 
impending Soviet breakout. The shift also, notably, prompted
134
some advocates in the community (albeit only a vocal 
minority at the time) to promote greater emphasis in R&D on 
exotic space-based systems, especially laser sensing and 
weapon systems, which might someday lead to the creation of 
a multilayered defensive system, and in so doing to exploit 
America's comparative advantage in high technology while 
leap-frogging more traditional Soviet ABM programs.
Given President Reagan's deeply held conviction in the 
essential rightness of comprehensive strategic defenses, it 
is quite unlikely that fine-grained analyses of the 
lead-time/lag-time issue played a role in his decision to 
launch the SOI program. Yet, SDI was a godsend to 
high-technology ABM advocates and was rationalized by many 
Pentagon officials precisely as a response to Soviet 
advantages. These advocates had long chafed under the ABM 
Treaty's purported inequalities; and, once articulated by 
the President, the SDI program provided a strong argument 
for efforts to loosen those parts of the treaty regime that 
constrained R&D work on space-based ballistic missile 
defense. The attempted reinterpretation of the treaty was 
the logical result.
When seen in the context of lead-time/lag-time 
considerations, the SDI episode is quite instructive in what 
it says about the incentives driving compliance behavior. 
Clearly, the presence or absence of violations is not the 
only legitimate measure for assessing the health of a treaty
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regime; shifts such as the one discussed above also need to 
be factored in. If compliance behavior exacerbates 
differences in breakout or "creep-out" advantages over time, 
it can have a corrosive effect on agreed restraints and 
loosen their staying power.
Structural Factors and Compliance Behavior
Beyond revealing some of the various influences 
surrounding compliance behavior, the Soviet-American 
experience draws attention to factors not previously 
considered in the discussion of Chapter 2. The gist of that 
discussion was that a state's treaty-constrained behavior is 
a product of constantly competing influences, some favoring 
compliance, others not. In speculating about those 
influences, however, we presumed only that a state would act 
in accordance with its perceived self-interest; no special 
consideration was given to the structural or contextual 
aspects of the compliance relationship between the parties. 
By structure I mean specifically any similarities or 
differences in the "match" between a uniform set of agreed 
rules and the activities which are subject to limitation on 
each side. All else being equal, one could imagine that 
similarities in structure would tend to facilitate 
compliance, while differences or asymmetries would tend to 
create complications.
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In looking at the record the complicating effects of 
structural asymmetries in two areas stand out prominently. 
The first concerns verification. Under SALT I and the ABM 
Treaty, both sides accepted the use of national technical 
means (NTM) for the purposes of verifying compliance. To 
assure the effectiveness of NTMs, and largely at U.S. 
urging, both sides attempted to elaborate some limits on 
concealment practices designed to defeat NTMs. (The 
negotiations on this point will be discussed in Chapter 7.) 
The task proved difficult. Concealment activities that may 
hamper verification can also serve the function of assuring 
the survivability of forces which rely on mobility and 
stealth rather than on hardness for protection.
Despite the dark purposes often attributed to it, there 
is nothing really nefarious about the idea of concealment 
for survivability's sake. It is no less legitimate for the 
Soviet Union to hide its mobile ICBMs from U.S. satellites 
than it is for the United States to operate its nuclear 
missile-carrying submarines in a submerged position, out of 
view of hostile forces. Some degree of concealment is even a 
virtue. It would not help stability very much if in a crisis 
the Soviet or U.S. leaderships acted precipitously on the 
basis of a mistaken impression that the other side knew 
where all its mobile forces were and could target them 
within a time frame of hours.
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Thus, the SALT I negotiators found themselves in a 
quandary, attempting to limit but not to ban concealing 
practices. What they achieved was agreement that acts of 
"deliberate" concealment designed to impede verification 
would be banned. Notwithstanding the neutral formulations of 
treaty language, however, there is a clear asymmetry in the 
degree to which each side has relied upon NTMs to meet its 
verification needs. With a wealth of information on U.S. 
military posture available from competitive, open sources, 
the Soviet Union always has had a "safety net" for its 
verification practices that the United States could not 
match.^ This difference came into sharp focus when both 
sides first came into conflict over the concealment issue.
In 1973, Soviet diplomats complained that the placement 
of prefabricated shelters over ICBM launch silos at 
Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana was an act of prohibited 
concealment. U.S. officials denied this allegation and 
explained that the shelters were for "environmental" 
purposes, to protect personnel working in and around the 
silos from severe winter weather. The Soviets persisted, 
arguing that satellite observation was being impeded and 
that the large size of these shelters relative to ones which 
had been used by the U.S. Air Force in the 1960s raised
^  One indication of this has been the Soviet Union's 
penchant on occasion for proposing treaty provisions that it 
could not verify except through knowledge of open sources. 
Its proposal in SALT I to ban the deployment but not the 
testing of MIRVs was a good example.
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questions about U.S. intentions.^’ The issue was not 
resolved on the basis of these initial exchanges. Then, a 
year or so later, the United States complained about an 
expanding pattern of concealment activities that might 
threaten to impede verification in the future. Reportedly, 
the issues of concern included the placement of large 
canvass covers over Soviet submarine construction and repair 
facilities and the concealment of launchers at test 
r a n g e s . T h e  Soviets denied any problem and kept up their 
string of complaints over the environmental shelters on the 
U.S. side.
In retrospect, the U.S. position in each of these 
episodes was a meritorious one. On the one hand, it was 
scarcely possible that U.S. ICBM shelters were really 
impeding Soviet verification, let alone "deliberately" so; 
the Soviets certainly knew from publicly available sources 
which types of missiles were in the silos in question. And 
there was a strong sentiment in the U.S. government that to 
show flexibility on this issue would only embolden the 
Soviets to raise false issues and to interfere with 
legitimate operational practices that were not intended to
Strobe Talbott, Endgame; The Inside Story of SALT II 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 116.
Testimony of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 
in U.S. Congress, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms 
Control, Senate Armed Services Committee, Soviet Compliance 
With Certain Provisions of the 1972 SALT I Agreements. 94th 
Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1975), p.
3 .
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impede their verification.^ On the other hand, instances of 
concealment on the Soviet side appeared less easy to explain 
as anything other than deliberate, and they did raise 
genuine intelligence concerns for the United States, given 
its overwhelming reliance on NTM systems for verification.
The crux of the problem, however, was this: a neutral, 
parallel application of the rule on which the Soviets 
appeared to be insisting in this case —  not to conceal 
treaty-limited weapons from NTMs —  produced unequal effects 
which worked to the net disadvantage of the U.S. side. The 
United States faced a hard trade-off: in order for it to 
claim a right to challenge Soviet practices that it saw as 
threatening to verification it would have to undertake steps 
to allay Soviet complaints which were costly, inconvenient, 
and ultimately unnecessary from the standpoint of assuring 
Soviet confidence in verification. Perhaps the United States 
should have paid the price in order to hold the Soviets to a 
stricter compliance standard. In any event, the concealment 
issue was not resolved in the early years of SALT and 
continued to flare up until the full effects of Soviet 
alasnost policies began to be felt in the late 1980s.
The other area where structural asymmetries have 
obtruded into the compliance relationship is illustrated in 
the systems R&D approaches of both sides. As will be seen in 
Chapter 5, much time during the SALT II negotiation was
Talbott, Endgame, p. 117.
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devoted to working out agreed rules on the modernization or 
ICBMs. In essence, both sides accepted the idea of allowing 
only one "new type" of ICBM on each side and then negotiated 
a complex set of rules to define the difference between new 
and merely improved ICBMs. Under this arrangement a missile 
that varied by more than five percent from an existing type 
in terms of launchweight, throwweight, and other parameters 
would be classified as a new type. Suggested by American 
negotiators, the five percent rule was proposed in the 
knowledge that the "new type" of U.S. missile —  the MX —  
was fully protected and certain to fall unambiguously into 
that special category of new ICBMs. Soviet plans were less 
clear (except of course to the Soviets) at the time; they 
had several follow-on systems in development.
As an arms control tool, the new-types rule sought to 
resolve the twin dilemmas that qualitative innovation is 
difficult to limit verifiably and cannot simply be achieved 
by canceling new weapons if the scope for improvement in 
existing weapons is large. From the compliance standpoint, 
however, it is significant that negotiations on new types 
were conducted against the background of major differences 
between U.S. and Soviet approaches to technical innovation. 
The Soviet approach is generally quite conservative and 
incremental. Traditionally, Soviet designers have been 
reluctant to take risks with new technologies and are slow 
to absorb them into their defense production base.
141
Consequently, once they succeed in producing a reliable 
product, like a solid-fueled rocket booster or a mobile 
missile transporter, they tend to crank out many variations 
on the same basic design. In general, they also begin the 
testing of prototypes very early in the R&D process, in many 
cases well before a decision has been made to push a system 
into full scale development and ultimately to mass 
production. By contrast, the U.S. approach is more tolerant 
of risk. In a technologically dynamic environment, American 
planners are more comfortable with the idea of developing 
wholly new designs for successive generations of weapons. 
They also rely to a far greater extent than their Soviet 
counterparts on computer simulations to test initial 
research hypotheses and experimental design concepts; 
prototype testing is costly and generally occurs at more 
advanced stages.
These differences in these contrasting R&D styles were 
not simply an abstract concern; they posed complications for 
compliance. In the case of the Soviet SS-25 missile, noted 
in Table 3-2 and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, 
U.S. officials took the view that the missile could not be 
justified as a slight variation on an older missile, even 
though the older weapon, the SS-13, did have certain design 
parameters which were quite similar. Yet the job of coming
For insights into Soviet and U.S. approaches to 
technology development in the military-industrial area, I am 
grateful to Stephen M. Meyer of MIT.
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to judgment on the SS-25 was a tortuous one, for the 
measurements required to ascertain compliance were demanding 
in terms of NTM data and would have been so even in the 
absence of extensive Soviet concealment through telemetry 
encryption. Thus, it is fair to ask whether the five percent 
rule was in fact well suited as a legal guideline for 
constraining new types of Soviet missiles. Intuitively, it 
seems very problematic to focus on slight variations in 
measurements as the basis for ascertaining compliance in a 
situation where incremental innovation is already the 
prevalent mode of behavior. There is some irony in the fact 
that the five percent rule appears to have been much better 
suited to verifiably limiting the U.S. rather than the 
Soviet style of research and development.
Given these experiences with verification and R&D 
styles, our understanding of compliance dynamics needs to be 
refined to encompass the idea of structure as an influential 
factor. One cannot simply abstract compliance behavior from 
the environment in which it occurs without ignoring a 
dimension which is essential to assessing its significance. 
True enough, rules which are ambiguous, which tempt 
free-riding, or which impinge unfairly are more prone to 
breaking down than those which are clearer, more 
categorical, and fairer in their application. But there is a 
class of problems that stem from the diverse interactions of 
agreed rules with the structural characteristics of the
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societies and military establishments on each side. Such 
frictions can create or contribute to the centrifugal 
tendencies discussed above.
CONCLUSIONS
That compliance behavior has been an ongoing source of 
controversy during much of the strategic arms control 
process since 1972 cannot be denied. Yet the nature of the 
problem defies the simple characterizations that are often 
used to describe it. The main issue has not been the 
occurrence of significant violations; these have been few 
and far between. Rather, the issues of concern have stemmed 
from a larger array of treaty-constrained behavior —  
compliant as well as noncompliant —  which resulted in 
disappointed expectations on each side regarding how agreed 
rules were supposed to work and which raised fears of 
adverse shifts in the relative potential of each side to 
break out of treaty restraints on short notice. Furthermore, 
these problems have been exacerbated by structural 
asymmetries in the compliance relationship which have put 
stress on agreements and have generated disagreement, 
especially in the United States, over the motives underlying 
problematic behavior.
We thus arrive at a question of singular importance: if 
the quality of compliance behavior on each side has provoked 
ongoing problems but was never damaging enough at any time
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to drive the negotiating process to a halt, what larger 
meaning can compliance problems have? Have they shaped the 
rule-making process in identifiable ways? Have they inspired 
a degree of experiential learning? Intuitively, some shaping 
effects must be present, for no agreement could ever be 
wholly stable in the face of opposing force postures (even 
at much lower levels than exist today). Like a house that 
sits on a shifting fault line, an arms control regime will 
always be subject to the build-up or attenuation of 
pressures and tensions brought about by shifts in the 
strategic context. To admit the inevitability of 
earthquakes, however, is not to be paralyzed by them. To 
extend our metaphor, the long-term durability of a house 
near a fault line will depend on the willingness of its 
occupants to cooperate in taking whatever steps are 
necessary to reinforce the structure against all but the 
worst shocks and tremors. The same is true in the arms 
control sphere. From the long-term perspective, the 
important issue is not simply what kind of damage has been 
inflicted by individual instances of compliance problems, 
but whether these problems overall have prompted useful 
refinements in the strategic bargaining process and in the 
character and constraining effects of the rules over time.
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PART II:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BARGAINING METHODOLOGY
—  "The devil is in the details."
Paul Nitze

4.
THE FORMATIVE CONTEXT
To understand the evolution of Soviet-American 
strategic arms diplomacy and the effects of compliance 
behavior upon it, we need to examine the impulses which drew 
the two sides into the bargaining process in the first 
place. Traditionally, it has been the fear of adverse shifts 
in international power relations which has acted as a 
catalyst for strategic diplomacy between rival states. In 
Thucydides' day, for example, the growth of Athenian power 
following the victory over Persia in 480 B.C. sparked fears 
among neighboring states on the Peloponnesian peninsula, 
prompting Sparta to propose that the Athenians refrain from 
rebuilding their city walls and join Sparta in "throwing 
down the existing walls of the cities outside the 
Peloponnese.Nothing came of this intriguing experiment in
 ^ Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, ed. 
and trans.. Sir Richard Livingstone (Oxford: GUP, 1972), p. 
48. In Thucydides' account, the rebuilding of Athens' wall 
had an unsettling effect throughout Greece. Sparta and other 
cities were wary of the growth of Athenian naval power and 
saw the city fortifications as underwriting an offensive 
strategy. In fact, this was precisely their purpose; the 
Athenian statesman, Themistocles, believed that with the 
wall to help fend-off attacks, he could shift manpower from 
the city garrison to the fleet. In her proposal to Athens, 
Sparta argued that in the event of another Persian invasion, 
it would be much harder to evict the enemy from areas north 
of the Peloponnesian peninsula if Athens and other cities 
rebuilt their walls. Instead of city defense, Sparta 
contended, Athenian forces could use the Peloponnese as a 
base for operations. The Athenians, however, would have none 
of it and criticized the plan as one-sided. Themistocles
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strategic defensive limitations, and soon thereafter ancient 
Greece lapsed into civil war.
In the early years of this century. Great Britain saw 
limitations on naval forces as a way to codify equality with 
the United States, its principal maritime rival after the 
first World War; both countries in turn feared the growth of 
Japanese power in the Pacific and looked to contain it in 
part through diplomatic means. The result was the Washington 
Naval Treaty of 1922, which lasted for about a decade. More 
than forty years later, the growth of Soviet strategic 
forces spurred American overtures on the possibility of 
controlling offensive and defensive strategic weapons. The 
ensuing negotiations —  the focus of this study —  are still 
unfinished business, and they lack any historical parallel 
if measured by the length of diplomacy and the number of 
agreements reached.
The impulse to negotiate of course is hardly a 
sufficient condition for achieving agreements, let alone 
durable or effective ones. For negotiating presupposes 
nothing more than a desire of one party to influence, for 
good or ill, strategic choices which the other party has 
within its own power to make. Such influence may be sought 
by cajoling, deceiving, bluffing, bullying, as well as
told his Spartan interlocutors that either "all the members 
of the confederacy should be without walls," or else the 
Athenian wall should be considered legitimate (p. 49).
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through sweet reason; and agreements may or may not be the 
objective.^ Logically, it seems unlikely that agreements 
could emerge unless three elements or conditions were 
present. First, the desire to influence choices must be in 
some sense reciprocal; it is only in the context of 
reciprocity that trade-offs can emerge. Second, both sides 
must perceive a security stake in the new or altered status 
quo, however defined. The status quo need not be 
comprehensive —  and probably could not be in an adversarial 
setting —  but is limited to aspects of the relationship 
where both sides sense penalties in allowing the free-play 
of military market forces to continue unimpeded. Third, 
there must be some means to verify the other side's 
compliance with confidence.
If experience is any guide, the intersection of these 
elements at any point in time is extremely rare. In our 
present case, Soviets and Americans negotiated with each 
other on security matters for over two decades without 
coming close to establishing a step-by-step process on 
limiting strategic force postures; none of the necessary 
pre-conditions for agreements obtained. This changed in the
 ^Again, Thucydides provides a good illustration. 
Themistocles traveled to Sparta on a diplomatic mission 
ostensibly aimed at calming fears in the Peloponnesian 
states about the Athenian city wall. However, the trip was 
really a delaying maneuver to buy additional time for the 
final push to completion of the wall, so that he could 
present Sparta with a fait accompli. Ibid.. pp. 48-49.
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later 1960s when important adjustments in the strategic 
setting created more opportune circumstances. The key point 
argued below, however, is that the formative conditions, 
once achieved, not only shifted the pattern of interactions 
from generalized diplomacy to focused bargaining on specific 
agreements, they also shaped significantly the content of 
the bargaining in subsequent phases. Thus, the very 
conditions that paved the way for initial agreements also 
created certain complications which in turn shaped the 
agenda for the negotiation of follow-on accords. What 
resulted from Soviet-American arms diplomacy was not a 
comprehensive framework in one fell swoop, but an evolving 
regime of operative rules achieved in incremental steps, 
with each step affecting the successive ones in various 
ways.
EARLY OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT
During the early Cold War years, the search for 
productive East-West negotiations was effectively precluded 
by two fundamental obstacles. First, the status quo of the 
late 1940s and early 1950s was inchoate. The Axis powers lay 
in ruin, and political alignments throughout Europe and Asia 
were unsettled. Second, the character of Soviet military 
power was veiled in secrecy. This knowledge gap —  the lack 
of Western intelligence on Soviet forces relative to Soviet 
knowledge of the Western posture —  was perhaps a less
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fundamental obstacle than the disputes over political 
alignment and ideology; and yet its resolution was an 
absolute prerequisite for dealing with other aspects of the 
confrontation through negotiation.
Shortly after World War II, U.S. and other Western 
intelligence services embarked upon an ambitious effort to 
develop a clearer understanding of Soviet military 
activities. With no access to Russian territory and little 
background knowledge on the Soviet military-industrial base, 
Western experts pieced together intelligence from a 
disparate and uneven network of sources.^ In hindsight it is 
well known that U.S. intelligence projections overestimated 
the scale of Soviet bomber and missile deployments during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s.^ To a significant degree, 
these forecasting errors were abetted by exaggerated claims 
by the Kremlin leadership, which had a strong stake in 
masking Soviet vulnerability in the face of overwhelming 
U.S. strategic power and an operational doctrine on the 
American side biased strongly toward the early, massive use
Prados, The Soviet Estimate, pp. 25-2 6; and David A, 
Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International 
Securitv. Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), p. 21.
Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet 
Strategic Threat (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), pp. 66-88.
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of nuclear weapons in wartime contingencies.^
On the diplomatic front, the secrecy surrounding Soviet 
strategic power became the symbol of the larger diplomatic 
stalemate. Still, the roots of the negotiating problem were 
largely strategic and conceptual: political alignments were 
not settled, and even if they had been, the question of 
bargaining methodology remained open. There simply was no 
historical analogue for the effective control of weapons of 
mass- destruction. Atomic and later thermonuclear power 
constituted a new and unprecedented threat which produced 
strong impulses for extreme remedies before these weapons 
were integrated into opposing force structures. "Ban the 
bomb" strategies dominated the public agenda. Many looked to 
the fledgling United Nations system as the only available 
way to regulate the technology and uses of atomic energy; 
but the wartime alliance structure on which the UN concept 
was based was breaking down, and the issue was ripe for 
impasse. The East accused the West of wanting "inspection 
without control" while the West responded that unverified 
disarmament was worse than none at all. This discordant 
theme was replayed numerous times in UN diplomacy during the 
early postwar years.
By the early 1950s, efforts to ban the bomb had lost
 ^ For a detailed treatment of Soviet strategy, see 
Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet 
Foreign Policv (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 
pp. 105—125.
152
credibility. The Soviet atomic test of 1949 made such 
strategies less practical and raised serious doubts that 
Western inspection proposals, which were already 
unacceptable to the Soviets, could ever be effective even if 
implemented. In April 1952, Secretary of State Acheson 
appointed a panel of experts led by Robert Oppenheimer to 
rethink the matter for the next administration. The general 
thrust of the panel's argument was that political tensions 
between East and West and the scale of arms acquisition on 
each side would make progress on comprehensive measures for 
disarmament very unlikely. More realistic efforts at "arms 
regulation," it concluded, should be the new priority. 
"Inspection" could be made more "effective and less 
burdensome by the development and use of increasingly 
sensitive techniques of scientific intelligence."* It was a 
prescient observation.
Gradually, American diplomacy shifted toward the 
general approach sketched out by Oppenheimer and his 
colleagues. Confidence-building rather than 
comprehensiveness soon became the major criterion for U.S. 
negotiating policy. Under Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal 
the United States argued that mutually-agreed overhead 
observation by aircraft could help to allay fears regarding
* McGeorge Bundy, "Early Thoughts on Controlling the 
Nuclear Arms Race: A Report to the Secretary of State, 
January 1953," International Securitv, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 
1982), p. 27.
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the dispersal of long-range bombers or large scale troop 
movements —  the precursors of surprise attack prior to the 
advent of ballistic missiles —  and yet be far less 
intrusive than other forms of inspection. The Soviets were 
hostile to the idea, however, and clashes over U.S. 
intelligence operations continued, culminating in the 
shooting-down of the American U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk, 
USSR, in 1960.
Where Eisenhower tried without success to establish a 
legitimate basis for reconnaissance by aircraft, U.S. 
officials fared better with satellites in the early 1960s. 
During late 1960 and early 1961, U.S. photo-reconnaissance 
satellites confirmed the absence of any widespread 
deployment of Soviet ICBMs, exploding the myth of Soviet 
missile superiority.^ At the UN and the disarmament talks in 
Geneva, the Soviets kept up their political offensive 
against U.S. intelligence collection, introducing proposals 
banning satellite-borne reconnaissance. By 1963, however, 
they gave indications of a more tolerant attitude. In 1967, 
they signed up to the Outer Space Treaty without insisting 
on any specific language banning satellite reconnaissance.®
Quite apart from the fact that they could not
 ^Philip J. Klass, Secret Sentries in Space (New York: 
Random House, 1971), pp. 105-108.
® Herbert Scoville, Jr., "The Technology of 
Surveillance," Society. Vol. 12, No. 3 (March/April 1975), 
p. 63.
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physically shoot down U.S. satellites at that time, the 
Soviets' gradual acceptance of satellite reconnaissance has 
been explained in a number of ways. According to one view, 
the shift resulted from a tacit bargaining process leading 
to the restraint of anti-satellite capabilities on both 
sides.* Others have suggested that Soviet views were 
conditioned by the development of their own programs —  they 
had, after all, established the precedent of satellite 
overflight with Sputnik —  and that they realized that the 
further militarization of space was probably not in their 
interests.^ The assiduous efforts by the Kennedy 
Administration to remove U.S. reconnaissance programs from 
the public limelight may have helped to avoid putting the 
Soviets on the public defensive.Whatever the reason, by 
the 1960s the sharp political tensions over strategic 
reconnaissance were ebbing, and these programs were 
beginning to provide the kind of data that could be useful 
both for strategic intelligence and treaty verification. The 
unilateral aspect of this capability was especially 
attractive. As President Kennedy commented in the aftermath
* Gerald Steinberg, Satellite Reconnaissance: The Role 
of Informal Bargaining (New York: Praeger, 1983).
See, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, "Banning the 
Bomb in Outer Space," International Securitv. Vol. 5, No. 3 
(Winter 1980/81), pp. 25-40.
See discussion in Paul B. Stares, The Militarization 
of Space: U.S. Policv, 1945-1984 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), pp. 62-71.
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of Khrushchev's decisions to withdraw Soviet missiles from 
Cuba and to permit U.S. verification of the removal:"The 
camera...is actually going to be our best inspector."^
TRENDS IN STRATEGIC FORCES
While the development of technical intelligence 
collection was instrumental in narrowing the knowledge gap, 
the more proximate triggering factor for serious negotiation 
emerged from strategic force interactions of the 19 60s. On 
the U.S. side, the acquisition of offensive delivery systems 
had essentially leveled off by 1967 after a substantial 
buildup in the Kennedy-Johnson years that saw deployment of 
54 Titan and 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs, 656 Polaris and Poseidon 
SLBMs on-board 41 submarines, and retention of about 600 
B-52 class bombers. Meanwhile, momentum had swung to the 
Soviet side. Beginning in 1965, the Soviets brought into 
service a new, third generation of ICBMs. Existing small 
scale and largely vulnerable deployments of SS-6 and SS-7 
missiles were eclipsed by rapid deployment of SS-9 and SS-11
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Davs: John F. 
Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1965), p. 694.
Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The 
Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 50-51; 
J.P. Ruina, "U.S. and Soviet Strategic Arsenals," in Mason 
Willrich and John P. Rhinelander, eds., SALT: The Moscow 
Agreements and Bevond (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 
51-59.
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ICBMs in hardened underground silos. Between 1966 and 1969, 
the Soviets added about 300 new ICBM launchers to their 
operational force each year, and by 1972 had deployed some 
970 SS-11 and 288 SS-9 missiles. They also made a major 
investment in developing a mobile I C B M . I n  addition, there 
were clear indications by 1968 that the Soviets would pursue 
a substantial SLBM program, beginning with the Yankee class 
submarine. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s they put 
into service Yankee and (later) Delta class boats at a rate 
of about eight per year. At the same time, Soviet efforts 
in the strategic defense area appeared to be slackening off 
somewhat. After triggering much concern about a possible 
move toward a nationwide ABM system in the mid-1960s, the
David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, 
2nd ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 43; 
William Hyland, "The U.S.S.R. and Nuclear War," in Barry M. 
Blechman, ed., Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture 
(Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger, 1982), pp. 52-53. In advance of 
the freeze on new silo launchers in 1972, as Hyland points 
out, the Soviets started work on 2 0 additional silos that 
turned out to be for the SS-9 follow-on, the SS-18, bringing 
the total number of large ICBM to 308. Garthoff points out 
that the rapid increase in silo starts essentially ceased 
with the commencement of SALT negotiations; only 80 
additional silos were started between 1969 and 1972 as 
contrasted to 650 in the two and a half years preceding the 
negotiations. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating With 
the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," International 
Security, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1977), p. 21.
But not with much success apparently. The weapon for 
this purpose, the SS-13, was eventually based in fixed silos 
and only deployed in small numbers (60).
Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1129; Freedman,
U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 154.
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Soviets curtailed deployments of the Galosh ABM system 
around Moscow at 64 launchers by 1967. By that time, the 
U.S. intelligence community had come to the view that 
defensive installations going in around attack air-corridors 
in the northwestern Soviet Union were not optimized for 
intercepting ballistic missiles.
It is difficult to pinpoint any single factor as the 
stimulus behind the growth of Soviet intercontinental strike 
forces during these years. At the very least, the Soviets 
perceived an immediate politico-military imperative to 
correct their glaring strategic inferiority that could no 
longer be hidden behind a veil of secrecy. Khrushchev's 
hasty covert deployment of medium-range missiles to Cuba in 
1962 had ended in failure. Henry Kissinger, among others, 
directly linked the Soviet arms expansion of the early 
Brezhnev years to the humiliation that Kremlin leaders 
suffered at the hands of the Kennedy Administration during 
the Cuban debacle.^® On the other hand, William Hyland has 
portrayed the Soviet defense program of this period as a 
logical progression from previous efforts dating back to the 
late 1 9 5 0 s . H e  contends that the force levels which the 
Soviets attained by the early 1970s were roughly comparable
Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 164.
Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 196-197.
Hyland, "The U.S.S.R. and Nuclear War," pp. 52-53.
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to what they expected U.S. ICBM forces to look like during 
the same general time frame.^° Michael MccGwire has 
explained Soviet actions in somewhat similar terms, arguing 
that initial plans for ICBM forces in the 1965-1970 time 
frame were drawn up on the basis of then-existing doctrinal 
requirements for strategic superiority, but were adjusted to 
match projected U.S. force levels.
Retrospective analyses certainly convey a clearer sense 
of the acute dilemmas that Soviet planners perceived as a 
result of the Kennedy-Johnson force expansion. Robert Berman 
and John Baker have argued that the Soviets saw in the 
Minuteman force an emerging threat that they could not 
offset with then-existing regional missile forces, strategic 
defense, or their still vulnerable above-ground I C B M s . O n e  
result was that the Soviets decided to expand production of 
their SS-11 variable range missile, which they apparently 
had developed for anti-naval missions (i.e., to target U.S. 
carrier task-groups), and deploy it instead as a counter to
Ibid. , p. 53.
Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), pp. 
235-236.
Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic 
Forces; Reguirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 1982), pp. 50-54.
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Minuteman. Deployment of the SS-11 on a scale commensurate 
with the Minuteman (1,000 units) had not been expected by 
U.S. analysts; it was a major contributing factor to CIA 
forecasting errors in the mid 1960s that understated the 
scale of the Soviet ICBM buildup within a five year time 
frame.
The most conspicuous element of the Soviet buildup —  
and one for which there was no U.S. counterpart —  was the 
SS-9 Scarp, a large payload ICBM deployed initially with a 
single warhead in the multimegaton range. No sooner had the 
SS-9 appeared in the operational inventory in 1966 than it 
was seen as an emerging threat to Minuteman. H o w  much of a
Ibid., pp. 54-55. It nevertheless remains unclear 
exactly what kind of countering role the Soviets saw the 
SS-11 as playing. The SS-13 had proved unreliable in this 
role and was downgraded in favor of an expanded SS-11 
program. But the SS-11 lacked the accuracy to be a 
counterforce weapon and thus cannot be considered as a 
military response to Minuteman. Berman and Baker (p. 53) 
argue that the Soviets wanted to politically match Minuteman 
deployments, preferably with the SS-13. MccGwire, Soviet 
Military Objectives, p. 484, suggests that the scale of the 
SS-11 deployment was consistent as an interim response to 
the Minuteman threat.
Bruce Berkowitz, "Intelligence in the Organizational 
Context: Coordination and Error in National Estimates,"
Orbis. Vol. 28, No. 3 (Fall 1985), p. 589. The other major 
source of error results from the fact that the Soviets did 
not retire their 200 or so SS-7s and SS-8s, as expected.
Les Aspin, "Debate Over U.S. Strategic Forecasts: A Mixed 
Record," Strategic Review. Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1980), p. 
37.
The 1966 draft presidential memorandum identifies 
SS-9s equipped with accurate MIRVs together with ABMs as a 
worst case against which U.S. planning would have to hedge. 
See Robert S. McNamara, Draft Presidential Memorandum on 
Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces for FY1968-72,
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threat was a very contentious issue. Commenting on the 
intelligence over a decade later, Harold Brown stated: 
"Because of the technical characteristics of their earlier 
systems we were able to infer that, as early as 1962-1963, 
the Soviets had a policy of building forces for preemptive 
attack of U.S. ICBMs....The more than 200 SS-9s were almost 
surely targeted against the 100 Minuteman launch control 
complexes, two missiles to a complex for reliability. The 
Soviets, unable at the time to produce forces whose number, 
yield and accuracy were such as to be able to threaten our 
hardened missiles, opted to target our ground 
command-control. We, however, had already anticipated such 
Soviet actions, and in the late 1960s deployed alternate 
airborne launch control.... In short, the SS-9 was a Soviet 
program of great megatonnage but little counterforce 
v a l u e . F o r e c a s t s  at the time were decidedly less 
sanguine, in large part because the SS-9 was widely seen as 
the logical candidate for MIRVing. The testing of the 
missile in a "triplet" configuration (3 warheads, not 
independently targeted), which commenced in August 1968, 
lent credence to this perception. Parts of the Pentagon and 
the intelligence community predicted a counterforce threat
Department of Defense, November 9, 1966, p. 7.
Address by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 
"Responding to Soviet Strategic Weaponry," U.S. Naval 
Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, May 30, 1979, p. 3 (mimeo)
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emerging from SS-9 deployments by the mid-1970s.
Hedging the Threat
The character of the Soviet buildup posed a sharp 
dilemma for U.S. policy planning. As is well known, then 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and like-minded 
analysts believed that the development of dispersed and 
survivable Soviet forces fundamentally undermined any notion 
that U.S. force planning should be geared to weapons 
employment strategies more ambitious than assuring 
devastating retaliation against the Soviet Union in response 
to an attack. McNamara consistently questioned and later 
opposed the more ambitious forms of damage limitation —  
i.e., having forces sufficient to destroy or disrupt the 
Soviet nuclear posture such that it could not cause severe 
damage to the U.S. population and industry —  that were in 
vogue in the U.S. Air Force.
John Foster, Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering (DDR&E), among others, was a vocal proponent of 
the SS-9 counterforce threat potential. According to 
Foster's calculations, 400 SS-9s, each armed with 3 MIRVs of 
about 5 megatons in yield and with an accuracy approaching 
one quarter of a nautical mile would suffice to put 
then-existing deployments of Minuteman at risk (i.e., better 
than 90% destroyed). See comments in U.S. Congress, ABM, 
MIRV. SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1970), p. 437.
For instance, in outlining recommendations in his 
draft presidential memorandum (DPM) on strategic offensive 
and defensive forces for fiscal years 1965-1969, McNamara 
argued; "The prospects for 'damage limiting' by counterforce 
attacks may not hold great promise in the latter part of the
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On the other hand, some kind of response to the Soviet 
build-up seemed necessary. The Johnson Administration found 
it increasingly difficult to reconcile force-sizing criteria 
that were not terribly sensitive to Soviet force levels with 
the widely held perception that some measure of U.S. 
superiority remained a vital component of deterrence 
overall.^* As a result, while McNamara and his associates
1960s if the Soviets harden and disperse their ICBM force 
and build up their missile submarine force as we now expect 
them to do. I believe the recommended forces accomplish what 
might reasonably be done from this point of view, and that 
the extra capability proposed by the Air Force would make a 
contribution to 'damage limiting' too small to be justified 
in the light of its extra cost." See Robert S. McNamara, 
Draft Memorandum for the President: Recommended FY1965-69 
Strategic Retaliatory Forces, Department of Defense,
December 6, 1963, p. 6. Contrary to the popular mythology, 
U.S. targeting policy always presumed a significant 
counterforce component, and McNamara was quite careful in 
weighing relative hard-target kill potential on each side.
In the 1967 DPM, for example, he compares the 1972 
programmed U.S. missile force against the expected Soviet 
ICBM force in terms of hard-target kill, and comes up with a 
favorable ratio from the U.S. standpoint (700:300 targets at 
risk). See Robert S. McNamara, Draft Memorandum for the 
President on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces for FY 
1969-73, Department of Defense, January 15, 1968 (revised), 
p. 7. The relevant point here is that the Soviet strategic 
buildup —  at least to the extent it resulted in deployment 
of more survivable second-strike systems —  offered McNamara 
a powerful argument against pursuing more expansive force 
postures that he regarded as profligate of weapons and 
scarce resources.
A good example of the ambivalence is seen in the 
1968 DPM's discussion of force planning options: "We do not 
intend to allow our policy of basing the size of our forces 
on the Assured Destruction mission to result in the Soviets 
overtaking us or even matching our strategic power. However, 
the relationship of 'nuclear superiority' as such to our 
military and political objectives is debatable....[o]nee 
each side has enough nuclear forces to be sure it can 
substantially eliminate the other's urban society in a 
second strike, the utility of extra nuclear forces is
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sought to downplay the significance of nuclear superiority 
as a useful instrument of national policy, they continued to 
emphasize those measures of capability which greatly favored 
the United States, such as deliverable warheads, as the most 
meaningful measures of c a p a b i l i t y D u r i n g  the 1965-1966 
time frame, a series of new initiatives was set in motion. 
The most notable of these were the upgrading of ICBM 
squadrons with procurement of the Minuteman II and III 
follow-on systems; replacement of Polaris A-3 SLBMs with 
Poseidon missiles on board 31 of 41 ballistic missile- 
equipped submarines; plans for dispersing and relocating 
long-range bombers during periods of tension; development of 
airborne command and launch control systems; and space-based 
early warning systems. The overarching aim was to hedge 
Soviet counterforce potential while assuring (and improving) 
coverage of Soviet targets in the face of a Soviet ABM 
system that had begun to be deployed in 1965. This was 
consistent with McNamara's avowed determination to hold the 
line against further force expansion which, in his view, 
compared poorly in cost-effectiveness and survivability 
terms with modernization of forces in being.
conjectural." Clark Clifford, Draft Presidential Memorandum 
on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces for FY1970-74, 
Department of Defense, January 9, 1969, pp. 6-7.
Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Securitv: 
Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 
56—57.
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In this sense, MIRV technology was the key element —  
and the great beneficiary —  of NcMamara's efforts to strike 
a balance between the contrasting imperatives of restraint 
and response. Armed with MIRV, Pentagon civilians had a 
strong lever against Air Force preferences for major 
increases in the number of operational missiles; efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness considerations strongly weighed in 
favor of MIRV.^ In most cases, it promised a substantial 
reduction in cost per target destroyed in comparison with 
bombers or single warhead m i s s i l e s . A t  the same time, MIRV 
provided an enhancement to deterrence which could be 
represented as a numerical superiority (in warheads) that 
would offset possible Soviet advantages in throwweight or 
launchers. Perhaps most importantly, McNamara and others saw 
in MIRV an indispensable tool for assuring coverage of
 ^Jerome H. Kahan, Securitv in the Nuclear Age: 
Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 1975), p. 133. Initially, the Air Force resisted 
MIRV on the grounds that it would lead to reduced 
counterforce capability as the ICBM force shifted to smaller 
warheads. Studies undertaken during the mid-1960s, however, 
showed that any diminution in silo kill probability 
resulting from lower yields could be recouped by increases 
in the number of warheads. See discussion in Ted Greenwood, 
Making the MIRV: A Studv of Defense Decision Making 
(Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger, 1975), p. 39.
McNamara used cost per target comparisons to argue 
against the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA), later 
termed the B-1, and in favor of the MIRVed Minuteman III.
See Robert S. McNamara, Draft Memorandum for the President: 
Recommended FY1966-70 Programs for Strategic Offensive 
Forces, Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces, and 
Civil Defense, Department of Defense, December 3, 1964, p. 
23.
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since the United States maintains such large strategic 
forces and could expand them with less sacrifice than the 
S o v i e t s . I n  light of subsequent developments, it is 
unclear whether the Soviets in fact worried very much about 
the effects of MIRVed Minuteman or Poseidon forces upon 
their deterrent, at least in isolation from ABM. Although 
the Soviets initially had expressed a clear preference for 
limiting strategic offensive arms first, by the time that 
negotiations got underway in 1969 they had, in Arkady 
Shevchenko's words, shifted "180 d e g r e e s . S o v i e t  
negotiators appeared far more intent upon protecting their 
offensive arms buildup than exploring the prospect of 
trading-off cutbacks in their programs as a quid for 
constraints on the modernization of U.S. forces. But ABM was 
an entirely different matter. Two-sided ABM deployment could 
impose burdens upon offensive forces that the Soviets were 
less well equipped to handle in the absence of MIRVed 
forces. They therefore gave every indication of accepting 
the idea of mutual vulnerability in practice, if not in 
principle, in the interest of gaining a lever on 
developments on the U.S. side that might leave them at a
Clifford, Draft Presidential Memorandum, p. 22. 
Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow, p. 2 01.
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substantial disadvantage.^^
THE IMPACT ON NEGOTIATIONS
As the foregoing suggests, the prerequisites for 
serious negotiation seemed to be falling into place by the 
late 1960s. The knowledge gap was shrinking thanks largely 
to U.S. NTMs. Meanwhile, a rough parity was beginning to 
emerge. The United States was looking for ways to moderate 
the Soviet buildup of offensive arms while the Soviet Union 
appeared increasingly anxious to thwart any countering U.S. 
moves, especially in the strategic defense area, which would 
erode its hard-sought gains. Finally, the struggle for 
political alignment was becoming less of an impediment, 
because it was shifting from Europe and Northeast Asia 
toward areas of the Third World where nuclear weapons played 
less of a role than power projection capabilities (e.g., 
sea- and airlift, and carrier-based aviation, etc.) in 
shaping regional security. Amid these developments, one 
could clearly discern the outline of an emerging status quo 
that might have some appeal to both sides. Still, several
Whether or not one believes that the Soviets meant 
to endorse mutual deterrence explicitly in the ABM Treaty or 
simply to improve their relative position vis-a-vis the 
United States in ABM technology, one can hardly deny that 
they accepted mutual deterrence as a practical consequence 
of the ABM Treaty for the indefinite future. The best 
affirmative case for Soviet acceptance of mutual deterrence 
as a basis for strategic relations is made in Raymond L. 
Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation 
in Soviet Policy," pp. 112-147.
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factors inherent in this situation promised to complicate 
efforts to formalize the new status quo through a bargaining 
process.
Strategic Postures; Balance and Imbalance
In the strategic realm, the fact of impending parity 
facilitated negotiations in a general sense, but the 
character of parity had important implications for the 
direction and content of the bargaining. First and foremost, 
nationwide ABM deployments were seen by both sides as 
expendable. Perhaps this was "parity” in its most elemental 
sense. The ABM mission had not been absorbed into the force 
structure of either side in a major way. In spite of vocal 
support for ABM from some quarters, neither country saw much 
utility in them; and each appeared apprehensive about the 
financial and operational burdens of having to hedge against 
extensive ABM deployment on the other side. As a 
consequence, low numerical thresholds were not a priori 
contentious; nor, for that matter, were stringent rules 
against the development of new forms of ABMs. The more 
problematic issues were how far to press for limits on 
non-ABM capabilities or testing activity —  eg., early 
warning, air-defense —  that might have residual ABM
This is not the same thing as saying that neither 
saw any role in ongoing R&D investments and, at least on the 
Soviet side, in small-scale deployment.
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applications, and whether permitted R&D might give one side 
or the other a breakout advantage over the longer term.
From the bargaining standpoint the situation of mutual 
forbearance in nationwide ABM which was formalized by 
agreement in 1972 was the logical outcome. It was, of 
course, not the only possible outcome. Both sides in theory 
could have constructed a more complex regime in which high 
levels of ground-based ABM deployments on each side were 
related to each other and to offensive forces according to 
some specified measure of equality. But such a regime would 
have been completely out of phase with the technical reality 
of offense dominance which existed at the time.
With respect to offensive forces, the character of the 
situation in the early 1970s forced the negotiations in a 
different direction. Mutual forbearance was not a practical 
option given the levels of deployment already achieved; some 
kind of balance would have to be pieced together. Yet by 
that time offensive strategic forces had already begun to 
evolve in ways that would complicate efforts to strike 
internally balanced agreements with roughly symmetrical 
effects. "Codifying parity" was much acclaimed as an 
abstract proposition, but the substantive characteristics of 
parity as it existed reflected a series of complex 
imbalances between increasingly asymmetrical force 
structures. From the negotiating standpoint this raised the 
question of whether operative rules would simply attempt to
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balance these differences or attempt to conform them through 
a process of restructuring. As will be seen in the next 
chapter, the idea of offsetting strength for strength held 
definite appeal for some policymakers. However, the core 
difference between the two force postures was difficult to 
offset: the Soviet proclivity to emphasize large payload 
ICBMs was seen as a clear indication of a destabilizing 
operational pattern —  i.e., preemption against ICBMs —  
that could not be counterbalanced by U.S. advantages in 
long-range bombers or sea-based forces. Cutting into 
preemptive ICBM capability therefore increasingly became the 
sine qua non for widely supported agreements in the United 
States.
Finally, MIRV technology was a major unsettled question 
in the early 1970s; in this sense, the strategic status quo 
was still inchoate and could have been open to adjustment in 
various directions. The dilemma here was that, as the main 
ingredient of the U.S. response to the Soviet buildup, MIRV 
had already come to reflect a bureaucratic consensus within 
the U.S. defense community which was unlikely to be undone 
short of a major restructuring of Soviet strategic rocket 
forces. Had MIRV simply been a counter to Soviet ABM it too 
would have become expendable. But MIRV was also a means to 
allocate more rationally a fixed level of destructive 
payload among a larger number of targets; it was a useful 
lever against further wasteful expansion in U.S. force
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posture; it was a potent symbol of continuing U.S. 
superiority at a time when superiority was still regarded as 
an indispensable part of deterrence; and it was justified by 
some as a hedge against certain types of Soviet violations 
of a mutual ABM ban.
Thus, the logic of MIRV was absorbed into U.S. defense 
planning well before the first testing of MIRVed systems in 
1968. Although MIRV certainly had its share of critics in 
the early 1970s, the outcome which makes the MIRV decision 
look so shortsighted in retrospect —  namely, the 
combination of MIRV and large payload Soviet ICBMs —  was 
not regarded as inevitable by many in the United States at 
the time. Those who favored MIRV argued that the best way to 
proceed in negotiations was not to restructure then-current 
U.S. ICBM and SLBM programs, but to seek cutbacks in future 
Soviet MIRV capacity via mutual limits on ICBM 
throwweight.^" Soviet MIRVing would then appear to be less
Foster, for one, justified retaining the MIRV option 
under the SALT I agreements as a hedge against covert 
upgrading of the SA-5. See comments in U.S. Congress, Fiscal 
1974 Authorization for Militarv Procurement. Research and 
Development. Construction Authorization for the Safeguard 
ABM, and Active Dutv and Selected Reserve Strengths. 93rd 
Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1973), p. 
941.
For discussion and a criticism of this view, see 
Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings, 1985), p. 134.
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threatening.41 whatever the merits of this position, it left 
open the nagging question of what capabilities the United 
States would offer in exchange for forbearance on the Soviet 
side. The MIRV problem went unsolved in SALT I and has 
plagued arms control ever since. Both sides now face the 
challenge of adjusting to a strategic world in which any 
known fixed target is theoretically at risk of prompt (e.g., 
30 minute) destruction, and in which any highly MIRVed 
fixed, land-based system constitutes a valuable target that 
can be destroyed at a fraction of its price. This inherent 
vulnerability, coupled with the risk of incautious behavior 
in crises, is one of the strongest impulses behind the 
negotiating process.
National Technical Means; Benefits and Burdens
Without question, NTMs proved to be a substantial 
catalyst to bargaining. By providing a baseline of knowledge 
on Soviet force structure, they served as a filter of sorts 
for U.S. policymakers in sifting out inherently unverifiable 
proposals from the menu of options. NTMs enabled U.S. 
officials to gauge the types of force enhancements that
41 Thus, for example, as Senator Gordon Allott argued 
during the Senate debate on the SALT I agreements: "In terms 
of 'throwweight'...the Soviet advantage today is between 4 
to 1 and 5 to 1. This is not intolerable until the Soviet 
Union MIRVs its missiles....The giant Soviet missiles make 
no military sense —  unless and until they are MIRVed." 
Congressional Record. August 3, 1972, p. 26687.
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might upset the balance and whether those actions were 
detectable within a useful time frame. This calculation was 
not at all cut-and-dried; it was couched in statistical 
probabilities and was subjective to a degree. Nonetheless, 
it enabled decision makers to relate hypothetical treaty 
violations to some measure of military significance, and 
thus to identify "adequate" or "effective" standards of 
verification as distinct from an absolute one.
For the Soviet side U.S. NTMs were an unsettling fait 
accompli but one that, paradoxically, divested the 
verification issue of much of its military significance. 
During the 1950s, alasnost in things military would have 
meant forfeiting the illusion of power and would have 
revealed Soviet vulnerability to U.S. planners.Short of 
disbanding the entire U.S. Strategic Air Command, it is hard 
to imagine that any agreement would have been worth such a
Soviet vulnerability and fears about U.S. preemption 
reinforced Soviet concerns about effective peacetime control 
of Soviet forces, mainly out of concern that the Americans 
might overreact to apparent provocation. For this reason, 
during the 1950s the Soviets generally maintained very low 
levels of alert in peacetime, despite genuine fears of 
surprise attack. Soviet bombers did not engage in airborne 
alerts, and it is doubtful that nuclear weapons were even 
co-located with delivery systems. For a brief discussion 
based on workshop proceedings, see Lori Esposito and James 
A. Schear, The Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons; A 
Workshop Report (Queenstown, Md.; Aspen Institute for 
Humanistic Studies, 1985), p. 9.
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price/^ On the other hand, by the time the full 
implications of U.S. NTMs were becoming clear to the 
Soviets, they were starting to reap international prestige 
from their own space program.Again, it was Sputnik that 
helped to establish the precedent for spacecraft overflight 
of national boundaries. In addition, with the advent of 
ballistic missiles, which compressed the tactical warning 
time of attack from hours to minutes, each side began to 
develop a stronger stake in spaceborne monitoring systems.
Thus sprang up the basis of a tacit "live-and-let-live"
regime of mutual reconnaissance which the political 
leaderships on each side simply exploited to the benefit of 
arms control diplomacy.It also is reasonable to suppose
that NTMs probably made the limited types of on-site
This is not to say that the absence of extreme 
vulnerability ceteris paribus would have resulted in a more 
relaxed attitude toward verification. As David Holloway has 
pointed out, Soviet hostility toward openness in military 
affairs also has been a reflection of internal organization 
and security priorities in the Soviet defense-industrial 
community. See The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, pp. 
126-127. It is unclear how much alasnost will change this 
situation.
Paul Stares recounts that Khrushchev took 
considerable pride in Soviet satellite reconnaissance 
capabilities, even offering at one point to show satellite 
photos to Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak in 1963. 
Stares, The Militarization of Space, p. 71.
Unlike the trench warfare metaphor, however, this 
regime probably would not obtain at all in wartime. The 
reconnaissance satellites that each side may regard as 
benign in peacetime could provide valuable targeting 
information in wartime and, for that reason, would almost 
certainly be prone to disruption or direct attack.
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inspection that we now see emerging in INF and START more 
palatable to the Soviets.
Nonetheless, NTMs were by no means cost free from the 
bargaining standpoint. The principle of self-reliance in 
verification which NTMs represented did not relieve either 
side from the burdens of complex bargaining. Both sides got 
a taste of this during the Cuban missile crisis, where the 
United States insisted upon the right to monitor departing 
Soviet vessels from fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and 
ships, and sought guarantees from the Soviets that this 
could be done without risk of hostile fire. The Soviets 
acquiesced to these steps, but final agreement on them 
required settling a number of nitty-gritty details. Under 
these so-called "alongside” verification procedures proposed 
by the U.S. side, the Soviets agreed to disclose the 
call-signs of the vessels carrying the missiles and 
associated equipment, their scheduled sailing times from 
Cuban ports, and the number of missiles aboard each ship. 
They further agreed to store the missiles on deck, where
As William D. Jackson perceptively comments:
"On-site inspection on military bases during the 1950s and 
1960s would indeed have provided a substantial volume of 
information. In the 1980s a substantial proportion of the 
security information which earlier would have been lost as a 
result of on-site inspection has already been lost to 
satellite surveillance. From a purely rational standpoint, 
satellite surveillance has made the risks of on-site 
inspection incremental risks." See "Verification in Arms 
Control: Beyond NTM," Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 19,
No. 4 (1982), p. 350.
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they could be photographed, and to remove canvass covers at 
prearranged times. The execution of these procedures was not 
flawless. Cargo ships did not always leave port on time. In 
one instance, a Soviet captain refused to uncover his cargo, 
and the Soviets actually declared more missiles than U.S. 
officials thought were in Cuba. These problems turned out to 
be minor ones, but they did underscore that technical 
collection activities involved a degree of jointness when 
the express purpose of the monitoring was to verify 
compliance with a stated action or agreement.(The 
bargaining issues raised by the requirement of jointness 
will be discussed in Chapter 7.)
Reliance upon NTMs also raised the question of whether 
national intelligence services were competent enough to 
collect the necessary information. During the early phases 
of SALT, some in the U.S. government, including Kissinger,
"Alongside" verification procedures were worked out 
in a series of meetings between Soviet and U.S. 
representatives in early November, 1962. Some of the 
procedures are spelled out in Telegram To: CINCLANT, From: 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, November 11, 
1962, titled: "Directive from Secretary of Defense on 
Arrangements for Inspection of Incoming and Out-going 
Shipments To and From Cuba," National Security File, Box 3 5 
(Cuba, General), John F. Kennedy Library and National 
Security Archive, Washington, D.C. A general announcement of 
the procedures was made by the Pentagon in a press release, 
see Statement by the spokesman for the Office of Public 
Affairs, Department of Defense, November 8, 1962. Cuban 
Missile Crisis Papers, National Security Archive,
Washington, D.C. On general results and some of the 
difficulties encountered, the author's interview with 
Raymond Garthoff, Washington, D.C. May 11, 1988 was very 
helpful.
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felt that the CIA was being too optimistic about U.S. 
monitoring capability.^® Questions arose as to whether the 
agency was factoring into its estimates the possibility that 
by slightly altering test and deployment patterns, the 
Soviets could thwart verification while denying any 
wrongdoing. To complicate matters, Richard Helms, then 
director of central intelligence, and other CIA officials 
were wary of making any commitments regarding verification 
that might force the CIA or other agencies to disclose the 
operational details of their NTMs, either to assure Congress 
that agreements were in fact verifiable or to prove 
allegations of Soviet violations.^’ Although the CIA 
eventually relaxed its opposition to playing a part in arms 
control, it continued to insist that the less said about 
NTMs in the negotiations, the better. Not surprisingly, 
however, it proved much harder to construct rules barring 
data-denial and other obstructive practices when both the 
collection systems and the required data could not be 
specified in agreed language.
In addition to fears regarding the adequacy of 
collection means, the quality of the analysis raised other 
concerns. One was the ever-present issue of false alarms. As 
Allan Krass has observed; "...any verification system must
Freedman, The Soviet Strategic Threat, pp. 46-48.
Halperin, "Arms Control: A Twenty-five Year 
Perspective," p. 8.
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attempt to balance the military and political consequences 
of possibly missing some important events against the 
difficulties of trying to pick the real events out of the 
noisy background of false ones, as well as the political 
consequences of possibly responding to false alarms as if 
they were real. In fact, worries about false alarms did 
slow down the process of generating intelligence findings on 
compliance issues in some cases, and, on the U.S. side, 
inspired critics to charge that U.S. officials were 
covering-up Soviet wrongdoing in order to protect ongoing 
negotiations. Correspondingly, the decentralized character 
of the intelligence community —  an "unruly collective of 
independent-minded organizations," as Stephen Flanagan has 
characterized it —  virtually guaranteed that compliance 
analysis in support of treaty verification would become 
bogged down in debates between various analytic branches. In 
part, this is due to the evolution of rather specialized 
intelligence functions within particular "producer" and 
"consumer" bureaucracies.^^ But it is also due to the very 
real need to protect against massive intelligence failures
Krass, Verification, p. 9.
See Stephen J. Flanagan, "Managing the Intelligence 
Community," International Securitv. Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 
1985), pp. 60-62. In the parlance of the U.S. intelligence 
community, "production" usually refers to the collection, 
processing, and evaluation of raw data, and "consumption" 
refers to the use of finished intelligence for policy and 
analytical purposes by, for example, officials in the State 
or Defense Departments.
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that cannot be caught at senior levels. Policy officials 
inevitably tend to be hostage to the analytical techniques 
and assumptions built into the monitoring process, and they 
rely upon the intelligence community to generate competing 
analytic assessments and thus to act as a hedge against 
parochial biases and "groupthink" tendencies that might 
pervade any single organization.^^ The cost of a system of 
checks and balances, however, has been to amplify the 
potential for disagreements at lower levels on key 
monitoring judgments.
Between 1963 and 1968, for example, there was enormous 
debate among experts over how to assess the new SA-5 missile 
system, which, as noted above, first appeared at sites 
collectively known as the "Tallinn line" in the northwestern 
Soviet Union. Reportedly, officials in the Air Force, Army, 
and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) initially took the 
view that the SA-5 weapon was intended specifically for ABM 
defense. In contrast, the CIA with some support from the 
Navy and the State Department held that the SA-5 was more 
likely to be a long-range anti-aircraft interceptor.^ It
As Bruce Berkowitz argues, however, the coordination 
requirement can also introduce errors into the intelligence 
estimation process. See "Intelligence in the Organizational 
Context," p. 585.
” Public statements by then Secretary of Defense 
McNamara and others stressed the ambiguity of the situation, 
and in fact reasonable inferences based on available 
evidence at the time did offer some support for each 
position. As Freedman points out, those advocating the ABM 
interpretation stressed the optimal location of the Tallinn
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was a high stakes argument, for the Tallinn line could have 
been the first indication of a Soviet decision to deploy a 
nationwide ABM system.
By 1968, it had become clear that the SA-5 was not 
going to be adequate for the ABM mission. The debate did not 
die, however; it simply shifted to the more specific 
question of whether the SA-5 could be upgraded to ABM 
status. Again, a range of conflicting viewpoints were 
expressed.With the advent of ABM negotiations in 1969, 
covert SAM upgrading was seen by many as a logical way for 
the Soviets to break out of any treaty. U.S. efforts to deal 
with the upgrade issue by banning testing in an ABM mode did 
not put the issue to rest. When it was discovered that the 
Soviets had turned on their SA-5 radars numerous times
line for ABM defense and the high-altitude capabilities of 
the SA-5 in the absence of any high-level bomber threat 
posed by the United States. Those advocating the SAM 
interpretation pointed to characteristics of the site 
construction that paralleled Soviet SAM installations and 
stressed the technical limitations of the SA-5 radar. See 
Freedman, The Soviet Strategic Threat, pp. 90-93.
The "upgrading" thesis was raised by John Foster, 
the Pentagon's top R&D official. Foster argued that 
upgrading the various components of the SA-5 system, 
essentially the radars, was an attractive option for the 
Soviets, since developing a wholly new ABM system would have 
been detectable and involved long lead times. Freedman, The 
Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 94. According to Prados, the DIA 
took the DDR&E viewpoint, while the CIA argued that the SA-5 
was only a SAM system. Public statements by Clark Clifford, 
who replaced McNamara, in early 1969 stressed the technical 
problems involved in upgrading the SA-5, but DDR&E continued 
to press the issue during the early Nixon years. The Soviet 
Estimate, pp. 166-169.
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during ABM testing in 1973-4, the data were not clear enough 
to decisively confirm or refute contending positions 
regarding upgrade. Under such conditions, the SA-5 testing 
episode, as a treaty compliance issue, simply became a 
convenient stage for rehearsing long-standing intelligence 
disagreements.
Viewed in this context, the contribution of NTMs to the 
negotiation of arms control agreements was very much a mixed 
blessing. While they did eclipse on-site inspections as the 
preferred U.S. choice for monitoring, NTMs raised other 
complications for negotiations.
SUMMING UP
Overall, one can see in the formative stages of the 
strategic bargaining process the emergence of several issues 
with great potential for shaping rule-making activity over 
successive phases of negotiation. The emerging asymmetries 
between Soviet and American force postures, especially with 
respect to ICBM capability, along with the development of 
MIRV technology, were destined to drive both sides toward 
major negotiating efforts aimed at limiting force 
concentration (i.e., how to prevent residual forces from 
being concentrated in destabilizing ways) and qualitative 
innovation (i.e., how to limit the destructive power of 
delivery systems). Similarly, the prospect of constraining 
ABMs to very low levels, though more comprehensive and
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radical than other options for arms limitation, probably 
contributed to heightened concerns about non-ABM systems 
being reconfigured to prohibited roles; one did not have to 
be a clairvoyant to see that rule-making aimed at preventing 
such diversions could become a major focus of the bargaining 
process, and not only for defensive forces but eventually 
for strategic offensive forces as well. Finally, the 
development of NTM technology, so essential in reducing the 
knowledge gap, injected into the bargaining process new 
requirements to safeguard collection systems engaged in 
verification activity and to limit concealment, among other 
priorities.
The pattern of Soviet-American bargaining behavior 
precipitated by ongoing efforts to deal with these issues 
and related compliance problems is explored in the next 
three chapters.
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5 .
THE FRAMEWORK OF AGREEMENTS 
FROM SALT TO START
Setting up a framework for restraint is the first and 
often the hardest step for parties in any arms negotiation. 
What aspects of military capability ought to be limited and 
can these be captured in some identifiable unit of account 
that is common to both sides? At what level (or levels) 
should thresholds on the relevant units of account be set? 
And if the overall threshold defines a non-zero limit —  
i.e., if residual forces are permitted —  what additional 
steps might be necessary in order to suppress technical 
developments or operational practices that could undermine 
the constraining power of the agreement?
In weighing these questions, each side naturally will 
seek to limit those capabilities possessed by the other 
which it regards as most threatening. Identifying units of 
account which correspond to those capabilities is often the 
easiest step if only because so many possible choices are 
unattractive as options. To take some extreme examples, we 
could safely rule out computer chips, steel, or copper wire 
as prospective units of account. While all these things 
underwrite strategic capability, their correspondence to 
destructive potential is so indirect as to be of little use 
in limitations. On the other hand, fissionable material (in 
metric tones), warheads and missiles (either in number.
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size, or destructive potential), delivery platforms (in 
numbers of bombers or submarines), flight testing (in 
numbers or range), or missile launchers (in numbers or size) 
all come closer to being useful units of account in 
strategic arms control. To choose intelligently among 
plausible options, however, one must apply the criteria of 
negotiability, verifiability, and, most importantly, 
desirability to each choice.^ Agreements become possible 
when a balance is struck among these three elements.
Negotiability and verifiability are fairly self-evident 
concepts. If negotiability were the only issue at stake, 
both sides probably would choose a unit of account that each 
has in roughly comparable numbers, so that negotiated limits 
or bans would tend to cut equally and not burden either with 
unequal sacrifices. Similarly, both sides probably would 
gravitate toward units of account that each could verify 
confidently, so that the resulting agreements would not fall 
prey to suspicions regarding noncompliance. On the other 
hand, judging "desirability" is a far more complex matter, 
for this depends entirely on what kind of constraining 
effects one is looking for in a particular agreement. 
Generally, Soviet negotiating behavior has long reflected a 
desire to curtail U.S. advantages in qualitative innovation 
and has sought to prevent the deployment of new systems —
 ^ See analysis by Joel S. Wit in U.S. Congress, 
Fundamentals of Nuclear Arms Control, p. 5.
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be they ABMs, cruise missiles, bombers, submarines, or 
exotic "space strike" weapons —  for which the USSR had no 
immediate counter. Once they succeeded in fielding new 
weapons, however, the Soviets generally have resisted any 
limits on their ability to modernize forces.
For its part, the United States has consistently sought 
to reduce Soviet advantages in force size —  mainly in large 
ICBMs —  with proposals that have had the effect of 
restructuring on-line forces or of restricting their 
modernization potential. Correspondingly, U.S. policymakers 
generally have been unreceptive to proposals that would 
hamper their ability to balance Soviet leads in numbers with 
superior technology embodied in new types of weapons.
Nowhere has the inherent tension in these contrasting Soviet 
and American approaches been more starkly illustrated than 
in the spirited disagreements during the SALT and, later, 
the START negotiations over limiting new types of weapons or 
constraining specific aspects of force posture, such as 
large payload ICBMs or cruise missiles, which one or the 
other side deemed to be destabilizing.
Desirability criteria also have an important meaning in 
a micro sense. In elaborating framework rules, negotiators 
generally need to address various hazards implicit in 
accepting non-zero limits as the basis of agreement.^ The
 ^Zero-level limitations normally include requirements 
to dismantle the supporting infrastructure of production, 
servicing, and deployment facilities for treaty-limited 
systems, such as called for in the INF Treaty. The hazards
187
record shows that while the identification of units of 
account per se has not been difficult, the negotiation of 
collateral measures to suppress threats to a treaty's 
framework has proved much more difficult.
Generally, these hazards are three-fold. The first type 
can be called the modernization hazard.^ This problem 
centers on the ever-present risk that technical innovations 
applied to existing force structures can undermine the basic 
equality assumed in whatever limit is agreed upon. Missiles 
can be MIRVed, for example, or bombers can be equipped with 
long-range cruise missiles. The destructive power of 
individual weapons can be increased even if their numbers 
are not. This trend can result in unwanted concentrations of 
power within the agreed upon residual force levels.
A second type of problem is often referred to as the 
reconstitution hazard. One party or another could bring back 
retired forces into service, either covertly or overtly as 
part of a hasty abrogation of the treaty. Weapons could be 
only partially dismantled, for example, or kept up in some
posed by retention and maintenance of residual forces —  
i.e., non-zero limits —  are not present.
 ^Although this problem could also be deemed an 
"upgrade" hazard, the reference to modernization may be more 
appropriate for our purposes. The issue here is the 
enhancement of weapons that are alreadv within the scope of 
agreement. The term "upgrade" can also mean augmenting 
weapons outside the ambit of an agreement —  like SAM 
systems —  so they can perform the functions of 
treaty-limited weapons. For this reason, I will use the term 
"upgrade" in connection with scope rules.
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State of readiness.
The third type of problem can be termed the stockpile 
hazard. This refers to the possibility that weapons kept in 
reserve for training or test purposes could somehow be 
deployed quickly as reloads for on-line launchers or as part 
of covert deployments in facilities that are normally used 
for R&D, testing, or repair purposes. The stockpile could 
also be enlarged through covert production.
Although usually submerged in the arcana of arms 
negotiations, these hazards are painfully familiar to 
government officials responsible for negotiating agreements 
and closing-off every conceivable loophole.* In the 
agreements at issue here, some of the rules devised to deal 
with these problems proved to be effective and became part 
of the evolving methodology of strategic arms control 
without much further adjustment; but other rules did not 
work out and had to be modified or dropped at later stages.
This chapter examines the negotiation of framework 
rules from SALT to START, paying particular attention to the 
ways in which early choices regarding units of account, 
thresholds, and collateral measures were reinforced or 
altered in subsequent efforts, and how the negotiations in 
general contributed to the emergence of identifiable norms
* There are, of course, variations on these themes. 
Another route to circumvention is the possibility of 
transferring treaty-limited weapons or technology to third 
parties or the deployment of additional weapons under the 
guise of being for test and training purposes only.
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and taboos to govern the structuring of agreements. As part 
of this examination, I also consider more generally the 
pattern of bargaining dynamics during this period, and in 
Chapter 8 posit some conclusions regarding the impact of 
these dynamics and of compliance problems upon the 
rule-making process.
SALT I DIPLOMACY; A POINT OF DEPARTURE
While the strategic situation of the late 1960s, as 
noted in Chapter 4, generated strong incentives on both 
sides favoring negotiations, it also created obstacles to 
agreement on the precise form of the limitations and on 
their putative constraining effects. To complicate matters 
further, the bargaining behavior exhibited by each side 
during SALT I revealed different conceptions of the balance 
that the negotiations were meant to stabilize. These 
differences contributed to uncertainty and confusion 
surrounding the basic objectives of each side, and in 
several notable instances led the negotiations down paths 
that proved to be suboptimal from the standpoint of 
developing a logical and internally coherent set of 
framework rules.
Specifying Units of Account
Of all the tasks involved in negotiating framework 
rules in SALT I, specifying the units of account proved to
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be the easiest step. During the exploratory session at 
Helsinki in November 1969, the U.S. side tabled ideas for 
quantitative limits structured around launchers. The Soviet 
side responded favorably to these ideas but raised questions 
about the verifiability of restrictions on missile boosters, 
penetration aides, and other components of weapon systems 
when U.S. negotiators tabled additional suggestions for 
collateral limits.^ As it turned out, both sides adopted 
launchers of ballistic missiles as the basic currency of the 
offensive arms limitations. On the defensive side, they 
focused on ABM launchers, ABM-dedicated radars, permitted 
ABM deployment areas (whose size, character, and location 
took much negotiation) and ABM interceptor missiles located 
within permitted deployment areas.* After some initial 
probing, the United States did not press for direct 
constraints on warheads, payload capacity, or missiles 
deployed or stored in reserve. Several considerations lay 
behind this decision.
To start with, direct constraints on weapons components 
and on production-related activity had fallen out of favor 
in the United States at the time. Five years earlier. 
President Johnson had proposed a freeze on "the numbers and
 ^Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 102-103.
* Both sides also agreed that future test ranges would 
be subject to mutual agreement. The Soviet Union did not 
initially agree to including limits on ABM interceptors (see 
Smith, Doubletalk, p. 131) but did so later on in the 
negotiation.
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characteristics” of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 
(SNDVs), including ABMs, bombers, as well as offensive 
missiles, with limited replacement of lost or retired 
systems allowed. The proposal was notable as a point of 
departure from comprehensive disarmament schemes, and its 
regime of data-exchanges and on-site inspections is mirrored 
to some extent in the provisions of the INF Treaty and the 
agreed START framework.^ But its scheme for direct controls 
on systems production, testing, and performance 
characteristics, which were reportedly included at the 
insistence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and which were far 
more invasive than the prospective START agreement), was far 
beyond anything that the Soviet Union was likely to accept, 
even if a freeze had accorded with its broader strategic 
interests at the time, which it did not.® What the Johnson 
SNDV freeze proposal did accomplish, however, was to spark a 
serious consideration of possible alternatives, specifically 
deployment-oriented restrictions which were being developed
 ^ See statement by Acting U.S. representative 
Timberlake to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: 
Verification of Strategic Delivery Vehicles Freeze, August 
27, 1964, in U.S. ACDA, Documents on Disarmament, 1964 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1966), pp. 367-373. The 
proposed provisions for the initial baseline count, 
production monitoring, and on-site verification of 
elimination of treaty-limited weapons are similar to those 
adopted under the INF Treaty.
® According to Newhouse, it is doubtful that the 
inventory controls specified in the Johnson proposal were 
any more acceptable to the United States than to the Soviet 
Union. See Cold Dawn, p. 70.
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within the State Department and the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
The trend toward deployment-oriented restrictions 
received an enormous boost from the growth of NTM 
capabilities. As noted earlier, throughout the 1960s 
intelligence monitoring increasingly keyed on a number of 
remotely "observable" measures of Soviet capability that 
could be exploited for arms control purposes: ABM radars, 
long-range bombers, and submarine-based launch systems for 
ballistic m issile s. Th e Soviet shift in 1964 from 
above-ground ICBM launch systems to silo-housed launchers 
abetted this trend, for it made land-based ballistic missile 
deployments much easier to count. In addition, within the 
Pentagon, there were signs of greater acceptance of the idea 
of structuring agreements without extensive reliance on 
intrusive verification. The 1968 DPM observed: "... an 
agreement limiting numbers of missiles and launchers 
would...reduce, but not eliminate, the uncertainties against
’ Ibid., pp. 70-71; U.S. Congress, Fundamentals of 
Nuclear Arms Control. pp. 14-15. A notable step in this 
direction was seen in a 1962 ACDA-sponsored study which 
inter alia concluded: "If agreements or adjustments in other 
areas should permit the United States to adopt a second 
strike or purely retaliatory posture, then a series of 
measures involving a minimum of access to Soviet territory 
would become possible." (emphasis mine). Woods Hole Summer 
Study, Verification and Response in Disarmament Agreements. 
Summary Report, prepared by the Institute for Defense 
Analysis, Washington, D.C., November 1962, p. 6.
Testimony in 1970 by former CIA Deputy Director for 
Research, Herbert Scoville, Jr., in U.S. Congress, ABM.
MIRV, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race, pp. 227-231.
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which we would have to insure. Such an agreement could be 
maintained without on-site i n s p e c t i o n . I n  fact, by the 
time SALT negotiations were underway, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, most notably General Royal Allison, the Chiefs' 
representative at the talks, had come to the firm belief 
that an initial agreement should focus on simple units such 
as launchers, not on more complex and difficult to verify 
measures such as missile throwweight. Reportedly, the 
Chiefs' view was a key factor in persuading the Nixon 
Administration not to hold out for direct controls on 
missile or delivery vehicle characteristics.^
In sum, the decision to adopt deployed launchers as a 
currency for arms control came about largely by default —  
it was the least worst choice. Such limits were more 
verifiable than limits on total inventories or on production 
and testing, and more negotiable because they avoided the 
necessity of on-site inspections. Moreover, there was no 
reason to suppose that constraints more extensive than 
launcher-specific limits were necessary in order to achieve 
strategically significant constraints, provided however that 
a supporting array of collateral limits on modernization 
could be agreed upon by both sides.
Clifford, Draft Presidential Memorandum, p. 24.
Smith, Doubletalk, p. 42, 114. Amb. Paul Nitze 
corroborates this point and provides further details, see 
Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of 
Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p. 288.
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Setting Thresholds
The task of setting numerical ceilings for the various 
units of account proved to be more difficult. On the 
question of ABM limitations, the Americans initially- 
proposed that each side be allowed one deployment area 
centered upon its capital or national command authority 
(NCA), with up to 100 launchers and interceptors. The 
Soviets had little problem accepting the one site idea, and 
indeed did so promptly, for it corresponded with their 
preferences for low ABM limits while leaving their 
rudimentary system around Moscow untouched. The Nixon 
Administration, however, grew increasingly uneasy about the 
asymmetrical effects of the NCA-only idea, because it 
foresaw little prospect that Congress would agree to fund 
NCA defense, and sought to distance itself from its own 
suggestion. As Raymond Garthoff and others have described, 
the process was awkward and embarrassing.^ On at least two 
occasions at the talks, U.S. negotiators on instructions 
hinted at a preference for a complete ban on ABMs but 
backpeddled on the idea before fully testing Soviet 
reactions. Then, in March 1971, as part of a restructuring 
of the Safeguard program (the Nixon Administration's version 
of Sentinel. redesigned for defense of ICBMs), the United
Garthoff, "Negotiating With the Russians," pp.
10-14.
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States proposed a deal to codify existing plans: 4 permitted 
sites for ICBM defense as against 1 site for NCA defense. In 
response to Soviet objections, this was later modified to a 
3:1 ratio in July 1971, and, a month later, to a 2:1 ratio 
before settling with the Soviets on 2 sites apiece (one ICBM 
and one NCA) with a minimum separation distance of 1,300 
kilometers. This bewildering trek was of little military 
significance because all of the options fell within the 
range of strategically-trivial ABM deployments.^ But it 
served to show the tensions that could develop between 
bureaucratic imperatives (to salvage some U.S. ABM 
deployments to balance a small Soviet deployment) and the 
pressure that drives negotiations in favor of equality of 
rights as well as of outcomes.
Throughout the talks, the USSR was firmly committed to 
equal levels of ABM and to something it called "homogeneity" 
—  the right of one side to match the other's mission choice 
(e.g., defense of NCA or of ICBMs). The contentious issue 
was how to have this equality reflected in sublimits on 
various types of equipment. Apart from the threshold of 100 
launchers per site, the Soviet Union generally opposed other
In the ratification hearings. Senator Jackson argued 
that a 100 launcher limit per site was totally inconsistent 
with defense of ICBM silos and argued that he would have 
preferred a zero-level threshold to one that provided for 
costly but ineffective ABM deployments. See comments in U.S. 
Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Militarv 
Implications of the Treatv on the Limitations of Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Svstems. 92nd Congress, 2nd sess. 
(Washington, B.C.: U.S. GPO, 1972), pp. 374-375.
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sublimits —  especially on radars —  which the United States 
proposed in order to constrain the capability of permitted 
deployment sites to roughly equal levels. It is quite 
possible that the Soviets feared that equal constraints at 
this level of force structure would actually leave them less 
capable in the face of more technically sophisticated U.S. 
systems deployed in comparable numbers. On several 
occasions, Soviet negotiators took exception to U.S. 
proposals to limit the type and number of ABM radars, 
arguing that each side should be free to design and deploy 
its major components on the basis of its own technology.^ 
The Soviets objected to stringent geographical limits on ABM 
radars for the same reason. In the end, however, they agreed 
to equal limits on the numbers and locations of ABM radars 
as part of a general deal in which the United States relaxed 
its insistence on a requirement for mutual agreement on the 
future construction of large radar stations for early 
warning and other uses. As a result, the ABM Treaty's 
ceilings are numerically balanced although (as will be seen 
in Chapter 6) at the expense of some clarity with respect to 
important scope rules.
Regarding offensive weapons, negotiations on the 
thresholds became bogged down in a now-famous disagreement 
that was never fully resolved in SALT I and was to plague
Smith, Doubletalk, p. 309. 
Ibid. , pp. 316-317.
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arms control throughout the SALT era: whether the Soviet 
Union should be compensated for U.S. strategic advantages in 
forward-based weapon systems (FBS), including European-based 
and naval aircraft that could strike Soviet territory with 
nuclear weapons, as well as for U.S. advantages in 
technology and for other factors that work to the 
disadvantage of the Soviet Union. Soviet negotiators 
insisted that such factors should be accounted for in 
codifying parity in accordance with their concept of "equal 
security." They rejected U.S. proposals for equal aggregates 
of ICBM and SLBM launchers (and later bombers) along with 
phased reductions down to a common ceiling of 1,000 
launchers, arguing that aggregate ceilings would have to 
include FBS. They were not prepared to proceed with 
offensive arms control on any other basis. From the U.S. 
standpoint, the practical consequences of the Soviet 
position would have been to require U.S. withdrawal of FBS 
to obtain symmetrical ceilings or, conversely, maintenance 
of those deployments by sacrificing equality in the number 
of launchers of intercontinental-range weapons. Not 
surprisingly, the Americans took the view that FBS were not 
strategic systems, but rather were intended to fulfill
Kissinger, White House Years, p. 541. U.S. 
negotiating guidance was explicitly to oppose any limits on 
FBS or intermediate-range weapons. Richard M. Nixon, 
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 69, Subject: 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, July 9, 1970, National 
Security Council Papers, U.S. National Archives, p. 3.
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deterrence commitments to the allies by counterbalancing 
Soviet intermediate-range forces, which also were excluded 
from the agreement.
The standoff on the compensation issue put U.S. 
officials in a quandary. By 1970, Soviet ICBM levels were 
approaching about 1,500 launchers, nearly 50 percent above 
the Minuteman/Titan II force, while Soviet SLBM levels were 
quickly catching up to U.S. totals. The United States had no 
new programs to expand its force structure and thus little 
to trade in return for Soviet reductions to a common 
ceiling, assuming that such could have been agreed upon. 
Evidently, the responsible U.S. officials, Nixon and 
Kissinger, also calculated that withholding the one 
bargaining chip that the Soviets truly wanted —  an ABM 
agreement —  was probably too risky in view of the steady 
erosion of congressional and domestic support for the 
Safeguard program. To break the stalemate, Nixon made a 
decision to shift gears and to aim for the lesser goal of 
gaining Soviet agreement on an interim freeze of five years 
on offensive weapons in return for adjustments favorable to 
the United States on other issues.
Under the terms of this arrangement, reached between 
Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and announced on 
May 20, 1971, the Soviets agreed to defer the FBS issue for 
later negotiations, to exclude bombers from the aggregate 
count, and to halt new construction of launchers for their
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modern large or "heavy" ballistic missiles, a category that 
included the SS-9 and its follow-on systems.^* While U.S. 
officials made much of the Soviet deferral of FBS and the 
bomber exclusion, it remains the case that the imbalance in 
overall U.S. and Soviet launchers implied at least tacit 
acceptance of the Soviet claim for compensation.Moreover, 
the framework of the freeze was blurred by disagreement on 
an important issue of scope: whether submarines would be 
included. In the wake of the May 20th agreement the Soviets 
insisted that the accord did not include SLBM-equipped 
submarines. Some U.S. accounts suggest that Kissinger 
actually gave the Soviets the choice of including or 
excluding SLBMs and that they chose the l at te r . T h i s 
development sparked acrimony in the U.S. bureaucracy, which 
displayed surprising unanimity that SLBMs should be included 
in the freeze. Kissinger sought to resolve the issue during 
a secret trip to Moscow in April 1972, where he and Brezhnev 
agreed on a ceiling for the Soviet Union of 950 SLBM
At the time it was thought that there were 313 heavy 
missile launchers. Later, the number was reduced to 3 08 
after additional intelligence revealed that some of the 
so-called III-X silos had been included in the count of 
heavy ICBM silo launchers. See Freedman, U.S. Intelligence 
and The Soviet Strategic Threat, p. 175.
Smith, Doubletalk, p. 93.
Ibid.. pp. 228-229. Providing additional details, 
Nitze says that Kissinger put the issue to Nixon, who 
expressed no preference, and that Kissinger informed the 
Soviets of Nixon's ambivalence. See From Hiroshima to 
Glasnost. p. 319.
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launchers on 62 submarines, a figure that corresponded to 
what the Soviets claimed to have under construction.^^ It 
was also agreed that above a certain threshold, later 
specified at 740, the Soviets would have to trade-in older 
launchers of ICBM or SLBM on a one-for-one basis in order to 
reach their maximum ceiling on SLBM launchers. U.S. 
deployments were limited to an upper threshold of 710 
launchers onboard 44 submarines.
Soviet insistence on asymmetrically high SLBM levels 
has been explained in various ways. The Soviets themselves 
claimed at times that their numbers were sensitive to 
geographical problems —  notably the "choke-points" around 
Greenland and Iceland which their submarines must traverse 
in order to reach patrol areas in the North Atlantic —  as 
well as to the size of U.K. and French f o r c e s . I n
Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1149. Kissinger 
characterizes this as a major Soviet concession, but others 
disagree. See Garthoff's analysis. Detente and 
Confrontation. pp. 161-166. In his memoir, Nitze observes 
that both sides disagreed over the point at which a 
submarine was deemed to be "under construction." The Soviets 
insisted that they had higher numbers of vessels under 
construction than the Americans thought they did, because 
they considered the threshold for construction to be the 
point at which work started on the propulsion system, while 
U.S. officials argued that the laying of the keel (which was 
visible to verification means) should be the threshold. See 
Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost. p. 319.
As an indication of Soviet concerns over allied 
fleets. Ambassador Semenov stated on May 17, 1972 that the 
Soviet Union would reserve the right to increase its numbers 
of ballistic missile submarines in response to any increase 
beyond the total of 50 U.S. and allied submarines. See U.S. 
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, p. 157.
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addition, with the United States moving to highly MIRVed 
Poseidon SLBMs in the early 1970s, it may be that the 
Soviets went into higher launcher production to offset a 
U.S. advantage in SLBM warhead levels. Hyland has suggested 
that Soviet production was geared to deployment levels high 
enough to offset a lower average on-station rate relative to 
SLBM submarines of the United States.MccGwire argues that 
the Soviets saw their SLBM force as the instrument to 
balance the combined strategic capability of U.S. SLBM and 
carrier-based aviation, a major component of U.S. FBS 
capabilities.^^ Whichever of these reasons comes closest to 
explaining Soviet force-sizing criteria, the fact of a 
Soviet production surge created an enormous problem for the 
SALT I negotiations. Evidently, Kissinger recognized only 
belatedly the advantage to the United States of including 
SLBM in the offensive freeze and gave the Soviets the 
figures they wanted in return for extending the scope of the 
agreement to include SLBM launchers.To soften the 
inequality of the projected SLBM limits, the United States 
gained Soviet agreement, as noted above, on a scheme for 
trading in older ICBM as the final 210 SLBM were put to sea.
Hyland, "The U.S.S.R. and Nuclear War," p. 54.
MccGwire, Soviet Militarv Objectives, p. 241.
U.S. military planners had concluded it was 
preferable not to build more Poseidon submarines but instead 
to push development and acquisition of the new Trident 
system, which would not be available until the end of the 
decade.
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Prior to this provision, which was developed in discussions 
between Kissinger and then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird 
in 1971, the U.S. position had been to allow a complete 
"freedom to mix" between SLBM, ICBM, and bomber components 
of the force postures.Although this shift to a "one-way" 
freedom to mix approach did not result in any major 
restructuring of Soviet forces (and was not designed to do 
so), it did help to establish a taboo against the 
substitution of non-ICBM forces by additional ICBMs, which 
has been carried over to subsequent SALT- and START-era 
agreements.
It has long been part of the lore of strategic arms 
control that the ABM Treaty was more viable politically, if 
not strategically, than the Interim Agreement because its 
quantitative ceilings were equal for both sides. Senator 
Henry Jackson made this point the centerpiece of his 
criticism of the Nixon Administration's negotiating 
approach. "It is my view," Jackson said, "that the principle 
of equality reflected in the ABM Treaty ought properly to be 
applied to a future treaty on offensive systems....The 
Soviet Union must understand that the numerical advantages 
conceded to them in the Interim Agreement are not
NSDM 69 called for complete freedom to mix: 
"...sea-based missiles, land-based ICBM launchers, and 
strategic heavy bombers could be substituted for each other 
on a one-for-one basis." Nixon, NSDM 69, p. 2; for 
background on the SLBM for ICBM trade-in idea, see 
Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1130-1131.
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permissible except as a transitory stage to equal 
balances.
Yet, the basic obstacle to achieving the rigorous 
application of the equality principle that Jackson desired 
was the stark difference between defensive and offensive 
forces with respect to the strategic implications of various 
numerical thresholds. Equality was not difficult to achieve 
in the ABM context because differentials in force levels 
meant little or nothing at the militarily insignificant 
levels to which both sides were already committed in 
principle. So, for example, the U.S. side had little to gain 
by holding out for higher launcher limits —  for instance, a 
level of 386 to 100 launchers implicit in its March 1971 
proposal on permitted ABM deployment sites —  since a 
differential on this scale would have had only marginal 
significance in mounting any defense against ICBM attacks,^®
In contrast, on the offensive side, differentials in 
force levels were deemed to be strategically important, 
either in terms of the balance in the number and types of 
targets held at risk, or because of the perceived coercive 
political effects which would flow from a superiority in
This was the gist of the so-called Jackson amendment 
which was attached to the congressional resolution approving 
the SALT I accord. Congressional Record, August 3, 1972, p. 
26693.
The launcher differentials in the U.S. 4:1 proposal 
for ABM sites is based on Garthoff's recollection. Detente 
and Confrontation, p. 150.
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numbers. For these very reasons, equality was an elusive 
goal in negotiations on offensive restraints during the 
early 1970s. Both sides had staked their programs to the 
pursuit of asymmetrical advantages —  be they technical or 
quantitative —  as a way to offset perceived strengths on 
the other side.^^ Any effort to create equality across a 
range of units of account would have represented a truly 
radical diplomatic intervention into this ongoing process, 
in effect holding the highest priority programs of each side 
(e.g., MIRVs, large payload ICBMs) hostage to a common 
standard of comparison. Not only was there no conceptual 
basis for this kind of arms control, neither side gave any 
indication that it was prepared to force the sort of far- 
reaching internal bureaucratic compromises that would have 
been necessary to move in this direction. The Interim 
Agreement thus was at best a holding action. Hard issues of 
balance and equality were deferred.
Fencing-in Hazards
The unequal ceilings on strategic offensive delivery 
vehicles might have been considerably less contentious if 
the SALT I limitations had dealt more effectively with all 
likely hazards to the specified units of account. In fact, 
however, negotiations on these matters produced mixed
To cite but one acknowledgement of this fact, see 
comments by Foster in U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1974 
Authorization for Militarv Procurement, pp. 816-817.
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results and only fueled controversy over the durability of 
the overall deal.
The stockpile problem —  that weapons in storage might 
be loaded quickly onto launchers for use in protracted 
warfare schemes —  did not pose any insuperable obstacles.
To a significant degree, in fact, the problem settled 
itself, at least with respect to offensive forces. By 1965, 
with initial deployments of ICBM in hardened underground 
silos, the Soviets shifted away from "soft" above-ground 
launching systems where reload missiles had been part of the 
normal deployment p a t t e r n . I n  effect, they traded a 
degree of reload capability for greater survivability 
afforded by hardening. Reloading was not a practical 
possibility for silo-based systems of the late 1960s because 
of the difficulties associated with repairing the damage 
inflicted upon a silo by a "hot" launch (i.e., igniting the 
missile booster inside the silo) in any time frame that 
would make reloading an attractive operational concept. On 
the defensive side, where the United States was more 
concerned with the viability of launcher-only limits, 
negotiations regarding stockpile issues were somewhat more 
complex. The Soviets initially did not accept U.S. arguments 
that the number of interceptors located within agreed 
deployment areas should be constrained along with the number
Comments by Howard Stoertz, Jr., at annual meeting 
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS), Philadelphia, May 29, 1986.
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of launchers, but they ultimately came around to the idea of 
parallel launcher/interceptor limits by the end of 1970. 
Later on, in the buildup to the Moscow summit, they also 
accepted U.S. proposals to ban launchers designed for 
multiple interceptors and for rapid relo ad.Thes e 
measures, combined with additional constraints on radars 
(discussed below), provided some protection against breakout 
scenarios involving the stockpiling of excess ABM 
interceptors. They also helped to establish a presumption 
favoring the segregation of stored missiles and on-line 
launchers.
Efforts to fence-in potential reconstitution hazards 
were handled in SCC deliberations during 1973-74 and 
eventually spelled out in a protocol governing procedures 
for dismantling and replacement of strategic weapons. 
Initially, there was no meeting of the minds on what degree 
of "deactivation" would suffice to remove a weapon system 
from the aggregate limits. Early Soviet proposals for such 
procedures were regarded by the U.S. side as too vague and, 
if adopted, they could have raised legitimate questions 
regarding whether deactivated weapons could be brought back 
into service as an operationally-ready f o r c e . U . S .  
diplomats countered by pursuing each issue —  ABM, ICBM,
Smith, Doubletalk, p. 368.
Author's interview with Sidney N. Graybeal, 
Washington, D.C., July 11, 1983.
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SLBM launchers, etc. —  on a case by case basis, often in 
minute detail. Although the specifics of the 1974 protocol 
remain classified, the general scope of these provisions is 
widely known. Mark Lowenthal summarizes: "...in general the 
dismantling procedures require rendering the launchers 
wholly inoperable and incapable of being easily restored to 
working condition. For ICBMs this entails removing the 
cables and wires, severing all connections with available 
power sources, destroying the silo itself, and then filling 
in the blown silo with dirt. In the case of SLBMs the launch 
tubes must be rendered inoperable, either by destroying the 
submarine, cutting away the sections of the hull, or 
removing a certain percentage of the tubes and welding 
plates over the areas r e m o v e d . A s  it turned out, U.S. 
negotiators obtained between 80-90 percent of the provisions 
they had tabled and established the basis of a mutual 
understanding that the dismantling of treaty-limited systems 
should be done in such a way as to preclude their reassembly 
in less time than it would take to build new weapons.
While the stockpile and reconstitution hazards were 
handled fairly successfully, the same cannot be said for
Mark Lowenthal, "The START Proposal: Verification 
Issues," Congressional Research Service Report, 1982, p. 4. 
It is more than a little ironic that this SCC protocol 
remains classified while the INF Treaty protocol for systems 
elimination, which spells out procedures for dismantling 
missile boosters in minute detail, is in the public domain.
Graybeal interview, Washington, D.C., July 11, 1983.
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efforts to fence-in hazards posed by the modernization of 
forces. Two developments in the talks posed major obstacles. 
First, both sides could not reach agreement on how to handle 
MIRV. Second, in Soviet-American backchannel discussions 
in 1971, Kissinger gave an overbroad assurance to Dobrynin 
that "modernization and replacement" of weapons would be 
expressly allowed under the Interim Agreement. This 
assurance accorded with a long-standing Soviet preference 
for avoiding constraints on the upgrading of existing force 
structure but seriously hampered subsequent U.S. efforts to 
impose limited restrictions on the MIRV potential of that 
part of the Soviet ICBM force undergoing modernization and 
replacement.
In the spring of 1970, the Americans proposed a ban 
on the testing and deployment of MIRV but coupled this offer 
with a demand for on-site inspection, not only of ballistic 
missile nose cones but also of SAM sites to verify a ban 
against upgrading activities that MIRV was meant to hedge. 
See Smith, Doubletalk, p. 172. The Soviets took the OSI 
caveat as an indication that the United States was more 
interested in shifting the onus of rejecting a ban to the 
Soviet side than in bargaining seriously about MIRV.
However, the Soviets did not exactly seize the high ground 
on this issue. They counterproposed a ban on the production 
and deployment of MIRV, but not on flight testing (which 
they had not yet accomplished), which raised legitimate 
concerns about verification and was rejected by the U.S. 
side. Efforts to bridge these two positions —  for example, 
by accepting the Soviet preference for a production ban in 
return for gaining joint agreement on a flight testing ban 
—  were not seriously explored, and active consideration of 
banning or limiting MIRV in SALT I was dropped after 1970. 
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 140-141.
Smith, in particular, laments the prejudicial 
effects of the May 20, 1970 agreement on the remainder of 
the SALT I negotiations dealing with ICBM controls. See 
Doubletalk, p. 332.
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These two developments interacted in a perverse way: 
failure to ban MIRV made it more important than ever to gain 
some controls on the size and payload capacity of Soviet 
ICBMs, while explicit allowance for modernization made the 
prospect of obtaining even modest controls on MIRVing 
potential less likely.
The basic U.S. formula for modernization controls 
involved restrictions on increases in the dimensions of 
launch silos and a provision to preclude the replacement of 
light with heavy ICBMs. Under this plan, any missile larger 
than the SS-11 (of which there were over 1,000 in the Soviet 
force by 1972) was to be defined as a heavy missile. From 
the U.S. standpoint, the obvious attraction of an agreed 
definition on the light/heavy ICBM demarcation line was to 
ensure that the only Soviet missile larger than the SS-11 
(which was not MIRV capable) would be the SS-9 and its 
follow-on. The silo limitations were deemed to be an 
important collateral measure that would add verifiability to 
the general prohibition on the conversion of lights to 
heavies. As Raymond Garthoff notes, the threshold fit in 
well with U.S. planning, for the replacement of Minuteman I 
with MIRVed Minuteman III ICBMs could go forward without any 
problem.^
Author's interview with Raymond Garthoff,
Washington, D.C., April 4, 1985. This point was underscored 
by the fact that when Brezhnev raised the possibility of a 
ban on any increase in the size of missile boosters (as 
opposed to silos) at the 1972 Moscow summit, the U.S. side 
was thrown into momentary panic. As Kissinger pointed out
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The Soviets were hostile to the general outline of the 
U.S. scheme, which they asserted was inconsistent with the 
idea of an interim freeze as specified by the May 20, 1971 
agreement. In the final stages of the negotiations, they did 
agree that there should be no significant increase in silo 
dimensions. Negotiators pinned down the meaning of 
"significant" to a range of 10-15 percent. The Soviet Union 
also accepted the general prohibition barring the 
substitution of lights with heavies. It refused to budge, 
however, on the proposed U.S. definition of a heavy missile 
while not offering any counterproposal. This disagreement 
was never resolved. The United States finally issued a 
unilateral statement that essentially recapitulated its 
position. This step was taken even though there were clear 
indications that the Soviets already had planned MIRVed 
replacements for the SS-11 that would not meet the U.S. 
definition of a light ICBM.^® Thus, as the Interim Agreement 
went into effect, there were nagging questions about the 
magnitude of Soviet MIRV programs and the constraining value 
of the silo size provisions. Despite optimistic statements
(White House Years, pp. 1218-1219), prohibiting any 
volumetric increase in missile size would have prevented the 
deployment of MIRVed Minuteman III. It also would have 
precluded the SS-17/19 deployments. To the relief of the 
U.S. delegation, Brezhnev's handlers quickly realized his 
grave blunder and the Soviet proposal was withdrawn.
See Garthoff's revealing footnote on his 
conversations with Soviet diplomatic counterparts during the 
SALT negotiations. Detente and Confrontation, pp. 169-170.
211
to the contrary by senior U.S. officials, negotiators well 
understood these problems and their potential for stirring 
controversy later on.
The issues surrounding modernization and replacement on 
the defensive side were more amenable to solution, in large 
part because allowances to engage in such activity were 
always understood to be more circumscribed in the context of 
a treaty severely limiting ABMs for an unlimited period. The 
thorniest problem involved the size and power potential of 
the radar base for the permitted deployment areas. From the 
earliest stages of the talks, the United States had sought 
tight constraints on radars as a hedge against breakout 
while the Soviets had sought to preserve flexibility in part 
on the grounds that engineering design options should not be 
unduly limited.^' As noted above, however, the Soviets did 
accept geographical, numerical, and power potential 
constraints on ABM radars as part of a larger package 
involving U.S. concessions on the treatment of non-ABM 
radars. The other aspects of the negotiation on 
modernization controls on ABMs were more straightforward. 
Both sides agreed early on to ban land-mobile and MIRVed ABM 
systems. In addition, despite apparent misgivings in the 
military ranks on both sides, each agreed in 1972 to proceed
In the 1971-72 time frame, the Soviets were more 
amenable to radar restraints on their Moscow system, which 
was already designed and deployed, at least in part, than to 
restraints on an undesigned and undeployed hard-site defense 
system for ICBMs. Smith, Doubletalk, p. 317.
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with severe restraints on new forms of ABMs: a flat 
prohibition was imposed on the development, testing, and 
deployment of sea-, air-, and space-based weapons to 
complement the ban on non-fixed land-based systems already 
agreed. Both sides also agreed that ABMs or their components 
based on "other physical principles," such as directed 
energy weapons or sensors, would be subject to the general 
limitations on development and testing (i.e., only at agreed 
test ranges) and would not be deployed unless the modalities 
of such were agreed to by the parties in advance.
Notwithstanding these notable steps, the overall SALT I 
package represented a controversial starting point for 
efforts to develop durable framework rules. The stated 
objective that guided the talks early on —  to strike a 
comprehensive framework for defensive and offensive forces 
that would stabilize deterrence and codify parity —  did not 
materialize in the agreed-upon rules. Instead, the 
negotiations veered off down two separate tracks —  one 
defensive, the other offensive —  that were not well 
coordinated and not at all parallel.
Both sides did achieve significant long-term restraints 
on ABMs; the units of account contained in the ABM Treaty 
were widely regarded as viable for the foreseeable future, 
and any concerns about the prospect of modernization or
Ibid., pp. 343-344; Garthoff, Detente and 
Confrontation. pp. 153-154.
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other hazards were overshadowed by both the extremely low 
thresholds set for permitted deployments and specific 
constraints on long lead-time items (i.e., ABM 
battle-management radars)
At the same time, the only restrictions agreed upon for 
offensive weapons were temporary and improvised. Any 
additional leverage that the United States might have 
wielded from its advantages in ABM technology did not 
translate into Soviet concessions on offensive forces. 
Whether because of strategic design or internal bureaucratic 
pressure, Soviet behavior demonstrated a clear preference 
for protecting its then-current ICBM and SLBM development 
programs over any approach involving substantial 
self-restraint in return for corresponding limits on U.S. 
force improvement programs. This preference may have 
reflected a natural if shortsighted judgment in Moscow that 
significant offensive arms restraints were not necessary 
because momentum had swung to the Soviet side in any event. 
It is also true, however, that the U.S. side chose not to 
attempt to bring other sources of leverage into play. 
Specifically, senior U.S. policymakers resisted any serious 
exploration of trading off advantages in U.S. MIRV programs
In general, the launcher and interceptor units of 
account are still recognized as viable even with the more 
recent interest in moving toward exotic space-based BMD 
systems. Traditional radar limits, however, are becoming 
less viable because of new sensor technologies which are 
being developed for other missions (i.e., early warning, 
ASAT) but which have inherent BMD capabilities.
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in return for restrictions on Soviet ICBM modernization. 
This reluctance was due in part to the fact that arms 
control methodology had not progressed beyond the point of 
treating controls on MIRVs as a binary "yes/no" choice. In 
SALT 1, no arms control alternative to a MIRV ban was ever 
developed by either side, and it is not clear that the 
feasibility of such was seriously examined on either side 
until 1973. U.S. behavior was also greatly affected by 
idiosyncratic factors.
In the end, while the negotiating process clarified 
basic strategic objectives for offensive restraints —  
particularly, to improve the survivability of land-based 
missile forces —  it laid a less than sufficient foundation 
for achieving that goal
The most notable was President Nixon's pervasive 
suspicion of Ambassador Gerard Smith, members of the U.S. 
SALT delegation, and the State Department generally, not 
only because he regarded them as a source of anti-White 
House leaks but because they were perceived to be too eager 
to compromise and soft on defense. Kissinger, Smith, and 
others have documented Nixon's perception in great detail. 
See Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 11, 14-15, 822, 
1216-1217; Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 233-242, 375-378, 466-468; 
and Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power (New York: Summit 
Books, 1983), pp. 161-167.
The inadequacy of the Interim Agreement was widely 
recognized. For example, on May 9, 1972, the U.S. Delegation 
informed the Soviet side that failure to complete a more 
comprehensive offensive arms agreement within five years 
could constitute a basis for U.S. withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty. As for future objectives, Gerard Smith stated: "The 
U.S. Delegation believes that the objective of the follow-on 
negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a 
long-term basis threats to the survivability of our 
respective strategic retaliatory forces." See U.S. ACDA,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, p. 156.
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SALT II DIPLOMACY! MANAGED GROWTH
SALT II marks a turbulent period for strategic arms 
diplomacy. With a framework for defensive controls in place, 
attention shifted entirely to offensive weapons. None of the 
substantive differences of SALT I, however, proved to be any 
more tractable in the early stages of talks on a 
comprehensive agreement; both sides started out very far 
apart. Moreover, the political setting for negotiations —  
stressed as it was by Soviet-American tensions over trade 
policy, human rights, and the corrosive effects of Watergate 
on the Nixon presidency —  was hardly conducive to progress. 
The eventual SALT II agreement was not as comprehensive or 
permanent as anticipated, and it was thrown into limbo by 
the collapse of East-West relations in the wake of the NATO 
INF deployment decision and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in late December 1979.
Nonetheless, from the standpoint of bargaining 
methodology, SALT II diplomacy represents a critical phase 
for arms control. It marked the first efforts at dealing 
with the modernization hazards that eluded SALT I, at 
limiting aerodynamic systems along with ballistic missiles, 
and at developing rules to govern the payload capacity and 
performance characteristics of major weapon systems. This 
experience had important effects on the development of 
bargaining methodology, even though SALT II itself was never
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formally implemented and was eventually renounced by the 
United States in November 1986 as a constraint on planning 
decisions.
Equality Versus Stability?
SALT I*s unequal launcher ceilings —  little more than 
a snapshot of where both sides stood in one measure of 
strategic power in the early 1970s —  created a major 
political imperative in the United States to regain 
numerical balance. There was not much dissent from this 
general objective in Washington. Indeed, the Nixon 
Administration lent active support to the Jackson amendment 
to the consternation of some liberals who saw its rigid 
insistence on equality in numbers and throwweight as 
straight-jacketing U.S. negotiating flexibility.^^ 
Kissinger's oft-cited rationale for the Interim Agreement 
was to buy time for the United States to establish a 
stronger bargaining po si ti on .A t the same time, numerical
According to William Hyland, the White House staff 
even took the lead in drafting the Jackson amendment 
language, with Kissinger and Jackson essentially agreeing to 
its provisions in advance, even while Jackson was 
criticizing the SALT I accords in public. See Hyland, Mortal 
Rivals. (Random House, 1987), p. 100.
For example, he observes in his memoir that: "We 
were determined to avoid ever again being in a situation 
where only the Soviets had strategic programs underway." See 
Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1245. He also recounts his 
comments to Secretary Laird: "The way to use this freeze is 
to catch up. If we don't do this we don't deserve to be in 
office." Ibid.
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equality was not the only goal at stake; stability 
objectives began to loom larger after SALT I. Failure to ban 
MIRVs begged the question of how their introduction into the 
arsenals of both sides could be managed. The Soviets, having 
worked hard to reduce their strategic vulnerability in the 
late 1960s, confronted a reversal of this trend in the early 
1970s with the initial deployments of MIRVed Minuteman III 
s qu ad rons.For the Americans, the central considerations 
were how soon Soviet MIRVed ICBMs would put Minuteman at 
risk and whether arms control could arrest this trend. As 
noted earlier, it was a given among virtually all top U.S. 
policymakers in the 1970s that substantial Minuteman 
vulnerability would introduce an instability into the 
strategic balance —  in effect, by inviting preemption 
during crises —  that could not be offset through any 
combination of sea-based or bomber forces. While dire 
warnings of SS-9 counterforce threats never materialized, it 
was clear by the early 1970s that the follow-on systems to 
the SS-9s and SS-lls would be MIRVed. The working hypothesis 
was 6-8 warheads per missile.
Useful analysis which points to such a shift is 
found in Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control; 
Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 
1985), pp. 305-308. See especially the trend of Minuteman 
III deployments, ibid.. Table A-1, p. 307, and the 
coincident shift in vulnerability calculations for the 
Soviet Union in Figure A-1, p. 3 08.
This was Kissinger's projection, noted in an NSC 
meeting of March 21, 1974. See Henry Kissinger, Years of 
Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), p. 1019. His 
calculation of 6-8 warheads on 1,500 ICBMs put his Soviet
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In the abstract there was nothing inconsistent about 
pursuing both numerical equivalence in launchers and low 
numbers of MIRVs. As a practical matter, however, the United 
States had little leverage to force the Soviet Union to 
concede its numerical advantages in launchers confirmed 
under SALT; it could build up to those levels (about 2,500 
launchers) but asymmetrical reductions appeared anathema to 
the Soviet leadership at the time, especially given its 
staunch position on including U.S. FBS in force totals. 
Correspondingly, the United States was already well advanced 
into its MIRVed Minuteman III deployment —  400 by about 
1973 —  making it very unlikely that the Soviets would forgo 
acquisition of MIRV technology unless the Americans were 
prepared to cede some major advantage.^® The dilemma for the 
United States was thus how to conserve its bargaining 
position in the face of conflicting goals: to limit Soviet 
MIRVs to less than destabilizing levels would mean to forgo 
some measure of force improvement (probably Minuteman III),
MIRV projection in the range of 9,000-12,000 warheads. Based 
on ICBM throwweight projections of 10-12 million pounds, 
other estimates for Soviet MIRVing ranged up to 15,000 ICBM 
warheads and beyond. In testimony, Schlesinger projected a 
range of 7-8,000 and noted that higher estimates were 
possible but assumed some combination of Soviet throwweight 
and warhead technology on par with U.S. systems. See U.S. 
Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Strategic Policies, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. GPO, 1974), p. 6. All these projections for ICBM MIRVs 
turned out to be high; as of late 1989, Soviet ICBM loadings 
totaled about 6,500 warheads.
In addition, MIRVed Poseidon SLBMs had already begun 
to be deployed on board U.S. submarines from 1971.
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and this in turn would make it ever more difficult to 
achieve equality with the Soviets in launchers or even to 
exert leverage in favor of reductions with the threat of a 
countervailing buildup/’ A further complication was that 
the most natural avenue to compromise —  to set a limit on 
Soviet MIRVed missile launchers at U.S. levels —  was really 
not much of a limit at all. Because of their throwweight 
advantages, the Soviets could deploy 3 to 4 times the number 
of warheads on an equal number of missiles, more than enough 
to threaten a substantial portion of the Minuteman force 
given expected improvements in ballistic missile accuracy. 
The United States was in no position to reciprocate this 
kind of a counterforce threat.
Initial U.S. SALT II proposals, expressed as general 
principles in 1973 and subsequently formalized in NSDM-245 
in 1974, did little to attenuate the latent tensions in the 
American bargaining position. Reflecting the imperative of 
the Jackson amendment, the U.S. negotiating position called
The idea of threatening a build-up in response to 
continued stalemate in SALT was raised several times. For 
example, Nixon records that Kissinger warned Gromyko during 
the 1974 summit that the United States might be compelled to 
MIRV all its Minuteman missiles in the absence of a new 
agreement within a two year period. See Richard Nixon, RN: 
The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlay, 
1978), p. 1031. At another point, Schlesinger evidently 
suggested an additional outlay of $2 billion for new 
programs if SALT I failed. According to one account, he 
argued for low ceilings on Soviet MIRV or, failing that, for 
a "five year, all out arms race." Leslie H. Gelb, 
"Vladivostok Pact: How It Was Reached," The New York Times. 
December 3, 1974, p. A26. Nothing of this sort ever 
materialized.
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for equality in the total numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers 
and strategic bombers. The initial figure chosen —  2,3 50 —  
was roughly a midway point between lower U.S. totals and 
higher Soviet ones.^° Missile throwweight was also proposed 
by the United States as a unit of account for the first 
time, not as an alternative to launchers but as a 
supplement. Strongly advocated by Pentagon officials, this 
throwweight proposal called for an equal ceiling on MIRVed 
ICBM throwweight, the effect of which would have been to 
restrict Soviet MIRVing to a few hundred missiles.
Evidently, this figure was suggested by U. Alexis 
Johnson, the chief SALT II negotiator. See U. Alexis Johnson 
with Jef Olivarius MacAllister, The Right Hand of Power 
(Englewood: Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 600.
A precise figure for a throwweight threshold was not 
proposed, however. Johnson was instructed to inform his 
Soviet interlocutors that the United States was unlikely to 
accept a level higher than the aggregate throwweight of the 
entire Minuteman force. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. p. 
1018. While the proposal might have been a good going-in 
position, it was hardly fair or balanced in terms of its 
effects. At a level of 1,000 units and with a programmed mix 
of 550 Minuteman Ills, and 450 Minuteman Ils, the 
throwweight total for the U.S. side would have come to about 
1,93 0,000 lbs. At this level, the Americans could have 
deployed as many as 877 Minuteman Ills (2631 warheads) by 
deactivating the remainder of their Minuteman Ils while the 
Soviets would have faced a choice between fielding a maximum 
of 115 SS-18s (1150 warheads) or possibly a maximum of 257 
SS-19 (1542 warheads) or some mix of the two ICBMs at lesser 
levels. The SS-17 with 4 MIRVs was also a possible choice 
but would have compared very poorly to the other two systems 
in a sharply constrained environment. In 1974, U.S. 
officials could not have known for sure how many warheads 
the Soviets would finally deploy on their MIRVed ICBMs, but 
the effects of the U.S. throwweight proposal were no doubt 
understood by Soviet planners, who did know. Throwweight 
values are taken from the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1988-1989 (London: 
IISS, 1988), pp. 210, 215.
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Possibly as a sweetener to the Soviets, the U.S. delegation 
also expressed willingness to negotiate a ban on cruise 
missiles of intercontinental range as well as a ban on 
long-range ballistic missiles stationed on surface ships or 
on aircraft.
None of this was acceptable to the Soviets; the gap 
between their initial positions and U.S. proposals was 
enormous. They urged extension of SALT I 's unequal ceilings 
into a permanent agreement and inclusion of FBS as well as 
strategic bombers in the aggregate count. They also proposed 
very robust non-circumvention language to preclude any 
transfers of delivery systems to allies. (The ABM Treaty 
forbade the transfer of ABM systems to third parties but 
allowed cooperation on anti-tactical ballistic missiles to 
go forward; a categorical non-transfer provision on the 
offensive side would have undermined the NATO position on 
FBS and unacceptably frozen long-standing Anglo-American 
cooperation on sea-based deterrent forces.) In addition to 
these measures, the Soviets called for the closure of 
overseas U.S. submarine bases and the removal of nuclear 
weapons aboard long-range bombers.Finally, they proposed
Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, p. 588. This 
suggestion of a cruise missile ban was later dropped after 
Kissinger persuaded the Pentagon in July 1973 not to cancel 
the ALCM program.
Ibid. The proposal on bomber loadings reflected a 
longstanding Soviet anxiety about the U.S. practice of 
keeping a portion of the B-52 fleet on constant airborne 
alert —  a practice which the U.S. maintained until its 
space-borne missile detection system became fully
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that "major new weapons" be banned —  including the B-1 
bomber and the Trident submarine —  but that weapons 
undergoing "modernization" (e.g., the replacement of the 
SS-9s and SS-lls with the MIRVed SS-18s, SS-17s, and SS-19s) 
be allowed to proceed.^ U.S. officials saw this proposal as 
a Soviet ploy to seize unilateral advantages in the 
modernization process and it was promptly rejected.
With both sides committed to conflicting conceptions of 
a permanent agreement, negotiations during 1973-74 sputtered 
along with little more than occasional probing of each 
other's bargaining positions. In an effort to generate a 
more flexible approach, the chief U.S. negotiator, U. Alexis 
Johnson, forwarded some private suggestions to Kissinger in 
November 1973. The novel element in Johnson's ideas was a 
threshold on total throwweight which would attempt to relate 
bomber payload (a major U.S. advantage) to missile boosting 
power (a major Soviet a d v a n t a g e ) T h e  combined effect of 
the low aggregate ceiling and the throwweight limits would 
then compel Soviet reductions in their SS-9/18 ICBM force
operational in the early 1970s. In the same way, the Soviets 
have consistently included among their proposals for 
confidence-building measures a prohibition against the 
massed take-off of strategic bombers.
See Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in 
an Era of Detente," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2 (January 
1976), p. 218.
Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, pp. 598-599. In 
Johnson's plan, bomber payload was to be calculated at 
one-half of their actual capacity, in compensation for their 
slower flight time relative to ICBMs.
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balanced in part by some U.S. reductions in B-52 bombers. As 
an added inducement for Soviet cuts, Johnson also evidently 
favored the idea of forgoing the Trident submarine while 
instead equipping the Poseidon fleet with the new C-4 
(Trident I) missile.
As it turned out, Johnson's plan foundered on Pentagon 
objections that it was not possible to weigh the value of 
bomber forces relative to ballistic missiles and that 
bombers should therefore be excluded. Nonetheless, his ideas 
were significant in the sense that they signaled the first 
step in a recurring U.S. tendency, seen not only in SALT but 
later in START, to achieve broader formulations of 
equivalence in which U.S. advantages could be used as 
catalyzing agents for structured limits on Soviet forces of 
interest to the United States. It was a kind of "grand 
compromise" for offensive forces that the U.S. side had 
half-heartedly tried to achieve with the use of ABM 
bargaining chips in 1972.
Kissinger's own evaluation of the situation led him 
down a different path in the search for optimal bargaining 
trade-offs. In his retrospective account of SALT II, he 
clearly puts himself in the camp of those who saw the 
paramount problem as being the strategic instabilities
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created by MIRV. However, the Pentagon's approach to 
dealing with this problem —  throwweight restrictions —  
would force a wholesale restructuring of the Soviet rocket 
forces unless the Soviets were prepared to live with far 
fewer missiles than the United States. This outcome seemed 
very unlikely. Instead, Kissinger saw more potential in a 
force concentration rule limiting the distribution of 
weapons under the aggregate limit —  in this case, a 
sublimit on MIRVed ICBMs. The principal issue raised by a 
sublimit, like all ceilings on key units of account, was 
where to draw the line. To set it on par with U.S. MIRVed 
missiles, as noted above, would have given the Soviets a 
destabilizing advantage in warhead-carrying capacity; to set 
it below projected U.S. MIRV levels would have risked 
triggering a bureaucratic revolt in the Pentagon.
Why not, Kissinger asked, simply drop the requirement 
for overall equality in launchers —  in effect, to extend 
SALT I, at least temporarily —  in return for Soviet 
acceptance of a "an offsetting asymmetry" in the numbers of 
MIRVed ICBMs? Kissinger unveiled his scheme at an NSC 
meeting in late March 1974, just prior to visiting Moscow to 
finalize arrangements for Nixon's visit in June. It was 
presented as a three year add-on to the Interim Agreement,
This is clearly indicated in Kissinger's constant 
criticism of the Pentagon's equal aggregates approach. See 
for example his revealing footnote in Years of Upheaval. pp. 
2 64-65.
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which would counterbalance the unequal launcher levels by 
limiting the Soviets to under 300 land-based MIRVed ICBMs 
while allowing the United States to complete its planned 
deployment of 550 Minuteman III missiles. As Kissinger 
recalls: "I did not really expect the Soviets to accept the 
numbers we would be proposing. There was no realistic 
prospect that they would confine themselves to 270 
land-based MIRVed ICBMs. But if the principle of unequal 
aggregates for MIRVs was accepted, I hoped to shape an 
outcome that would delay the Soviets' achievement of a 
first-strike capability.
Perhaps to his surprise, the main bureaucratic players 
seemed to close ranks behind the idea; in particular. 
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger gave conditional 
approval to the plan. But there turned out to be little 
latitude for real bargaining. In Moscow, Brezhnev did agree 
in principle to unequal MIRV ceilings but at levels high 
enough —  1,100 for the United States, 1,000 for the Soviet 
Union —  to vitiate any real constraining effect. The 
Soviets also rejected any sublimit specifically on MIRVed 
ICBMs. A few weeks later, Kissinger floated a counteroffer 
to Gromyko of an 850 MIRVed missile ceiling for the Soviets 
with a sublimit of 600 MIRVed ICBMs, but Schlesinger 
publicly disassociated himself from it in early June, 
reasserting the Pentagon's staunch support for the equal
Ibid. . p. 1019.
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aggregate approach.^® From Nixon's viewpoint, it was the 
Pentagon's about-face that essentially barred any "flexible 
negotiating" on SALT during his last summit with Brezhnev.^’ 
Arguably, the demise of Kissinger's approach may have 
stemmed less from internal opposition to its substance than 
from a desire in parts of Congress and the Pentagon to block 
any desperate move by Nixon to revive his failing presidency 
with a snap agreement. That said, however, there is no clear 
evidence to suggest that, having budged on the principle of 
offsetting inequalities, the USSR would have really applied 
it as a tool for suppressing MIRV capability. Kissinger has 
portrayed this episode as a lost opportunity, and it has 
been argued by others that an agreement in 1974 could have 
affected Soviet acquisition plans then being drawn up for 
the 1976-80 time frame.However, so far as is known, the 
Soviets never signaled any willingness to accept a low 
sublimit on MIRVed missiles (e.g., less than 1,000) during
In fact, Schlesinger was quite happy to accept a 
differential in MIRVed ICBMs. Under his proposal, the 
Soviets would have been allowed 300 less MIRVed ICBMs (3 60 
to 660) under an overall aggregate ceiling of 2,500 deployed 
SNDVs, see ibid.. p. 1158. The catch was that he was not 
prepared to sacrifice overall equality in SNDVs in order to 
achieve that outcome, despite the fact that the Pentagon had 
no plans to field 660 Minuteman Ills or 2,500 SNDVs.
Nixon, RN, p. 1035.
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. pp. 1028-1029. In 
fairness to Kissinger the historian, he points out that 
missed opportunities can never be proven. For discussion on 
the connection between SALT and Soviet planning, see 
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 4 32.
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this time frame; nor did they ever name a price —  even an 
outrageous one —  for accepting such a limit. Reinforcing 
this pessimistic interpretation is the fact that, despite 
hints that they would show flexibility in dealing with the 
new Ford Administration,^^ the Soviets continued to reject 
U.S. proposals to cut their force of 3 08 heavy ICBMs or to 
bar their MIRVing, even though they were at the same time 
proceeding with two MIRVed replacements for their smaller 
SS-11.^ These facts, coupled with lobbying by the Pentagon 
for leeway under SALT to proceed with Trident, effectively 
precluded any constraints on MIRV. When the Vladivostok 
framework was agreed to in November 1974 by Presidents Ford 
and Brezhnev, its ceilings of 2,400 on overall launchers and 
1,320 on MIRVed ICBM and SLBM were too high to impose any 
obvious constraint.^* MIRVed missiles were preferentially 
restricted for the first time but at such a high level as to 
make any constraining effect, for either side, essentially 
theoretical for nearly a decade.
See account of Ford-Gromyko meeting of September 20, 
1974 in Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobioaraphv of 
Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 183-4.
Garthoff, in Detente and Confrontation, p. 443, 
supplies a fact not reported in other accounts, namely that 
the U.S. proposal of September 1974 in effect would have 
limited MIRVing to non-heavy ICBMs.
With one exception: the Soviets would have had to 
reduce their overall aggregate by about 100 launchers, a 
level that was still 200 above programmed U.S. forces.
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The significance of Vladivostok
It is against this background that one should assess 
the Vladivostok compromises. While the Vladivostok accord 
was not a formal treaty, it was a framework agreement which 
represented a series of highly consequential bargaining 
adjustments for each side. For the Soviet Union, it marked 
the end of formal demands in SALT II for compensation on FBS 
within the overall aggregate totals —  a step of no lesser 
consequence than Gorbachev's decision to drop insistence on 
including British and French nuclear forces within the INF 
negotiations nearly thirteen years later.^ It also signaled 
an end to the more extreme Soviet proposals in SALT II on 
banning new U.S. strategic systems. These concessions, 
however, came at a substantial price: the Soviets staved off 
U.S. demands for cuts in heavy ICBM and achieved a high 
launcher ceiling which, as they almost certainly reckoned, 
the Americans were unlikely ever to match.
For the U.S. side, Vladivostok resolved the stability 
vs. equality trade-off decisively in favor of equality. 
Indeed, it marked the end of the road for any real U.S. 
effort at limiting ICBM vulnerability wholly through
^ However, Soviet officials did on occasion threaten 
to revisit the FBS issue, see Thomas Wolfe, The SALT 
Experience. (Cambridge, Ma.: Ballinger, 1979), p. 200, and 
certainly threatened to do so when the Carter Administration 
tried to reintroduce the issue of cutting heavy ICBMs in 
1977. According to U. Alexis Johnson, the Soviets 
continually insisted that FBS was not off the bargaining 
table for good, and would have to be addressed in SALT III. 
See U.S. Congress, The SALT II Treaty. Part 5, p. 491.
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constraints on the Soviet MIRV buildup, whether by- 
offsetting inequalities or direct limits on throwweight. 
Thenceforth, without unilateral basing adjustments, it was 
at least theoretically possible that most U.S. ICBMs as well 
as submarines in port and non-alert bombers would be at risk 
to prompt attacks at some point in the future. This 
so-called "window of vulnerability" created by the MIRVed 
throwweight differential was the basis upon which Paul Nitze 
and other critics eventually came out against the 
Vladivostok understanding and any agreement stemming from 
it The idea of shaping procurement and arms control 
policies around the concept of adequate survivability based 
on a favorable warhead/target ratio —  that is, 
proliferating low-value aim points to such a degree that the 
"price to attack" becomes unacceptable to the side striking 
first —  did not become a widely accepted goal for U.S. 
policy until the Scowcroft Commission popularized it in 
1983/*
Finally, for both sides, Vladivostok meant the end of a 
search for a permanent offensive arms agreem en t. In
This was the centerpiece of Nitze's now famous 
attack on the Vladivostok framework, see Nitze, "Assuring 
Strategic Stability," p. 22 0.
*  Report of the President's Commission on Strategic 
Forces (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 
1983), p. 14.
The decision on a finite time frame for the new SALT 
II agreement was actually taken at the Moscow summit in July 
1973, not at Vladivostok, although the Vladivostok accord 
formalized it. In a revealing comment to the press,
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bargaining terms, the accord conformed to the pattern set by 
the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement of achieving limited 
progress at the price of deferring hard issues for 
subsequent negotiations. Those issues —  principally the 
matters of negotiating verifiable limits on the force 
loadings of different classes of missiles and bombers, of 
limiting new missile types, and of dealing with gray-area 
weapons such as the Backfire bomber (a scope issue, which 
will be examined in Chapter 6) —  dominated the negotiating 
agenda during the remainder of the SALT II period.
Compliance Frictions
Despite its high launcher limits, the Vladivostok 
package could have imparted substantial momentum to SALT II
Kissinger explained this choice in terms of the bargaining 
problems raised by either a temporary extension of the 
interim accord (with new MIRV limits) or by a permanent 
agreement. He said: "Extending the interim
agreement....presented a number of extraordinarily difficult 
problems because we would be pressed in terms of quantity, 
since a number of our new programs, such as Trident. are 
going to be deployed starting around 1978, 1979; and...the 
Soviet Union would be pressed in terms of quality, because 
their deployment of MIRVs is only now starting. And the 
difficulty of making an agreement with a cutoff date of 1979 
is, when you have gone through all the agony, you have not 
put a cap on the rate of deployment.... On the other hand, 
when you talk of a permanent agreement, you get yourself 
frozen into situations in which the technology is so 
unpredictable that it is very difficult to make reasonable 
judgments, and this is why the period 1985 was chosen. It 
was chosen in the hope...that if such an agreement were 
reached next year, we would be talking about a ten-year 
agreement." Press conference of Henry A. Kissinger, Moscow, 
July 3, 1974, reprinted in Labrie, ed., SALT Handbook, p. 
259.
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diplomacy. A major reason that it did not was a flurry of 
charges of noncompliance with SALT I which dominated 
political discussions in the United States during 1975 and 
intermittently thereafter until the completion of SALT II.
The most noteworthy development was the Soviet SS-19 
ICBM, which was flight-tested beginning in August 1973. 
Armed with a payload of 6 warheads, the SS-19 turned out to 
be about 50 percent larger in volumetric terms than the 
SS-11 and possessed more than 3 times the throwweight 
potential. Between 1974 and the early 1980s, the Soviets 
retrofitted 360 SS-11 silo launchers with SS-19s of three 
different variants, two of them MIRV-equipped. They also 
installed 150 SS-17s, a missile closer in size to the SS-11 
but with roughly twice the throwweight capacity. Equipped 
with 4 warheads, the SS-17 was less a bone of contention 
than the larger SS-19. Its ability to be "cold launched" 
(i.e., ejected from the silo by compressed gases prior to 
ignition) was a troublesome innovation, however, for it 
raised the possibility of silo reloading operations within 
some meaningful time frame and created a new requirement to 
clarify in agreed treaty language the relationship of 
non-deployed missiles and on-line launch systems.^
^  The notion of a strategically significant time frame 
depends entirely on one's view of the feasibility of 
protracted warfare scenarios. U.S. intelligence has not 
assessed this reload capacity as "rapid" but as one that 
could be exploited over several days. See Soviet Military 
Power, 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 
1981), p. 56. Perhaps the main attraction of cold-launch for 
the Soviets was not reloading per se but the possibility of
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Neither the SS-19 nor the SS-17 actually violated 
agreed treaty language. Under SALT I's rules on upgrading, 
the modernization of missile forces was explicitly allowed 
unless it resulted in greater numbers of heavy ICBMs or a 
significant increase in the size of existing launch silos. 
The problem was that, as noted earlier, the Soviet Union had 
persistently refused to accept a U.S. proposal to designate 
the SS-11 as the dividing line between light and heavy 
ICBMs, while the United States refused to adjust its 
proposed definition upward, opting instead to restate 
unilaterally for the record that it would regard any missile 
significantly larger than the SS-11 as a heavy missile.
This was a move that U.S. officials would later regret. 
Referring to the silo upgrade provisions and other 
"safeguards" in the agreement, Kissinger told members of 
Congress in June 1972 that SALT I would bar the substitution 
of the SS-11 by heavy I C B M s . H e  was not entirely
deploying larger throwweight ICBMs in silos that were 
already constrained by agreement. For a given silo size, the 
cold-launching technique permits deployment of larger ICBMs 
than would be the case if the missile had to be ignited 
inside the silo during the launch sequence. See Department 
of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Defense, 1978), pp. 49-50.
In his briefing to Congress, Kissinger spoke of 
several "safeguards": first, that substituting light with 
heavy ICBMs was barred; second, that silo configuration 
could not be changed in a significant way; and third, that 
both sides had agreed to define the term significant as a 10 
to 15 percent increase in silo dimensions. See remarks by 
Kissinger, June 15, 1972, printed in U.S. Congress, Military 
Implications of the Treatv on the Limitations of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Svstems. p. 128.
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incorrect. Without the silo restrictions, there would have 
been no clear barriers to replacement of the entire Soviet 
SS-11 force with SS-18s.^° Contrary to Kissinger's 
suggestion, however, there was no bar to "in-between" ICBMs 
significantly larger than the SS-11, which would meet the 
U.S. definition of a heavy ICBM. There is some evidence to 
indicate that U.S. intelligence may have underestimated the 
size of a new missile that could be fired from a slightly 
enlarged SS-11 silo.^ Given Soviet opposition to an agreed 
definition of a heavy ICBM, however, it is unrealistic to 
suppose that this miscalculation alone would have led U.S. 
officials to develop exaggerated notions of the constraining 
power of the Interim Agreement. Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that the Nixon Administration's claims were badly 
undercut by Soviet compliance behavior.
As the Soviet Union's best shot at acguiring MIRV 
capability at the time, the SS-19 was a strategically 
significant development by any measure.^ With a maximum
This was not simply a theoretical concern. Then 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, for one, was careful to 
justify the silo restrictions in terms of preventing the 
replacement of SS-lls with SS-9 class missiles (i.e., the 
SS-18). See comments by Laird, ibid.. p. 548. At the same 
time, so far as is known, there was no evidence to indicate 
that the Soviets ever seriously intended to replace SS-lls 
with SS-9s or their follow-ons.
U.S. Congress, Principal Findings on the 
Capabilities of the United States to Monitor the SALT II 
Treaty, p. 3.
According to Jan Lodal, who served on the NSC staff 
during this period, the SS-19 was viewed by U.S. experts as 
the Soviets' "main prospect for developing a workable MIRV."
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force loading of 2,160 warheads, the SS-19 force has carried 
more than one-third of total deployed Soviet ICBM warheads. 
Yet some critics have overstated the compliance-related 
aspects of this case by arguing that the Soviets deceptively 
inserted a loophole for the SS-19 into the agreement.^ It 
is hard to see where deception took place. One does not have 
to look very far to realize that SALT I's rules on upgrading 
were recognized at the time as allowing substantial room for 
new and larger missiles. As Kissinger himself observed at 
the time: "No doubt one of the reasons for the Soviet 
reluctance to specify a precise characteristic is 
undoubtedly that they are planning to modernize within the 
existing framework some of the weapons they now possess. 
Moreover, while the official Soviet position was that the 
proposed American definition was unnecessary, because NTMs 
could distinguish between light and heavy ICBMs, this fact 
alone does not validate the charge of deception. Soviet 
negotiators at SALT I had let it be known by the Spring of 
1972, more than a year before the SS-19 was flight-tested,
See Jan Lodal, "Verifying SALT," p. 49. It is worth noting 
that the accuracy of the SS-19 has been downgraded in recent 
years. The 1986 edition of Soviet Militarv Power, p. 25, 
asserted that the SS-19 Mod 3 has "similar capabilities" to 
the silo-busting SS-18 force. But the 1987 edition stated 
that the SS-19 Mod 3 has significant capability against all 
but unhardened targets." See Soviet Militarv Power. 1987, p. 
29.
^ Sullivan, "The Legacy of SALT I," p. 35.
Kissinger briefing of June 15, 1972, in U.S. 
Congress, Militarv Implications, p. 128.
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that the U.S. definition was unacceptable because they had 
in development a system that would be inconsistent with 
it.^ The Soviet side thus did not encourage the United 
States to believe falsely that a unilateral statement to 
which they had already objected would have some binding 
effect. The real fault lies in Kissinger's decision to table 
a unilateral statement in the first place and to assert the 
existence of "safeguards" in the agreement that did not in 
fact exist. Why these steps were taken in the face of clear 
evidence that they would raise problems later has never been 
fully explained.
Another event which raised doubts about compliance with 
framework rules involved the apparent establishment of a 
Soviet ABM test range on the Kamchatka peninsula (see Table 
3-1), in the vicinity of a well established impact area for 
ICBM tests. In the Fall of 1975, U.S. intelligence observed 
the installation at Kamchatka of a prototype ABM tracking 
radar, dubbed Flat Twin, which was a main component of a new 
Soviet ABM system, the ABM-X-3, then in the early stages of 
engineering development. Reportedly, this radar initially 
had been deployed at the Sary Shagan test range, then 
disassembled, moved to Kamchatka and reassembled there, all 
within a period of months.
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 169-170,
174.
Thomas K. Longstreth, John E. Pike, and John B. 
Rhinelander, The Impact of U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile 
Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty, (Washington, D.C.:
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This activity raised two issues from the compliance 
standpoint. The first was whether the Kamchatka range should 
be classified as a "new" or "existing" ABM test range. Under 
the treaty, both sides accepted the obligation that new test 
ranges would be subject to mutual agreement. This 
requirement was proposed by the U.S. side in order to 
prevent a situation in which key units of account —  in this 
case, ABM radar components —  were deployed in excess of 
agreed ceilings under the guise of a test program.^ The 
problem was that Kamchatka was not included on a list of 
existing U.S. and Soviet test ranges furnished by the United 
States during the final stages of the ABM negotiations, and 
the Soviet side took no action to amend the U.S. 
declaration, asserting somewhat ambiguously that "national 
means permitted identifying current test ranges."^® When 
queried about the matter in the SCC, Soviet representatives 
stated that a test facility on Kamchatka had in fact existed
National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, 1985), pp. 57-58.
^  As John E. Rhinelander, a legal advisor on the SALT 
I delegation, later stated: "The effect of Article IV (on 
test ranges) is to prohibit either side from constructing 
ABM components, for instance, around Leningrad or New York, 
under the label of a 'test range.'" See "The SALT I 
Agreements," Mason Willrich and John Rhinelander, eds., 
SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Bevond (New York: The Free 
Press, 1974), p. 133.
This assertion did not amount to an endorsement of 
the U.S. statement, despite the fact that it is listed 
erroneously under the heading of "Common Understanding" in 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements. 1980 Edition, p. 145.
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in 1972, even though they had not specifically identified it 
as such, and that they were prepared to consider it as a 
current test range within the meaning of the ABM Treaty.^’
The second question was whether the radar installed at 
Kamchatka violated the treaty's prohibition on land-mobile 
ABM components (i.e., not being of a permanently fixed 
type). The time frame of a few months within which the Flat 
Twin was disassembled, transported to Kamchatka and 
reassembled triggered concern among some experts. As in the 
test range case, the idea behind a ban on mobility was 
mainly to erect a barrier against breakout, this time by 
preventing either side in their respective R&D programs from 
developing ABM components that could be stockpiled and then 
deployed on extremely short notice. When the Carter 
Administration examined the issue in 1979, it concluded that 
the Flat Twin and associated radars were not mobile in the 
sense of being able to be moved about or readily hidden. 
However, the dividing line between mobile and merely 
transportable components is an inherently fuzzy one; 
judgments about mobility focus not only on the time frame of 
movement, but on the extent of assembly or disassembly 
required as well as the need for special site preparations
U.S. Department of State, Compliance With SALT I 
Agreements, p. 3.
Ibid. , p. 6.
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(e.g., concrete foundations, etc.).®^
Unlike the SS-19 deployment, the Kamchatka matter was 
not deemed at the time to have much strategic significance 
as a compliance problem.®^ Had the Soviet Union been 
forthright in declaring the facility in 1972, as the United 
States did for its own, the problem might never have come 
up. (The USSR was not, however, required to make such 
declarations at the time.) As it turned out, in pursuing the 
case further in SCC discussions, U.S. officials got the 
Soviet side to acknowledge that Sary Shagan and Kamchatka 
were the only existing ABM test ranges in the Soviet 
Union.®^ This admission not only settled the immediate issue 
at hand —  in effect precluding the sudden appearance of 
other "existing" Soviet test ranges —  it also signaled an
®^ The time frame criterion seemed to be the dominant 
consideration during the negotiations. According to some 
observers, the U.S. interpretation of mobility or 
"transportability" was that if components could be moved 
within a few days or a week, such activity would be 
inconsistent with the treaty. See Longstreth, et al., U.S. 
and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs, p. 58. 
However, a slightly longer time frame —  from a week to 
several months —  was also of concern, even if not clearly 
at odds with the intent of the ban on mobile components. I 
am grateful to Albert Carnesale, of the U.S. SALT I 
delegation, for this observation.
®^  Nonetheless, as a compliance issue per se. and in 
contrast to the Carter Administration's conclusion, the 
Reagan Administration in 1985 assessed the evidence with 
respect to the ABM component mobility issue as "ambiguous" 
and stated that there was the possibility of a "potential 
violation." See President's Report on Noncompliance. 
February 1, 1985, p. 8.
®^ U.S. Department of State, Compliance With SALT I . p
3.
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important step toward a more systematic approach to data 
exchanges and other verification rules under future 
agreements, to which we will return in Chapter 7.
Renewed Efforts at Constraining Modernization; 
Fencinq-in MIRVs
The development of MIRV-equipped Soviet ICBMs brought 
into sharp focus the central methodological drawback of the 
SALT I framework: numerical limits on launch systems 
required a supporting array of modernization constraints to 
be effective, but the silo restrictions that were supposed 
to serve this purpose had more modest effects than many in 
the United States had been led to believe. Given their 
importance for verification, it was scarcely possible that 
launchers would be dropped as a unit of account. 
Increasingly, however, the negotiations faced the challenge 
of trying to limit weapons performance. This forced each 
side into a bargaining process aimed at determining which 
aspects of strategic capability —  the number of payloads, 
explosive power, accuracy, more and better silo restraints, 
etc. —  should be limited; and also on ways to make 
verifiable distinctions between or among strategic weapons 
of differing capability.
Sorting out these issues was a painstaking process. The 
negotiations never really managed to overcome the minutiae 
of accounting and definitional disagreements during the
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remainder of Ford's and Kissinger's tenure.®^ At the 
delegation level, agreement was reached on a counting rule 
for MIRV missiles, whereby any booster tested with multiple 
payloads would be counted as MIRVed, and thus subject to the 
MIRV sublimit, regardless of whether it was actually 
deployed with MIRVs. Both sides also agreed in principle 
that SALT II would ban the storage of spare missiles and 
reloading equipment at operational launch s i t e s . A i m e d  at 
fencing-in the cold-launch technique which made rapid 
reloading theoretically possible, this provision firmed up 
the presumption in favor of strict segregation of 
non-deployed missiles and operational launchers. However, a 
host of other issues ultimately eluded agreement and further 
negotiation was deferred until after the 1976 U.S. 
presidential election and the advent of a new administration 
in Washington.
^ Both sides came close to a deal covering Backfire 
and cruise missiles during Kissinger's visit to Moscow in 
January 1976. The general framework of this tentative 
compromise was to add to the Vladivostok thresholds a 
separate allowance for 300 Backfire bombers and roughly the 
same number of cruise missiles on U.S. surface ships while 
lowering the overall aggregate from 2,400 to 2,200. As part 
of this arrangement, the Soviets also agreed not to count 
each ALCM against the MIRVed launcher aggregate, as they had 
insisted upon in the wake of Vladivostok, but to count 
ALCM-equipped bombers against the MIRV sublimit. What 
apparently nixed the deal was an urgent cable from 
Washington indicating that the Pentagon firmly opposed 
forfeiting the option to deploy SLCMs on submarines. See 
Mortal Rivals, pp. 159-161. For details on Soviet treatment 
of ALCMs up to January 1976, see comments in U.S. Congress, 
The SALT II Treatv. Part 5, p. 281.
Talbott, Endgame. p. 36.
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In contrast to his immediate predecessors, Jimmy Carter 
brought to the U.S. presidency a strong philosophical 
interest in arms control and a willingness, at least 
initially, to explore the prospects of more far-reaching 
agreements. Perhaps for this very reason he was also eager 
to find common ground with critics of the Ford-Kissinger 
approach within his own party, especially Sen. Henry 
Jackson, whose support for a new agreement would be critical 
to successful ratification. Jackson's insistence on 
revisiting the issue of cutting Soviet heavy ICBMs pushed 
the U.S. planning process toward a more radical formula 
involving deep reductions and technical restraint. The 
product of this effort was a comprehensive package featuring 
cuts of 20-30 percent in the Vladivostok aggregates, a 50 
percent cut in Soviet heavy ICBMs, a complete ban on new 
types of ICBM, and a missile flight-testing quota, which 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance presented in Moscow during 
his first visit in March 1977 A Gorbachev conceivably
^  The full package included: an overall equal 
aggregate of 1,800 - 2,000 launchers; a MIRVed missile 
sublimit of 1,100 - 1,200; a MIRVed ICBM sublimit of 550; a 
reduction in heavy ICBM to 150; a ban on the development, 
testing, and deployment of new types of ICBM; a ban on the 
modification of existing ICBMs; a ban on mobile ICBMs; a 
flight-test limit of 6 ICBM and 6 SLBM per year; a ban on 
cruise missiles above 2,500 km in range; ALCMs of between 
600 - 2,500 km range would be limited to heavy bombers ; and 
Backfire would not be included if the Soviets would provide 
a list of measures to assure that the bomber would not be 
used in a strategic role. The basic elements of this package 
were spelled out by Vance, in his March 30, 1977 Moscow 
press conference, see Documents on Disarmament. 1977. p.
178. See also U.S. Congress, The SALT II Treatv. Part 4 . p. 
482. Figures and supplementary detail are supplied by
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might have seized upon the proposal as a basis for 
negotiation on matters of long-standing Soviet interest.
(The U.S. plan would have eliminated the MX missile while 
leaving Soviet fourth generation missiles intact, albeit at 
lower levels.) But Brezhnev and Gromyko spurned the package 
as a betrayal of Vladivostok, and the Carter Administration 
suddenly found itself caught between a major impasse with 
Soviet leaders and disappointed expectations at home.®^
What happened next is a good illustration of the 
inertial influences of arms control as a diplomatic process. 
Faced with the need to reestablish a credible bargaining 
position, the Carter Administration fell back upon a more 
modest approach as a way to bring into balance Soviet 
insistence on the Vladivostok framework with its own desire 
for limitations that would arguably be a more progressive 
version of arms control. Somewhat ironically, one of the 
vehicles for this was a variation on the force concentration 
rule for MIRVed ICBMs which Kissinger had attempted to 
negotiate previously. Support for this option within the 
U.S. government was driven in part by a growing belief that 
the Soviets would never budge on cutting heavy ICBMs, and in 
part by a new concern that even if cuts in heavy ICBMs were
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 806.
The quality of scorn in the Soviet reaction was 
vividly demonstrated in an unprecedented press conference 
held by Gromyko in the wake of Vance's visit. See news 
conference remarks by Gromyko, March 31, 1977, Documents on 
Disarmament, pp. 181-182.
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obtained, they would not buy very much in the way of 
constraints on prompt counterforce potential if Moscow could 
offset such cuts with SS-19s.®® A threshold of 550 on MIRVed 
ICBM had been tried in March 1977 but rejected by the 
Soviets as part of the U.S. comprehensive package. U.S. 
planners therefore began to look at options more compatible 
with Vladivostok —  sublimits in the 700-800 range —  with 
the possibility of adding ALCM- equipped bombers into the 
framework as an inducement to the Soviets.®^
The Carter Administration made a slow and 
politically embarrassing retreat in its proposals to 
constrain Soviet heavy ICBM. Initially, in its comprehensive 
proposal, it wanted a limit of 150 on heavy missile 
launchers; then, in May 1977, Vance proposed to freeze 
MIRVed heavy ICBMs at 190 (in effect, preventing further 
retrofitting of SS-9 silos with SS-18 missiles); finally, in 
September the United States proposed a "heavy systems" 
sublimit in which the Soviets could keep 250 MIRVed heavy 
ICBMs balanced by 250 U.S. cruise missile equipped bombers. 
This latter proposal echoed the earlier throwweight limit 
proposed by U. Alexis Johnson in 1974. However, the Soviets 
rejected all three approaches. Meanwhile, the SS-19 issue 
was becoming paramount in the calculations of U.S. 
officials. For a detailed account, see Talbott, Endgame. pp. 
101-103.
The 550 figure corresponded to the number of U.S. 
Minuteman III already deployed and so would have had no 
effect on U.S. plans. The idea of counting ALCM-equipped 
bombers under a MIRV sublimit had been tentatively agreed to 
in principle during Kissinger's January 1976 meeting in 
Moscow, but was not widely accepted as part of the agreed 
framework in the United States, in part because of the 
disputes between Moscow and Washington shortly after 
Vladivostok over how to handle cruise missiles. In 
retrospect, this solution was a good compromise in that it 
offered the United States operational flexibility within a 
limited scope but was not nearly as constraining as the 
initial Soviet proposal that everv long-range ALCM deployed 
aboard bombers should be counted against the overall ceiling 
of 2,400. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 202.
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In theory, new sublimits were a sensible way to make 
the Vladivostok framework more relevant to the force 
multiplying (and concentrating) effects of MIRV. Yet, for a 
sublimit on MIRVed missiles to have any effect, there 
logically had to be supplemental controls on the number of 
MIRVs on each system in order to negate the circumvention 
potential implicit in untapped ballistic missile throwweight 
—  a potential that would allow an SS-18 ICBM, for example, 
to be loaded-up with 20 or more additional w a r he a d s . A s  an 
alternative to throwweight limits, the Carter Administration 
focused its efforts in 1978 on achieving a freeze on missile 
"fractionation" (i.e., the number of RVs per missile). The 
bargaining on this issue was tortuous and involved some 
horsetrading. The Soviets were loath to limit the 
fractionation potential of their SS-17 and SS-19 ICBMs to 4 
and 6 warheads respectively while the Americans insisted on 
going ahead with a 10 warhead package for their new MX 
ICBM.’^ Furthermore, Gromyko wanted to apply the same
Under SALT counting rules, the SS-18 and its 
follow-on were limited to 10 warheads. Given past test 
experience there is some reason to think the SS-18 could be 
uploaded to carry 14 RVs without major alterations; its 
throwweight, however, gives it a potential to carry up to 3 0 
warheads. This estimate was supplied by then Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown in testimony, see U.S. Congress, Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Militarv Implications of the 
Treatv on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and 
Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treatv). 96th Congress, 1st sess. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979), p. 15.
Talbott, Endgame. pp. 180-181. As Talbott tells the 
story, the primary reason for attributing 10 RVs to the MX 
was political, to put it on par with the SS-18. Pentagon 
studies had concluded the missile was more efficient with
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principle to bombers, so that the ALCM loadings for 
individual aircraft were subject to agreed counting 
procedures. He made Soviet acceptance of the missile 
fractionation idea contingent upon American acceptance of 
ALCM constraints.
Beyond restricting the "value added" potential of 
MIRVed throwweight, limits on fractionation interposed 
another demand on the bargaining process —  the need to 
segregate MIRVed from unMIRVed forces for the purposes of 
verification. Once it had become clear that the USSR was 
going to acquire MIRV capability, some in the United States 
feared that Soviet missile designers would be able to 
proliferate MIRV payloads clandestinely throughout the 
existing SS-9/SS-11 force. These anxieties turned out to be 
premature. The Soviets did not test older missiles with 
MIRVed payloads, and the characteristics of the MIRV 
components they did test on the front-ends of their new 
SS-17s/18s/19s made it virtually impossible to retrofit 
these assemblies on to older generation missiles. 
Furthermore, careful monitoring by U.S. intelligence of 
Soviet launch sites during 1974-75 revealed that some of the
6-8 warheads.
Lawrence Weiler, "The Status of SALT: A 
Perspective," in William H. Kincade and Jeffrey D. Porro, 
eds.. Negotiating Securitv: An Arms Control Reader 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1979), p. 31. For a 
reference to MIRV payloads, see Les Aspin, "The Verification 
of the SALT II Agreement," pp. 5-6.
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modifications to silo launchers and associated command and 
control equipment required for new MIRVed missiles were 
quite visible to NTMs.’^  This ruled out the possibility that 
MIRVed missiles could be deployed in older, unmodified 
silos. Thus, the prospect of achieving verifiable MIRV 
sublimits boiled down to whether clearcut distinctions could 
be made between MIRVed and unMIRVed versions of the same 
missile class and whether the Soviets would retain single RV 
systems in launchers capable of handling MIRVed missiles.
Even prior to Vladivostok, U.S. planners had come to 
the judgment that MIRVed and unMIRVed versions of the same 
missile class could not be differentiated with NTMs, and 
they pressed for a broad rule attributing a MIRV capability 
to all missiles tested with MIRV. The Soviets initially 
resisted this rule on the grounds that they should not be 
penalized for deploying SS-18s with single warheads but, as 
noted earlier, they eventually accepted the rule in July 
1 9 7 5 Developing a general counting rule for launch 
systems proved to be more elusive, in part because of 
disagreements over the status of modified Soviet launchers 
located in the vicinity of SS-19 deployments that were still
See Kissinger's comments to the press, December 3, 
1974, in Labrie, ed., SALT Handbook, pp. 302-303.
The Soviets apparently wanted to retain some SS-18 
Mod 3s with single warheads for maritime targeting at 
extended ranges. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States 
Militarv Power for FY 1978 (Washington, D.C.; Department of 
Defense, 1977), p. 10.
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equipped with SS-lls. In this case, the United States argued 
that there was no visible way to preclude modified, MIRV- 
capable silo launchers, even those which it knew were still 
equipped with the SS-11, from being reloaded surreptitiously 
with SS-19S at a later date. American negotiators thus 
insisted that the logic of the booster counting rule be 
applied to launchers as well. In September 1977, the Soviets 
agreed to the specific application of this rule in 
connection with two deployment areas —  at Derazhnya and 
Pervomaysk in the Ukraine —  where SS-lls and SS-19s were 
interspersed. However, they resisted the broader requirement 
to count all MIRV-capable launchers within the MIRVed 
aggregate until the very end of the SALT II negotiation.’^
As with most bookkeeping techniques, "class" counting 
rules were open to criticism on the grounds that they 
artificially distorted force structure and created perverse
The interspersing of two missile types at these two 
locations might not have been so problematic except that 
U.S. intelligence reportedly had seen the remodeling of the 
older SS-11 silos at these sites (120 in all) and had also 
seen SS-19s being flight-tested from launchers 
indistinguishable from these reconfigured silos. New SS-19 
silos were visibly different from older, remodeled ones but 
this fact alone did not preclude the latter from being 
outfitted with SS-19. Talbott, Endgame, pp. 111-114. It is 
in part for this reason that, along with the missile and 
launcher type counting rules contained in agreed language 
clarifying Art. II, para. 5 of SALT II, there is a separate 
provision which says that if a launcher merely contains or 
launches a MIRVed missile, it shall be considered MIRV 
capable, regardless of whether all launchers of that type 
were supposed to be developed and tested for MIRVs. See U.S 
Department of State, SALT II Agreement. Selected Documents 
No. 12b (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979), p. 12.
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incentives. Christoph Bertram, for example, criticized the 
technique of counting ICBM launchers and missiles "as if" 
they were fully MIRVed as a "positive stimulus to maximum 
exploitation of qualitative advances and hence to 
qualitative arms competition."’^  To assume the worst case, 
in short, was to invite it. As a tool for counting, however, 
the logic of conceding the likelihood of greater numbers 
through conservative counting rules in return for greater 
certainty and lower breakout potential seemed unassailable. 
For one thing, apart from test monitoring, there were no 
other ways to make clearcut distinctions between various 
iterations of the same type of missile. Even on-site 
inspections were deemed inadequate.’^  Thus, in an important 
sense, agreement on class counting rules clarified the 
principle that the performance capabilities (e.g., number of 
payloads, range, etc.) attributed to systems would be those 
observed during flight testing unless there were observable 
ways to distinguish between different types or classes of 
systems in deployment.
Within about six months after Vance's ill-fated visit 
to Moscow, both sides were able to maneuver the negotiation 
more or less back on to the trajectory set by Vladivostok.
Christoph Bertram, "Arms Control and Technological 
Change: Elements of a New Approach," in Christoph Bertram, 
ed., Arms Control and Militarv Force (Farnborough: Gower, 
1980), p. 154.
See Kissinger's comments to the press, December 3, 
1974, in Labrie, ed., SALT Handbook, p. 303.
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In a series of meetings with Carter and U.S. officials, 
Gromyko accepted the two U.S. proposed sublimits —  one on 
MIRVed ICBM, later set at 820, and the other on 
ALCM-equipped bombers —  and also accepted some modest 
reductions in the numbers of the aggregate ceilings on total 
launch systems (2,250 from 2,400) and on MIRVed missiles 
(1,200 from 1,320). The effect of the MIRVed ICBM ceiling 
was to cut Soviet deployments to perhaps 100 less than they 
might have been in the absence of SALT —  a modest result, 
to be sure, but one that the Carter Administration could 
portray as a step in the right direction.’® An important 
part of this deal was Soviet agreement to ban the 
production, testing and deployment of the SS-16, a mobile 
ICBM then under development. Eventually, the Soviets also 
agreed on freezing missile fractionation, on allowing the MX 
to proceed with 10 warheads, and on a formula for averaging
’® There was a widespread consensus in the U.S. 
government that the Soviets were planning to field about 92 0 
MIRVed ICBMs. See Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices; Critical Years 
in America's Foreign Policv (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1983), p. 60. Calculations underlying this assumption are 
provided by Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 813.
With respect to ALCMs, under the U.S. proposal accepted by 
the Soviets, each side could have up to 120 ALCM-equipped 
bombers before counting them against the 1,32 0 sublimit on 
MIRVed systems. Once that limit was reached, both sides 
could only field additional ALCM platforms by drawing from 
their 1,200 MIRVed missile quota. However, the Americans 
were anxious to avoid a situation in which the Soviets could 
cash-in ALCMs for additional ballistic missiles, and so 
insisted upon a limitation of the freedom to mix principle.
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payloads on ALCM-equipped bombers.^ For its part, however, 
the United States forswore yet again any attempt to impose 
cuts on Soviet heavy ICBMs and finally agreed to the 
principle of treating ALCM-equipped bombers, in effect, as 
airborne MIRV carriers.
The "New Types” Negotiation
By itself, the main utility of the modified framework 
agreed to in late 1977 was to establish a formal numerical 
equality; the question of limiting new types of weapons was 
still to be addressed. The Vladivostok aide-memoire 
reportedly had explicitly referred to the possibility of 
"additional limitations on deployment of new types of 
strategic arms during [SALT II's] period of
^  The U.S.-proposed averaging formula for bombers was 
a bow in the direction of Gromyko's insistence upon treating 
missile fractionation and ALCM loadings in an analogous 
fashion, albeit in a less stringent way than the Soviets 
wanted. (According to Talbott, the Soviets initially 
proposed to count each bomber against the 1,320 sublimit by 
multiples of 20 ALCMs. So for example, a bomber optimized 
for an ALCM load of 40 would count twice. See Endgame. p. 
183.) Under the final agreement, both sides could have 
greater or lesser numbers of ALCMs deployed provided that 
the average for the whole fleet at any one time did not 
exceed twenty-eight. See U.S. Department of State, SALT II 
Agreement. pp. 28-29. With respect to missile fractionation, 
the Soviets accepted a flight-test provision barring the 
simulation of MIRV dispensing procedures in excess of the 
permitted number of RVs. See U.S. Congress, The SALT II 
Treatv. Part 5, p. 284. However, the Soviets did simulate RV 
releases prior to the treaty, and some in the intelligence 
community argue that the SS- 18 could be configured with up 
to 14 warheads without any need for visible testing. For 
background see Richelson, "Old Surveillance, New 
Interpretations," p. 21.
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effectiveness."^^ This provision reflected an obvious point 
of overlap between U.S. concerns about Soviet MIRVing and 
long-standing Soviet interest in constraining U.S. 
advantages in new technologies. Nevertheless, on the 
practical question of how to limit new types, Vladivostok 
was conspicuously silent; it provided guidance on the goal 
but not on the method. The most straightforward approach —  
simply to limit weapon systems developed or tested after a 
certain date —  was not sufficient as a tool for reining-in 
technical innovation; it was well recognized that forces in 
being could be upgraded with newer components. In the 
broadest terms, in order to develop controls with real bite, 
both sides would have to choose between direct limits on 
specific types of technical developments, or a more indirect 
form of restraint, limiting the application of new 
technologies in specified mission areas (e.g., ballistic 
missile attack).
The direct route was tried first. In the Fall of 1977, 
the United States unveiled a very ambitious regime of 
controls aimed at precluding further improvements in ICBM 
accuracy, boosting power, and target coverage through a 
freeze on major missile subsystems. Under this proposal, any 
new ICBM equipped with a propulsion system, a guidance 
system, reentry vehicles, penetration aids, or a post-boost
Reported in Gloria Duffy, et al.. Compliance and the 
Future of Arms Control (Cambridge; Ballinger, 1988), pp. 
62-63. The aide-memoire itself remains classified.
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vehicle (a PBV or, in strategic parlance, a MIRV "bus") 
which differed at all from corresponding systems or 
components on existing ICBMs would be considered a "new 
type. Modifications to existing missiles in any of these 
parameters were to be barred. Almost immediately, however, 
the plan encountered resistance from several quarters. The 
Soviets objected to its comprehensiveness and intrusive 
aspects. Some on the U.S. side warned that limits on 
component hardware, especially on guidance systems, were not 
v erifia bl e. Th er e were also concerns expressed by Pentagon 
experts that including RV technology within the new-types 
criteria would impede work on maneuvering reentry vehicle 
(MaRV) t e c h n o l o g y . B y  late 1977, there were growing 
pressures on the Carter Administration to rethink its 
proposal.
Indirect approaches did not look much more promising. 
Constraining ICBM capability through limits on 
flight-testing had already drawn opposition from the Soviets 
in March of 1977 and in any event would have forced both 
sides into a tortuous negotiation on quotas and on how to
See information submitted by Ambassador Ralph Earle 
and Dr. William Perry in U.S. Congress, The SALT II Treatv. 
Part 4, p. 482.
See comments by Vance, U.S. Congress, Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Militarv Implications of the Treatv on 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol 
Thereto (SALT II Treatv). p. 510.
Talbott, Endgame. p. 192.
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avoid impinging upon unrelated military or commercial space 
launch activity. On the other hand, banning new ICBMs 
altogether, which Gromyko raised at one point, was too 
categorical a step for the United States and would not have 
solved the problem of defining permissible modifications in 
older f o r c e s . T h e  Americans were willing to prohibit new 
ICBMs for a three year period but wanted a one-time 
exemption —  to cover MX —  through the end of the agreement 
in 1985. The Soviets initially had advocated a ban on new 
MIRVed ICBMs, precisely to zero out the MX, but wanted an 
allowance to proceed with a new single RV ICBM as a 
replacement for its SS-lls and SS-13s. The natural point of 
convergence between these positions was eventually achieved 
in July 1978, when it was agreed in principle to ban new 
types of ICBM with one MIRVed or unMIRVed exemption for each 
side during the period of ag re em ent.Wh il e this was a 
reasonable way to accommodate conflicting preferences, it
Comments by U.S. officials during the SALT II 
ratification hearings suggest that once the United States 
came to the judgment that constraints on ICBM performance as 
proposed under its Fall 1977 plan were not practicable, and 
thus that ICBM vulnerability could not be precluded through 
arms control alone, it was no longer willing to cash-in the 
MX as part of a "new types" negotiation. See U.S. Congress, 
The SALT II Treatv. Part 5, p. 274.
For a brief background, see Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 
103-104. Vance makes an interesting point that there were 
talks on a similar limit for SLBMs but these were 
discontinued by the United States after the Soviets insisted 
that the Trident I be counted as the U.S. new type. At the 
time, the United States was unwilling to give up the Trident 
II.
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still forced both sides into protracted bargaining on 
criteria for distinguishing new from merely modified ICBMs.
In April 1978, the United States tabled a set of 
criteria for defining "new types" according to missile 
design parameters —  launchweight, throwweight, length, 
largest diameter, number of stages, etc. —  which were 
susceptible to measurement with NTM-collected data. Under 
this new plan, any change in fuel-type (e.g., from liquid to 
solid) or number of stages or a variation in any of the 
other parameters of greater than 5 percent would qualify an 
ICBM as a new type. Except for inclusion of fuel-type and 
constraints on boosting power (i.e., "total impulse"), which 
were later dropped, the mode of control focused not on 
technical modernization per se but on observable changes in 
the weights and dimensions of systems that would constrain 
Soviet options with respect to the mix of their follow-on 
ICBMs. Thus, constraint on Soviet program choices was the 
key issue for the United States. ACDA director Gen. George 
Seignious observed: "Our major goal in negotiating a ban on 
new types of ICBMs was to force the Soviets to make choices 
in such modernization....This provision will, for practical 
purposes, affect only the Soviet Union. For example, if they 
replace the SS-11 with a new, larger single-reentry vehicle 
missile, they will not be permitted to replace the SS-17 or 
SS-19 with a new 10-reentry vehicle missile. They may not do 
both under SALT II. This provision will force them to make
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choices which they otherwise would not have to make. . . .
These revised U.S. proposals for "new-types" criteria 
constituted a form of indirect control, closely akin to SALT 
I's limits on silo size as a means of constraining the 
deployment of large ICBMs. They also represented the 
trading-in of a more ambitious goal —  to freeze technical 
innovation —  for a lesser one —  to force hard choices upon 
the Soviets in their modernization programs. While the 
Soviets accepted the U.S. position as a basis for 
negotiation, they waffled on the proposed 5 percent 
criterion, accepting it initially, then objecting to any 
limit on decreases in the parameters, and still later 
suggesting a 10 percent allowance for so-called 
"downsizing." Full agreement eluded both sides until May 
1979, when the United States narrowed its list of proposed 
parameters in exchange for Soviet acceptance of the 5 
percent rule for both increases and decreases in specified 
p a r a m e t e r s . T h e  SALT II agreement was finalized a few 
weeks later.
Overall, the framework rules of SALT II were more 
substantial than those of the SALT I interim accord. The 
tools were more diverse: preferential limits on fractionated 
(MIRVed) missiles; "class" counting rules for MIRVs and
Remarks by Gen. George Seignious II in U.S. 
Congress, The Militarv Implications of SALT II. p. 455.
U.S. Congress, The SALT II Treatv. Part 5, p. 299.
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cruise missile-equipped aircraft; and "new-types" rules to 
govern the modernization process. There were also some 
precedents borrowed from earlier efforts —  for example, the 
banning of rapid reload launch systems and the proscribing 
of spare missiles at launch sites, both borrowed from the 
ABM Treaty. By this time, however, the SALT effort had 
become completely out of phase with the general decline in 
East-West relations, and a long fallow period for 
negotiations seemed likely.
START DIPLOMACY; UNCERTAIN REDUCTIONS
At the outset of 1981, there was little question that 
the United States would attempt to alter radically the 
strategic bargaining relationship. As the new president, 
Ronald Reagan brought leading critics of SALT into his 
administration to manage his arms control policies. The new 
goal, he told reporters, would be "actual reductions in the 
numbers of weapons," not a continued buildup of arms which 
SALT II permitted.Little more than this was said, 
however. The State Department enunciated a "no undercut" 
policy for the SALT II agreement: it would not be ratified 
or implemented but neither would it be undercut so long as
Presidential news conference, January 29, 1981, in 
Weeklv Compilation of Presidential Documents. Vol. 17 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, February 2, 1981), p. 66.
257
the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.^** The INF talks, 
a leftover from the Carter Administration, resumed in the 
Fall of 1981 while planning for START went forward more 
slowly amid a general expectation that talks would commence 
in mid-1982.
Searching for New Tools
With SALT II discredited as a model for arms control, 
Washington lacked an obvious starting point in developing 
its bargaining methodology. To some, of course, this was a 
definite virtue, for the whole idea was to rethink basic 
goals and methods in order to achieve agreements that would 
be at once less complex and more radical in their effects. 
The President's "zero option" proposal on INF —  to forgo 
new deployments of the U.S. Pershing II and GLCMs in return 
for dismantling of the Soviet Union's SS-20 force —  met 
these criteria but sidestepped some hard issues of central 
importance to START, such as how to count force levels and 
how far to cut them. SALT had been criticized because 
permitted forces levels were too high, because the Soviet 
advantage in MIRVed heavy ICBMs was left unscathed, and
On June 21, 1982, Leonard Zamyatin, a member of the 
Soviet Central Committee, replied that: "If the United 
States will observe SALT I and SALT II, then the Soviet 
Union, to the same degree, will abide by the provisions of 
those agreements." Cited in Arms Control Reporter. July 
1982, p. 607.B.7.
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because verification was regarded as i n ad e qu a t e . B u t  these 
criticisms alone were hardly a definitive guide on how to 
proceed with START.
Without any clear guidance from the White House, 
framework rule development quickly became a focal point for 
internal debates within the U.S. bureaucracy. Pentagon 
civilians, most notably the Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger and his aide Richard Perle, wanted a new unit of 
account to focus directly on destructive potential, 
capturing both throwweight and the number of warheads.
They and ACDA officials advocated a ceiling on ballistic 
missile warheads and a sublimit on ballistic missile 
throwweight. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
and his aide Richard Burt, agreed on the importance of 
limiting warheads directly but rejected throwweight-specific 
limits in favor of SALT-style launcher limits, both for 
reasons of verification and concerns that throwweight would 
prove non-negotiable in light of then-current imbalances.
See Secretary of State Haig's comments in U.S. 
Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nuclear Arms 
Reduction Proposals. 97th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1982), p. 132.
Early on. Pentagon civilians sought interagency 
agreement on the idea of combining warhead numbers and 
throwweight into a single index number. In this case, 
throwweight totals would have been divided into 500 lb. 
increments. The total for each side would have been 
calculated by summing these increments and adding in the 
number of warheads. Arms Control Reporter. April 1982, p. 
611.B.17. This approach was later dropped in favor of 
straight throwweight/warhead limits.
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The other major party in interagency deliberations —  the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff —  did not have a clear position 
initially but eventually sided with the State Department out 
of concern that low ceilings on U.S. warheads would hamper 
coverage of Soviet targets if launchers were not also 
limited.
With respect to numerical ceilings, interagency 
positions also diverged though to a somewhat lesser extent.
A general direction in the discussions pointed to a 
ballistic missile warhead aggregate in the range of 4-5,000 
RVs, amounting to a reduction of 3 0 percent or more in which 
cuts in Soviet ICBM RV would be counterbalanced somewhat by 
U.S. reductions in SLBM warheads. By SALT standards this 
certainly qualified as a deep cut, but not one that was 
clearly asymmetrical. On the other hand, various proposals 
for sublimits were clearly aimed at cutting into Soviet ICBM 
advantages. Pentagon and ACDA officials lobbied for a 
throwweight ceiling pegged at just under the U.S. capacity 
of about 4 million pounds and some 60 percent below the 
Soviet level of 11.2 million pounds. The State Department 
counterproposed a force concentration rule requiring that no 
more than one-half of all ballistic missile RVs could be 
deployed on ICBMs. If coupled with a low agreed limit on 
launchers. State Department officials asserted, this 
provision would have the effect of driving down Soviet
Talbott, Deadlv Gambits, pp. 261-262.
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throwweight dramatically while avoiding a tortuous 
negotiation on throwweight itself, in fact, the distance 
between these two approaches was not very substantial, 
except that the State Department was willing to accept a 
sublimit on bombers and ALCMs as an inducement to the 
Soviets. Pentagon civilians strongly opposed this move on 
the grounds that it blurred a sharp focus on ballistic 
missiles as the main source of strategic instability and 
that it bore too close a resemblance to the SALT II 
agreement.
In spite of these differences, no one in the U.S. 
bureaucracy could fairly be accused of promoting positions 
that sought to achieve an agreed result through balanced 
concessions. Everyone wanted arms control to mandate a 
restructuring of Soviet land-based missile forces without 
much change on the U.S. side; the critical questions were 
what degree of restructuring was required and at what cost. 
Perle and company were staunchly committed to equal and low 
throwweight levels while Burt and his colleagues appeared 
more tolerant of allowing some asymmetries provided warhead 
levels were at least balanced. Interestingly, each side 
claimed that negotiability arguments tended to buttress its 
position. As a matter of bargaining strategy. Perle argued, 
it was probably better to force the Soviets to address a 
radically new concept on its merits than to haggle over 
marginal improvements in current agreements which Moscow
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would attempt to discredit as a heavy-handed effort to 
extort unilateral Soviet concessions in order to save SALT. 
Burt and others replied that it was unwise to press for 
wholly new types of limits (e.g., on throwweight) when doing 
so would probably trigger exorbitant Soviet demands for deep 
cuts in areas of traditional American advantage (e.g.,
SLBMs, bombers).
In contrast, on another key issue —  qualitative 
controls —  there was no real disagreement within the 
administration: these were not in the U.S. interest and 
should be eschewed. It was widely believed that 
modernization was essential for deterrence at whatever 
residual levels of force might be negotiated, and that the 
United States was in the difficult position of having to 
catch up. Perle played on this theme repeatedly: "75 percent 
of our strategic nuclear warheads," he said, "are carried by 
delivery systems that are 15 years old or older. By 
contrast, 75 percent of the nuclear warheads on Soviet 
strategic systems have been built within the last 5 
years. Qualitative restraints also clashed with the 
general idea that force modernization was a prerequisite for 
negotiating from strength. The administration's 1981 plans
Ibid., pp. 235, 237.
Statement of Richard Perle in U.S. Congress, House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, The Role of Arms Control in U.S 
Defense Policy. 98th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, B.C. 
U.S. GPO, 1984), p. 46.
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for resurrecting the B-1 bomber while pursuing the MX ICBM, 
the C-4 and D-5 SLBMs, and the Tomahawk SLCM had been 
justified in large part as negotiating leverage; to restrain 
these efforts at an early phase would be seen as a 
preemptive concession. As it was, modernization was an 
important quid for securing JCS approval for low numerical 
limits.
The Problems of Allocating Cuts
In light of all these considerations, the initial U.S. 
proposals for START, unveiled in May 1982, represented an 
artful if uneasy compromise among the conflicting pressures 
on the White House. Bowing to State Department preferences, 
ballistic missile warheads and launchers were chosen as the 
units of account; in a first phase of agreement, ceilings 
were to be set at 5,000 and 850 respectively. Also included 
was a proposed subceiling of 2,500 on ICBM w a r h e a d s . T h e  
throwweight-specific limits advocated by Weinberger and 
Perle were put off to an uncertain second phase of 
negotiation. On the other hand, a number of qualifying 
guidelines for phase 1 negotiations cut clearly in the 
Pentagon's favor. The most significant of these was a 
requirement to limit the Soviet SS-18 to 110 and the 
SS-17/19 force to no more than 100 missiles in addition.
Strategic Survev 1982-1983 (London: IISS, 1983), 
pp. 24-25.
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This was done to ensure that launcher cuts would in fact 
promote the kind of throwweight-reducing effects that the 
State Department and the JCS claimed for them. In addition, 
limits on cruise missiles were to be put off until phase 2, 
in effect removing them from phase 1 as possible bargaining 
chips in return for deep cuts in Soviet missiles.^*
When superimposed upon then-current deployments and 
acquisition programs, the full restructuring effects of the 
U.S. START position upon Soviet forces were stark indeed.
The proposals mandated a reduction of nearly 3,600 Soviet 
ICBM warheads (about 60 percent of their total) in order to 
reach the 2,500 sublimit. The 850 threshold for ballistic 
missile launchers levied a requirement to cut nearly 
two-thirds of Soviet launchers. To meet these provisions 
while also taking full advantage of the 5,000 warhead 
aggregate, the U.S. plan actually gave Soviet planners some 
incentive to go forward with highly-MIRVed SLBM forces. On 
the other hand, for the United States, the warhead and 
launcher aggregates mandated a smaller U.S. SLBM force —  a 
cut from approximately 6,400 RVs on 576 missiles to perhaps 
half of those levels —  though it also encouraged the 
replacement of the highly MIRVed Poseidon force (14 RV per 
missile) with newer Trident C-4 and D-5 SLBMs (8-10 RVs per 
missile). There was no constraining effect on U.S. ICBM RVs,
 ^ Talbott, Deadlv Gambits, p. 2 68. According to 
Talbott, the phase 1 proposal allowed for a possible freeze 
on bomber numbers but went no further.
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however, given that American totals (approximately 2,100) 
fell below the 2,500 sublimit; and deployment of MX was not 
precluded under the launcher and warhead aggregates assuming 
the general shrinkage of the SLBM force and replacement of 
some portion of Minuteman Ils and Ills on a less than 
one-for-one basis.
Meanwhile, the Soviets staked out a START position that 
basically represented an extrapolation of the SALT framework 
into the early 1990s with the significant addition of a 
freeze-like constraint on force modernization. Their 
starting point was SALT'S projected 1985 level of 2,250 
overall launchers. From this, they proposed a phased 
reduction down to 1,800 launchers by 1990, coupled with 
modest reductions of about 10-15 percent in the various 
launcher sublimits. They also proposed a new, albeit 
unspecified, threshold on "nuclear charges" (later defined 
as ballistic missile RVs and bomber ordnance) at levels 
substantially below the then-current U.S. level of about 
10,000 weapons. The proposed qualitative controls included a 
ban on all cruise missiles with a range over 600 km and a 
modernization freeze on both side's arsenals.
Ironically, the Soviet START proposal embraced an 
aggregate limit on launchers that approximated the Carter 
Administration's ill-fated March 1977 SALT proposal —  a
The Arms Control Association, Background Paper: 
Strategic Offensive Arms Negotiations (mimeo), May 1988, p. 
3.
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plan which the Soviets had peremptorily rejected at the time 
and which Gen. Edward Rowny, a leading Soviet critic and the 
new chief U.S. negotiator, had s u p p o r t e d . T h e  comparison 
to SALT also created a political problem for the Reagan 
Administration; because the Soviet proposal did embrace the 
principle of reductions within an already agreed framework, 
it appeared more negotiable and accommodating than the U.S. 
position. Faced with a mounting public outcry for a nuclear 
freeze, U.S. officials already were under considerable 
pressure to show that U.S. proposals could also be a 
reasonable basis for bargaining. Haig argued in testimony:
"...the unit of measure that has been put forth by the
President for the numbers of warheads and missiles is, in
general, compatible with the previous work that we had done
under SALT II and other arms control discussions; and 
therefore, will be in general welcomed by the Soviet 
Union.
In fact, the U.S. choice of direct limitations on 
warheads and deployed missiles (e.g., launchers) did 
coincide with the general Soviet approach as it emerged 
later o n . I n  the context of sublimits and other collateral
I am grateful to Robert Nurick of RAND for this 
observation.
Haig testimony, U.S. Congress, Nuclear Arms 
Reduction Proposals, p. 114.
Although Haig, ibid., p. 139, made it clear in 
public statements at the time that the United States was 
focusing its efforts on limiting deployed weapons, there was 
much advocacy in the Reagan Administration for collateral
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measures, however, it was hard to overlook the fundamental 
divergence between American and Soviet goals: The United 
States aimed at nothing short of recasting force asymmetries 
—  starting with the Soviet advantage in large ICBMs —  
while at the same time protecting major U.S. force 
modernization; the Soviet proposal aimed at a shrinkage of 
force levels within an existing structure, supplemented with 
a qualitative freeze. Conceptually, there was no overlap 
here. It is useful to keep these baseline positions in mind 
when evaluating developments after 1985, when common 
positions began to emerge.
Noncompliance Deia Vu
As the nuclear arms talks headed toward stalemate in 
late 1983, both sides got caught up in a new cycle of 
charges and countercharges regarding treaty violations.
While these developments were largely coincidental —  the 
collapse of the talks being triggered by the U.S. INF 
deployments —  the combined result was sustained tension and 
a palpable sense that all existing restraints were in danger 
of unraveling.
limits on overall inventories (i.e., non-deployed systems), 
especially among those who worried about protracted warfare 
scenarios. Under the emerging framework for START, the 
1,600/6,000 ceilings would cover only deployed systems. 
Robert Einhorn, "The Emerging START Agreement," Survival. 
Vol. 30, No. 5 (September/October 1988), p. 387. As a 
collateral measure, however, there will be provisions for 
counting overall inventory and limits on certain types of 
non-deployed weapons, in particular mobile missiles.
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In the realm of framework rules, the disputes again 
revolved around ballistic missile modernization, this time 
land-mobile systems. When SALT II was signed, U.S. officials 
had fully expected that a new fifth generation of Soviet 
ICBMs would begin to appear from the R&D pipeline within a 
few years, all but one type being limited to minor 
modifications in the design parameters defining a new type 
of ICBM. In October 1982, the Soviets initiated 
flight-testing of a new, MX-sized, solid-fueled missile with 
multiple warheads, later called the SS-24. Dobrynin duly 
reported this to Washington as the Soviet Union's one 
permitted new type, in accordance with the SALT II 
a g r e e m e n t . A  few months later, however, the Soviets 
started flight-testing a smaller solid-fueled single RV 
missile dubbed initially the PL-5 and later the SS-25. As it 
turned out, the SS-25 was the more successful of the two 
test programs, and came into service in 1985; the SS-24 
followed in 1987.
The SS-25 brought both sides into conflict on several 
compliance issues. The most significant was whether the 
missile itself constituted an impermissible "new type" or a 
permitted modification of an existing weapon. The SS-25 was 
something of an orphan system; it had no obvious predecessor 
among fourth generation Soviet SS-17, -18, or -19 ICBMs.
When queried, the Soviets explained that the missile was a
Strategic Survev 1982-1983. p. 26.
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modified version of the SS-13, an older, third generation 
solid-fueled system deployed in small numbers in the 1960s. 
After reviewing intelligence on the initial tests, however, 
American officials concluded that the SS-25's throwweight 
was substantially greater than that of the SS-13. On these 
grounds alone it was found to be a wholly new type of ICBM 
and thus a violation of SALT II. This charge precipitated a 
vigorous (and as yet unresolved) debate on how throwweight 
was to be calculated under the treaty. The Soviets claimed 
that the United States understated the throwweight of the 
SS-13 while overstating the throwweight of the SS-25, 
leading to a discrepancy.^^ U.S. officials replied that even 
if the SS-25 missile were not a new type, it still ran afoul 
of SALT II's requirement that an RV on a new single 
warheaded missile not weigh less than 50 percent of the 
total throwweight of the system. Controversy surrounding 
this provision, which was intended to preclude the rapid 
addition of RVs to missiles has never been resolved, for it
Under their reading of SALT II's throwweight 
definition, Soviet officials have argued that the United 
States excluded certain components (i.e., a targeting device 
and penetration aides) in its calculations of SS-13 
throwweight, while mistakenly including other components 
(i.e., an instrumentation package) into its calculation of 
SS-25 throwweight. For useful background see Duffy, et al.. 
Compliance and the Future of Arms Control, pp. 65-71. U.S. 
and Soviet disagreements on throwweight have spilled over 
into START. By the end of 1989, the Soviets were holding to 
a literal interpretation of SALT II, while the United States 
was pressing for a definition that would include the "total 
mass that separates from rocket stages after they are 
fired." See Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Proposes Limit on 'Star 
Wars' Tests," The New York Times. October 27, 1988, p. AlO.
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also hinges on the definitional dispute over throwweight.^^ 
Finally, there were disagreements over whether deployment of 
the SS-25 at former SS-7 launch sites violated procedures 
established under SALT I barring use of former facilities 
for new ICBMs. U.S. officials charged a violation (see Table 
3-2) while the Soviet side asserted that the facilities 
being used at those sites did not include any which were 
deactivated as a result of agreed procedures.
None of these disputes was regarded as highly 
consequential in a strategic sense. Compared to other 
conceivable avenues to breakout involving ballistic missiles 
with counterforce potential, the strategic impact of 
deploying several hundred mobile SS-25s seemed slight; 
indeed, survivable single RV mobile systems clearly not 
designed for first strike applications, and thus held in 
strategic reserve, would tend to suppress unstable crisis 
behavior, if these systems were deployed on both sides. Nor 
was the possibility of sudden fractionation particularly 
troublesome; compared to the massive untapped throwweight 
potential of Soviet heavy ICBMs, even those remaining after 
START-imposed 50 percent cuts, the significance of adding
If the SS-25's throwweight value actually were 
smaller, as the Soviets contend, the ratio of warhead weight 
to throwweight would presumably be higher, possibly at or 
above the level prescribed by SALT II. See Duffy, et. al. 
Compliance and the Future of Arms Control, p. 67.
Jeanette Voas, "The Arms-Control Compliance Debate," 
Survival. Vol. 28, No. 1 (January/February 1986), p. 22.
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one or possibly two extra RV per missile would be marginal.
Yet, when measured against SALT II and the constraining 
power imputed to the new-types rule by U.S. officials, the 
SS-25 development was far more significant. As noted in 
Chapter 3, it clearly undermined the claims advanced by 
senior U.S. officials that SALT II would force the Soviet 
planners to choose between new types of MIRVed and unMIRVed 
ICBMs. In hindsight this rationale appears to have been 
based on a faulty assumption that the liquid-fueled, silo 
based SS-11, rather than the older SS-13, would serve as the 
baseline for determining whether a new single RV system was 
a new type of ICBM. The public record on SALT II does not 
suggest that the SS-13 figured at all in U.S. calculations. 
Given their own overriding interest in developing a MIRVed 
mobile ICBM at the time, American officials may have 
speculated that the Soviets would follow suit, rather than 
to modernize an older missile with an uneven record in 
development. Moreover, the Soviets had agreed formally to 
forgo the SS-16, their only candidate for a single RV mobile 
system in the late 1970s. However reasonable these 
calculations may have seemed at the time, the SS-25 
demonstrates that the Soviets had something quite different 
in mind: to develop two new systems substantially different 
from fourth generation missiles and to engineer one of them 
—  the SS-25 —  close enough to the parameters of the SS-13 
to be justified as a permitted modification, albeit on a
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contentious definition of throwweight. Rightly or wrongly, 
this was not what the United States expected would happen 
under the agreement.
For their part, while insisting that the SS-25 was 
permitted, the Soviets argued that the missile was a 
response to the U.S. decision to pursue the Midaetman which, 
they claimed, was a "pre-programmed" violation of SALT 11.^ ^^  
While it is true that the Midaetman is unambiguously a new 
type, this charge looked very weak in light of the actual 
sequence of events. The SS-2 5 was first flight-tested in 
February 1983, whereas the Reagan Administration did not 
decide in favor of Midaetman until after April of that year, 
when the Scowcroft Commission recommended it for 
presidential decision. Moreover, that recommendation 
explicitly noted that flight-testing and deployment of 
Midaetman would not occur until after SALT II would have 
expired, thereby avoiding conflict with the then-existing 
political commitment not to undercut the treaty. These 
arguments, however, did not deter the Soviets from 
continuing to press the charge.
The other troublesome compliance issue was a series of 
reports regarding possible deployment of mobile SS-16s at 
the Plesetsk missile test range. As noted earlier, the
TASS Statement, June 11, 1985, cited in Warner, "SDI 
and the Existing Arms Control Regime," p. 127.
The President's Commission on Strateaic Forces, p.
24.
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Soviets agreed under SALT II to forgo the testing, 
production, and deployment of the SS-16 at U.S. insistence. 
While a zero-level ceiling on SS-16 was part of the SALT II 
framework —  and thus a framework rule —  its real function 
was to underwrite the verifiability of an important scope 
rule: that any launcher associated with the SS-2 0, a 
modified medium-range version of the SS-16, would be 
eligible for exclusion from SALT II restraints. U.S. SALT 
negotiators had complained that similarities between the 
SS-16 and SS-20 would make it very difficult to detect the 
SS-16 with NTMs if it were intermingled with SS-2 0 
regiments, especially if SS-2 0 launchers could themselves be 
used to fire SS-16s with little or no modification.Since 
the SS-16 was clearly an ICBM, and since the Soviets had 
every incentive to protect their INF missile forces from 
collateral constraints which in turn would generate 
inconvenient U.S. demands for verification rights, Moscow 
very likely reasoned that the benefits of keeping the SS-16, 
which had experienced difficulties in flight-testing, were 
simply not commensurate with the costs. Banning it was the 
lesser of two evils.
In charging a "probable" violation of SALT II, American 
officials made it clear that the source of concern was not 
testing or development activity related to the SS-16 program
See Vance's analysis, SALT II Agreement, pp. 23, 25.
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but the possible deployment of a small mobile force. 
Reportedly, the issue in question was whether unspecified 
construction activity and the presence of some launch 
equipment in the vicinity of stockpiled SS-16 boosters left 
over from the development program indicated an 
operationally-ready force. This was not a scenario that 
worried Carter Administration officials, who had argued that 
the Soviets were not likely to produce or deploy the SS-16 
in the absence of further testing.However, some in the 
Reagan Administration apparently believed that given the 
close proximity of missiles and launchers, one could not 
prove a negative —  that no SS-16 were deployed —  and that 
loading and firing these boosters could probably be done 
with relative ease. The Soviets denied that the SS-16 was 
operational and argued that the activities in question were 
associated with R&D on the new SS-25 program. In late 1985, 
however, the Soviets took certain actions at Plesetsk which 
resulted in a U.S. decision to drop the SS-16 from its list
Public statements from Washington and the 
tentativeness of the charge at the time suggested that the 
pertinent intelligence data was disputed within various 
parts of the Reagan Administration; prior to the formal 
charge, U.S. military officials had stated explicitly that 
there was no intelligence to indicate active deployment of 
SS-16s at Plesetsk. See U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations 
Committee, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 1984. Part 1, 98th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1983), p. 313.
See comments of Ambassador Ralph Earle in U.S. 
Congress, Military Implications of SALT II. Part 4, p. 14 67.
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of treaty compliance problems.
Although the SS-16 episode was negligible in strategic 
and political terms, it did serve to underscore an important 
point regarding rules governing non-deployed systems. 
Concerns about the status of SS-16 missiles almost certainly 
never would have been raised —  even by the most ardent 
critics —  if boosters and launchers had not been present in 
the same general location. It was this same type of concern 
that had prompted both sides to agree on provisions barring 
non-deployed interceptors at ABM deployment areas and 
banning spare missiles nearby putatively reloadable ICBM 
launch silos. Yet, in banning the production, testing, and 
deployment of the SS-16, SALT II did not prescribe the 
disposition of the remaining equipment; there was no 
requirement to dismantle existing launchers or to keep them 
separate from boosters. No doubt this step seemed 
unnecessary at the time, given the Carter Administration's 
position that the SS-16 was never fully developed as well as 
its expectation that any residual ambiguities could be 
sorted out with NTM and discussions in the SCC. Beyond that, 
a requirement to eliminate boosters or launch equipment 
would have generated a portentous requirement for on-site 
inspection, something which seemed out of reach in the 
pre-Gorbachev era and which in any event would have seemed
Duffy, et. al. Compliance and the Future of Arms 
Control. pp. 42-43.
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disproportionate to the small value added by an elimination 
requirement on top of a highly verifiable testing ban.
Still, the absence of any guidelines in this area did 
represent an unfortunate exception to the evolving norm that 
stockpiled systems claim their non-deployed status in part 
by being visibly separated from launch systems. And since 
the Soviets were not inclined to help U.S. intelligence sort 
out ambiguities in the early 1980s, the issue was ripe for 
controversy.
In spite of continuing friction, these compliance 
issues did not erect any insuperable barriers to reconvening 
the Geneva talks. Indeed, with its Soviet policies drawing 
domestic and international opprobrium, the Reagan 
Administration could ill afford to allow the prosecution of 
alleged SALT violations to be the sole element in its 
approach toward Moscow; it also had to show that it could 
somehow "do better" in arms reductions. Thus, pressures by 
conservatives in Washington to discontinue U.S. "no 
undercut" SALT policies as a response to Soviet 
noncompliance may actually have increased U.S. executive 
branch interest in resuming talks in Geneva. Second, 
persistent American accusations may have inhibited Moscow 
from trying to press on with a START negotiating approach 
based strictly on an extrapolation of SALT rules. As it was, 
the slow eclipse of the Brezhnev generation in the Soviet 
leadership between 1982-85 was already beginning to loosen
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the political underpinnings of an approach based on a 
rigidly inflexible defense of past agreements.
Movement Toward an Agreed Framework
At the resumption of talks in March 1985, the prospects 
for major movement seemed as remote as ever. Both sides 
picked up where they had left off, retabling their old, 
conflicted bargaining proposals. Furthermore, the new 
mandate issued by Gromyko and Secretary of State George 
Shultz —  "to work out effective agreements aimed at 
preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on 
earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at 
strengthening strategic stability" —  was too vague and 
longwinded to offer much helpful guidance.
Yet the negotiating context had changed in two very 
significant ways. First, the top policymakers on each side 
were now much more directly involved in the dialogue than 
they had been during Brezhnev's final days. This 
involvement, and the presence of a dynamic new leader in the 
person of Mikhail Gorbachev, greatly increased the saliency 
of the negotiations and created an imperative for results. 
Second, and equally important, Soviet diplomacy was becoming 
more assertive, driven in part by the objective of trying to 
establish a clear linkage between reductions in offensive
ACA, Background Paper: Strateaic Offensive Arms, p.
5.
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arms and restraints on the U.S. SDI program. From Moscow 
there came a flurry of new proposals aimed at calibrating 
offensive cuts of various sizes to limits of various types 
on strategic defense research, including a mutual 
reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty which SDI, at least in a 
symbolic sense, placed in jeopardy. The core principle 
underlying Moscow's new approach was simple enough: the 
stricter the limit on SDI the deeper the cut in ballistic 
missiles. While this trend in Soviet behavior tended to 
validate the conventional wisdom that SDI had "brought the 
Soviets back to the talks," it also put pressure on the 
Reagan Administration to define its own terms for agreement 
and not to allow Soviet diplomacy to become the pacing 
element of the negotiation.
Within a few months both sides found themselves caught 
up in an accelerated bargaining s i t u a t i o n . I n  October 
1985, the Soviets unveiled a plan for 50 percent cuts in all 
"strategic" delivery systems, including American FES, if the 
U.S. side would agree to ban all "purposeful" SDl-related 
research. This was clearly not acceptable to the American
Material for this discussion is drawn from ibid. , 
pp. 5-13, and from Ronald F. Lehman 11, "The Strategic Arms 
Reductions Talks: A Treaty Takes Shape," NATO Review, August 
1987, pp. 19-23; "Arms Control," Strateaic Survev 1985-1986. 
pp. 52-55; "Arms Control," Strateaic Survev 1986-1987. pp. 
52-64; and Ivo Daalder, "Nuclear Modernization Choices for 
the New U.S. Administration: Strategic Weapons Decisions," 
The Council for Arms Control Bulletin. No. 42, February 
1989, p. 1.
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side —  and indeed went beyond ABM Treaty limits on R&D —  
but the 50 percent struck a responsive chord in the White 
House. Responding a few weeks later, U.S. officials accepted 
the general principle of 50 percent cuts so long as no 
constraints were placed on SDI, and they counterproposed a 
series of sublimits applying the 50 percent criterion to 
cuts in launchers, ballistic missile RVs, ICBM RVs, and 
long-range ALCMs, excluding FBS. In late November, Reagan 
and Gorbachev endorsed the principle of 50 percent 
reductions as an area of "common ground" at their meeting in 
Geneva, but no progress was made in resolving differences 
over SDI.
In May 1986, the Soviets tried a different tack. They 
attempted to balance offensive cuts of a lesser magnitude, 
about 30 percent, against some allowance for basic research 
on SDI provided that the United States would commit itself 
not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of 15-20 
years. Reagan accepted the non-withdrawal idea in July but 
counterproposed a 7 1/2 year time frame along with rights to 
test SDI systems in accordance with a broad interpretation 
of the ABM Treaty, followed by the option to deploy SDI at 
the end of the non-withdrawal period. This was unacceptable 
to Moscow. In September, American negotiators followed up 
with two alternative proposals whose common element was an 
integrated 1,600 aggregate limit on ballistic missile 
launchers and bombers. The first option embraced the earlier
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50 percent concept but with ALCMs included in the warhead 
count while the second was pegged to the higher ceilings 
implicit in the Soviet 3 0 percent cuts proposal of May.
Then, in October, Reagan and Gorbachev held their impromptu 
session in Reykjavik. Although the meeting dissolved into 
acrimony over SDI testing and a now-famous bidding war over 
drastic cuts in nuclear weapons, the two leaders did reach 
agreement (hammered out between delegations headed by Amb. 
Paul Nitze and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev) on a START 
framework encompassing ceilings of 6,000 on warheads and 
1,600 on strategic delivery systems. As part of this 
package, the Soviets agreed in principle to cut their SS-18 
force in half —  a significant step.
The 1986-87 period also marked a major turning point in 
bilateral dealings on INF. In the months leading up to 
Reykjavik, Gorbachev had let it be known that the USSR would 
accept the complete elimination of INF from Europe. Although 
dressed up as part of a comprehensive plan to ban all 
nuclear weapons by the year 2000, this new and surprising 
Soviet position was close enough to the old U.S. "zero 
option" of 1981 to inspire talk of reviving a separate 
negotiating track for INF. Several months after Reykjavik, 
this "delinking" of INF from other issues did occur, with 
the result that the talks were put on a completely new 
footing. There was no longer any need to negotiate a complex 
set of framework rules for counting and limiting deployments
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in Europe. Having accepted zero in principle, the remaining 
issues were ones of scope (that is, how to preclude 
circumvention of the ban) and verification. The best way to 
make the ban work, it was agreed, would be to include INF 
stationed outside of Europe as well as all shorter-range 
missiles (of between 500-1,000 km) in the ban and then 
negotiate a complete elimination of the infrastructure 
supporting INF forces.
In START, of course, such sweeping solutions were never 
an option; the negotiators still had to work out the 
framework for balancing and stabilizing residual force 
levels. Nonetheless, the Reykjavik arrangements provided the 
basic contours for ongoing negotiations. Both sides 
registered agreement at the December 1987 summit in 
Washington on a 4,900 ballistic missile sublimit, on a 
substantial cut in Soviet missile throwweight, and on a new 
set of rules for counting ballistic missile w a r h e a d s . A t  
their final major summit, in Moscow in June 1988, Reagan and 
Gorbachev managed to reach some common ground on limiting 
mobile missiles, including provisions to limit the number of 
non-deployed mobile ICBM and to store such missiles 
separately from launch v e h i c l e s . B y  late 1989, the new
The joint communique of the Reagan-Gorbachev 
Washington Summit, December 1987 is found in "Joint 
Communique Lays Out Talking Points," Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report. December 12, 1987, p. 3064.
Arms Control Reporter. June 1988, pp. 611.D.75-78.
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administration under President George Bush had indicated 
that it would not revisit the basic framework of START but 
instead press for resolution of remaining disagreements 
while deciding which kinds of U.S. force modernization 
initiatives seemed most sensible in light of START and the 
general retrenchment in spending on defense.
In examining the diplomatic record, one can hardly deny 
that Soviet concerns about the American SDI program were a 
major factor shaping the negotiations during the later years 
of the Reagan Administration. Indeed, despite the fact that 
both sides agreed to drop the idea of an ABM Treaty 
non-withdrawal period in discussions on space and defense 
matters, Moscow continues to insist that any U.S. departure 
from a strict reading of the ABM Treaty might trigger its 
withdrawal from a START agreement. In this sense, the 
incentive structure for the talks has reflected the 
oft-cited idea of a "grand compromise" involving Soviet 
acceptance of deep (mutual) cuts in offensive ballistic 
missiles in return for a U.S. commitment to a stable regime 
of controls on Soviet and American strategic defensive 
capabilities. At the same time, it would be oversimple to 
say that movement toward START was simply a function of 
Soviet offers to cash-in progressively greater increments of 
offensive arms in exchange for U.S. restraint in the 
defensive realm. If one factors out the public posturing and 
the occasional digressions, it is clear that both sides made
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significant adjustments in their respective bargaining 
positions on strategic offensive force postures and 
planning.
The most notable step taken by the USSR was to agree to 
reductions down to an aggregate ceiling of 6,000 warheads 
and 4,900 in ballistic missile RVs. By itself this was not 
exactly a unilateral concession; a common ceiling on missile 
RVs, on paper at least, would also entail substantial 
overall reductions for the U.S. side given its large SLBM 
loadings. Even so, the fact remains that Gorbachev's 
proposed cuts of 1985 were roughly double the size of any 
contemplated by any previous Soviet government. They 
actually brought the Soviet bargaining position below the 
original U.S. proposed ceiling on missile RVs (5,000) of 
1982. More importantly, the principle of 50 percent cuts, 
though blurred somewhat by permissive counting rules for 
bombers, discussed below, provided a strong lever for 
achieving reductions of corresponding size in Soviet heavy 
ICBMs and, later, in ballistic missile throwweight, both of 
which were high priorities for American negotiators and 
significant concessions by the Soviets.
On the American side there were two significant 
adjustments, the first and most obvious being a progressive 
relaxation of quantitative controls on strategic launchers. 
From its extremely low level of 850 in 1982, the U.S. figure 
rose to 1,250-1,450 in 1985 and then, at Reykjavik, to 1,600
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with the incorporation of bomber forces. The second change 
was apparent in the U.S. approach to bombers and ALCM 
limitations. In 1982 the United States had flatly opposed 
including aerodynamic forces within an initial START 
agreement on the grounds that these systems were not 
destabilizing, first-strike weapons like "fast flying"
MIRVed ballistic missiles. Four years later, however, U.S. 
negotiators were using ALCMs quite explicitly as a quid for 
satisfaction on other i ss ues.First, in 1983, the United 
States offered a separate limit of 400 bombers and no more 
than 4,000 ALCMs. Then, in its September 1986 proposals, 
the United States offered to cut its allowance of 4,000 
ALCMs by 50 percent. Later on, at Reykjavik, it agreed to 
integrate ALCMs into the 6,000 warhead aggregate, implying 
further shrinkage to approximately 800-900 ALCM slots or so, 
depending on the application of specific counting rules.
From the bargaining standpoint, however, it is clear 
that adjustments like those just described were eased 
considerably by compensating action taken by the other side. 
Bombers and ALCMs are a case in point. The American decision 
in 1986 to include bomber forces under the START ceilings 
was eased considerably by Soviet willingness to "discount" 
bombers not equipped with ALCMs, thus in effect not charging 
other bomber ordnance (e.g., gravity bombs and short-range
U.S. ACDA, Issues Brief; Nuclear and Space Talks; 
U.S. and Soviet Proposals. ACDA Office of Public Affairs, 
January 22, 1990, p. 3. (mimeo)
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attack missiles) against the overall limit on warheads. 
Correspondingly, the Soviet decision to cut heavy ICBMs by 
50 percent occurred within roughly the same time frame in 
which the United States softened some of its previous 
positions on ballistic missile and RVs sublimits. The 
initial U.S. proposal of 1982 for a sublimit of 2,500 on 
ICBM RVs floated upwards to 3,000 in 1985 and then to 3,300 
a year later; the U.S. demand in 1982 that the Soviets cut 
about two-thirds of their SS-18s was relaxed once the 
Soviets agreed to halve their force of heavy missiles; and, 
finally, in 1988, the U.S. side dropped a proposal for a 
combined sublimit of 1,650 on warheads of heavy missiles, 
mobile ICBM, and ICBMs with more than 6 RVs.
Interconnected shifts of this kind were instrumental in 
gaining agreement on central features of the treaty 
framework once the general objectives for START —  50 
percent cuts and 1,600 launchers —  had begun to emerge 
prior to Reykjavik.
From mid-1988, when Gorbachev and Reagan reached 
agreement on the general contours of START, to the end of 
1989, negotiations on framework rules became preoccupied 
with fleshing out unresolved issues of counting, sublimits, 
and collateral limits on non-deployed weapons. In the Fall 
of 1989, both sides drew closer to agreement on limiting
At the same time, the United States has continued to 
press for a ceiling of 3,300 on ICBM RVs.
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deployments of mobile ICBMs, after the Bush Administration 
dropped its insistence on an outright b a n F o r  their part, 
the Soviets moved toward accepting U.S. proposals for more 
permissive counting rules for ALCM-equipped bombers.
Somewhat more contentious were U.S. proposals to impose 
limited forms of qualitative controls by banning the further 
flight-testing and modernization of the SS-18, and by 
banning the testing of short time-of-flight (or "depressed 
trajectory") SLBMs. On the whole, however, agreement on a 
phase 1 START agreement appeared to be a virtual certainty 
within the 1990-91 time frame. The only matter in doubt was 
how much both sides would choose to defer —  such as the 
SLCM question (discussed in Chapter 6) —  and whether such 
deferrals and permissive counting rules would generate 
criticism that both sides are settling for superficial 
agreements in order to keep up with the astonishing pace of 
political changes in East-West relations.
START Methodology: Balancing Survivability 
and Breakout Issues
Given the proliferation of MIRVs and cruise missile 
weapons that occurred during the latter years of SALT, it
A number of Washington officials, including Sen.
Nunn and reportedly Gen. Brent Scowcroft, expressed interest 
in the idea of banning mobile MIRVed systems. See R. Jeffrey 
Smith, "Scowcroft Seeking Ban on Some Mobile Systems," The 
Washington Post, January 15, 1990, p. Al. Indications were, 
however, that such limits would be put off until a second 
phase of START.
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was logical that both sides sooner or later would see 
advantage in adopting warheads as a major unit of account 
for strategic accords. Although quantitative limits on 
warheads can be viewed as a natural outgrowth of the RV 
fractionation limits in SALT II, the constraining effects 
sought in each case were quite different. Whereas a 
fractionation freeze is aimed at capping untapped 
throwweight potential, a numerical ceiling denominated in 
RVs imposes direct penalties on highly MIRVed forces. Thus, 
an MX with 10 warheads suddenly "costs" more than 3 times as 
much as a Minuteman III with 3 warheads, and an SS-19 
equipped with 6 RVs is six times more valuable than a 
single-warheaded SS-25. With this built-in differential, 
MIRVed missiles will bump up against common ceilings more 
quickly than unMIRVed ones. As a disincentive to high levels 
of fractionation, warhead-specific limits thus attempt to 
achieve in a quantitative sense the kind of restraints on 
ICBM performance improvements that SALT'S qualitative 
controls on silo-size and new types failed to achieve in a 
situation in which economies of scale and limits on 
launchers led both sides to invest heavily in MIRVed forces.
Not all aspects of warhead-specific limits are 
salutary, however. Strictly applied, they tend to value 
bombers with large payloads on a par with highly MIRVed 
ICBMs, neglecting the important facts that aerodynamic
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weapons arrive more slowly on target and may be vulnerable 
to air-defenses. Beyond that, warhead limits impose a price 
for calculating force loadings based on physical capacity or 
on the maximum number of payloads observed during 
flight-testing; actual force levels are often smaller, and 
both sides end up counting non-existent warheads. In START, 
some U.S. officials have complained that such counting rules 
would actually understate Soviet warhead potential while 
inflating U.S. force loadings.Finally, in a situation of 
deep cuts, warhead limits might not promote force 
survivability, the key ingredient of crisis stability. If 
time and expense posed no constraints, defense planners 
would probably absorb warhead cuts by designing and 
deploying new systems with lower individual warhead-carrying 
capacity. But weapons development is a long and hugely 
expensive process, and in the intervening period planners 
may have little choice but to implement warhead cuts by 
shrinking the number of high-payload delivery systems. If 
the remaining delivery systems of one side became more 
vulnerable to the residual forces of the other —  either to 
attacking warheads or to non-strategic forces (e.g., 
anti-submarine weapons) —  the result would be less not more 
stability at lower force levels.
Between 1986-^89, much time in START was spent
Ronald F. Lehman II, "The Arms Control Legacy of the 
Reagan Administration: A Focus on START," Strategic Review. 
Vol. 16, No. 4 (Fall 1988), p. 17.
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developing methods to cope with these disruptive 
side-effects. As noted earlier, the United States succeeded 
in gaining Soviet agreement to discount substantially 
non-ALCM bomber weapons under the 6,000 RV ceiling. The U.S. 
side also sought to obtain a discount, albeit less 
substantial, for ALCMs but ran into Soviet objections which 
both sides were still attempting to resolve by the end of 
1989.
Methodologically, the discount for bombers agreed at 
Reykjavik took the form of an "attribution" rule under which 
both sides assigned an arbitrary RV value —  "one," in this 
case —  to all non-ALCM bombers no matter how many weapons 
they actually carried. Because the value is arbitrary, the 
requirement to inspect actual loadings is relaxed and 
verification is eased considerably. Both sides simply agreed 
that, for accounting purposes, an American B-52 or a Soviet 
Bison without ALCMs should be equivalent to a single warhead 
weapon —  such as an SS-25 —  but only one-tenth as valuable 
as an MX or an SS-18 ICBM. As for ALCMs, both sides agreed 
to count each ALCM as 1 RV against the 6,000 ceiling but 
disagreed for a long time on how many ALCMs to attribute to 
each bomber. U.S. negotiators proposed to attribute six, and 
then ten, weapons to each ALCM-capable b o m b e r . E a c h  side
U.S. B-52S are capable of carrying 20 ALCMs but 
those types of B-52s actually equipped for ALCM delivery 
would carry a load of 12; the U.S. B-IB and Stealth could 
carry 36 but are not to be deployed with ALCMs under START 
I.
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could then spread its accountable ALCM slots across a larger 
number of platforms, not only complicating first strikes 
against bombers but avoiding highly intrusive on-site 
inspections at bomber bases which ultimately could not 
guarantee compliance given the relative ease of ALCM 
reloading operations. The Soviets, however, argued that 
cruise missiles generally require tighter limits than 
bombers alone, because they are more difficult to detect and 
shoot down than penetrating bombers, and initially insisted 
upon counting ALCMs using the "maximum-equipped" formulation 
in SALT II.
With respect to ballistic missiles, concerns about 
stability in the implementation of deep reductions in 
warheads steered counting rule negotiations towards a 
somewhat different formula. At the 1987 Washington summit, 
both sides accepted the idea of "declaratory" rules for 
counting warheads on existing and future types of ballistic 
missiles. Under this scheme, the two sides would declare the 
number of RVs installed on each type of ICBM and SLBM; the 
RV numbers could be changed provided notification was given; 
and there would be agreed upon inspection procedures for 
verifying these declarations. The actual numbers declared 
for ICBMs —  MX, Minuteman, and corresponding Soviet systems 
—  matched the figures cited in SALT II "as tested." For
Reportedly, the Soviet Bear-H bomber which can carry 
12 ALCM would be counted as carrying eight.
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SLBMs, however, there would be a significant measure of 
downloading from maximum tested levels of fractionation: the 
U.S. Trident II would carry eight instead of ten or twelve 
RVs, for example, while the Soviet SS-N-23 would carry four 
instead of ten.
The main appeal of declaratory counting rules is the 
program flexibility they provide to both sides. Neither side 
is forced to charge non-existent warheads or decoys against 
the 6,000 ceiling. Both can choose, if they wish, to spread 
existing warheads more evenly across a larger number of 
delivery systems. The results are particularly striking if 
superimposed upon a future Trident force, which has been the 
main U.S. concern. If one were to hypothesize a nominal 
force of 3,500 SLBM warheads, about the level projected 
under START, a drop from 12 to 8 warheads per Trident D-5 
missile would allow those warheads to be spread across a 
much larger number of missiles —  roughly 437 rather than 
290 —  which would translate into an additional 6 Trident 
submarines, assuming each carried a full complement of 24 
missiles.
"Joint Communique," p. 3064.
To underscore its concerns about survivability, the 
United States proposed a rule to exclude submarines in 
overhaul from the SLBM warhead count, which would allow 
retention of 2 or 3 additional submarines on each side. See 
Paul H. Nitze, "The Nuclear and Space Talks: The Reagan 
Legacy and the Path Ahead," Arms Control Todav. Vol. 19, No 
1 (January/February 1989), p. 9. By late 1989, the Soviets 
had indicated interest in this idea but no agreement had 
been reached. It is also possible that the United States 
could load less than a full set of 24 missiles per Trident
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From the bargaining standpoint, an arms reduction 
regime that gave both sides latitude to download MIRV 
missiles would be very desirable as a transitional step to a 
smaller force structure, one in which individual delivery 
systems each possessed smaller destructive capacity. Both 
sides could then use this flexibility to obtain greater 
survivability. ICBMs would become less valuable as targets 
if fewer were MIRVed; and SLBMs with smaller payloads could 
obtain greater ranges, increasing the size of the ocean 
areas in which alert submarines could patrol. On the other 
hand, extensive downloading of systems without any other 
programmatic steps could have destabilizing consequences 
over the longer term, especially if testing of these systems 
at much higher fractionation levels were permitted to take 
place.
The main breakout concern associated with downloading 
is a variant of the stockpile hazard noted previously; 
instead of spare boosters being reloaded, the concern is 
that RVs in storage could be brought back into service 
covertly. Situations that could aggravate suspicions are not 
hard to imagine. For example, the Soviets could declare one 
day that they were going to lower the standard MIRV load on 
their SS-24s from 10 to 5 and deploy another hundred
submarines as a way to spread the allocated warheads across 
a larger number of platforms.
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missiles on rail-mobile launchers in the p r o c e s s . U n l i k e  
"attribution” rules, which simply presume a certain level of 
weapons loading, "declaratory" rules would require some 
verification procedure. Equipped with such a procedure, U.S. 
personnel would be able to confirm some portion of the 
downloading of the SS-24 force, and perhaps to spot-check 
later with occasional challenge inspections. Over time, 
however, there probably would be some irreducible level of 
uncertainty regarding the location and status of spare 
warheads as well as the ever present possibility of covert 
storage of undeclared s t o c k s . O n e ,  of course, need not 
hypothesize a surreptitious cheating program to see breakout 
problems. There would be no bar to a legal abrogation of the 
treaty followed by extensive uploading of, say, SS-N-23 and 
D-5 SLBMs in nearby port facilities, or the uploading of 
ICBMs. Given that SALT'S counting rules traded away some 
flexibility in return for greater insurance against 
surreptitious MIRVing, it is therefore not surprising that 
efforts to recapture that flexibility under START have
The throwweight reduction and cap mandated under the 
phase 1 START accord might preclude this, but would still 
leave existing downloaded missiles as a source of concern.
According to Congressman Aspin, the most worrisome 
breakout scenario under START would involve a combined 
covert deployment of legal spare missiles and illegally 
produced mobile launchers. Solid-fuel missile production is 
fairly distinctive to satellite reconnaissance while 
launcher production is not. Remarks by Cong. Les Aspin 
before the American Bar Association, Committee on Law and 
National Security, June, 27, 1988 (mimeo).
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evoked criticism concerning breakout.
This is not to say that breakout feasibility should be 
accepted uncritically. Covertly uploading on-line forces 
undoubtedly would be a complex and time consuming exercise, 
especially if submarines or land-mobile forces had to be 
recycled through secure facilities as part of the process; 
and the ever-present risk of a challenge inspection at 
"suspect sites" could be a significant deterrent. One also 
has to ask what the incentives for breakout would be if the 
force posture of the other side was not highly sensitive to 
it. If, for example, the uploading of MIRVs on Soviet 
SS-N-23 SLBMs deployed off the North American coast would 
still be insufficient for the purpose of mounting an 
effective barrage attack on U.S. mobile ICBMs in conjunction 
with other forces, it would not contribute very much to 
Soviet capabilities for preemption.
Nonetheless, the idea of allowing a major gap to 
develop between MIRV loadings "as tested" and "as deployed" 
would probably be corrosive politically over the long term. 
Hitherto, on-site inspection has not been regarded as a 
useful tool for high confidence verification of missile
See, for example, U.S. Congress, Report of the 
Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee, 
Breakout. Verification and Force Structure; Dealing With The 
Full Implications of START. 100th Congress, 2nd sess. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1988), p. 33. A rebuttal to 
this report was made by then Secretary of Defense Frank 
Carlucci in a lengthy letter to Congressman Les Aspin, 
September 20, 1988 (mimeo).
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fractionation. Deterrence of treaty violations may be a 
reasonable goal for challenge inspections; but monitoring 
confidence is quite another matter. While one cannot 
obviously dismiss such procedures a priori as tools for 
achieving such confidence, especially given mutual agreement 
to find a solution, the challenges involved are enormous.^* 
In light of these considerations it is clear that the 
prospects for the emerging START framework will hinge on the 
performance of these counting rules and on the constraints 
on non-deployed systems and components as a barrier to 
breakout. That both sides currently have strong incentives 
to make the rules work is not in doubt; the question is 
whether there are inherent limitations in the rules 
themselves which might trigger doubts and suspicions in 
future periods of instability. Whereas in SALT the central 
problem was the modernization hazard posed by MIRV 
technology, in START the main problem is the "strategic 
surplus" implicit in excess missile and bomber capacity in a 
strategic context characterized by shrinking numbers of 
delivery systems. To be an improvement over previous 
agreements, START has to promote both greater survivability 
in the force postures of each side and a strategic balance
Richard Garwin has proposed a method for 
reconfiguring downloaded or deMIRVed missiles with 
fiber-optic seals as a way to achieve timely warning of a 
breakout. See comments in "Technology, Verification, and 
Global Security: A Pugwash Symposium," Disarmament. Vol. 11, 
No. 3 (Autumn 1988), pp. 83- 84.
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that provides no reward for risk-taking in times of crisis. 
Reductions per se do not necessarily accomplish this; it is 
the character of the reductions that matter. The reductions 
that are likely under START may be stabilizing because they 
penalize large ballistic missile deployments. Still, the 
transition to lower force levels —  represented by START and 
its successor agreements —  remains a bumpy road.
SUMMING UP! ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
From SALT to START, one can see certain identifiable 
patterns in the way that both sides have sought to structure 
framework rules for successive agreements. To speak of 
"patterns" is not to suggest that the cooperative choices 
defining these patterns were themselves static or immutable. 
Change has been present along with continuity. Nonetheless, 
in successive phases of negotiation, the framework rules 
that emerged generally reflected a series of incremental 
adjustments over previous efforts, even though each new 
agreement aimed at achieving a better or different result 
than its predecessor. Change thus has occurred within 
well-defined contours; and it has been evolutionary in 
nature.
The factors favoring incrementalism are not mysterious. 
It is only natural to crave convenience in solving problems 
or creating rules. In governmental decision-making, as in 
other spheres of activity, to depart from a true and tested
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approach generally risks the old retort: "If it isn't 
broken, don't fix it!" Bargaining incentives, as will be 
seen in Chapter 8, have also played an influential role in 
promoting incrementalism. And there may be other factors.
Our principal task here, however, is to understand the 
implications of this dynamic for the substantive contents of 
strategic agreements.
Carry-Over. Innovative, and Purging Tendencies
The overall effects of the negotiating and compliance 
behavior spanning the agreements at issue here can be 
characterized in terms of three distinctive traits or 
tendencies. Most obviously we can see carrv-over tendencies. 
These are well-defined continuities in framework rules. Some 
of the rules found in later agreements "look like" those 
agreed to in earlier ones. These rules served their purpose; 
they operated without any compliance problems; and they were 
carried over to new agreements without significant 
adjustment. The opposite of continuity in the arms control 
context is not simply change, however, but rather change of 
two distinct types. One type is reflected in various 
innovative tendencies. Here, rules were updated, expanded, 
or adjusted in response to new or unexpected compliance 
problems. In certain other cases, however, rules were 
dropped as new agreements were negotiated, either because 
they were no longer needed, or because they did not live up
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to expectations, or because of compliance difficulties. This 
type of change can be called a purging tendency. The 
preceding discussion has provided good examples of each of 
these traits.
With respect to units of account, the record indicates 
a high degree of carry-over from one agreement to another. 
Not only have both sides arrived at common positions with 
remarkably little fanfare or acrimony, they have stuck to 
them. Indeed, missile launch systems —  a common currency in 
the ABM Treaty, SALT I, SALT II, and prospectively in START 
—  have acquired a certain permanence in arms control 
methodology which some experts see as outmoded.
Convenience is almost certainly the major reason for this 
tendency; operational launchers are something on which both 
sides can readily agree. In the strategic realm, launchers 
have been easy to count, and both sides have deployed them 
in numbers that are not grossly unequal.
Carry-over has also been seen in decisions not taken. 
Despite strong advocacy from some quarters in the United 
States, missile throwweight has never figured prominently in 
negotiations on units of account; its absence from direct 
negotiation can fairly be read as a carry-over tendency. 
Throwweight has been hard to measure, even to define, and 
historically there has been a huge differential favoring the
Jan Lodal, "An Arms Control Agenda," Foreign Policv. 
No. 72 (Fall 1988), pp. 165-167.
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Soviet Union; all these factors weigh against easy 
negotiability. As the record shows, throwweight was raised 
by the United States only temporarily in the initial stages 
of SALT II, and in the early 1980s it was consigned to an 
uncertain phase 2 in the U.S. START position. Even so, since 
1987 there has been some movement in favor of formalizing 
throwweight reductions "as a result" of reductions in other 
areas. The Soviet Union eventually chose to accept such 
reductions at little apparent cost to itself, and in fact 
the measure may have had some positive appeal for Soviet 
planners.
A clear illustration of the innovative tendency was the 
addition of warheads (i.e., missile RVs and bomber weapons) 
as a unit of account for START. Interestingly, this change 
was introduced without much fanfare; it emerged de facto in 
separate U.S. and Soviet proposals for START tabled in 1982. 
Yet, in retrospect, the factors behind this convergence are 
fairly easy to discern. On the American side, interest in 
warhead limits was the product of disappointment over the 
inability of launcher and silo limits in SALT to constrain 
the growth of Soviet ICBM warheads. At the same time, for 
the USSR, warhead counting represented a more direct form of 
control on U.S. SLBMs and, in particular, on long-range
From the Soviet standpoint, a low equal ceiling on 
throwweight could help to hedge future increases by the 
United States aimed at achieving some barrage attack 
capability against mobile ICBM deployment areas.
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cruise missiles which started coming into the U.S. force 
posture in the early 1980s. Furthermore, by the mid 1980s, 
warheads were a potential negotiating currency that both 
sides had in roughly equal amounts. Thus, the circumstances 
seemed ripe for a shift. With respect to numerical ceilings, 
the choices regarding overall aggregate limits appear to 
have been a product of politically inspired decisions 
bearing little direct relevance to rule-making principles.
In START decision-making, for example, there was nothing 
inevitable about the idea of 50 percent cuts; it was simply 
a more dramatic gesture than, say, 3 5 or 40 percent cuts.
From the methodological standpoint, the far more 
interesting phenomenon has been the progression of rules 
regarding force concentration under aggregate ceilings. 
Elements of carry-over and innovation have both been 
present. The relevant baseline here is the SALT I Interim 
Agreement. For all its defects, SALT I did establish the 
idea of "one-way" freedom to mix —  that the trading-in of 
ICBMs for SLBMs is okay but the reverse is not. SALT I also 
barred the conversion of light ICBM forces into heavy ICBMs, 
which, in conjunction with the freeze on launcher 
construction, created in effect a sublimit on heavy ICBMs.
In follow-on negotiations these provisions were carried over 
with notable additions: SALT II added subceilings on 
ALCM-equipped bombers, MIRVed ballistic missiles, and MIRVed 
ICBMs, and extended one-way freedom to mix as a barrier to
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the exchange of bombers for missiles. Depending on final 
details, START will carry over sublimits on bombers, 
ballistic missiles, and ICBMs, recasting them in terms of 
warheads (and thus reintegrating MIRVed and unMIRVed forces, 
which SALT had separated) while retaining the principle of 
one-way freedom to mix. The cumulative product of this 
process —  an interlinked structure of ceilings and 
subceilings —  is one of the most enduring attributes of 
strategic arms diplomacy. It exemplifies a gradual expansion 
of operative principles governing rule-making for limiting 
force concentrations under agreements; specifically, that 
bombers cannot be traded-in for ballistic missiles; that 
non-ICBM missiles cannot be traded-in for ICBMs; that 
smaller ICBMs cannot be traded-in for larger ones; and 
finally that non-MIRVed ICBMs cannot be traded-in for MIRVed 
weapons.
Because this hierarchy is biased against the 
traditional Soviet emphasis on ICBMs, the job of applying 
these principles through negotiated rules proved very 
difficult throughout the 1970s. The constraining power of 
the heavy ICBM sublimit was greatly vitiated by the 
inability of both sides to agree on a dividing line between 
light and heavy missiles. Similarly, the MIRVed ICBM 
sublimit, set at 820 in SALT II, was too high to preclude 
the growing theoretical vulnerability of fixed land- based 
missiles to prompt counterforce attack. In each of these
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cases, Moscow accepted a U.S. proffered concept but was able 
to apply it on terms most favorable to the Soviet side. By 
including provisions for 50 percent reductions in SS-18 
warheads, START would significantly cut into Soviet ICBM 
advantages. Interestingly, the cuts themselves produce no 
dramatic force concentration effects —  warheads on heavy 
ICBMs and on total ICBMs are now respectively about 26 and 
55 percent of total Soviet force loadings, and these 
percentages will remain essentially unchanged under a 6,000 
warhead aggregate.^* However, if the Soviets chose to take 
greater advantage of the bomber discount allowed in START, 
the result would be a shift toward a more balanced, 
survivable p o s t u r e . L i k e  SALT II, START would not "solve" 
the problem of ICBM vulnerability for either side; but it 
should make certain unilateral remedies easier to achieve.
While the discounting of bombers relative to ICBMs has 
been a consistent theme since SALT II, the overall rules set 
up to govern missile and bomber sublimits may be going 
through a major transition. Previously, by attributing 
capability to certain classes of weapons on the basis of 
performance during flight-testing, SALT II established
These percentages are based on figures contained in 
The Militarv Balance 1988-1989. p. 230.
Not all aspects of the START sublimits are resolved, 
however. The Soviets still insist on a 60 percent 
concentration rule which would be applied to SLBM warheads, 
if the U.S. continues to insist on a similar sublimit for 
ICBM warheads.
302
observed test performance as the operative principle for 
counting rules (i.e., the so-called "look alike, count 
alike" rule). In part because of the pressure exerted by 
reductions, START has shifted this burden to a system of 
declarations to be verified through the monitoring of actual 
deployments. This innovation will enhance force flexibility 
at the price of increasing verification uncertainties 
regarding actual force loadings (how much uncertainty is 
still unclear). It therefore remains to be seen whether this 
new scheme will work in practice. If it does reasonably 
well, the old SALT-style counting rules will have been 
purged from framework methodology; if not, they might be 
brought back and carried over into future START-style 
agreements.
Finally, with respect to suppressing various breakout 
hazards associated with the reconstitution, stockpiling, or 
modernization of weapons, the pattern of rule-making has 
been marked by discontinuities. On the one hand, a seemingly 
high degree of carry over has been observed in rules 
governing the dismantling of on-line weapons. SCO 
regulations prescribing the elimination of ABM and offensive 
missile launchers have worked reasonably well. The 
principle enshrined in these procedures —  that dismantling 
should preclude the reconstitution of a weapon in less time
Sidney N. Graybeal and Michael Krepon, "Making 
Better Use of the Standing Consultative Commission," 
International Security. Vol. 10, No. 2 (Fall 1985), p. 189.
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than it would take to build a new one —  has been applied 
more broadly to cover new units of account since the days of 
SALT.Similarly, with respect to stockpile hazards, the 
consistent trend in rule-making since the ABM Treaty has 
been to enforce the separation of on-line weapons and spares 
or reloads. Just as SALT II proscribed the storage of 
boosters at operational launch silos, provisions that are 
agreed in START would assure that missile stocks, launchers, 
and warheads are kept separate. Here, the SS-16 ban was an 
exception that proved the importance of the rule: compliance 
ambiguities would not have been able to linger if the ban 
had been structured in accordance with the principles 
observed in rules on stockpiling and dismantling.
On the other hand, it is hard to find much consistency 
in rules governing modernization. The SALT experience proved 
very controversial. The silo-size constraints in SALT I 
clearly were not stringent enough to achieve the results 
that were imputed to them by the United States. It was not 
because the technique itself was flawed, for tighter limits 
on permitted expansion than the 15 percent allowance could 
have impeded the deployment of larger missiles. Rather, it 
was because the USSR would never have agreed to such an 
outcome, which would have meant forfeiting the SS-19.
 ^ The INF Treaty, for example, applies to ballistic 
and cruise missiles elimination procedures that are roughly 
comparable to those which were developed for the destruction 
of ICBM silos in SALT I.
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Disputes over the SS-19 provided the impulse for the "new- 
types" rule in SALT II.
The consequence of this was not successful rule 
innovation, however, but only further problems, this time 
regarding the SS-25 ICBM. The SS-25 was not a development 
expected by the U.S. side. To make matters worse, the 
intended effects of the "new-types" rule were never very 
clear. No specific technologies were being limited. The 
rationale of "forcing trade-offs" in modernization was 
rather abstract and not clearly consistent with U.S. 
security interests. Even if the provision had worked, a 
trade-off involving the choice of a MIRVed over an unMIRVed 
system would have been no great boon to U.S. security.
Perhaps more than any other single factor, it was the 
"new-types" experience which undermined the idea that arms 
control can be used to constrain unwanted technical 
developments. The role of technical restraint in strategic 
arms diplomacy has been controversial ever since. Yet, 
without such rules, and in the face of rapid technical 
change, the framework for strategic arms reduction must be 
considered incomplete.
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6.
THE BOUNDARIES OF RESTRAINT
No treaty can be effective if its coverage is unclear 
or subject to dispute. Just as framework rules are required 
to regulate the size and mix of forces falling within the 
domain of agreement, it is also necessary to develop 
supplemental provisions —  or scope rules —  which speak to 
the inclusion or exclusion of particular weapons and R&D 
activities. Without such rules, an agreement might hamper 
flexibility by overreaching into military or civilian 
activities that are unrelated to its purposes. Or, 
conversely, an agreement might not reach far enough, leaving 
certain key weapons or activities unconstrained which could 
later pose a risk of circumvention. As this chapter will 
show, the competing imperatives of preserving flexibility 
while thwarting circumvention have weighed heavily on both 
sides from SALT to START. Below, I examine major cases which 
have raised these concerns —  first in the strategic 
defensive realm, then on the offensive side —  and assess 
their implications for the evolution of bargaining 
methodology.
THE DILEMMAS OF LINE-DRAWING
While arms diplomacy focuses on. limiting weapons. the 
sought-after constraining effects of agreements are often
306
measured in terms of mission performance. This distinction 
is central to any discussion of scope rules. In our present 
case, to speak of strategic agreements is by inference to 
draw bright lines between and around various classes of 
weapons capable of performing strategic offensive and 
defensive missions. But what precisely does "strategic" mean 
in terms of weapons?
Since Douhet's time, the concept of the strategic 
mission has been closely identified with the use of 
offensive air power to attack an enemy's heartland with the 
aim of destroying his capacity and will to wage war. Prior 
to military aviation, land and naval forces both could be 
used for strategic purposes, but only (usually) after 
defeating hostile forces on the battlefield or the high 
seas. Douhet reasoned that such tactical engagements were no 
longer a decisive element in warfare. He argued that 
"command of the air" —  defined not as aerial combat but as 
the bombing of an enemy's military-industrial infrastructure 
—  would effectively trump all other military operations, 
assuring a swift and decisive victory to the side which 
attained it first.^ While Douhet's theories provided a 
powerful argument for the expansion of strike air power, the 
strategic bombing campaigns of World War II prior to 
Hiroshima failed to sustain many of his predictions
Bernard Brodie provides the classic exposition of 
Douhet's theses, see Strateav in the Missile Aae (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 82-90.
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regarding the level of damage inflicted and the likely 
impact on war outcomes. It was left to nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles to give Douhet's ideas a grim, lasting 
relevance.
Given the geographical distances that separate the 
Soviet and American homelands, offensive strategic arms in 
the superpower context are confined to bomber and ballistic 
missile forces designed for long-range operations. This 
attribute alone —  range —  makes an enormous difference in 
determining scope criteria for strategic agreements, if only 
because so many weapons would fall out of consideration as 
candidates for control. Range-like criteria (i.e., 
"battlespace," maximum detection range, etc.) are also 
helpful in distinguishing strategic defensive systems from 
tactical or local air defenses.
Another basis for making distinctions is type of 
armament. Nuclear-armed, long-range delivery systems are 
clearly more "strategic" than systems which are 
conventionally-armed and short-range. Still other criteria 
involve the idea of power potential. Radars with a power 
aperture product large enough to detect attacking missile 
warheads at long distances, or lasers with brightness 
sufficient to deliver lethal doses of energy onto rocket 
boosters or satellites at 2-3,000 km, fall more clearly into 
the category of strategic forces than, say, radars or lasers 
designed to protect tank divisions or carrier task groups.
308
Although these attributes convey a good sense of what 
strategic weapons are, the task of drawing clear lines 
around such weapons for treaty purposes is nonetheless a 
complex matter. Clearly, range cannot be the sole arbiter of 
what is a strategic weapon and what is not. The USSR has 
always argued that any weapons designed for use against its 
territory should be considered "strategic," regardless of 
their range. The U.S. B-29 bombers that were forward- 
deployed in Great Britain during the Berlin crisis of 1948 
did not have an intercontinental range and would not qualify 
as a true strategic weapon today; nonetheless, Soviet 
officials clearly perceived them as a direct strategic 
threat.^ Conversely, some of the longest range bombers 
currently deployed by each side —  Soviet Tu-95s and U.S. 
B-52S —  have important applications in reconnaissance, 
naval warfare, and other missions outside the strategic 
offensive arena. Armament type would perhaps be a more 
useful basis for distinction except for the fact that 
ordnance is often quite fungible; many bomber and missile 
types, especially U.S. cruise missiles, are inherently
 ^As General Nikolai Chervov later told an American 
television interviewer: "I knew about the atomic strategic 
bombers based in England the moment they arrived....We were 
evaluating the U.S. nuclear potential and in particular 
those ninety atomic bombers with one or two bombs abroad. 
That meant approximately two hundred bombs, which was a real 
threat. Two hundred Hiroshimas." WGBH TV interview cited in 
John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p. 67. The fact was, however, that 
the bombers had not yet been modified to carry atomic 
weapons.
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dual-capable. Moreover, U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons are 
routinely maintained for missions outside central strategic 
warfare.
On the defensive side, the problem of relating weapons 
to missions is even more slippery because strategic 
potential is a function of a variety of capabilities —  
sensing and computational power, interceptor velocity, etc. 
—  which are hard to measure and can support a variety of 
applications. No one would seriously argue that an aircraft 
interceptor could qualify as an ABM-capable system; short of 
the poor pilot wandering into the path of an on-coming RV, 
it has no capacity to counter ballistic missile attacks. On 
the other hand, surface-to-air missile systems and ASATs 
require more careful handling by negotiators. They cannot be 
excluded a priori. One must look at the search volume of the 
sensors, the speed and range of the interceptors, the power 
of the computer support, and so forth. While the 
interception of bombers, subsonic cruise missiles, and 
satellites is a technically easier task than intercepting 
ballistic missile RVs, weapons deployed for those non-ABM 
purposes conceivably could be upgraded for the ABM mission 
with improvements in their sensors and data-processing 
capability. Large radar stations are perhaps the most 
difficult systems to categorize, because they can inherently 
perform a variety of civilian functions (e.g., air-traffic 
control, space-tracking) as well as military missions (e.g..
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ABM battle management, early warning, etc.).
Given that mission diversity makes it difficult to 
distinguish neatly between or among various classes of 
weapons on the basis of attributes like range, armament 
type, or power potential, negotiators have little choice but 
to balance the costs and risks associated with three 
possible choices of action. First, both sides could agree to 
include all weapons or components in a given class within 
the scope of limitations, regardless of mission. The price 
of this choice would be either to curtail non-strategic 
missions or possibly to deploy additional forces that are 
clearly not strategically capable in order to cover unmet 
needs. Alternatively, both sides could agree to exclude 
given classes of systems or activities. The cost of this 
action is circumvention (i.e., substituting the excluded 
system for those which are limited by agreement). Finally, 
in some cases, both sides could find a way to split the 
difference, including some systems of a given class while 
excluding others on the basis of some individuating 
procedure. This is often a tempting choice —  akin to having 
one's cake and eating it too —  but also the most complex to 
work out in practice.
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES
What kinds of scope choices have characterized 
limitations on strategic defensive forces? Since the 1960s,
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the strategic defense mission has cut across a broad array 
of systems: not only ABMs, but SAMs, aircraft interceptors, 
anti-satellite weapons, warning and attack assessment 
systems, and anti-submarine weapons. ABMs were singled out 
by negotiators largely for reasons of expediency and 
strategic significance: ABMs were not yet deployed in large 
numbers; they were technically undeveloped and 
cost-ineffective; and they were seen at the time to pose a 
real threat of stimulating a major expansion in offensive 
ballistic missiles.
In singling out ABMs, however, both sides faced three 
scope issues. First, they had to establish some basic 
guidelines for dealing with potential overlap problems 
between non-ABM defensive weapons and ABMs. Second, they had 
to make choices regarding whether to include or exclude 
so-called "exotic" ABMs (i.e., ABMs based on "other physical 
principles," in treaty parlance) capable of replacing 
then-current systems and components in the future. Finally, 
they had to decide how to handle large, multipurpose radars 
with some potential for contributing to the ABM mission.
SAMs and Non-ABM Defensive Weapons
At the outset of the SALT process, concerns regarding 
mission overlap focused most sharply on air defense. During 
the McNamara years, the United States had begun to draw down 
and reorient its continental air-defense forces. The
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expansion of long-range Soviet bomber forces fell short of 
Western expectations as the Soviets began to invest heavily 
in the development of strategic ballistic missiles. As a 
result, the stress on the American side began to shift 
noticeably toward early warning of attack and away from 
active interception of hostile aircraft. This was not the 
case with the Soviets, however. Their national air-defense 
forces, incorporated under PVO Stranv (Protivovozdushnaya 
Oborana Strany), attained the status of an independent 
service in the years following World War 11.^ PVO oversaw 
the creation of a large air-defense network, concentrated 
along likely attack corridors and around key military and 
population centers. It maintained and modernized this system 
throughout the 1970s, and by the mid-1980s it included 
approximately 12,000 SAM launchers at over 1,2 00 sites, 
10,000 air-defense radars, and more than 4,000 interceptor 
aircraft available for strategic defensive missions.^
Numerous reasons have been adduced to explain why the 
Soviets continued to bear the burdens of air-defense 
expenditure. Some interpreted it as a natural response to 
the enormous damage they suffered at the hands of the 
Germans during World War II. Others stressed the degree to 
which a strong air-defense posture has accorded with the
 ^Durch, The ABM Treatv and Western Securitv, p. 3.
 ^Department of Defense and Department of State, Soviet 
Strategic Defense Programs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO,
1985), p. 17.
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traditional emphasis of Soviet military planners upon damage 
limitation in their concept of strategic operations (i.e., 
intercepting retaliating forces after a Soviet preemptive 
strike against an enemy's missile forces). Still other 
explanations highlighted in varying degrees the threats 
posed by highly capable U.S. strategic bombers, regional 
third party air forces such as those of NATO and China, and 
U.S. forward-based strike aircraft. It is impossible to say 
which of these factors comes closest to explaining the 
Soviet commitment to air defense. What is clear is that 
Soviet air defense has provided a powerful stimulus to the 
U.S. Air Force to hone the penetration capabilities of its 
bomber forces with electronic countermeasures, stealth 
technology, and increasingly capable stand-off weapons 
(e.g., short-range attack missiles and cruise missiles) 
designed to destroy air-defense installations during the 
retaliatory phase of nuclear operations.
As an arms control matter the imbalance in air-defense 
capability created negotiating obstacles. I have already 
noted the acrimonious debate within the U.S. intelligence 
community over the possible contributions of an upgraded 
Soviet SAM network to ABM breakout capability. Both sides 
had tested SAM systems for possible ABM roles prior to the 
late 1960s, albeit without much success, so the idea of SAM 
upgrade was well established. Critics of the upgrade thesis 
argued that it would be very costly and technically
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difficult to modify then-current Soviet SAMs for ABM 
missions, and that it would be an ineffective way to break 
out of treaty restraints because even upgraded SAM batteries 
would not have more than a minimal ABM capability.
Proponents replied that there simply was no way to preclude 
the possibility of some covert upgrading, and that the 
overall protection provided might be substantial in view of 
the large numbers of SAMs involved.^ There was less 
disagreement on the proposition that improvements in SAM 
technology in the future would probably blur the line 
between SAMs and ABMs.*
In the midst of this debate, American policy 
development proceeded in a tentative, ad hoc way. During the 
Johnson Administration, Secretary Rusk attempted to resolve 
the SAM matter by erring on the side of inclusion. Either 
the Soviets should take steps to show that their SAMs were 
not capable of acting as ABMs, he said, or else they should 
agree to include their SAMs in the numerical totals for each
* Dr. Donald Kerr, former director of the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, summarized the analytical problem this 
way: "I always thought that the 'SAM upgrade' threat was 
overstated. Mobile air-defense systems in the field simply 
do not operate under conditions that would make them 
amenable to high-speed intercept of reentry vehicles. The 
problem with SAM upgrade is that the key developments are 
those we can't see: improvements in data-processing 
capability, the ability of radars to 'hand-off targets to 
other systems, the ability to direct interceptors in a 
highly disturbed environment." Remarks at the J.F.K. School 
of Government, Harvard University, November 6, 1985.
* See Foster's comments, U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 
1974 Authorization for Militarv Procurement, p. 818.
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side.^ When the Nixon Administration got down to business on 
SALT, however, the matter was still being contested. Some 
U.S. officials believed that the case for including SAMs was 
extremely weak and regarded such proposals as throwing 
needless obstacles in the way of productive negotiation. But 
others in the Pentagon remained adamant. Foster, who was 
kept on by Nixon, raised the idea of counting SAMs as 
fractions of ABMs (e.g., an SA-5 being equal to one-half an 
ABM; the older SA-2 equal to one-third, etc.). The main 
attraction of this plan was that it would have neatly 
allowed full deployment of the U.S. Safeguard ABM (about 800 
launchers) while obliging the Soviets to trade-in existing 
SAMs as a price for proceeding with new ABMs of their own.® 
Ultimately, the Nixon White House decided to exclude SAMs 
from direct numerical counts and sought instead a series of 
collateral constraints on SAMs and radars to suppress 
putative upgrade hazards and to enhance verification.
The Soviets of course were well acquainted with U.S. 
concerns and put the worst possible construction on them 
once talks were underway. They accused the United States of 
trying to probe beyond the legitimate bounds of negotiations 
and to gather intelligence information.* They ridiculed the
 ^Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 166. See also Nitze, 
From Hiroshima to Glasnost. p. 288.
® Author's interview with Raymond L. Garthoff, April 4,
1985.
9 Smith, Doubletalk, p. 307.
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idea of converting SAMs into ABMs as unrealistic and absurd. 
Karpov dubbed it "an artificial" problem.Semenov quipped 
that the whole Russian population would have to "go without 
trousers for the next five years" if Soviet planners tried 
to give all their SAM radars an ABM capability. It would 
be "superfluous," he argued, "to establish limitations of 
any kind on any type of antiaircraft SAM systems, and also 
on missile attack warning radars, space monitoring radars 
and antiaircraft radars.
Whether the Soviets would have adopted this stiff 
posture if faced with a U.S. SAM network of comparable size 
can only be a matter of conjecture. In the absence of such a 
threat, however, the Soviets had little interest in 
suppressing upgrade hazards or in helping the United States 
to establish a legal requirement for collecting intelligence 
data on Soviet SAMs or radars. As a matter of bargaining 
strategy, they knew very well that virtually any limit on 
non-ABM defensive systems would cut asymmetrically against
Memorandum of conversation (memcon) A-540 from the 
U.S. SALT Delegation, dated September 3, 1971, p. 3, 
contained in declassified material in appendix A of U.S. 
Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, The ABM 
Treatv. Part I: Treatv Language and Negotiating Historv, May 
11, 1987.
Smith, Doubletalk, p. 315.
Statement of Ambassador Vladimir Semenov, December 
4, 1970, cited in Senator Sam Nunn's report, "Interpretation 
of the ABM Treaty: Part 4: An Examination of Judge Sofaer's 
Analysis of the Negotiating Record," in Congressional 
Record, May 20, 1987, p. S-6825f.
317
them.
Thus, until late 1971, Soviet negotiators assiduously 
avoided any stance that might validate the general principle 
that limits of some sort on non-ABM systems were essential 
to the effectiveness of the treaty. They objected to the 
U.S. idea of defining ABM systems and components in broad 
functional terms, as any system or component capable of 
countering ballistic missiles or their elements in flight 
trajectory, including "other devices" capable of performing 
the functions of then-current ABM components (e.g., radars, 
interceptor missiles, and launchers) as well as systems 
"indistinguishable from" ABM components.^ U.S. negotiators 
had pressed for a broad formulation to ensure that the 
treaty would encompass future ABMs based on directed energy 
technologies which might incorporate components different 
from those currently in existence; it was not explicitly the 
American aim to directly restrain non-ABM systems through a
Even in its broad formulation, the U.S. definition 
was crafted in ways to permit important exclusions. The 
reference to strategic, for instance, was carefully inserted 
to exclude anti-tactical ballistic missiles from the 
agreement. Even ICBMs were a matter of scope concern. John 
Rhinelander, the U.S. legal advisor on the SALT I 
delegation, pointed out in his analysis of the treaty that 
the formulation "in flight trajectory" was included to 
"preclude the assertion than an ICBM on one side that was 
targetable at ICBM silos on the other was an ABM system..." 
See Rhinelander, "The SALT I Agreements," p. 128. The 
reference to "other devices" is found in Senator Nunn's 
analysis, see "Interpretation of the ABM Treaty," p. S-6817. 
The reference to "indistinguishable from" is found in 
Smith's account, see Doubletalk, p. 270.
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broad definition.The Soviets, however, feared that the 
Americans would later argue that because SAMs had some 
capability (however marginal) to counter ballistic missile 
warheads or were "indistinguishable from" ABMs, they should 
be defined as ABMs. The fact that some in the U.S. 
government were lobbying for controls on SAMs probably lent 
credence to this perception.
As a response, the Soviets proposed to define ABMs in 
the narrowest possible way: as systems, encompassing 
interceptors, launchers, and radars, "specially" constructed 
and deployed for an ABM role.^^ The Americans balked at 
this, for it seemed to deny the possibility of exotic ABMs 
with different kinds of components as well as systems 
constructed for other purposes but reconfigured to perform 
as ABMs. It thus was a classic conflict of scope priorities, 
pitting American insistence on including all forms of ABM 
against Soviet insistence on excluding non-ABM systems from 
direct control.
The gap between these positions was not unbridgeable, 
however. Even while ridiculing the notion of converting 
non-ABM systems into ABMs, the Soviets let it be known that 
their mission-oriented ABM definition (i.e.,"specially
Raymond L. Garthoff, Policv Versus The Law: The 
Reinterpretation of the ABM Treatv (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 1987), pp. 39-40.
Statement by Soviet representative Grinevsky in 
memcon A-644 from U.S. SALT Delegation, December 13, 1971, 
p. 2. See appendix A, U.S. State Department, The ABM Treatv
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constructed...for an ABM role") did comprehend the idea that 
testing in an ABM mode would be one way of identifying the 
purpose of a system. Indeed, they presented this thought as 
a simple extrapolation of their skeptical view on the whole 
circumvention argument: since upgrading was a silly idea to 
begin with, the issue of testing for upgrading purposes 
would never arise. Karpov repeatedly stressed the relevance 
of testing: "...a system, whatever it might be, if it is 
tested in an ABM mode, it is an ABM system. At another 
point he observed that once such testing had occurred, "the 
old system would cease to exist. The new system would be 
deployed in an ABM mode."^^
Soviet clarifications became a pivotal element in a 
series of compromises on establishing ABM scope criteria. 
What made agreement possible was a mutual decision to link 
determinations of scope —  what is or is not an ABM system 
—  to observable acts (i.e., testing) rather than to 
unilateral assertions of intended mission. In doing so, both 
sides got a measure of what they wanted. The Soviets were 
able to place their SAMs and other non-ABM defensive systems 
outside the legal boundary of the ABM Treaty, provided they 
did not test them as ABMs; at the same time, the Americans 
were able to establish a legal basis for monitoring Soviet
Comments of Soviet representative Karpov, September 
2, 1971, cited in Nunn's report, "Interpretation of the ABM 
Treaty," p. S-6815.
U.S. SALT Delegation, memcon A-54 0, p. 4.
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SAM programs, to watch for signs of illegal testing 
behavior.
The treaty language fell into place fairly quickly. The 
Soviets agreed on defining ABM components inter alia as any 
component tested in an ABM mode.^® In return, the U.S. side 
dropped the formulations "indistinguishable from" and "other 
devices" from its proposed ABM definition and agreed to 
settle the precise form of exotic ABM limits elsewhere in 
the treaty so long as the definitional article (Article II) 
acknowledged the possibility of ABM systems based on other 
than then-current components.^ Finally, both sides agreed 
on language barring the upgrading or converting of non-ABMs 
to ABM-capable s y s t e m s . W h a t  the Soviets had branded as a 
"superfluous" and "unnecessary" obligation turned out to be
One can reasonably infer this from a comparison of 
Grinevsky's statement in memcon A-644 and the final language 
of Article II, see ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agreements. pp. 139-140. The importance of including the 
formulation "tested in an ABM mode" is underscored by the 
U.S. SALT I delegation in memcon A-677, December 20, 1971, 
p. 2, in appendix A, U.S. State Department, The ABM Treatv.
This was done by inserting the phase "currently 
consisting of" into Article II, which had the effect of
indicating that there might be systems in the future which
might have components other than those listed in Article II.
See memcon A-677, p. 1, and Garthoff's assessment of the
interaction in Policv Versus The Law, pp. 44-45.
The precise language is found in Article VI(a) of 
the ABM Treaty. In it, each party undertakes: "not to give 
missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor 
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to 
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in 
flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode."
U.S. ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements. p. 141.
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acceptable in the end.
The missing element here was a common definition of 
activities constituting testing in an ABM mode. Paul Nitze, 
then a U.S. delegate, had engaged in some exploratory 
exchanges on criteria for ABM-related testing with his 
Soviet interlocutors; but no agreed formula emerged. Both 
sides recognized that refining a precise definition would be 
lengthy and complex, given the need to address individual 
components. Soviet negotiators displayed considerable 
reluctance in moving toward full clarification, and there 
were internal disagreements within the U.S. executive branch 
on how to p r o c e e d . I n  April, 1972, during the final hours 
of negotiation, Nitze tabled a unilateral American 
interpretation of activities that would constitute testing 
in an ABM mode.
Other issues were also left unclarified. Both sides
Author's interview with Raymond L. Garthoff, April 
4, 1985.
Under the U.S. interpretation of 1971, testing in an 
ABM mode could occur if (1) "a launcher is used to launch an 
ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is 
flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight 
trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic 
missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in 
conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or 
an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to 
an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets 
against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes 
measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind 
referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of 
its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the 
test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the 
same test range." See U.S. ACDA, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements, p. 147.
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agreed to exclude anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs) 
from the ABM definition.^* Yet no effort was made to specify 
any clear dividing line between ATBM or dual-capable 
ATBM/SAM testing and ABM testing.^* Moreover, while the 
operation of non-ABM radars in conjunction with ABM testing 
was ruled out by the United States as a matter of general 
practice, an agreed exemption was given to non-phased array 
radars if operated for range safety and instrumentation 
p u r p o s e s . A s  these examples suggest, the criteria for 
scope determinations were not at all free from ambiguity. At 
that time, however, potential compliance problems were seen 
as manageable and very much overshadowed by the 
accomplishment of gaining general agreement on the principle 
of an upgrade ban.
At the time the United States was developing the 
SAM-D system for NATO air defense and saw the possibility of 
upgrading it to counter Soviet short-range missiles.
The presumptive baselines for classifying such tests 
are the characteristics of ballistic missile RVs associated 
with strategic offensive forces. These RVs typically travel 
at higher speeds and altitudes than do tactical or 
intermediate-range RVs. However, as Herbert Lin correctly 
points out, there is no precise and clear dividing line, 
because some SLBMs which are included in SALT and START are 
less "strategic" in terms of their RV characteristics than 
some land-based intermediate-range weapons. See "New 
Technologies and the ABM Treaty," Michael Krepon and Mary 
Umberger, eds.. Verification and Compliance; A Problem- 
Solving Approach (New York: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 186- 187.
U.S. ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements.
p. 144.
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Exotic Systems
While both sides moved toward closure on definitional 
and upgrade questions, they pressed on with parallel efforts 
to clarify the scope of limits on exotic ABMs. 
Notwithstanding recent interpretations of the record, both 
sides actually were never very far apart on exotic 
weapons.After much internal debate in Washington, U.S. 
negotiators in August 1971 tabled treaty language specifying 
a two-pronged approach to exotic ABMs: to bar their testing, 
development, and deployment in mobile basing modes (e.g., 
land-mobile, sea-, air-, and space-borne); but to allow 
their development and testing (while barring deployment) in 
fixed, land-based m o d e s . T h i s  differentiation was sought 
because the Pentagon was interested in ground-based laser
Those who argue that Soviet negotiators never 
actually agreed to ban the development and testing of mobile 
exotic ABM systems or components under the treaty's Article 
V provisions would clearly dissent from this view and rely 
on Judge Sofaer's analysis of the ABM Treaty. See U.S. 
Department of State, The ABM Treatv. and his article, "The 
ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative," Harvard 
Law Review. Vol. 99, No. 8 (June 1986), pp. 1972-1985. On 
the other hand, the record of declassified U.S. memcons from 
SALT I as well as subsequent analysis by U.S. negotiators 
and Sen. Sam Nunn provides a strong basis for concluding 
that the Soviets both recognized and accepted U.S. 
interpretations of the key definitional and other articles 
bearing on exotic weapons. See, for example, Garthoff,
Policv Versus the Law, pp. 28-69, and Nunn, "Interpretation 
of the ABM Treaty," previously cited. While I make no effort 
to parse the key differences of interpretation here, the 
above analysis assumes the essential correctness of the 
traditional view of the ABM Treaty.
The language of the initial U.S. draft proposal is 
found in Garthoff, ibid.. p. 30.
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systems and did not want to forfeit an R&D option.
Soviets officials proved receptive to severe restraints 
on mobile systems and agreed to operative provisions in the 
Fall of 1971.^® On the other hand, while appearing to share 
an interest in handling fixed systems in a more permissive 
way, they went even farther, questioning whether deployment 
of these should be banned at all. Academician Shchukin, the 
principal Soviet negotiator on this question, framed the 
choice this way: "...both sides agree there should not be 
territorial defenses....thus, the agreement would ban the 
deployment of future systems in a manner providing 
territorial defense. If, however, new technology should make 
possible components carrying out the same tasks as existing 
components, but perhaps in a more efficient and less costly 
manner, why should those be prohibited? We are not 
prohibiting ABM components.
U.S. negotiators strenuously objected to this line of 
reasoning. Nitze argued that if a new system capable of
The language for what eventually became Article V(l) 
was substantially agreed on September 23, 1971. See 
Garthoff, Policv Versus the Law, pp. 35-37, and memcon A-503 
from the U.S. SALT Delegation, September 15, 1971, appendix 
A, U.S. State Department, The ABM Treatv. in which Karpov is 
reported to have agreed with Graybeal's interpretation that 
the Soviet proposed textual modifications covered "any type 
of present or future components" of ABM systems. The 
definitional article was agreed on December 22, 1971, see 
Garthoff, ibid.. p. 44.
Memcon A-639 from the U.S. SALT Delegation, December 
10, 1971, p. 1, in appendix A, U.S. State Department, The 
ABM Treatv.
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substituting for existing weapons (e.g. , the 100 launchers 
and interceptors) was allowed without prior agreement, it 
might render the numerical limitations meaningless. To this 
the Soviets replied that if R&D ever progressed to a stage 
where deployments of exotic systems became feasible, the 
question of specific limits could be taken up in the SCC 
where the necessary regulations could be worked out. At 
this point, both sides focused on working out an agreed 
statement that would spell out the idea of joint 
consultation, although it took a number of probes by U.S. 
negotiators to nail down Soviet acceptance of the principle 
that no deployment of fixed exotic systems would be allowed 
unless both sides were agreed and amended the treaty 
accordingly.^
Nitze's reply and Shchukin's reference to the SCC 
are found in ibid.. p. 2.
For example, according to memcon A-710, Garthoff 
queried his Soviet counterparts on what would happen if the 
consultation produced no agreement on deployment: would the 
party wanting to deploy be able to do so or not? Grinevsky 
initially sidestepped this question, saying the whole matter 
was purely hypothetical, and then suggested that a party 
could withdraw from the treaty if it wished. Others in the 
Soviet delegation, however, appeared to accept Garthoff's 
idea of resorting to amendment procedures specified in the 
treaty rather than withdrawal. See memcon A-710 from the 
U.S. SALT Delegation, January 11, 1972, pp. 1-2, appendix-A, 
U.S. State Department, The ABM Treatv. Final agreement was 
reached on January 26, 1972, see memcon A-743, ibid.
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Large Radar stations
Applying scope criteria to radars also proved to be a 
complex matter. With some systems, such as SAM radars, the 
"testing in an ABM mode" proscription could be helpful. 
Testing was deemed a necessary step in determining the 
upgrade potential of a candidate system. At higher 
thresholds of size and power, however, radar systems did not 
necessarily require visible upgrading modifications or 
extensive testing to be deemed ABM-capable. Hence, U.S. 
officials initially took a very restrictive approach: 
existing radars deemed to have an ABM application would be 
listed by type and number; any radars directly associated 
with existing ABM deployments would be limited numerically 
and restricted geographically; further construction of 
certain early-warning radars (e.g., "Hen House" radars) 
would be barred; and above a certain power threshold, any 
new radars built for other purposes would be subject to 
mutual agreement and would have to meet some agreed criteria 
that would rule out an ABM role.
None of this went over well with the Soviets. They 
objected to the whole premise of radar controls, arguing 
that launchers and interceptors, not radars, determine ABM 
capability. While conceding that permitted ABM radars might 
be limited geographically, they argued that each side should 
be free to determine the number and size of its radars on 
the basis of its own technology. They also asserted flatly
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that early-warning radars could not operate as ABM systems 
and any limits on these would unjustifiably constrain the 
modernization of air defenses which were not covered by 
agreement.
The lengthy give-and-take which led to agreement on 
radars has been well chronicled elsewhere and need not be 
recounted in detail here.^^ The outlines of a deal began to 
emerge when the Soviets agreed after some haggling to 
numerical and geographical limits on ABM radar complexes. 
Meanwhile, the United States softened considerably its 
proposals for non-ABM radars, dropping the requirement for 
agreed criteria and a veto power on new deployments. In 
return, the Soviets agreed to a generic ban on new large 
phased-array radar installations above an agreed threshold, 
albeit with some notable exemptions for early warning, 
verification, and space tracking p u r p o s e s . A s  for early- 
warning radars, both sides converged on a middle ground 
position. Rather than numerical limits or a freeze, both 
agreed to allow new deployments but only on the periphery of
Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 305-306, 315.
Ibid. , pp. 301-318.
Large phased-array radars (LPARs) which steer their 
beams electronically without moving the antenna were a 
source of great concern because of their potential to detect 
and to track hundreds of incoming missile RVs at long 
distances. The agreed threshold on LPARs was calculated in 
terms of "power-aperture product," which is the product of 
mean emitted radar power in watts and the area of the 
antenna size in square meters. The threshold was set at a 
value of 3 million watts-square meters.
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national territory, oriented outwards.Although less 
constraining than its earlier proposal, the United States 
reckoned that a peripheral deployment rule would 
substantially reduce the ABM potential of these radars. They 
would be harder to defend in outlying areas and, by facing 
outwards, their ability to detect attacking warheads would 
be limited to those in flight trajectory above the 
atmosphere where decoys and countermeasures could be used to 
confuse and spoof missile defenses.
All told, the major scope choices in the ABM Treaty 
negotiations illustrate in varying degrees the three 
potential avenues for diplomacy. Non-ABM defensive systems 
and components were excluded from the agreement, and both 
sides, though mainly at U.S. insistence, agreed to bar 
upgrading activity, particularly testing in an ABM mode. 
Conversely, exotic systems and components were included to a 
degree consistent with verification requirements, and both 
sides agreed to some latitude for managed deployment of 
certain types subject to mutual agreement. Finally, on large 
radars, they essentially split the difference. LPARs built 
expressly for the ABM battle management mission were 
covered; those built for early warning were exempted except
The relevant portion of Article VI provides that 
each side undertakes "not to deploy in the future radars for 
early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except 
along the periphery of its national territory and oriented 
outward." ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, p. 
141.
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for the loose constraint on peripheral deployment. Location 
became the key agreed element in distinguishing between 
radars designed for these different missions.
Scope Rules in Operation
The discussion in Chapter 3 established the range of 
compliance problems that have arisen since 1972. With 
respect to scope issues, the most sustained set of disputes 
involved the role of non-ABM systems and components in ABM 
testing. As noted earlier, the Soviets repeatedly operated 
SA-5 radars to monitor air traffic in and around their 
missile test range at Sary Shagan between 1973 and 1975 
while ABM systems were being tested. Concerned that these 
radars appeared to be making measurements on incoming 
ballistic missile warheads, U.S. officials in early 1975 
raised the issue pursuant to the Article VI prohibitions on 
upgrade and testing in an ABM mode. The Soviets replied that 
the radars were being used for range safety and 
instrumentation purposes and claimed the practice was 
exempted on the basis of U.S. and Soviet statements made for 
the record during the negotiations. In support of this 
position, however, they reportedly proffered a very narrow
Location and orientation were not the only possible 
criteria. A radar's frequency in megahertz would have been 
another way to distinguish between ABM and early-warning 
radars. The drawback of using any operational criteria, 
however, is that they could not be conclusively verified 
until the installation was already built and actually 
emitting energy.
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construction of the testing provision: that tracking an 
incoming RV with a non-ABM radar did not constitute testing 
in an ABM mode, and was thus permitted, so long as the radar 
was not also being used to guide an interceptor to its 
t arget.This was not consistent with the U.S. view.
One result of this exchange was a long sequence of SCC 
diplomacy aimed at clarifying the meaning of "testing in an 
ABM mode." Elements of an agreed definition were worked out 
in 1978, largely on the basis of the unilateral U.S. 
criteria.^* As part of this arrangement, both sides agreed 
that "to avoid future misunderstandings" each would refrain 
from simultaneously testing ABM and SAM components and from 
utilizing instrumentation equipment to make measurements on
Duffy, et al.. Compliance and the Future of Arms 
Control. pp. 35-6.
For a glimpse at provisions of this agreed 
clarification, see comments of Paul Nitze, "Permitted and 
Prohibited Activities Under the ABM Treaty," Speech before 
the International Law Week-end Group, New York, N.Y.,
October 31, 1986, printed in U.S. Department of State, 
Current Policv. No. 886, p. 2. Although Nitze does not say 
so explicitly, Ivo Daalder and Jeffrey Boutwell correctly 
argue that his comments can be read to infer that the 1978 
agreed statement omits a portion of the earlier U.S. 
definition which specified testing at altitudes inconsistent 
with the interception of aircraft as an activity 
constituting testing in an ABM mode. See "TBMS and ATBMS: 
Arms Control Considerations," in Donald L. Hafner and John 
Roper, eds., ATBMs and Western Securitv (Cambridge: 
Ballinger, 1988), p. 186. In fact, the United States did not 
pursue an altitude criterion in negotiations on the testing 
definition out of concern that this might interfere with 
then-existing plans for ASAT development. Interview with 
Raymond L. Garthoff, April 4, 1985.
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missile RVs.^’ This step aimed at barring a recurrence of 
the initial problem but left open the question of whether 
any form of SAM operations would be allowed during ABM 
testing. The Soviets maintained that they needed some 
latitude to operate air-defense systems if unidentified 
aircraft were detected flying in the vicinity of the test 
range. In 1982, both sides finally agreed to bar concurrent 
operations but only after U.S. and Soviet negotiators worked 
out a provision allowing for SAM radar monitoring of 
unidentified aircraft provided that notification of specific 
instances was given subsequently in the SCC.^^
ATBM development has also proved to be a source of 
irritation.Despite obtaining an exclusion for ATBMs, the 
United States did not pursue an upgrade for the SAM-D system 
during the 1970s, although it has done so for its follow-on
The provisions in the 1978 agreed statement 
regarding concurrent testing and the use of instrumentation 
equipment are summarized in a letter of November 13, 1979, 
from J. Brian Atwood, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Congressional Relations, to Senator Frank Church. See U.S. 
Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, SALT II 
Treatv: Background Documents, 96th Cong., 1st sess. 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979), p. 80.
There were some internal disputes over reporting 
requirements pursuant to this exemption. Reportedly, 
agreement was reached in 1982 to permit notification at the 
semi-annual meeting of the SCC. The Pentagon, however, 
argued that notification ought to take place within ten days 
of the occurrence. Agreement apparently was reached on a 30 
day deadline. See Michael R. Gordon, "CIA is Skeptical that 
New Soviet Radar is Part of an ABM Defense System," National 
Journal, March 9, 1985, p. 524.
For a detailed overview of this problem, see Daalder 
and Boutwell, "TBMS and ATBMS: Arms Control Considerations."
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system, the Patriot. in recent years. Meanwhile, the Soviets 
pursued a new generation of SAMs —  initially, the SA-10 and 
later the SA-12 —  and reportedly tested an advanced version 
of the SA-12 against tactical and intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles on numerous occasions.In its public 
pronouncements, the Reagan Administration concluded that the 
SA-12 has the potential for intercepting some kinds of 
ballistic missiles but did not cite the Soviets with a 
violation, stating instead that the evidence was 
"insufficient to assess compliance" with the ABM Treaty.
Even in the absence of clearcut noncompliance, however, 
advanced ATBMs on both sides could in time come to represent 
a portion of air-defense infrastructure that would be 
particularly suitable for upgrading if these deployments 
were extensively internetted with warning systems and 
augmented with more capable acquisition sensors.Under the 
INF Treaty, both sides have removed a significant portion of 
the non-strategic missiles against which ATBMs might be
The SA-12B's test record in fact has raised doubts 
that the weapons could operate effectively even in an ATBM 
mode. See Michael R. Gordon, "Defense Dept. Is Rebuffed on 
Soviet ABM Threat," The New York Times. March 5, 1987, p. 
AlO.
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power. 
1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1988), p. 56. See also 
President's Report on Noncompliance, December 2, 1988, p.
17.
Sidney D. Drell and Thomas H. Johnson, "Managing 
Strategic Weapons," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 66, No. 5 (Summer 
1988), p. 1040. The authors see widespread ATBM deployments 
as possibly providing a partial defense against SLBM attack,
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deployed; but the treaty does not cover all tactical 
missiles or strategic cruise missiles, and it has given 
ATBMs a new rationale, namely insurance against breakout.
The ABM Treaty's testing provisions also figured in 
charges leveled by the Soviet Union at the United States. In 
its 1984 Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), the United States 
tested a non-nuclear exoatmospheric interceptor and 
associated sensors, which were carried into space aboard a 
modified Minuteman I ICBM. Although the test was conducted 
from a declared U.S. ABM test range, the Soviets asserted 
that the use of a Minuteman booster to launch ABM components 
was impermissible, because it amounted to giving a non-ABM 
system capabilities to intercept strategic ballistic missile 
RVs. (The target vehicle had also been launched by a 
Minuteman ICBM from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.) 
The United States claimed that the booster and its 
performance characteristics were observably different from a 
Minuteman missile, and that Minuteman I was no longer an 
operational ICBM in the U.S.inventoryThis issue has 
since fallen by the wayside but was never fully resolved.
More serious upgrade problems have revolved around the 
application of scope criteria to proposed experiments on
 ^ Melissa Healy, "Another Anti-Missile Plan Finding 
New Justification," Los Angeles Times. November 29, 1987, p 
1.
Longstreth, et. al., U.S. and Soviet Ballistic 
Missile Defense Programs," p. 45.
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advanced sensing and directed energy technologies mandated 
by the American SDI program. These experiments include the 
testing of space-based and air-borne sensors to track 
ballistic missiles during boost, post-boost, and mid-course 
phases of flight trajectory, as well as tracking and 
targeting devices associated with laser weapon systems 
designed for space-basing. The USSR has claimed that these 
and other elements of the SDI program represent a breach of 
the treaty's commitment not to establish a base for 
nationwide defense, and that they go beyond the permissible 
limits of research on non-fixed exotic systems. Although the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations have defended such testing 
as consistent with their broad interpretation of the treaty, 
under which any non-fixed exotic system or its component 
could be developed and tested, Washington officials also 
have claimed that these planned experiments could be allowed 
under the treaty's traditional interpretation because the 
devices would be tested against satellites rather than 
ballistic missiles and would not be sufficiently powerful to 
be construed as fully fledged ABM "components.
With respect to testing against satellite targets, 
Paul Nitze stated that neither the United States nor the 
Soviet Union consider "tested in an ABM mode" to encompass 
tests against targets in space that do not follow a 
ballistic missile flight trajectory. See "Permitted and 
Prohibited Activities," p. 2. The U.S. position has been 
that field-testing of certain devices may be treaty 
compliant if the sensors, weapons, or platforms being tested 
are really adjuncts to components of ABM systems, due to 
inherent power or other limitations (e.g., computational 
power) that make them unable to fully substitute for ABM 
components. Some experts, however, have questioned whether
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Discussions between the two sides on space and defense 
questions have not settled these questions.
Finally, with respect to large radars, compliance with 
scope rules has been a source of long-standing friction. As 
noted in Table 3-1, the Soviets lodged a complaint in the 
see over U.S. construction of a large radar, called Cobra 
Dane. on Shemya Island in the Aleutians, in 1975. They cited 
as evidence of its ABM application the fact that many of its 
elements had been taken from an older ABM radar, the Missile 
Site Radar, a component of the partially constructed 
Safeguard system located at Malmstrom Air Force Base, 
Montana, but subsequently disassembled.^® The Americans 
responded that Cobra Dane was permitted, both because it was 
sited appropriately for early-warning purposes and because 
it was covered under the exception for NTM radars (e.g., 
radars to collect data on Soviet missile tests). The U.S.
such distinctions are too finely-drawn to serve as a basis 
for unilateral assertions of compliance. See Aspen Strategy 
Group, The Strategic Defense Initiative and American 
Security, pp. 43, 56. While it is clear from the negotiating 
record that both sides sought to exempt "adjuncts" designed 
to augment traditional components (e.g., radars), the 
dividing line between adjuncts and components was never 
specified in treaty language; both sides in effect have 
relied on a commonsense understanding of the treaty's 
general guideline that the line would be crossed if a device 
were capable of "substituting for" a traditional component. 
Durch, The ABM Treatv and Western Securitv. pp. 7 0-72, 
provides some good illustrations of how new technologies can 
blur the line between permitted adjuncts and prohibited 
components, as well as the line between permitted forms of 
research and prohibited development.
David Morrison, "Radar Diplomacy," National Journal. 
January 3, 1987, p. 18.
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side also claimed an NTM exception for a ship-borne radar 
system. Cobra Judv. which was subsequently stationed off the 
Aleutians to track Soviet strategic missile warheads for 
intelligence and verification purposes.^*
By the late 1970s, Soviet radar construction activity 
had begun to generate concerns in Washington. U.S. officials 
reportedly expressed concern that the first of a new 
generation of LPARs, located near the city of Pechora, more 
than 100 miles south of the Barents Sea, might not be close 
enough to the Soviet periphery to be considered an 
early-warning radar.Shortly thereafter, the Soviets 
initiated work on four other Pechora-class radars, 
apparently in compliance with treaty obligations. The United 
States did not pursue the matter further at the time and did 
not list it as a violation subsequently.^^ The initial U.S.
Durch, The ABM Treatv and Western Securitv. pp.
47-48.
Duffy, et. al.. Compliance and the Future of Arms 
Control, p. 107.
According to Morrison ("Radar Diplomacy," p. 18),
U.S. diplomats were prepared to charge in 1978 that the 
Pechora facility was not properly located on the periphery, 
but decided not to press the issue for fear of forfeiting
the opportunity of raising an even more serious charge: that
the radar might be part of a new ABM system. So far as is
known, however, the United States never pursued this latter
charge. The Soviets, for their part, consistently claimed 
that their Pechora-class radars were being deployed in a 
manner consistent with the treaty while taking account of 
"technical and practical" considerations. U.S. experts have 
taken this qualification to mean that the Soviets would opt 
for locations closest to the periphery which were also 
deemed to be geographically suitable and accessible to 
transportation. According to Longstreth, et al., U.S. and 
Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs, p. 54., the
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complaint in the SCC was met by Soviet criticism of new 
American SLBM detection radars, called PAVE PAWS. which were 
cited as possible violations of the Treaty's Article I 
commitment not to provide a base for nationwide defense. The 
Soviets apparently did not dispute that the radars were 
designed for early-warning purposes, but argued that their 
broad field of coverage (240 degrees) from southerly 
locations in Texas and Georgia provided coverage over 
certain interior portions of the continental United States.
The best known episode in the radar controversy started 
to unfold in July 1983, when U.S. intelligence detected 
construction work on the fifth in the series of 
Pechora-class radars, near Krasnoyarsk, in central Siberia. 
Situated over 700 km from the nearest frontier and oriented 
toward the vast expanses of upper Siberia, the radar did not 
meet the location and orientation tests specified in the 
treaty for early-warning radars. When queried about it, 
Soviet officials stated that the Krasnoyarsk facility was 
going to function as a space-tracking radar and they invoked 
Agreed Statement "F" exempting such radars from the generic 
power potential threshold set for LPARs. U.S. experts, 
however, concluded its main mission would be early warning, 
arguing that it resembled other Pechora radars rather than
Soviets did not justify the Krasnoyarsk radar in these 
terms, however.
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any Soviet radars dedicated to the space-tracking mission. 
Beginning in 1984, the United States formally charged a 
violation of the ABM T r e a t y . T h e  Soviets rejected this 
finding and in 1986 countercharged that new U.S. LPAR 
construction at sites in Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, 
England, represented a breach of the early-warning radar 
limitations because they were not being located on the 
periphery of U.S. territory. American officials argued that 
these radars were part of permitted modernization work at 
existing early-warning sites associated with the U.S. 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS), not new 
facilities within the meaning of the treaty's Article VI 
restriction on early-warning radars. Although the Soviets 
eventually admitted that the Krasnoyarsk station was a 
violation, the dispute over U.S. BMEWS programs has not been 
resolved.
More accurately, the Krasnoyarsk station is better 
suited as a "late-warning" radar, since it would not detect 
SLBM RVs launched from the Gulf of Alaska until they were 
already over Soviet territory. Moreover, as Durch points 
out, RVs aimed at targets in the Soviet Far East would tend 
to underfly the radar. See The ABM Treatv and Western 
Securitv. p. 49. Still, it is worth noting that Krasnoyarsk 
is located near the "periphery" of the present Soviet 
command and control system (which traditionally has been 
concentrated in the western USSR) and would provide initial 
detection for military commands in the central and western 
Soviet Union. In this sense, it is an "early-warning" 
system.
” In its initial noncompliance report of January 1984, 
the Reagan Administration characterized it as "almost 
certainly" a violation; in its February 1985 report, it was 
characterized simply as a "violation." See President's 
Report on Noncomoliance. February 1, 1985, p. 8.
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The Significance of Compliance Problems
What do these disputes tell us about the efficacy of 
the scope rule choices in support of the ABM Treaty? To 
answer this question one needs to look at the treaty not 
only in terms of its basic positive purposes —  to prohibit 
territorial defense or the base for one —  but also in light 
of what it was intended not to do —  to constrain 
operational flexibility in other mission areas. Treaty 
negotiators consciously steered a middle course where 
possible; they presumed the exclusion of non-ABM mission 
areas unless or until technical developments threatened to 
spill-over into the ABM arena. The question is whether this 
balance was achieved. One cannot say so categorically, for 
one can never prove a negative —  that no program 
flexibility was forfeited. However, there are few if any 
traces in the pattern of strategic arms development since 
1972 to suggest that either side forswore an important R&D 
or procurement opportunity in air-defense, ASAT, early 
warning, or in other non-ABM areas, which it might have 
otherwise pursued but for the ABM T r e a t y . N o r  has either
Perhaps the closest instance was the Aegis fleet air 
defense system. On the U.S. side, there was concern that the 
Aegis system, combining a ship-borne phased-array radar and 
a nuclear-version of the SM-2 missile (optimized to 
intercept Soviet sea-launched cruise missiles) might pose 
problems with Article Vi's upgrade provisions, just as U.S. 
analysts have been concerned with the inherent upgrade 
potential of new Soviet SAMs with phased-array engagement 
radars. However, U.S. officials deemed Aegis to be compliant 
with the Article VI provisions on upgrade, noting that it
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side sought to redefine the specific numerical limits on ABM 
components (e.g., 100 launchers, 2 large ABM radars, etc.) 
on the grounds that they unduly constrained capability to 
operate ABM systems and components in other r o l e s . N o r  
were there any major constraining side-effects which were 
overlooked or unappreciated at the time the treaty was 
implemented.^* Given all this, it can be said with some 
confidence that the treaty achieved its negative goal of not 
overreaching to the detriment of operational flexibility on 
either side.
To say this goal was achieved, of course, does not 
necessarily mean that the choices implicit in the goal were 
sensible ones. Quite obviously, overreaching (and limiting 
flexibility on both sides) could have been a justifiable
had "essentially no capability" to counter strategic 
ballistic missiles and was not to be tested in an ABM mode. 
Moreover, the nuclear version of the SM-2 missile was not 
deployed, most likely for operational and cost reasons. For 
a redacted discussion of the issue, see U.S. Congress, 
Fiscal Year 1981 Arms Control Impact Statements, Statements 
submitted to the Congress by the President Pursuant to 
Section 3 6 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 9 6th 
Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979), pp. 
387-389. I am grateful to Ivo Daalder and William Durch for 
background on this issue.
Conceivably, the Galosh ABM interceptor could be 
used to counter U.S. satellites, though its use in any 
scenario short of strategic warfare is difficult to imagine
This stands in contrast to the limited test ban 
treaty, whose de facto prohibition on above-ground nuclear 
effects testing arguably has turned out to be a more far- 
reaching limitation on development of reliable counterforce 
capability than was commonly appreciated during the early 
1960s.
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policy choice if suppressing non-ABM activity was deemed a 
fair price to pay for keeping the treaty regime intact. Any 
net judgment on scope choices must therefore weigh whether 
non-ABM activities have undermined the treaty's positive 
goal of restricting ABM capability to very low levels and of 
erecting barriers to breakout so that the parties would not 
have to invest in potential hedges or countermeasures.^^ If 
undermining effects are present, one would have some basis 
for arguing that the parties should have broadened the scope 
of the treaty, sweeping ATBMs, SAMs, ASATs and other systems 
into the framework as a hedge against circumvention hazards.
Unfortunately, there is no objective standard for 
determining the point at which such hazards become 
significant; certainly none is specified in the treaty. If 
one takes a pessimistic view of technical change, one could 
pinpoint any variety of developments which might be 
construed as having adverse effects. While the projected 
production and deployment timelines for nationwide defense 
on either side are still on the order of years, the 
technological hurdles today to establishing "a base" for 
territorial defense are clearly fewer in number than in the 
early 1970s, in part because of activities in non-ABM 
mission areas. General advances in data-processing, modular 
radars, and rocket propulsion and guidance have narrowed the
Ashton B. Carter, "The Structure of Possible 
U.S.-Soviet Agreements Regarding Missile Defense," pp. 
142-143.
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gap separating SAMs and ATBMs, on one side, and ABM systems, 
on the other. Each side's radar network for early warning 
and long range tracking of ballistic missiles is much more 
capable today, and further development of a variety of 
active and passive (and even "interactive") sensing 
technologies with space-based applications promise dramatic 
improvement in the future.
A common rejoinder to this line of argument is that any 
technically feasible defense today might be only marginally 
more effective than those that were on the drawing boards in 
the early 1970s, because ballistic missile capabilities on 
each side have also improved considerably since that time. 
Yet, while this may be true, such a comparison is a flawed 
measure for establishing the significance of ongoing 
technical activity as far as the treaty is concerned. 
Offensive forces may well enforce the viability of the 
regime in the sense of dampening breakout incentives. But it 
cannot be the case that the treaty was meant to rely on 
offensive force improvements to remain viable. On the 
contrary, it was supposed to lay the foundations for 
extensive limitations on the offensive side.
Moreover, such comparisons necessarily hinge on very 
subjective judgments of defense effectiveness. If one 
believes that robust strategic deterrence depends critically 
on one's ability to hold at risk some small number of high 
value targets on the other side (e.g., command centers.
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fixed ICBMs), even a small infrastructure of local ABM 
deployments protecting those targets might be troublesome 
and thus deemed to be "effective." On the other hand, if one 
interprets targeting requirements for deterrence more 
flexibly, one might have a more relaxed attitude about the 
significance of ABM capability.^* In any event, negotiators 
on both sides steered well clear of this dilemma. The treaty 
enjoins the parties to forbear not simply in those defenses 
presumed to be "effective." Rather, it obliges the parties 
to forbear in deploying anv ABM defense of national 
territory, in providing anv base for one, or in deploying 
anv local or regional defenses beyond those permitted. A 
judgment on effectiveness presumably would be a final hurdle 
in any process of national decision leading to the 
deployment of strategic defenses; but one need not presume 
some measure of effectiveness to see compliance hazards to 
the treaty.
In dealing with scope problems in the 1969-72 
negotiations, both sides understood that a regime of 
unlimited duration would have to adapt to changing 
circumstances. As Ashton Carter has pointed out, the ABM 
Treaty contains language that foresees and encourages
Carter provides some useful illustrations of how 
differing perceptions of defense effectiveness could bear 
upon the problem of ASAT upgrade. See Ashton B. Carter, "The 
Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems," Daedalus, Weapons in 
Space, Vol. 1: Concepts and Technologies (Spring 1985), pp. 
175-176.
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updating.^’ The treaty's presumption of managed adjustment 
is an especially important factor to consider when 
appraising the negotiating requirements and trade-offs that 
were perceived at the time. One can imagine any number of 
problems that would have arisen if the United States had 
sought to include ATBMs or SAMs in the scope of the ABM 
Treaty. Limiting air defenses, at a minimum, would have 
greatly strengthened the Soviet demand for including U.S. 
forward-based aircraft in the offensive package. And 
limiting or banning ATBMs would have generated similar 
demands within NATO with respect to Soviet tactical 
ballistic missiles. Negotiations might well have stalled on 
such objections. Correspondingly, a split-the-difference 
solution for large phased-array radars was the only choice 
that really made sense at the time. Both sides had a major 
stake in improving their early-warning systems. Indeed, each 
continues to have a great stake in the capacity of the other 
to refrain from desperate acts in periods of crisis.
Reliable early warning is a prerequisite to acting and 
reacting rationally in a situation where strategic forces 
are put on a high state of alert. Suppressing improvements 
in early-warning capability in hopes of gaining greater 
insurance against breakout would simply not have been a 
sensible goal for the negotiations.
Given these calculations, together with a presumption
Carter, "The Structure of Agreements," p. 142.
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in favor of ongoing adjustment, it is difficult to gainsay 
the basic determinations of scope under the ABM Treaty. The 
choices were not flawed in any fundamental sense. But this 
does not necessarily mean that the provisions implementing 
those scope choices were necessarily correct or optimal. 
Indeed, as argued below, the compliance problems encountered 
to date in the operation of these rules speak tellingly to 
the inadequacies of these implementing provisions.
To start with, both sides have taken liberal advantage 
of exemptions which were ill-defined or, more accurately, 
left up to each party to define. The USSR justified its 
non-ABM radar activities on range safety and instrumentation 
grounds; and until 1989 it justified the Krasnoyarsk 
facility on the basis of a putative space-tracking mission. 
The United States claimed NTM exemptions for its Cobra Dane 
and Cobra Judv radars, and also argued that construction of 
new LPARs at Thule and Fylingdales was permissible under the 
treaty because there were already radars at those sites 
being used for early-warning purposes. There is, of course, 
nothing inherently problematic in the idea of exemptions per 
se. The allowances for space tracking and NTM radars in the 
treaty reflected a natural concern that one party or the 
other might need some relief from the power threshold 
specified in Agreed Statement "F" in order to carry out
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other legitimate m i s s i o n s . A  common problem in all these 
cases, however, is the absence of any basis in clear treaty 
language for deciding whether a claim of exemption is 
legitimate or not.
The Krasnoyarsk radar is a prime illustration. Once the 
construction site was detected in 1983, it took U.S. experts 
very little time to reach the judgment that the radar being 
built was inappropriately located and oriented from the 
standpoint of treaty requirements. It was just too similar 
in appearance to other early-warning radars —  indeed, 
virtually indistinguishable from them —  to be considered 
anything else. The Soviets knew this. Whatever their 
original reasons for building the radar, they gave 
increasing indications beginning in 1985 that they were 
looking for face-saving solutions, and in 1989 they admitted 
it was a violation. Nonetheless, in the face of much 
criticism, the Soviets persisted with the space-tracking 
claim for years. The reasoning behind their position went 
something like this: LPARs for space-tracking are exempt 
from any size or location restrictions; there are no agreed 
criteria to distinguish between early-warning and 
space-tracking LPARs on the basis of external appearance; 
all early-warning LPARs also perform some space-tracking
Arguably, however, the United States should have 
established a stronger legal base for upgrading the 
early-warning capabilities of BMEWS-related facilities. This 
was a case where a larger treaty loophole was called for.
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roles; Krasnoyarsk, therefore, can be justified as a 
space-tracking LPAR. It was a contrived argument —  because 
space-tracking was clearly not the role for which the radar 
was optimized —  but not one that could be thrown out on the 
basis of the plain language of the treaty. What fatally 
undermined the Soviet position was its absurd implication. 
Carried to its extreme, the Soviet argument would have 
sanctioned the construction of LPARs of any size and 
capability, anvwhere in the Soviet Union or the United 
States, provided they had some space-tracking capability. 
Neither side could have lived with such a precedent over the 
long term.
In hindsight, the initial U.S. proposals of 197 0 to 
establish agreed criteria for distinguishing between various 
types of LPARs would have provided a clearer if more complex 
guideline for proceeding with new radar construction in 
non-ABM mission areas. Both sides then would have sought to 
reach agreement on design parameters that would minimize or 
rule out an ABM or early-warning capability. This approach, 
however, was eventually dropped in return for Soviet 
concessions on other issues.
Apart from the problems of unqualified exemptions, 
experience has shown the drawbacks of relying too heavily 
upon the yardstick of "testing in an ABM mode" in making 
determinations about what qualifies as an ABM system or 
component. The testing proscription, as noted above, was
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meant to verifiably enforce the general ban on upgrading 
non-ABM systems specified in Article VI. The operative 
premise was that testing would be a necessary step at some 
point in any covert upgrading program, especially in cases 
like SAMs where upgraded performance depends critically on 
the integration of newer, more powerful components (e.g., 
modified radars) into the overall system. This assumption 
was not an unreasonable one, but efforts to peg a treaty 
obligation on it ran afoul of three obstacles. First, 
testing in an ABM mode is inherently hard to define by 
reference to discrete activities. Several years and much 
effort in the SCC were required to flesh out a common 
definition. Second, its application to new technologies is 
awkward because the Article VI upgrade provision was framed 
only in terms of traditional ABM components —  radars, 
interceptors, launchers —  whose functions could be 
redistributed in different ways in systems with non- 
traditional elements (e.g., particle beams, passive sensors, 
etc.)^ Without any measure of functional equivalence, it 
becomes harder to pinpoint the stage at which 
non-traditional elements could "substitute" for ABM 
components or to measure the value-added of testing to that 
substitution process.
Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, Eliot 
Spitzer, "Space Weapons: The Legal Context," Daedalus. 
Weapons in Space, Vol. II: Implications for Security, Vol. 
114, No. 3 (Summer 1985), p. 204.
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Third, and more significantly, the testing yardstick 
has become less uniquely important in policing the outer 
boundaries of the treaty as the underlying technologies for 
ballistic missile defense and other mission areas begin to 
blur distinctions. Infrared sensing technology, for example, 
has progressed to a stage where future space-based sensors 
could be used not just to detect missiles being launched but 
to determine RV trajectories in mid-course flight, a task 
which currently only dedicated ABM radars can perform. 
Similarly, optical or laser-guided weapons were once only 
useful in the realm of air-to-ground warfare; now, however, 
high-acceleration rockets equipped with advanced optical 
homing sensors could be developed for ASAT missions but also 
have some inherent capability to intercept missile boosters 
or RV buses. In these and other cases, while actual testing 
against target vehicles with strategic ballistic missile RV 
characteristics would be important at some stage of 
development, it is not a prerequisite to obtaining general 
confidence in the ability of a particular system, component, 
or "adjunct” (e.g., a subcomponent not capable of 
substituting for radars, interceptors, etc.) to operate in 
support of ABM missions.Consequently, as the central
In theory, there are numerous ways both to enhance 
the ABM relevance of a non-ABM test and to skirt the ban on 
testing of dedicated systems. For example, Lin suggests that 
if an ASAT weapon were given trajectory data on its orbiting 
target only minutes before intercept, the test would closely 
resemble a test against a strategic RV in mid-course flight. 
Correspondingly, one could test directed energy sensors or 
weapons at power levels considerably below design limits.
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delineating rule specified under the treaty, "testing in an 
ABM mode" has lost much of its value as a policing agent 
over activities that could constitute a base of preparations 
for territorial defense.
The diplomatic response to this development has been 
meager to date. From the beginning, both sides understood 
the potential for problems, but neither wanted to extend the 
process leading to the 1972 treaty when there existed an 
expectation of ongoing discussions aimed at adjusting the 
regime cooperatively. Yet bilateral discussion from 1974 to 
1985 generally was confined to the clarification of terms 
which were not fully spelled out in treaty text; new 
rule-making was not a f o c u s . T o  some degree, the unlimited 
duration of the treaty probably has been a disincentive to 
major new undertakings. Absent a date of expiration, neither 
side appeared very anxious to embark on significant 
renegotiation given the ever-present risk that the final 
result might be less optimal to one or the other than a 
continuation of the status quo.
Since the commencement of the Defense and Space Talks 
in 1985, the situation has become more complex and 
difficult. On top of outstanding compliance problems, each
See Lin, "New Technologies and the ABM Treaty," pp. 192,
206.
The protocol signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the 
Moscow summit of 1974 reduced permitted ABM deployment areas 
from two sites to one apiece. See ACDA, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements. pp. 162-163.
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side has disagreed on what exactly the existing treaty 
regime allows in terms of development and testing, and 
whether it should be eclipsed by a transition to a defense 
dominant strategic situation.
To provide a stable environment for offensive arms 
reductions, both sides agreed to negotiate a period of non­
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (this idea has since been 
dropped), to address issues bearing upon permitted 
development and testing activity under the current treaty, 
and to discuss whether missile defenses beyond those 
permitted could be phased in at some later date. But whereas 
Moscow has sought to strengthen the treaty's traditional 
treatment of non-fixed ABMs and opposes any transition to 
defense, Washington has used the talks to advance its broad 
interpretation of the treaty and to press for the idea of a 
cooperative transition to a defense-dominant world. This 
basic divergence has denied the talks any common basis for 
agreement on principles, either in the context of a new 
defense and space treaty (as proposed by the United States) 
or as a protocol to the ABM Treaty (as proposed by the 
USSR). U.S. negotiators have proposed broad exclusions for 
R&D activity —  for instance, to exempt all ABM-capable 
sensors for test purposes and to allow testing of 
space-based weapons limited only by the number of satellites
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involved at any one time.^ Meanwhile, the Soviets have 
sought U.S. agreement on a list of devices not to be tested, 
and have proposed a threshold of "critical parameters" to 
delineate between permitted and nonpermitted ABM-related 
test activity.
Ultimately, whether the treaty regime is loosened, 
strengthened, or merely clarified, the idea of refining its 
scope has undeniable appeal. A variety of criteria for this 
purpose, have been proposed/* What stands in the way of any 
further scope rule negotiations is the fundamental 
disagreement between the two sides on the basic purposes of 
strategic defensive limitations.
^ The figure proposed was 15, and there would also 
be requirements for notifications of testing activity. See 
Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Proposes Limit on 'Star Wars' 
Tests," The New York Times. October 27, 1988, p. AlO. See 
also U.S. ACDA, Issues Brief: Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. 
and Soviet Proposals (mimeo), January 22, 1990.
Arms Control Association, Defense and Space Talks: 
Background and Negotiating History. January 1989, p. 5.
*  See, for instance, Lin, "New Technologies and the 
ABM Treaty," p. 198. See also W.K.H. Panofsky, "Management 
of Permitted Versus Prohibited ABM Activities," October 20, 
1987 (mimeo), pp. 7-8. Panofsky's approach would exempt 
testing conducted below a lower threshold and limit or 
prohibit it above an upper threshold; in the in-between gray 
area, testing activity would incur a requirement to discuss 
the nature and purposes of the tests and the power levels of 
the devices involved. As Panofsky states, the purpose of 
disclosure is to enable a party to judge whether the 
proposed experimentation will or will not "create a base" 
for deployment.
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STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES
The context of scope rule-making for offensive arms 
agreements has been markedly different. First, and most 
obviously, the attributes of targets which delimit the 
strategic potential of given classes of systems are far 
easier to identify: location is the main thing that matters. 
Any weapon capable of striking targets situated in the other 
party's homeland is presumptively a strategically-capable 
weapon regardless of actual mission. In determining which 
weapons are actually designed for strategic missions, range 
is generally a dispositive criterion; less visible 
characteristics such as the speed or burn time of the 
boosters or the "power potential" of sensors are not 
critical in scope determinations. Not only is range 
capability strongly suggestive of the intended target 
locations and categories, it usually indicates whether the 
system is optimized for nuclear weapons delivery. 
Furthermore, the strategic offensive mission area does not 
encompass a wide array of weapons; unlike ABMs, which had to 
be carved out from a larger category of systems, long-range 
ballistic missiles and bombers tend to single themselves
Intercontinental range is not exclusively 
indicative of the strategic land-attack mission since in the 
past the Soviets built ICBMs for naval targeting. Regarding 
armament type, however, long-range has always been a good 
indicator of nuclear ordnance, since nuclear warheads are 
both lighter than their conventional counterparts and can 
compensate for guidance inaccuracies in a way that 
conventional weapons cannot.
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out. Lastly, with one important exception —  cruise missiles 
—  both present and near-term trends in offensive weapons 
technology are not of the kind that would blur boundaries 
between strategic and other mission areas. Maneuvering or 
precision-guided RVs, stealth features, or depressed 
trajectory SLBMs are all examples of new technologies (or a 
new operational practice, in the SLBM case) which would 
improve the capabilities of strategic weapons but are not 
likely to turn theater or tactical weapons into strategic 
systems.
In light of these differences one might conclude that 
scope criteria are easier to apply in offensive than in 
defensive strategic arms control. In retrospect, however, 
ballistic missiles and aerodynamic weapons have clearly 
posed complications, albeit of different types, in 
determining the scope of particular agreements. This is due 
in part to geographical asymmetries between the two sides —  
in particular, the relatively greater vulnerability of U.S. 
targets to sea-based forces, and the relatively greater 
Soviet vulnerability to intermediate-range delivery systems 
based in and around Europe —  and in part to the fungibility 
of certain types of offensive weapons, as discussed below.
Ballistic Missiles! ICBMs and SLBMs
By the late 1960s, intercontinental-range ballistic 
missiles were well on their way to becoming the weapon of
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choice for strategic offensive missions. Swift, survivable, 
relatively cheap, and highly susceptible to command and 
coordination, land-based missile squadrons offered a degree 
of high-confidence, prompt target destruction potential that 
bomber and sea-based systems (then, mainly U.S. 
carrier-based strike aircraft or Soviet sub-launched cruise 
missiles) could not hope to match.^ For all these reasons, 
and because of their increasing accuracy, they were also 
attractive candidates for restraint. As bargaining chips, 
ICBMs had the virtue of being unencumbered by any scope 
problems analogous to the "SAM upgrade" issue. Shorter-range 
ballistic missile forces were configured quite differently 
from ICBMs; civilian and scientific space launch 
capabilities on each side posed no ambiguities; and "testing 
in an ICBM mode" was not a real possibility with non-ICBM 
systems. In short, it was hard to imagine how one could 
develop non-ICBM systems or components and give them the 
capability of "substituting for" ICBMs.
Nevertheless, both sides in SALT I were at odds 
initially on general inclusion criteria for ballistic 
missiles because neither was prepared to accept the others’ 
position on regional nuclear forces, specifically
^  This is not to say that all characteristics of 
ballistic missiles are more advantageous from the military 
planning standpoint. Bombers are subject to recall, can 
escape their bases without having to attack their target 
set, and can attack targets of opportunity. On the other 
hand, bombers are slower than ballistic missiles and quite 
vulnerable on base.
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forward-based systems in Europe. We have already seen how 
FBS and SLBMs complicated the task of setting numerical 
thresholds in the SALT framework; as a scope problem, this 
issue surfaced in disagreements over how to define the term 
"strategic.” The United States had actually opened the 
pandora's box by suggesting that the agreement might include 
launchers of Soviet IR/MRBMs targeted on Europe.^’ When 
Soviet negotiators objected to the inequity of including 
these forces while excluding U.S. FBS, the United States 
promptly shifted gears, proposing that "strategic" offensive 
weapons be defined according to intercontinental range and 
thereby excluding both side's European-based forces 
entirely. Yet, the Soviets insisted on defining as 
"strategic" any weapon capable of hitting the territory of 
the other side regardless of mission. This broader 
formulation was not entirely self-serving, for it meant the 
inclusion of the Soviet SS-11 variable-range ballistic 
missiles even though a substantial number of these were
Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 141. 
Subsequent U.S. guidance called for exclusion of Soviet INF 
missiles "except for those limits on IR and MRBMs which are 
necessary to insure adequate verification of the limits 
imposed on ICBMs." See Richard M. Nixon, NSDM 69, July 9, 
1970, p. 3. One could fairly read such a requirement as a 
harbinger of U.S. intelligence concerns about possible 
associations between ICBMs and IRBM launchers which later 
emerged during SALT II regarding the SS-16 and SS-2 0 
launchers. See discussion later in this chapter.
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targeted on Western Europe.However, their proposal neatly 
excluded dedicated Soviet theater forces (e.g., the SS-4s 
and SS-5s) while including U.S. FBS. This was unacceptable 
to the United States and its NATO allies.
As noted in Chapter 5, the joint decision of May 1971
to drop negotiations on a comprehensive agreement in favor
of an interim freeze overcame the impasse created by the FBS
standoff. Both sides in effect set aside bombers and theater 
weapons in order to concentrate on limiting the construction 
of new ballistic missile launchers. In its final form, the 
interim accord registered agreement to define ICBM launchers 
as those supporting missiles with ranges "in excess of the 
shortest distance between the northeastern border of the 
continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the 
continental USSR."^ While this definition was agreed in the 
context of interim restraints and only addressed one class 
of weapon, it nonetheless represented an important Soviet 
step toward a definition of strategic forces that would 
comprehend the idea of range as well as target location.
Unfortunately, the shift to an interim approach threw 
up new obstacles. Just as it sharpened the focus on ICBMs, 
it blurred the boundaries with respect to SLBMs. Prior to
According to Berman and Baker, some 320 SS-lls 
were oriented toward Eurasian targets, Soviet Strategic 
Forces, pp. 122-123.
See U.S. ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agreements, p. 154.
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May 1971, the general U.S. objective had been to include 
sea-based missiles under SALT. The Soviets initially 
appeared not only to share this goal but sought even more 
ambitious coverage. They had proposed to include all SLBMs 
carried on-board nuclear-powered submarines; at another 
point they even agreed to include those deployed on board 
less capable diesel-powered submarines; and they sought and 
obtained U.S. acquiescence on banning SLBM launchers on 
surface ships.However, the Soviets perceived a direct 
linkage between FBS and SLBMs.^ Once they agreed to drop 
claims on the former in the context of an interim agreement, 
their stance on the latter changed radically as they sought 
to protect their ongoing construction programs. Moscow only 
shifted back to accepting SLBM limits toward the very end of 
the negotiation, when the United States acquiesced to very 
high ceilings.
In terms of setting the scope on SLBMs, the key issue 
was not the ceiling but how to establish "floor" criteria —  
a minimum threshold of capability above which SLBM and their 
submarines would be counted against agreed quotas but below 
which they could be exempted. This was not an easy line to 
draw, for the strategic potential of SLBMs is a function not
Smith, Doubletalk, p. 189.
^ This position is consistent with their operational 
patterns in which SLBM-carrying submarines patrolled in 
European waters. These forces have included not only older 
Golf class submarines but some of the Yankee class as well.
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only of missile range but of submarine capability. In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, sea-based forces on each side 
were still evolving. None of the SLBMs then operational on 
either side could match ICBM ranges. The U.S. C-3 Poseidon 
(4,600 km) and Soviet SS-N-6 (3,000 km) came closest; the 
older U.S. A-3 Polaris (2,400 km) and the Soviet SS-N-4s 
(700 km) and SS-N-5s (1,400 km) were farther away. During 
the mid-1960s, the Soviets had operated their diesel-powered 
Golf class submarines, equipped with the SS-N-4 SLBM and 
later the SS-N-5, in parts of the Atlantic and Pacific, 
apparently against mainly regional targets. Their Hotel 
class nuclear-powered submarines armed with SS-N-5 missiles 
patrolled off Nova Scotia, suggesting limited coverage of 
coastal targets in the continental United S t a t e s . T h e  
diesel submarines, however, had little capacity for 
sustained operations —  or "on-station" time —  in forward 
areas without basing facilities, and Cuba was closed to them 
under the U.S.-Soviet understandings reached after the 
missile crisis. Beyond that, these submarines were not 
stealthy enough to be very secure in areas heavily patrolled
Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, pp. 
94-95; MccGuire contends that the Hotel class were targeted 
on U.S. submarine and surface fleet port facilities. See 
Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policv. p. 97; 
Kissinger suggests that Golfs were deployed on station off 
the U.S. Atlantic coast prior to 1967 and off the U.S. 
Pacific coast prior to 1969, but subsequently withdrawn. See 
Kissinger's comments to the press, June 24, 1974, reprinted 
in Labrie, SALT Handbook, p. 228.
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by Western ASW forces.^ By the late 1960s, both the Golfs 
and the Hotels were eclipsed by the newer Yankee class SSBN 
with the SS-N-6 SLBM, with the older boats being redeployed 
more clearly in theater roles. Six of the Golf class boats, 
for example, were redeployed to the Baltic fleet between 
1976 and 1989, to the annoyance of Scandinavian states.
When the SLBM issue came up in post-May 1971 SALT 
negotiations, the Soviets declared that their older 
submarine forces —  then comprising about 100 missile 
launchers on approximately thirty submarines —  were simply 
too old and too limited in range to be seriously considered 
on par with modern sea-based strategic forces (e.g., the 
Yankees and Poseidons). They warned that to insist on 
including them would force reconsideration of the whole FBS 
issue, for it was absurd to discuss these weapons while 
excluding aircraft of equal or longer ranges. In fact, few 
experts in the United States attached much strategic value 
to older Soviet SLBMs, yet no one was anxious to overlook 
them when Soviet insistence on high numerical ceilings on 
SLBM launchers was certain to be controversial anyway. 
Moreover, the issue was contentious within the U.S. 
executive branch. White House unwillingness to push the
^ Kissinger stressed that the Golfs were very noisy, 
could only stay submerged for two or three days, and that 
the older ones had to surface in order to fire their 
missiles. See Labrie, ibid. Moreover, in the wake of 
U.S.-Soviet tensions over Soviet naval port visits at 
Ceinfeugos, the Soviets were not about to send their 
SLBM-carrying submarines into Cuban ports.
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Soviets hard on SLBMs spawned opposition from an unlikely 
coalition of arms control negotiators, who saw the exclusion 
of Golfs and Hotels as giving the Soviets latitude to build 
newer submarines before reaching their agreed "trade-in" 
point of 740 SLBM launchers, and the Joint Chiefs, who 
favored inclusion of the older systems in the overall limit 
as a matter of general principle.
Against this background, the deal finally brokered by 
Kissinger at the 1972 Moscow summit was very much a 
split-the-difference solution. The United States acceded to 
Soviet wishes and excluded Golf class submarines from the 
agreement altogether, while the Soviets agreed to count 
launchers on Hotel class submarines against the 740 
threshold and to retire them if they built up to their 
maximum agreed ceiling of 950 launchers. The Soviets also 
undertook two "upgrade"-like obligations with respect to the 
Golf class: if they were equipped with new missiles, their 
launchers would count against the 950 total; and if they 
were not modernized but retired, they could not be used as 
trade-ins for additional modern missile-launching submarines 
up to the maximum allowance. Only the first of these 
qualifications was actually spelled out in the agreement.
The provision regarding non-replacement was called into
 ^ The protocol provides in part that: "the 
deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of 
type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs 
permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R." U.S. ACDA, Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agreement, p. 153.
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question after the summit, when the Soviets suddenly stated 
they were now prepared to accept the initial U.S. position 
(i.e., to include Golfs). The United States flatly rejected 
any change, however, and the American reading of the record 
was clarified in a mutually-agreed interpretative statement 
of July 24, 1972, which Kissinger worked out with Dobrynin 
in Washington.^
What caused this attempted flip-flop was a recognition 
by the Soviets, albeit belatedly, that their "victory" on 
SLBM exclusion was really a pyrrhic one. In their eagerness 
to thwart constraints on shorter-range sea-based weapons, 
the Soviets failed to see the advantage of including
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1146. That the 
United States proposed and the Soviets accepted a specific 
commitment not to use the Golfs as trade-ins for newer 
SLBM-carrying submarines is well established in various 
accounts of the record. Kissinger strongly implied this in 
his Moscow press conference, see U.S. Congress, Military 
Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, pp. 108-109. Later, in his 
memoirs. White House Years. pp. 1238-1241, he recounted the 
bargaining with the Soviets on this issue and boasted that 
his approach was more favorable to U.S. interests than the 
Joint Chief's plan to include the Golfs, p. 1238f. On the 
other hand, there was nothing in the plain language of the 
interim agreement that actually prohibited the exchange of 
Golf submarine launchers for newer boats; indeed the 
language in the protocol that additional Soviet SLBMs over 
the 740 threshold could become operational as "replacements 
for...ballistic missile launchers on older submarines," a 
reference that was meant to address Hotel class submarines, 
did not specifically exclude the Golf class. Presumably, 
this is why the United States felt the additional agreed 
statement was necessary. Kissinger was adamant on the need 
to force the Soviets to trade-in something more substantial 
—  that is, either older ICBMs or nuclear-powered submarines 
(i.e., H-class subs) —  than obsolete diesel submarines in 
exchange for new systems above the 740 threshold.
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obsolescent Golfs against the upper numerical ceiling, and 
thus to reserve room in the quota for a future replacement, 
rather than to exclude these weapons at the price of 
upgrade-like constraints. In subsequent statements, 
Kissinger presented the outcome as a case where shrewd U.S. 
diplomacy paid off.^® Given its prior position on the 
importance of including Golf boats, however, U.S. 
recognition of this counterintuitive effect was also 
somewhat belated. It was less a case of the Americans 
outwitting the Soviets than the Soviets outwitting 
themselves.
The Golf episode provides some useful insights on the 
effects of certain kinds of scope choices. No one doubted 
that these Soviet submarines were of marginal strategic 
value in their normal operational setting. From the 
standpoint of arms control methodology, the key question 
was: what kind of circumvention risks were raised by 
excluding the Golfs?
It seemed unlikely that the Soviet Union would station 
its existing fleet of 20 or so Golfs in strategically
See Kissinger's comments to the press in Labrie, 
SALT Handbook, p. 228. Although the benefits of the trade-in 
ban on Golf class submarines were real enough, they were 
still less advantageous to the United States than the option 
of including the Golfs in the initial baseline count of 740 
launchers. Had Golfs been included, Soviet submarine 
building programs would have brought them much more quickly 
to the figure of 740 launchers, the point at which they had 
to trade-in ICBMs or other systems for new submarines up to 
the 950 level.
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provocative ways. These were slow, noisy boats, and thus 
vulnerable to ASW. In theory, the Soviets could have built 
additional diesel-powered Golf submarines, declared them not 
to be "modern" as defined by the agreement, and equipped 
them with spare SS-N-5s. There was nothing in SALT I to 
prevent this.^ Again, however, given the lack of forward 
basing facilities and other factors, this kind of 
circumvention seemed terribly remote. Kissinger correctly 
surmised that the best use of Golfs would be as trade-ins 
for nuclear-powered boats. Excluding them from the count 
would help to prevent this from happening. In addition, an 
extra requirement to count them if the missiles themselves 
were modernized would force upon the Soviets a totally 
illogical choice —  to squeeze out new SLBM launchers under 
their quota of 950 in favor of putting new launchers and 
missiles on old, outmoded boats. This they were not about to 
do.
Given all these calculations, the scope decisions 
concerning SLBMs in SALT I made good sense for the United 
States: the circumvention risk was small, the Golf 
exclusions would work to the advantage of lower aggregate 
numbers and capabilities, and no real operational
According to Smith, Doubletalk, p. 398, the 
Soviets defined a "modern" submarine as one which was 
nuclear-powered and which became operational after 1965. The 
term is not fully defined in the agreement itself.
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flexibility was sacrificed.®® For the Soviets, the final 
outcome preserved the principle that regionally-oriented 
forces should be exempt from strategic agreements, even at 
the cost of greater flexibility in the replacement process. 
Finally, it is worth stressing that the idea of drawing a 
line between nuclear and diesel-powered submarines for the 
purposes of strategic agreement was a principled choice for 
both sides. Nuclear propulsion is the attribute that gives a 
submarine the capacity for sustained, long-range operations. 
(Later on, we will see other situations in which essentially 
the same set of calculations can lead to a different 
outcome.)
In terms of compliance under SALT restraints, the 
essential correctness of the basic scope choices were borne 
out by subsequent behavior. The Soviets gradually have 
retired without replacement their Golf class submarines over 
the years. Within the domain of strategic forces substantial 
modernization and replacement occurred throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, but this was not inconsistent with the agreement: 
on the Soviet side, older submarines, like those of the 
Hotel and the Yankee class, and older land-based missiles, 
the SS-7s and SS-8s, have been traded-in for newer 
submarines; and on the U.S. side, older Poseidons have been
®® One can argue that the effect upon the aggregates 
was beneficial in that if the Soviets had been able to use 
the Golfs as trade-ins, they would have been left with 60 or 
so SS-7 or SS-8 launchers as well as newer submarines.
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retired in favor of Trident.
With respect to ICBMs, the only unforeseen event 
bearing on scope matters involved the so-called III-X silos. 
In 1973, construction activity observed by U.S. intelligence 
indicated that the Soviets were building silos whose purpose 
was genuinely unclear. If constructed for ICBM launchers, 
they would have been a major violation of the SALT I freeze. 
(Some of this construction actually had started before SALT 
I was completed, and it was assumed by the United States at 
the time that these were ICBM silos being initiated prior to 
the freeze.)
When questioned about the activity, Soviet 
representatives stated that these facilities, though similar 
in appearance to launch silos, were actually for command and 
control purposes. U.S. intelligence had already reached this 
conclusion but was concerned that the facilities might be 
dual-capable or readily converted.^ Rather than to take 
Soviet claims at face value, U.S. representatives asked for 
specific evidence indicative of the command and control 
function. In an uncharacteristic display of pre-alasnost 
openness, the Soviet Union did so with little acrimony, 
furnishing detailed information on construction and design 
that could not be gleaned solely by NTM. U.S. 
representatives then requested externally visible design
Comments by Schlesinger in U.S. Congress, Soviet 
Compliance with Certain Provisions of SALT, p. 3.
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alterations —  specifically to narrow the silo aperture —  
to preclude the launching of ICBMs. The Soviets complied 
with this and the result was confirmed by U.S. 
intel 1 igence.
This interaction on the III-X silos was a highly 
consequential one, both for future scope rules and 
compliance procedures. It provided an operational test of 
the principle that for claims of exclusion to be valid, they 
had to be justified, and that verifiable indicators would 
need to show not only some evidence of intended purpose but 
also proof that the exempted system could not function as a 
treaty-limited system. Methods of limitation based on this 
test, specifically the notion of functionally-related 
observable differences, or FRODs, were developed 
subsequently to enable both sides to avoid having to make 
case-by-case determinations on weapons exclusions.
By the late 1970s, both sides thus had managed to 
establish a rational baseline for ballistic missile scope 
choices which has been modified only incrementally in 
subsequent negotiations. The ICBM definition was carried 
over into SALT II with the addition of a precise threshold 
value, 5,500 kilometers. The rules governing older Soviet
Schlesinger, ibid.. p. 21, referred explicitly to 
U.S. proposals for design changes. Howard Stoertz provided 
further details, conversation with the author. May 19, 1988.
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submarines were carried over as well.^
In addition, new issues proved amenable to solution.
One matter which emerged was how strategic negotiations 
should proceed in light of the SS-20 IRBM deployments. As 
noted earlier, U.S. analysts had worried that SS-20 
regiments could become a base for surreptitious deployments 
of the SS-20*s intercontinental-range mobile varient, the 
SS-16, since it appeared that SS-20 launchers could also 
accommodate the SS-16. Because the Soviets clearly wanted to 
exclude their SS-20 launchers from the SALT II aggregate, 
they signed on to a provision obliging both sides not to 
convert non-ICBM launchers into ICBM-capable launchers, and 
not to test such launchers for that purpose. The 
verifiability of this rule was underwritten by a specific 
Soviet obligation not to produce, test, or deploy the SS-16, 
and not to produce its unique component parts (a plausible 
route to the upgrading of SS-20s).
Another, less significant issue concerned the 
disposition of some 18 launchers at the test range at 
Tyura-Tam. Soviet officials argued that these were old test 
and training launchers for fractional orbital bombardment 
(FOBS) missiles and thus should be exempted from the
See U.S. Department of State, SALT II Agreement, 
pp. 8, 11. During the ratification debate, before the 
agreement was formally withdrawn, a motion to have the Golfs 
included was defeated in the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee by a vote of 10 to 5. See U.S. Congress, The SALT 
II Treatv. 96th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
GPO, 1979), pp. 67-68.
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aggregate. U.S. officials said they appeared to be 
operational launchers for SS-9 ICBMs (the booster for FOBS) 
and should either be counted or dismantled. Eventually, the 
Soviets agreed to dismantle twelve of these launchers and to 
convert the other eight to test launchers for missiles 
undergoing modernization.®^ Both the SS-16 ban and the FOBS 
dismantling/conversion were tailored remedies whose common 
aim was to prevent the scope of agreement from expanding 
into unwanted areas.
To date, negotiations in the START era have been 
relatively unencumbered by lingering definitional and scope 
problems regarding ballistic missiles. Land- and sea-based 
missiles falling within the agreement have been clearly 
identified in bilateral statements since the end of 1987.®^ 
Further, by eliminating land-based missiles below the 5,500 
km threshold, the INF ban will buttress START against any 
encroachment from new or improved medium-range missiles. A 
dominant unanswered question is whether new forms of testing 
might be agreed upon which would require special scope 
rules. A test quota, for instance, would necessitate a 
common definition of "testing in an ICBM mode," both to 
distinguish ICBM tests from unrelated space-launch activity
®^  U.S. Department of State, SALT II Agreement, p.
37.
®^  Collateral limitations on non-deployed missiles 
are essentially a framework issue, since the missiles 
themselves are clearly strategic.
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not charged against a quota and to close loopholes for 
circumvention (e.g., destroying test vehicles shortly after 
burn-out, etc.). Finally, while the INF Treaty has helped to 
clarify START's scope, it may have done so at the price of 
sparking bilateral disagreements over scope issues at lesser
ranges.®^
Aerodynamic Weapons; Bombers and Cruise Missiles
If ballistic missile issues were becoming more 
tractable by the early 1980s, bombers and cruise missiles 
were driving negotiations into ever greater complexity. 
Aircraft inherently are more multi-purpose than ballistic 
missiles given their capability to perform at various ranges 
and speeds, to be refueled in flight, and to carry payloads 
of various types. It has been hard to develop inclusion 
criteria for strategic bombers and cruise missiles without 
constraining flexibility in non-strategic mission areas;
^  In May 1989, Soviet foreign minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze warned that the Soviet Union might stop 
elimination of its SS-23 rockets as required by the INF 
Treaty if the United States pursued the modernization of its 
short-range nuclear weapons, particularly the Lance system. 
Reportedly, the Soviet position at the time the treaty was 
signed was that the SS-23 did not have sufficient range to 
be included in the ban. U.S. officials, however, disputed 
the range estimates, and the Soviets finally agreed to SS-2 3 
inclusion on the condition that the United States undertake 
not to develop a similar missile. U.S. officials deny that 
any linkage was ever agreed. See report by R. Jeffrey Smith, 
"Alliance Caught in Superpower Squeeze," The Washington 
Post. May 14, 1989, pp. Al, A31. As it turned out, the USSR 
completed its elimination of SS-23s and political changes in 
Europe have made the whole issue of Lance modernization 
irrelevant.
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and, correspondingly, it has been hard to exclude 
non-strategic systems in any open-ended way without exciting 
fears of circumvention. The result has been rules which are 
often cumbersome and difficult to verify.
SALT I negotiations on aerodynamic systems played out 
in a desultory fashion. American negotiating policy was 
especially erratic, a reflection perhaps of the absence of 
highly threatening Soviet bombers or cruise missile forces 
to concentrate minds in Washington. At first, bombers were 
simply omitted from U.S. proposals; then, in response to 
Soviet criticisms, they were included under separate but 
unequal ceilings; still later, they were integrated into a 
common ceiling with ballistic missiles.®^ For their part, 
the Soviets consistently sought bomber limits as a way to 
curtail U.S. numerical advantages, but were unwilling to 
concede their advantages in ICBM launchers to obtain this 
result. Finally, after May 1971, bomber and cruise missile 
limits simply were cast aside in the switch to an interim 
approach. This de facto exclusion was almost certainly a 
great relief for the United States. Beyond staving off 
Soviet FBS demands, it enabled U.S. officials to claim their 
own form of compensation for Soviet missile advantages; and,
Bombers were omitted in the "Illustrative 
Elements" tabled by the United States in the first Helsinki 
meeting, see Smith, Doubletalk, pp. 88-90; the approach of 
common ceilings for ballistic missile launchers and bombers 
was authorized in the policy review of July 1970, see Nixon, 
NSDM 69, p. 1.
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notably, it relieved Washington of having to explain why 
aircraft should be included in offensive arms control while 
air defenses under the ABM Treaty were allowed to run free.
In SALT II, aerodynamic weapons quickly moved to the 
forefront of scope problems after the 1974 Vladivostok 
accord. Both sides were now agreed in principle to bomber 
inclusion; the contentious issue was whether the Soviet 
Backfire should be counted among them. The Backfire became 
operational in 1974. By 1979, when SALT II was completed, 
about 200 of them had entered into service, the force being 
split equally among Soviet Long Range Aviation and Naval 
Aviation; another 130 or so have been added to the Soviet 
order-of-battle since then.®® The Backfire raised all of the 
hoary scope problems associated with bomber weapons. With an 
operating radius somewhat in excess of 4,000 km, it was 
always regarded by Western intelligence as a medium-range, 
peripheral attack aircraft —  to be used against targets in 
Asia, Europe, and surrounding maritime regions —  not a 
strategic bomber.®’ Nonetheless, Backfire was deemed to have 
some marginal intercontinental capability against U.S.
®® According to the IISS, Backfire totals as of 1988 
include some 358 aircraft, of which 178 are assigned to 
long-range aviation and 180 are assigned to naval aviation 
IISS, Military Balance. 1988-1989 (London: IISS, 1988), p. 
217.
®’ By comparison, B-1 and Blackjack bombers have a 
combat radius of about 7,000 km while B-52s have a combat 
radius about 8,000 kilometers. See U.S. Department of 
Defense, Soviet Military Power. 1987, p. 36.
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targets if operated from Soviet arctic bases and flown 
subsonically at high altitudes and recovered in a third 
country, presumably Cuba. With in-flight refueling, for 
which it was equipped. Backfire was presumed capable of 
two-way missions. In recent years, its prominence as a 
modern long-range bomber has been offset somewhat by new 
deployments of ALCM-equipped Bear H bombers and the even 
newer Blackjack bomber, both clearly optimized for 
intercontinental strike missions.
Conceptually, three options for handling Backfire were 
possible; all had drawbacks. First, the force could have 
been counted in SALT II's aggregate, either in toto or, as 
some in the Ford Administration favored, above a "set-aside" 
figure that might roughly balance the U.S. FB-111 force, 
also excluded from SALT. Politically, however, it seemed 
scarcely believable that the Soviets would cave in on any 
form of inclusion after having conceded FBS at Vladivostok. 
Second, Backfire could have been charged against a separate 
limit. Various "off-budget" formulae were considered in 
Washington during 1975-76 and raised with Moscow. The basic 
idea was to deal with Backfire outside the SALT aggregate, 
where it would not squeeze out other strategic weapons, and 
to balance it against comparable numbers of U.S. long-range 
cruise missiles. Not only would this provide some limits on
See comments by Walter Slocombe in U.S. Congress, 
The SALT II Treatv. Report of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, p. 180.
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Backfire, it would legitimize limited cruise missile 
deployments, something which the Soviets were intent on 
banning. For precisely this reason, of course, the Soviets 
were not enthusiastic about the option, though Brezhnev was 
careful not to reject the idea outright during Kissinger's 
visit to Moscow in January 1976.’^
A third option was to exclude Backfire from the SALT 
count provided there was agreement on upgrade-like 
constraints on its ability to perform in strategic roles. 
This approach gained favor with the Carter White House and 
Pentagon civilians after March 1 9 7 7 Initially, the most 
durable constraint in this category was thought to be a ban 
on the basing of Backfire at air fields in the far north of 
the Soviet Union. But the Soviets objected to this on 
sovereignty grounds, and some U.S. experts worried about 
unwanted reciprocal implications, so the idea was
According to Garthoff, a Backfire/SLCM/FB-111 
package was proposed to Brezhnev in a letter from Ford in 
the Fall of 1975. This proposal, worked out by Kissinger and 
Schlesinger, provided for a separate ceiling of 3 00 for each 
side under which any combination of SLCM and Backfire (for 
the USSR) or SLCM and FB-111 (for the U.S.) could have been 
deployed. Brezhnev rejected it. See Detente and 
Confrontation. p. 451. However, a slightly modified version 
of this idea, involving a U.S. commitment to limit 
deployments of SLCM to surface ships, was proposed to 
Brezhnev during Kissinger's visit to Moscow several months 
later. According to Hyland, Brezhnev said he would think 
about it. However, the U.S. plan was withdrawn when the Navy 
objected. See Hyland, Mortal Rivals, pp. 160-161.
Although favored by the Carter Administration, the 
idea was actually first floated by U.S. ambassador U. Alexis 
Johnson and his team in Geneva. See Johnson, The Right Hand 
of Power, pp. 614-615.
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subsequently dropped. In the end, the best that U.S. 
negotiators could obtain was Soviet agreement to count 
Backfire in SALT if it were ever equipped with long-range 
ALCMs (analogous to the Golf modernization provision); not 
to give Backfire the capability to operate at 
intercontinental distances; not to increase its combat 
radius through in-flight refueling or related measures; and 
not to exceed its then-current production rate, a figure 
that Brezhnev fixed at 30 per year, through 1985.’^  Harold 
Brown underscored the production constraint as the most 
useful of these steps: "The Backfire production restriction 
means that the Soviets now will not be able to divert 
Backfires to a strategic role —  where they would add only 
marginally anyway —  without greatly reducing Soviet 
capability for the naval and regional missions to which 
Backfires are normally a s s i g n e d . T h e  idea of forcing 
operational trade-offs through negotiated controls, somewhat 
akin to the justification given for the "new-types" rule in 
SALT modernization, did in fact exploit an important dilemma 
for Soviet breakout choices; but, alas, it was not one to 
which worst-case analysis was likely to lend much credence.
See Backfire statement in U.S. Department of 
State, SALT II Agreement, p. 58. Carter also made a 
statement for the record that the United States reserved the 
right to match Backfire if necessary by building a 
comparable aircraft.
U.S. Congress, Military Implications of the Treatv 
on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons. Part 1, p. 
18.
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The treatment of Backfire was deemed inadequate by anti-SALT 
critics, and U.S. proposals during the 1980s consistently 
called for its inclusion in the START framework. It remains 
a sticking point to this day.
Just as Backfire represented the quintessential scope 
problem with circumventing effects, the converse problem —  
unduly constraining the non-strategic applications of 
strategic systems —  was best illustrated in the area of 
bomber limitations more generally. Since the mid-1970s, both 
sides have sought ways to exclude from strategic agreements 
aircraft having the same basic airframe as strategic (or, in 
SALT parlance, "heavy") bombers but with applications in 
reconnaissance, airborne refueling, ASW, and conventional 
warfare. For example, the newer Soviet Tu-95 Bear H bombers 
which carry ALCMs have variants which are also used for 
reconnaissance and ASW; the Soviet Myr-4 Bison bomber has a 
tanker varient; and portions of the U.S. B-52 fleet have 
been converted for shorter-range conventional warfare 
missions. There have also been concerns that one side or the 
other might use airframe designs of non-strategic aircraft 
(or even non-military aircraft) as the basis for fielding a 
fleet of dedicated cruise missile carriers.
In the talks on conventional forces in Europe (CEE), 
the USSR agreed to include medium-range bombers, including 
Backfire, but has resisted including those versions of the 
bomber which are earmarked for maritime missions on the 
grounds that the U.S. wishes to exclude its carrier-based 
aircraft.
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Though technically complex, the negotiations on 
strategic bomber exclusions brought into play a more 
balanced set of incentives than was possible in the Backfire 
case, no doubt for the simple reason that this problem 
genuinely was seen as two-sided in nature and hence both 
sides had a stake in finding some common ground. SALT II 
provided the venue for working out definitional wrangles. 
"Bombers" were defined as aircraft initially constructed or 
converted for the delivery of bombs and missiles. This 
deliberately broad formulation encompassed not only carriers 
of cruise and ballistic missiles as well as gravity weapons, 
but also airframes designed for other uses (e.g., wide­
bodied civilian aircraft) and later shifted to a bomber 
application, either prior to construction or afterwards 
through conversion procedures.The sticking point was the 
inherent difficulty of attempting to distinguish "heavy" 
bombers as a sub-class based on any sort of technical 
criteria (e.g., weight, payload, wing-span, range). Both 
sides in fact did not even attempt to do so and instead 
simply identified current types deemed to be heavy bombers. 
Regarding future types, both agreed to include any aircraft 
capable of operating in a "manner similar or superior to" 
those identified as current types, and they charged the SCC
SALT II*s bomber definition actually includes only 
"initially constructed" aircraft in Article II, para. 3, but 
treats aircraft converted to bomber roles in Article VIII, 
para. 1.
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with the responsibility of developing some kind of 
individuating procedure.’^
Finally, as if to cast the net still wider, both sides 
agreed to count "mothballed" strategic bombers in SALT II's 
aggregate. The effect of this was to include large numbers 
of aircraft, especially older B-52 models on the U.S. side, 
which were not operational and in some cases were even being 
cannibalized for spare parts. This provision drew much 
opprobrium from critics who saw no logic in counting these 
weapons while excluding Backfire. However, this arrangement 
was sought deliberately by the United States, for reasons 
that ran precisely opposite from the Golf class exclusions 
seen in SALT I. The idea here was to preclude a situation in 
which the Soviets could exceed the aggregate for bombers by 
arbitrarily declaring old ones to be "non-operational," and 
hence exempted, even though they could be brought back into 
service on short notice. Since Golfs posed no serious risk 
of circumvention they could be safely excluded and thus 
disqualified from serving as trade-ins for legal 
replacements. This situation was quite different. Not only 
was the circumvention scenario a more realistic one, but 
there was a tangible benefit for the United States in 
holding old bombers as trade-ins for modern penetrating 
bombers or cruise missile carriers. The most sensible choice 
for U.S. negotiators in this case was clearly inclusion.
Article II, para. 3b, SALT II Treaty.
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In various respects, then, the boundary lines for heavy 
bombers were widely drawn. Having deliberately erred on the 
side of inclusion, however, both sides went on to apply the 
FROD concept as a means to obtain their sought-after 
exclusions. We noted in the last chapter how FRODs were used 
to distinguish between ALCM and non-ALCM equipped aircraft 
within different sublimits of the SALT aggregate; here, the 
same principle was applied to overall exclusions —  i.e., 
aircraft with the design characteristics of heavy bombers 
could only be excluded if they displayed FRODs indicating 
their inability to operate as heavy bombers. Accordingly, 
Soviet Bear reconnaissance aircraft based on the Tu-95 
bomber design could be excluded because they lacked bomb-bay 
doors. Or, tanker or transport variants of a future cruise 
missile carrier could be exempted if they lacked a 
specialized hatch for releasing ALCMs.’® Used in this 
fashion, FRODs were a practical split-the-difference 
solution that had eluded both sides in the ABM Treaty 
negotiations. Applied to LPARs, for example, a possible 
FROD-like criterion for space-tracking facilities would have 
been a requirement to assure a high elevation angle for the
’® The FROD rule is spelled-out in the first common 
understanding attached to Article 11, para. 3, the SALT 11 
Treaty. With respect to certain existing aircraft, where 
FROD-like distinctions were not really an option, both sides 
simply agreed to differentiate on the basis of externally 
observable differences. For a discussion of the issue, see 
Vance analysis in U.S. Department of State, SALT 11 
Agreement, p. 13.
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radar face so that its early warning capability would be 
stunted. This was not done, however, and the Krasnoyarsk 
radar revealed the magnitude of the error.
To be sure, the FROD concept has come in for its share 
of criticism, at least as applied to aerodynamic systems. 
Critics attacked the treatment of bombers in SALT II, 
charging that scope boundaries were too vague and that it 
was risky to delegate future determinations on 
inclusion/exclusion to the SCC. Technically-informed 
analysis has shown that many design attributes normally 
cited for their utility as FRODs could be altered or 
obscured fairly quickly.^ On the other hand, no one has 
claimed that bomber-specific FRODs were ever intended to be 
fail-safe insurance against breakout. Rather, they were 
justified mainly as serving the lesser goal of being useful 
accounting tools in drawing principled and verifiable 
distinctions between variants of the same aircraft.
Arguably, had either side really feared bomber breakout in 
the context of limitations on prompt, accurate ballistic 
missile weapons, it is very likely that the pressures not to 
grant FROD-based exclusions for bombers would have been much 
greater. In fact, however, with one minor exception, FRODs 
were not a focal point for compliance disputes during the
^  See, for example. Dean A. Wilkening, "Monitoring 
Bombers and Cruise Missiles," in Potter, ed., Verification 
and Arms Control, pp. 110-111.
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1980s.
Clearly, the more significant question —  which both 
sides face in START —  is whether there are limits beyond 
which FRODs simply cannot be effective even as an accounting 
tool. The START negotiations have validated the FROD 
principle and even have sought to extend it further. At the 
June 1988 Reagan-Gorbachev summit, agreement was reached on 
the idea of allowing conversions, through agreed procedures, 
of nuclear-armed heavy bombers to excluded categories of 
reconnaissance, tanker, and jamming a i r c r a f t . I n  addition, 
mainly at U.S. urging, both sides have sought ways to 
exclude from START heavy bombers equipped only with 
non-nuclear ordnance, even though it would appear that such 
differences (e.g., internal weapons carriage, wiring, etc.) 
would be too finegrained as FRODs except perhaps on a 
temporary basis, and then only with extremely intrusive 
forms of inspection. In SALT, a strategic bomber was 
included whether or not it actually carried nuclear weapons. 
Again, if both sides did not see the benefits of operational 
flexibility as greatly outweighing any risk of
U.S. and Soviet inabilities to finalize 
procedures for converting Soviet Bison bombers to tanker 
aircraft resulted in the United States charging that the 
Soviets had undercut SALT II commitments by exceeding their 
current aggregate limit on strategic delivery vehicles. See 
discussion in Duffy, et al.. Compliance and the Future of 
Arms Control. pp. 41-42.
See "Fact Sheet on ALCMs," Text released by U.S. 
delegation at the Moscow summit, reprinted in the Arms 
Control Reporter. June 1988, p. 611.D.78.
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circumvention, it is hard to imagine that either would be 
prepared to carry the FROD concept this farJ°^
With respect to cruise missiles —  the other type of 
aerodynamic weaponry —  scope negotiations have been plagued 
by asymmetrical and conflicting incentives. Since the 
mid-1970s, the Soviet Union has sought the inclusion of 
"long-range" cruise missiles within strategic agreements, 
most often in the extreme form of zero-level limitations on 
vehicles above a certain range. (A floor threshold of 600 
kilometers, to which both sides agreed after the Vladivostok 
summit, had the effect of excluding tactical air- and 
sea-launched cruise missiles on both sides.) There was 
nothing very mysterious about the motivations underlying the 
Soviet position: not only have cruise missiles fared poorly 
relative to fast-flying ballistic missiles in Soviet 
offensive planning priorities, but in U.S. hands they have 
been seen as a major complication for Soviet air defense 
forces. The small size of cruise missile airframes and their 
zig-zag flight patterns make them extremely difficult to 
pick up on radar, and their high accuracy gives them great 
flexibility against a wide array of potential targets. For 
precisely these reasons, of course, U.S. planners have been 
loath to forfeit various cruise missile options, especially
Indeed, U.S. representatives reportedly have been 
skeptical on the utility of FRODs for this kind of 
differentiation. See Gordon, "The Moscow Summit," 
Disarmament, p. 131.
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given their potential utility in theater warfare, in 
substituting for high-cost piloted combat aircraft, and in 
extending the useful life of the U.S. bomber force.
American and Soviet interests were not always this 
conflicted. In SALT I, cruise missiles were excluded 
arbitrarily along with aircraft after the May 1971 accord.
In the early phases of SALT II, U.S. negotiators raised the 
idea of banning cruise missiles of "intercontinental range" 
altogether if the Soviets agreed to accept equal 
a g g r e g a t e s . A t  the time, this was not a very painful offer 
because Washington had no plans to invest heavily in 
long-range cruise missiles. Indeed, to give the proposal an 
aura of plausibility, Kissinger interceded with Pentagon 
officials in an effort to thwart cancellation of cruise 
missile development plans, in particular the ALCM program.
As a force enhancement to the B-52 fleet, the ALCM was not 
much beloved in the U.S. Air Force; many regarded it as a 
competitor for funding with the new B-1 bomber.However, 
as is well known, Kissinger's ploy succeeded all too well, 
for he was unable to play this bargaining chip when the 
Pentagon blocked his proposal to limit sea-launched cruise 
missiles in return for Backfire. From that point, events 
conspired to make cruise missile development a high priority 
for U.S. defense programming. The Carter Administration's
Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, p. 588.
See Kissinger's account. Years of Upheaval, p. 273
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1977 decision to cancel the B-1 in favor of an expanded ALCM 
program, the 1979 NATO decision to deploy GLCMs and Pershing 
Ils in Europe, and, finally, the Reagan Administration's 
strong support for SLCM in 1981, all underscored the growing 
importance of the weapon.
In a situation of diametrically opposed interests, any 
impulse toward compromise in a bargaining situation would 
almost certainly favor a middle ground position, in effect 
to include long-range cruise missiles but within fairly 
permissive limits. Methodologically, however, the 
development of inclusion/exclusion criteria for cruise 
missiles has been slow; and split-the-difference solutions 
have not always been practical. Initially there did not 
appear to be a viable intermediate point between allowing 
ALCMs, GLCMs, and SLCMs to run free or comprehensively 
banning them above a range floor. In the wake of 
Vladivostok, the Soviets insisted that each ALCM deployed on 
bombers should be counted against the 2,400 ceiling on 
strategic delivery vehicles. U.S. officials thought the
The range "floor" initially was set at 600 km (372 
miles) at Vladivostok. This had the effect of excluding 
older Soviet SLCMs, such as the SS-N-12, as well as older 
ALCMs, which were mainly tactical and anti-ship systems. 
Comparable U.S. systems, like the air-launched Hound Dog 
cruise missile and the newer U.S. SLCM, the Harpoon, were 
also excluded. Ambiguities surrounding the status of the 
Soviet weapons spurred the interest of skeptics during the 
U.S. ratification hearings but did not figure prominently in 
the debate. See U.S. clarifications on Soviet weapons, U.S. 
Congress, Militarv Implications of the Treatv on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II). Part 2, 
pp. 498-499.
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terms of this inclusion were ludicrous —  effectively 
equating individual ALCMs with highly-MIRVed ballistic 
missiles —  and they argued that ALCM was just another type 
of bomber ordnance, like bombs or short-range attack 
missiles. Kissinger came up with the idea of putting 
ALCM-equipped bombers (not the missiles themselves) into the 
MIRV sublimits and of limiting the range of ALCMs to 2,500 
kilometers. The Carter Administration, as noted previously, 
latched on to this "fractionated bomber" approach to ALCM 
limits and secured Gromyko's agreement in 1977. Washington, 
however, changed its mind on the proposed limit on maximum 
range at the urging of Pentagon officials, who felt that it 
would be difficult to verify and would pose major 
constraints on the ability of U.S. bombers to penetrate 
Soviet air defenses.^* The Soviets accepted this in return 
for U.S. concessions on other matters.
As it turned out, cruise missile range has proved to be 
a less nettlesome scope problem than payload. In negotiating 
the terms of inclusion, both sides have had to decide 
whether the cruise missile definition should be formulated 
in generic terms —  as any pilotless, aerodynamic vehicle —  
or whether it should encompass only weapon-delivery systems, 
or whether indeed it should be restricted to solely 
nuclear-armed weapons. The Soviets had no problem excluding
See comments of Gen. David Jones, ibid. . Part 1, 
p. 274; and discussion in Talbott, Endgame, pp. 184-185.
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unarmed reconnaissance vehicles and target drones (called 
RPVs, or remotely piloted vehicles), and agreed on a 
FROD-based exemption for RPVs along with a commitment not to 
convert them for weapons delivery. However, they insisted on 
coverage for all long-range "armed" cruise missiles 
regardless of armament type.
This did not sit well in Washington. There were strong 
pressures in Congress and NATO to exempt
conventionally-armed cruise missiles lest SALT hamper non­
nuclear force improvement programs in the alliance. What 
eventually prompted U.S. officials to relax this demand and 
to accept essentially a modified split-the-difference 
solution (i.e., to exclude drones but include 
conventionally-armed weapons) was a concern that any 
exemption pegged to armament type might offer the Soviets a 
way to circumvent ALCM limits by upgrading non-strategic 
aircraft with convertible long-range cruise missiles.
Thus, from the U.S. perspective, the risks of circumvention 
outweighed the benefits of operational flexibility, at least 
with ALCMs. The degree of flexibility to be forfeited was 
very slight in any event, for the Soviets finally agreed to 
deal with GLCMs and SLCMs in a protocol to SALT II that 
imposed no limits on U.S. programs after 1981.
NATO's decision to proceed with land-based missile 
deployment had the effect of sweeping GLCMs out of the
Talbott, ibid. . pp. 224-225.
387
strategic arena and into the INF talks. Even so, as the 
prospects for reaching agreement on INF increased during the 
mid-1980s, the scope choices and solutions that emerged were 
roughly comparable to those in SALT I I . A g a i n ,  both sides 
agreed to exclude RPVs while including conventionally-armed 
GLCMs. The fact that INF systems were to be banned entirely 
made the choice of including conventional GLCMs a focal 
point for some criticism.^** In defending its choice, the 
Reagan Administration stressed that it had no plans to 
deploy conventionally-armed GLCMs in any event, and that 
exclusion would have adversely affected the conventional 
balance and given the Soviets a loophole for maintaining a 
nuclear GLCM option under the guise of a conventional 
p r o g r a m . T o  compensate somewhat for this decision, U.S. 
negotiators sought provisions in START to safeguard the 
option of deploying conventional or shorter-range 
nuclear-armed ALCMs for theater use outside the START
With one slight variation: the range "floor" in 
the INF Treaty is not 600 but 500 kilometers.
See, for example, criticisms of a study group 
chaired by Frank Gaffney and Richard Perle, 
"Article-by-Article Review of the INF Treaty," AEI 
Occasional Papers (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute, February 1988), p. 2.
See comments by Ambassador Max Kampelman in 
"Administration's comments on Senate Armed Services Report," 
contained in U.S. Congress, Report of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, The INF Treatv. 100th Congress, 2nd 
sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1988), p. 510. It is also 
worth noting that Ambassador Maynard Glitman stated (p. 60) 
that the United States could distinguish between GLCMs which 
were drones and those configured for weapons delivery.
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agreement.
Undoubtedly, SLCMs have presented the most difficult 
problems with respect to payload-based scope determinations. 
Until the Reykjavik summit, when both sides agreed on the 
need to deal with SLCMs in some fashion, albeit outside the 
formal structure of START, the United States assiduously had 
sought to exclude SLCMs from the negotiating scene 
altogether. The U.S. line of reasoning was that verifiable 
distinctions between the nuclear and conventional versions 
of the U.S. Tomahawk SLCM and comparable Soviet systems were 
not possible but that —  unlike the INF Treaty —  
conventional weapons in principle ought not to be addressed 
in START. From the U.S. perspective, the conventional SLCM 
option has always been a real one; whereas 
conventionally-armed ALCMs and GLCMs were never high 
priorities, most of the U.S. long-range SLCMs already 
deployed are conventionally-armed, and well over 
three-fourths of the Navy's total planned buy of 4,000 SLCMs 
are earmarked for conventional anti-ship and land-attack 
missions. Correspondingly, the idea of suppressing
*
conventional SLCMs in order to thwart a potential 
circumvention risk has not hitherto been very persuasive for 
the United States because current and near-term Soviet
For example, in START, the United States sought to 
exclude ALCMs of any type below a range of 1,500 km, rather 
than the old threshold of 600 km. See Gordon, "The Moscow 
Summit," p. 130. Subsequently, this range was dropped to 
1,000 kilometers.
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systems —  the SS-N-21 and the larger SS-NX-24 —  are 
believed to be nuclear-only w e a p o n s . F o r  these reasons 
U.S. officials have sought to deflect any comparisons 
between the SALT and INF treaty outcomes and possible 
outcomes for SLCMs in START. During the INF Treaty 
ratification hearings, then Secretary of Defense Frank 
Carlucci exhorted Congress to "resist the demands of logic, 
at least in this stage of negotiations" with respect to 
SLCM.”^
Yet, it is hard to imagine how serious conflict between 
the imperative of flexibility, on the one hand, and the 
concern over treaty circumvention, on the other, can be 
avoided over the long-term. Under the phase 1 START 
agreement, the United States has proposed that both sides 
issue "politically-binding" (i.e., not to be ratified) 
declarations on projected nuclear SLCM deployments over a 
five year period. The numbers are to be updated annually; no 
verification is required. This approach builds a modest 
degree of transparency into SLCM deployments but represents 
a deferral of hard choices for the future. Pressures for 
limits of some form are likely to grow. Open-ended 
exclusions for nuclear SLCM in the context of deep cuts 
elsewhere are bound to be seen as a circumvention problem in
"U.S. and Soviet SLCM Programs," in Arms Control 
Todav, Vol. 19, No. 3 (April 1989), p. 12.
U.S. Congress, The INF Treatv. p. 70.
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its own right, even if R&D on newer generation systems is 
cut back as a result of unilateral restraint on each side. 
The USSR sees the current U.S. SLCM program as a surprise 
attack threat that it cannot fully counter with early- 
warning systems or anti-submarine m e a s u r e s . A n d  in time, 
with more advanced SLCMs deployed on both sides, strategic 
planners might regard the SLCM even more seriously than 
today.
Nevertheless, the terms of SLCM inclusion —  either in 
START or in a naval nuclear arms control negotiation (which 
the USSR has proposed in the face of stiff U.S. objection) - 
- remain difficult to identify. Open-ended inclusion of all 
SLCMs would almost certainly require offsetting steps to 
dampen the adverse effects on operational flexibility, 
probably in the form of very high aggregate ceilings or 
elaborate schemes for segregating nuclear- and 
conventionally-armed weapons on different platforms.
Clearly, however, very high ceilings would make a mockery of 
the whole idea of restraint; and any sublimit focused 
exclusively on nuclear SLCM would raise again all the 
daunting problems of distinguishing between nuclear and 
conventionally-armed SLCMs and of precluding covert 
upgrading through conversions. As for some kind of split-
Thus, Shevardnadze said "the easiest way to launch a 
surprise attack is from the sea." Paul Lewis, "Moscow Urges 
Sharing of Naval Data," The New York Times. February 13, 
1990, p. AlO.
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the-difference approach, such a regime, even with very 
intrusive inspections, would not provide much breakout 
insurance in the presence of unlimited numbers of 
conventional SLCMs that have any dual-capability at all. 
What is more, if the convertibility option really were only 
available to the United States, it is hard to see the 
Soviets accepting such an asymmetrical outcome.
Ultimately, the minimum price for excluding 
conventional SLCMs from strategic arms reductions may be to 
ban nuclear SLCM entirely. In a somewhat different context 
the SS-16 missile was banned as a minimum condition for 
verifiably excluding SS-2 0 launch systems from the SALT II 
ceilings. Such a step would, in effect, concede that 
nuclear-armed land-attack SLCMs are less uniquely important 
to U.S. security than the flexibility that conventional 
SLCMs offer in anti-ship and related naval warfare mission 
areas, and that a ban would be the surest way of preventing 
future generations of conventional SLCMs from providing a 
base for ready convertibility. Even here, though, intrusive 
forms of verification at airframe production and warhead- 
mating facilities and ports would probably be required to 
assure a "clean" (i.e., non-nuclear) logistics flow, and 
occasional ship-board inspections may be needed to verify
This would be the case even if conversion of 
conventionally-armed SLCMs to nuclear status could not take 
place on board ships at sea; sea-borne loading of covert 
stocks could not be ruled out.
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the absence of any nuclear SLCMs introduced surreptitiously 
from covert stocks or production.^*
Ironically, operational exigencies may exert a stronger 
constraining effect on the surreptitious conversion of 
conventional SLCMs than legally-binding treaty commitments 
ever could. Most SLCM-specific cheating scenarios overlook 
the conflicting pressures which weigh upon planners in a 
situation of deep crisis or war. In a very fundamental 
sense, dual-capability is a two-edged sword in the maritime 
domain. To convert large numbers of conventionally-armed 
SLCMs to nuclear status is by definition to impose penalties 
on the anti-ship, anti-submarine, and conventional 
land-attack capabilities of those vessels carrying the 
weapons. Facing a risk of war at sea, fleet commanders would 
be loath to replace or convert ordnance which is essential 
for these primary missions in order to put land targets at 
risk with nuclear weapons. Armament trade-offs are 
particularly acute on board attack submarines, which pose 
the greatest threat of undetected SLCM attack on land 
targets. None of this is to say that loosely verifiable 
scope provisions are more acceptable for SLCMs than for 
other types of weapons. However, the conventional-to-nuclear 
SLCM "upgrade" threat under most plausible scenarios is
For useful discussion, see a Working paper of the 
Center for International Security and Arms Control, 
Potential Verification Provisions for Lona-Ranae. 
Nuclear-Armed Sea Launched Cruise Missiles, Stanford 
University, July, 1988.
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probably overstated due to operational constraints.
SUMMING UP
Scope issues clearly have become more difficult and 
numerous in the years from SALT to START. In particular, 
aerodynamic and defensive weapons especially have become 
lightning rods for disagreement, because of the widening 
reach of negotiations generally (e.g., INF weapons), because 
of technological innovation which enables new weapons to 
reach across traditionally separate mission areas, and 
because the prospect of major nuclear reductions has 
heightened incentives to protect non-strategic capability 
through liberal exclusions. Each of the major scope issues 
discussed here —  non-ABM defensive weapons, radars, SLBMs, 
bombers, cruise missiles —  involved quite different 
problems of individuation. Yet all shared something in 
common from the bargaining standpoint: they each brought 
into play one party's desires to suppress real or perceived 
circumvention options available to the other side at minimum 
cost to its own flexibility. This probably is a natural 
impulse in any two-sided bargaining situation.
Even so, rules governing exclusion/inclusion criteria 
are not immune to the law of symmetrical outcomes: namely, 
that to preclude circumvention by one's negotiating partner 
one must accept constraints on one's own freedom of action; 
and, conversely, to maintain operational flexibility one
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must be willing to cede a corresponding degree of 
flexibility to the other side. Both sides understood the 
structure of these trade-offs in a general sense; and each 
was forced to undertake cost/benefit calculations in 
assigning values to these competing priorities. In 
retrospect, one can see that the degree of conflict or 
compatibility between each side's net assessment influenced, 
for better or worse, the bargaining outcomes in a major way.
In cases where preference orderings generally were 
compatible, the outcomes were both predictable and 
achievable. FROD-based exemptions for heavy bombers, for 
example, were a logical consequence of the facts that both 
employed such aircraft for non-strategic missions, both 
wanted the flexibility to continue to do so, and both seemed 
to give greater weight to the benefits of this flexibility 
than to plausible circumvention risks. Likewise, a 
split-the-difference outcome for large radar stations 
reflected compatible preferences. Each side had great 
incentive to improve its own early-warning, space-tracking, 
and NTM systems and at the same time to suppress the other 
side's ability to construct ABM battle management radars. 
Here, the circumvention risks were greater but were thought 
to be manageable in the context of locational and other 
constraints.
By the same token, in cases where one party's desire 
for flexibility offered no real payoff to the other party or
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—  even worse —  carried with it serious circumvention 
implications, bargaining incentives then were no longer 
congruent. The SAM upgrade taboos in the ABM Treaty and the 
treatment of Backfire in the SALT II Treaty were inherently 
hard to negotiate in large part because it was clearly the 
Soviet Union at which those constraints were directed. The 
Soviets had little incentive to cede flexibility because 
they faced no circumvention risk in failing to do so; the 
United States was not going to field thousands of SAMs and 
was not prepared to negotiate limits on its FBS in any 
event. The same kind of calculation has been seen on the 
U.S. side with SLCMs. The inclusion of conventionally-armed 
SLCMs in strategic controls has been anathema to the United 
States given its growing reliance upon SLCMs for non­
nuclear anti-ship and power projection capability. In its 
view, the benefits of including SLCMs (which some argue are 
substantial) thus far have paled in comparison to the 
tangible, immediate burdens on flexibility. Overall, the 
consequence of asymmetrical incentives has not been to 
preclude agreed outcomes but to trigger attempts at complex 
bargaining compromises involving trade-offs in other areas 
(for example, including ALCMs in SALT II and START, as the
Such a perception is not immutable. There are 
those who regard the Soviet land-attack SLCM threat as 
potentially a very serious one. See discussion in Rose E. 
Gottemoeller, "Finding Solutions to SLCM Arms Control 
Problems," International Securitv. Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 
1988/89), pp. 177-179; and in the same issue, Theodore 
Postol, "Banning Nuclear SLCMs," pp. 193-198.
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Soviets demanded, but within a framework of heavy bomber 
limitations substantially on U.S. terms).
From the compliance standpoint, some scope rules did 
work smoothly. The exclusions granted to short-range SLBMs 
were on the whole sensible and produced the sought-after 
effects. The use of FRODs for distinguishing among types of 
bombers to date has worked without serious problems. But 
other rules crafted to enforce a given outcome were not 
necessarily adequate to the task. As illustrated by the 
radar controversies, certain exemptions built into the ABM 
Treaty were vague and prone to overbroad interpretations.
The rules governing "testing in an ABM mode" required much 
greater refinement and clarification to be effective with 
respect to traditional SAM systems, not to mention exotic 
technologies that present ongoing challenges. And even when 
the direct effects of a particular scope choice were 
understood, in some cases they triggered unwelcome 
compensating steps by one side or the other to offset a loss 
of flexibility.
The treatment of variable-range SS-lls in SALT I 
is a prime example. As coverage of European and Asian 
targets provided by SS-lls was gradually reduced as a 
consequence of their being traded-in for newer, dedicated 
ICBMs, the Soviets sought to recoup these targets by 
fielding a new system that would not fall into SALT quotas. 
The SS-20 fit this requirement. Although it was hardly an 
unprecedented development, given that medium range SS- 4s 
and SS-5s had performed this mission prior to the SS-11, the 
SALT I outcome did contribute to the SS-20 decision. For two 
different views, see comments of Perle and Garthoff, in U.S. 
Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on 
Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1984. 98th 
Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1983), pp.
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On the other hand, when compliance problems occurred, 
the results were sometimes salutary. The III-X command and 
control silos set an important standard of proof for 
claiming exclusions. Negotiating a common definition of 
"testing in an ABM mode" along with notification procedures 
helped to clarify permitted activity. Even the Krasnoyarsk 
radar issue, though now defused on the basis of a Soviet 
admission of culpability, has created pressure to address 
radar problems in a more systematic way.
In terms of methodology, the patterns of continuity and 
change observed in inclusion, exclusion, and split-the- 
difference choices have varied according to the tvpe of 
criteria employed. With respect to offensive forces, scope 
choices pegged to a range criterion have been carried over 
with modest innovation in the areas of land-based ballistic 
missiles and long-range cruise missiles.^* The INF Treaty 
will have a positive buttressing effect on strategic missile 
agreements by eliminating the SS-20 and follow-on systems 
which fall just beneath the range "floor." There also has 
been a high degree of carry-over in SLBM limitations, where 
choices have been pegged both to platform type (i.e..
275, 341-342.
For ICBMs, that floor is 5,500 km, and for cruise 
missiles, it has been 600 km pending an upward adjustment in 
START to 1,000 kilometers. Note that use of a range 
"ceiling" to differentiate between limited and banned 
systems —  as proposed by the United States in the late 
1970s —  never caught on.
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nuclear-powered) and the time of deployment (i.e., "modern" 
in the sense that the initial flight-test occurred after 
1965). START is not likely to depart substantially from 
these definitional precedents. As for criteria pegged to 
payload-type, the choice of defining cruise missiles as 
"weapon delivery" systems —  in effect, excluding RPVs and 
including conventionally-armed weapons —  was carried over 
from ALCMs in SALT to GLCMs in the INF Treaty. Finally, 
although the rather anomalous approach of pegging bomber 
inclusion/exclusion to specified types of "baseline" 
aircraft (e.g., the B-1, Tu-95, etc.) may well be 
carried-over for lack of a better alternative, the practice 
of granting FROD-based exemptions to aircraft may become 
harder to sustain as bomber forces become more stealthy and 
begin to carry a much larger proportion of each side's 
strategic offensive striking power.
On the defensive side the balance between continuity 
and change has yet to be determined because the regime 
essentially has been static since 1972. It is clear that the 
ABM Treaty's scope rules are under increasing technological 
and political pressures. In the wake of controversies over 
early-warning radars, the split-the-difference approach 
based on locational criteria which characterized LPAR 
limitations might still be sustained; but mission-specific 
exemptions for space-tracking, etc., will need to be 
clarified to avoid abuses in the future, and more direct
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forms of limitation are also possible. It may be difficult 
to sustain qualified exclusions for ATBMs, SAMs, and ASATs 
if new sensing technologies make future generations of these 
non-ABM systems more inherently ABM-capable without 
dedicated testing, or if continuation of exclusions offer a 
way to circumvent the central prohibitions by testing exotic 
ABMs under the guise of ASATs or other systems. Just what 
kind of alternate criteria might be employed to clarify and 
strengthen the scope of the ABM Treaty remains unclear, 
especially when both sides cannot agree on what kinds of ABM 
limitations, if any, will further mutual security.
In the final analysis there are no perfect solutions in 
reconciling the conflicting imperatives of flexibility and 
circumvention control. One can see in the progression of 
diplomacy discussed here the emergence of two operative 
principles for scope rule methodology. The first principle 
is to err on the side of inclusion unless sought-after 
exclusions could be verifiably justified by the side making 
the claim. Thus, we have seen growing reliance on FROD-like 
requirements in a range of cases, from heavy bombers, to 
command and control silos, to variable-range ballistic 
missiles. The second principle is that exclusions usuallv 
are not open-ended but come with "strings attached." The 
provisions on testing in an ABM mode, the SS-16 ban, and the 
collateral limits on Backfire and on older SLBMs all 
exemplify this principle in different ways.
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Neither principle assures that the rules will be 
perfectly crafted or applied intelligently; both simply 
illustrate the natural impulse to hedge bets when facing 
tough choices on how narrowly or widely to cast the net of 
agreed limitations.
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7.
THE EMERGING VERIFICATION REGIME
Treaty verification —  historically a vexatious issue 
in Soviet-American negotiations —  has become a dramatic 
symbol of progress in recent years. Under the banner of 
alasnost. U.S. and Soviet personnel have observed each 
other's military maneuvers, witnessed the elimination of INF 
missiles, inspected dozens of missile support and basing 
facilities, and visited areas of compliance concern, such as 
the radar station at Krasnoyarsk. In various policy 
pronouncements Soviet officials have proclaimed verification 
as a genuine concern of their own. No longer reflexively 
rejecting U.S. proposals, they now advocate intrusive forms 
of inspection on the basis of strict reciprocity and chide 
the United States for proceeding cautiously.^ Indeed, it is 
often hard to discern from their statements what kinds of 
monitoring the Soviets would actually exclude.
While the full implications of alasnost remain to be 
seen, changes which have already occurred are opening up new 
bargaining options at a time when on-site inspections appear 
more central than ever to successful verification practices.
 ^ A Soviet commentator quipped: "Now that our country 
is advocating verification with the utmost clarity and is 
going much further than the West in this most important 
issue, the West disowns verification." See "U.S. Response to 
Verification 'More Than Reserved,"' Moscow Domestic Service, 
printed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Dailv 
Report: Soviet Union. August 17, 1987, p. AA3.
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Prior to Gorbachev, efforts to negotiate rules governing 
verification endured a cycle of hope and disappointment. 
Steps which were correctly heralded as accomplishments at 
earlier stages proved very difficult to apply in practice; 
and progress was more a product of marginal adjustments 
rather than of dramatic breakthroughs. Since 1985, however, 
the startling degree of progress achieved cannot be 
accounted for by normal negotiating dynamics. Old 
assumptions regarding Soviet attitudes —  that they would 
never accept intrusive inspections or negotiate verification 
prior to actually reaching agreements —  have been tossed 
out the window. This does not mean that all bargaining 
behavior has been superseded by the fact of wholesale Soviet 
concessions; disagreements persist, and the USSR has not yet 
achieved the degree of openness in military matters that 
characterizes the American situation. At the same time, the 
core constraints on bargaining have changed dramatically —  
they are no longer simply generalized concerns about 
American "spying" or Soviet "cheating," but rather a host of 
practical obstacles to achieving trouble-free cooperative 
procedures that really do boost confidence in the 
verification of complex agreements.
It is axiomatic that verification requirements shape 
and constrain the range of plausible negotiating options. We 
have seen numerous examples since the early 1970s. SALT II's 
rules on ICBM modernization were whittled down to
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performance parameters that were verifiable using data 
collected by remote sensors; conventional GLCMs were swept 
into the INF Treaty essentially because U.S. planners could 
not differentiate between nuclear and conventional variants; 
and the term "production" was deliberately omitted from the 
ABM Treaty because production-specific limits were not 
verifiable with any degree of confidence. Yet beyond shaping 
particular agreements, verification is a bargaining issue in 
its own right. There is a whole category of rules which 
speaks exclusively to verification and compliance. It was 
argued in Chapter 4 that while the development of NTMs 
reduced the Soviet-American knowledge gap and provided a 
strong inducement to productive bargaining, the mere fact of 
NTMs did not prevent verification from complicating the 
negotiating process. What these issues are and how 
rule-making evolved to deal with them are the questions to 
be addressed below.
VERIFICATION AND RULE-MAKING
Traditionally, data collection activities in support of 
verification have injected two pivotal considerations into 
the negotiating process. The first concerns the nature of 
safeguards granted to data collection activity legitimized 
by agreement. Quite obviously, not all information collected 
through intelligence methods is required for treaty 
verification. One can easily imagine categories of data that
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are "essential,” or "nice to have," or "unnecessary" for 
verification purposes. The problem has been to find a 
practical way to make such delineations for safeguarding 
purposes. In the past, the Soviets criticized the United 
States for putting an overly broad construction on 
verification requirements in order to improve its espionage 
capabilities. U.S. policymakers, in turn, criticized the 
Soviets for being unwilling to acknowledge the essential 
legitimacy of verification in the pursuit of agreements.^ 
The shift toward reliance on NTM collection in the early 
1970s did not defuse this issue. Rather, it merely led both
 ^Compounding this problem, in the U.S. view, has been 
the longstanding emphasis in Soviet military doctrine 
accorded to maskirovka. or deception and concealment 
practices (i.e., camouflage, dummy targets, feints, 
diversionary actions, etc.) which are designed to "mislead 
the enemy with regard to the presence and disposition of 
troops, military objectives...combat readiness and 
activities, and also the plans of command." See Notra 
Trulock III, "The Role of Deception in Soviet Military 
Planning," in Dailey and Parker, eds., Soviet Strategic 
Deception, p. 279. Quite apart from this doctrinal emphasis, 
specific types of strategic systems rely on high levels of 
concealment in their normal operational pattern. Soviet 
mobile ballistic missile units operate with high levels of 
tactical concealment because location uncertainty and 
stealth are critical to their survival as reserve forces in 
wartime. Reportedly, the movement of these mobile units in 
the field is restricted during periods of time when 
reconnaissance satellites would be passing overhead. William 
J. Broad, "U.S. Designs Spy Satellites to be More Secret 
Than Ever," The New York Times. November 3, 1987, p. Cl.
The Soviets are not alone in figuring out ways to avoid 
satellite detection. The United States also has developed 
operational patterns for naval and land forces aimed at 
avoiding or defeating detection by Soviet satellite 
reconnaissance in wartime. For discussion, see Paul B. 
Stares, Space and National Securitv (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 1987), pp. 112, 133-136.
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sides into some tortured line-drawing exercises —  on the 
one hand, to declare as legitimate certain forms of data 
collection, and on the other hand, to preserve the right of 
each side to thwart unauthorized collection of data for 
non-treaty purposes. As discussed below, this task proved 
difficult.
The second consideration raised by data collection 
activity has centered on the issue of compliance 
problem-solving. specifically the requirement for a process 
aimed at preempting or resolving disagreements on data 
ambiguities or on what the data (ambiguous or not) indicate 
about the behavior of one party or the other. Such a process 
is conceptually quite distinct from the purely unilateral 
question of how to respond to treaty violations which are 
deliberate and which continue despite protest. Both sides 
have recognized an intermediate area where a structured 
dialogue is useful in preventing minor disputes and 
disagreements from getting out of hand. While disagreeing at 
times over the requisite tools for this process, both sides 
have engaged in rule-making —  mainly, it should be 
stressed, at U.S. urging —  aimed at developing regular 
procedures for bilateral data-exchange and consultation.
In the following sections I examine the evolution of 
rule-making methodology in these areas. I then turn to 
consider the implications of the trend toward intrusive 
inspection techniques represented in INF- and START-era
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agreements.
Data Collection Safeguards
Even before the SALT I negotiations had made any real 
progress on substance, the outlines of a deal on 
verification had already fallen into place. The Soviet 
government, as noted in Chapter 4, had begun to see NTMs as 
a fact of life in superpower relations and entered the talks 
voicing an explicit preference to tailor SALT and ABM 
provisions to "national means" of verification. The United 
States had already reached essentially the same conclusion, 
although it did not concede the possibility of selected 
forms of on-site inspection (OSI) for problem-solving 
purposes until later on in the talks.^ Without much fanfare, 
agreement was reached on language specifying that each party 
should use "national technical means of verification at its 
disposal," along with the Soviet-sponsored caveat that NTMs 
be used "in a manner consistent with generally recognized 
principles of international l a w . T h i s  obligation embodied 
the core principle for verification: that arms agreements 
impose a requirement to permit the unimpeded collection of 
information on treaty-limited forces (even those not 
dismantled but remaining after reductions) in order to
 ^In SALT I OSI was euphemistically called "selective 
direct observation" (SDO), see Smith, Doubletalk, p. 134.
 ^The ABM Treaty, Art. XIII, para. 1; and the SALT I 
Interim Agreement, Art. V, para. 1.
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confirm claims of compliance. The NTM formulation has proved 
quite durable and was carried-over into SALT II and adopted 
by the Reagan Administration with minor modifications for 
the INF Treaty. The phase 1 START agreement is not likely to 
change the formulation much.
Given the inextricable links between verification and 
intelligence functions, it is noteworthy that the NTM 
formulation has been quite impervious to the seemingly 
immutable trend toward ever greater specificity in most 
aspects of treaty drafting. Indeed, in a kind of conspiracy 
of silence, each side has deliberately avoided pressing the 
other for disclosure of its NTM capabilities or for specific 
enumeration of collection practices that would run afoul of 
international law. Over the years, the American position has 
been that it was not prepared to itemize NTM systems for the 
Soviets, and that partial disclosure would only call 
attention to systems not included and remove them from any 
protection afforded by agreements. U.S. officials generally 
have eschewed any definition of NTMs more specific than 
"technical information collections systems" used for 
verification which "operate outside from the national 
territory of the other s i d e . T h e r e  also has been a strong
 ^See comments of then Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown, U.S. Congress, The SALT II Treatv. Part 2, pp. 
279-280. Even the existence of photo-reconnaissance 
satellites was not officially acknowledged by the United 
States until 1978. See Remarks by President Jimmy Carter at 
the Kennedy Space Center, October 1, 1978, Weeklv 
Compilation of Presidential Documents. Vol. 14, No. 40 
(October 9, 1978), p. 1686. For an overview of U.S. NTMs,
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desire in Washington to tiptoe around the politically 
sensitive issue of intelligence facilities based in third 
countries (e.g., China, Cuba, Turkey), since disclosure of 
these in negotiated agreements would imply a form of 
endorsement which would be awkward for both sides —  
especially Moscow —  and probably very controversial in the 
affected countries.*
From outward appearances the USSR has seemed quite 
content to live with the ambiguities surrounding NTMs. There 
is evidence to suggest the Soviets were fearful that 
disclosures would inflame resentments among third world 
countries toward superpower surveillance without their 
consent.^ Although in counter-intelligence terms the Soviets 
would have benefited from excluding as legitimate any NTM 
system which the Americans were not willing to reveal, it is 
doubtful they were prepared to make reciprocal disclosures. 
Moreover, as NTM operators themselves, the Soviets well 
understood that there is no inherent way to disentangle the 
intelligence and verification functions of these systems.
see Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Communitv 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985), and David Hafemeister, 
"Advances In Verification Technology," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists. (January 1985), pp. 35-40.
* Brown, Ibid.
 ^See Stuart A. Cohen, "The Evolution of Soviet Views 
on SALT Verification: Implications for the Future," in 
William Potter, ed., Verification and SALT: The Challenge of 
Strategic Deception (Boulder: Westview, 1980), p. 54.
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Couching their endorsement of NTMs in a general, oblique way 
helped them to finesse the awkward fact that they were 
consenting to militarily-significant reconnaissance of their 
territory and departing from their historic opposition to 
the idea that verification rights should legitimize such 
practices.® In this regard the pointed reference in treaty 
language to "generally recognized principles of 
international law" made it quite clear that certain 
monitoring techniques would still be off limits as tools for 
treaty verification. International law recognizes the right 
of a state to forbid intrusions into its national territory, 
including overflights by reconnaissance aircraft or 
eavesdropping by submarines from within territorial waters.* 
In fending off pressures from the Congress for further 
clarification, U.S. officials have claimed that both sides 
in fact do have a good working definition of the systems and 
practices which encompass NTMs. Reportedly, the Soviets have 
acknowledged NTM "architecture" in its broad contours, 
including not only reconnaissance satellites, but also 
ships, aircraft, ground-based radars, and intelligence 
stations based in third countries.^ The absence of 
counterindicative evidence tends to back up such claims.
® Author's interview with Gerard Smith, July, 15, 1983.
* George Bunn, "Open Skies for Missile Killers?," Arms 
Control Todav. Vol. 17, No. 4 (May 1987), pp. 15-16.
See summary of Brown's remarks, U.S. Congress, The 
SALT II Treatv. p. 195.
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Arguably, any number of unhappy events could have put the 
presumptive accord in jeopardy. One party or the other could 
have attempted to justify direct interference with a data 
collection system on the grounds that it was not covered by 
agreement, or that information regarding a specific 
compliance issue was impermissibly collected. So far as is 
publicly known, however, justifications of this kind have 
not been used in compliance disputes. In the meantime, the 
Soviets have opened up markedly in their willingness to 
consider initiatives on the peaceful uses of remote 
reconnaissance.
Apart from firming-up a legal base for treaty-related 
technical collection (even while not disclosing its exact 
nature), the familiar construction of the verification rule 
has included certain immunities for NTM systems operating in 
accordance with agreements. In SALT I the Soviets accepted a 
U.S. proposal that both sides not "interfere with" systems 
engaged in legitimate monitoring. Since neither the forms 
nor the purposes of legitimate interference were specified 
in agreed treaty language, this prohibition has a broad 
scope: any effort to actively defeat a remote sensing system 
—  destruction, jamming, "blinding" with lasers, etc. —  
would be covered; and any activity with interfering effects, 
whether or not its purpose was malign, would also be barred. 
The only operative constraint on the non-interference pledge 
is the scope of the treaty itself. Outside the ambit of a
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treaty, both sides implicitly reserve the right to counter 
systems deemed to be acting in a hostile manner, including 
non-reconnaissance systems (e.g., direct broadcast 
satellites, space-based weapons) as well as remote-sensing 
systems engaged in non-verification data gathering activity.
Again, however, the presumptive boundary line between 
legitimate and illicit NTM reconnaissance has not been 
tested to date in any significant way. A U.S. 
photo-reconnaissance satellite over the Soviet Union was 
temporarily blinded in 1975, but this was later determined 
to have been caused by the explosive rupture of a natural 
gas pipeline, not a ground-based laser attack.^ There have 
also been reports of Soviet efforts to jam U.S. space- and 
airborne systems engaged in collecting data on Soviet radar 
signatures and other activities; but bilateral tensions over 
such practices have never slipped over into treaty-related 
disputes in any major way.^^ While the absence of direct 
interference may be more indicative of fears of retaliation 
than devotion to the rule of law, this is not of course 
unique to verification; in a fundamental sense, all of arms
U.S. Department of State, Compliance with SALT I 
Agreements. pp. 5-6.
In 1984, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard 
Perle noted in statements to Congress that the Soviets had 
engaged in activities "which might be characterized as 
interfering with" NTMs, but stated only that the U.S. 
government was studying whether these would constitute 
violations. None was ever charged. See U.S. Congress, Soviet 
Treatv Violations, p. 40.
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control is underwritten by fears of reciprocal 
noncompliance. The important point here is that deterrence 
and legal principles have worked together to establish a 
basic norm against routine interference with NTM in 
peacetime. Meanwhile, the basic rule of non-interference has 
been carried-over into successive agreements from SALT to 
START.
Fencina-in Concealment
The other route to defeating verification —  through 
concealment —  has been more nettlesome. It was one thing to 
give NTMs a free ride; they were already operational in any 
event. But for years Soviet negotiators showed no interest 
in giving equal scope to guarantees against concealment. In 
SALT I, they objected in particular to a U.S. proposal 
banning covered facilities for submarine construction, and 
expressed a general concern that the United States would 
exploit an unqualified ban on concealment to challenge long­
standing construction and basing practices on the excuse 
that NTM observation was somehow being curtailed. U.S. 
negotiators at the time stated that then-current Soviet 
practices did not impede verification of the SALT I and ABM 
agreements and could be expressly exempted. The concealment 
provision would therefore apply only to future alterations. 
With this "grandfather" clause in place the Soviets went 
along. As it turned out, however, the final agreed language
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specifically forbade "deliberate” acts of concealment which 
"impede" verification, not a broader category of activities 
that might have incidental concealing effects.
Soon after SALT I and the ABM Treaty came into force, 
irritations began to flare up regarding implementation of 
the non-concealment provisions. As noted in Chapter 3, the 
Soviets objected to U.S. installation of prefabricated 
aluminum shelters over ICBM launch silos undergoing 
renovation, charging deliberate concealment, and U.S. 
officials complained about a heightening pattern of 
concealment activities at Soviet ship yards, test ranges, 
and other areas, which threatened to impede verification. In 
each of these cases the issue of intentionality was 
contested. U.S. officials defended the shelters, insisting 
that their purpose was not to conceal but to provide 
environmental protection for workers. It was illegitimate, 
they reasoned, for the Soviet Union to allege any concealing 
effects when the activity had other aims and did not really 
reduce in any significant way Soviet knowledge of which
For background, see letter to Senator John Glenn 
from J. Brian Atwood, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Congressional Relations, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, The SALT II Treatv. Part 5 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1979), p. 300. The treaty 
language exempting existing practices in the ABM Treaty,
Art. XII, para. 3, provides that: "this obligation (against 
deliberate concealment) shall not require changes in current 
construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices."
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missiles were in which silos While this was not an 
unreasonable position, it prompted the Soviets to respond in 
a tit-for-tat manner. When the U.S. side registered 
complaints concerning the covering over of submarine 
construction areas, Soviet officials claimed that these 
actions were dictated by weather and other considerations 
entirely unrelated to concealment. The proper baseline for 
measuring changes in construction and related practices that 
might impede verification was also contested. Washington 
argued that the Soviets were altering the preexisting 
baseline in unacceptable ways by steeping up activities with 
concealing effects; similarly, the Soviets took note of the 
fact that the offending U.S. silo shelters were much larger 
than those constructed for similar tasks in the 1960s.
Generally, concealment remained a bone of contention 
throughout the 1970s. The Soviet activities cited by the 
United States for their treaty-relevant concealing effects 
did not expand to the point where verification became 
impossible, but neither did they taper off. The United
According to Duffy, et al., the Soviets may have 
had difficulty monitoring the flow of materials entering or 
leaving the silo area because of the shelters. The Soviets 
complained that the problem of differentiating between 
MIRVed and unMIRVed versions of Minuteman missiles was 
already difficult with NTMs, and that the shelters 
exacerbated the problem. See Duffy, Compliance and the 
Future of Arms Control, p. 50.
The shelters increased in size from 300-700 square 
feet to about 2,700 square feet. U.S. Department of State, 
Compliance with SALT I Agreements, p. 4.
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States voluntarily reduced the size of its ICBM 
environmental shelters in 1977, but this did not soften 
Soviet opposition to them appreciably. Increasingly, 
concealment-related compliance matters were channeled into 
the ongoing SALT negotiations for resolution. Some new 
treaty language resulted: both sides agreed that shelters 
which impeded verification would be banned under SALT II; 
the modalities of deliberate concealment were spelled-out in 
more detail; and the SCO was given expanded authority to 
discuss unintentional acts of concealment with impeding 
effects. But these were minor adjustments and ameliorated 
the situation only marginally. Moreover, in the area of 
missile flight-testing, SALT II was generating new burdens 
of its own.
By 1977, both sides had begun work on qualitative 
controls on ICBMs. As part of this effort, the United States 
sought explicit agreement with the Soviets to extend SALT 
I's non-concealment rules to the flight-testing of ballistic 
missiles. This was a logical step, for the Soviets had 
defended some of their concealment measures (e.g., covering 
ICBM test launchers) on the grounds that testing was not 
covered under SALT I. Still, a number of awkward problems 
arose. Because little was publicly known about U.S. 
telemetry collection techniques at the time, the United 
States adamantly opposed specifying data requirements 
precisely lest these assets be compromised. Meanwhile, the
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Soviets had no enthusiasm for the idea of legitimizing by 
treaty what they suspected to be an extensive eavesdropping 
campaign aimed at their most important class of strategic 
weapon. To make matters worse they had already begun 
encrypting portions of their telemetry broadcasts in 1974, 
in effect concealing that information from American NTM 
operators.
When the issue was first broached, the Soviets flatly 
denied that test data were essential for the verification of 
limits on new types of ICBMs; data collection in this area, 
they argued, was espionage pure and simple. After much U.S. 
pressure, they finally budged on the idea of telemetry 
collection in principle but with the proviso that they not 
be required to alter existing test practices. This, however, 
was unacceptable to the U.S. side because Soviet encryption 
techniques already were hampering the verification of 
provisions then under negotiation. How much it was hampering 
data collection was something that U.S. negotiators were not 
authorized to disclose, for security reasons. Nor, in light 
of SALT'S limited scope, could they plausibly assert that 
all telemetry data were required for verification; to do so 
would simply have lent unwanted credence to the long­
standing Soviet argument that the United States was using
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verification as a subterfuge for intelligence gathering 
In the end, after much wrangling, a complex set of 
compromises was worked out: both sides agreed to a general 
obligation not to use deliberate concealment associated with 
test practices (thus extending verification to the testing 
stage of weapons acquisition), and both agreed on a 
cumbersome split-the-difference formulation that 
acknowledged a right to encrypt —  as the Soviets demanded 
—  except when it impeded verification/^ However, the 
treaty gave no precise meaning to the term "impede" and was 
silent on the specific kinds of telemetric data (i.e., on 
fuel consumption, engine temperature, booster velocity, 
simulated RV releases, etc.) required for verifying the 
ballistic missile parameters controlled by SALT II, such as 
throwweight and warhead fractionation.
This outcome presented an opportune target for 
criticism. Some argued that the treaty's formal sanction of 
encryption, in effect removing the taboo, was unwise in
As it was, U.S. Air Force officials wanted to 
retain the option of encrypting portions of MX flight-test 
data, and strongly opposed a blanket ban on telemetry 
encryption.
The relevant SALT II language provides that: "Each 
party is free to use various methods of transmitting 
telemetric information during testing, including its 
encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions 
of paragraph 3 or Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party 
shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, 
such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever 
such denial impedes verification of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty."
418
precedential terms, while others asserted that the 
provisions gave too much leeway to the Soviet Union to 
decide for itself what data were necessary for 
verification.^® Standing alone, such criticisms had merit. 
Ideally, the treaty should have sought to relate data 
requirements to specific controls. Again, however, in the 
bargaining context of 1978-79, U.S. options were sharply 
constrained. The U.S. government was not prepared to 
advocate a total encryption ban or to specify data 
requirements in any direct way. Officials in Washington were 
under no illusions that the problem had been definitively 
settled. Their expectation was that the job of establishing 
a precise compliance standard would have to await further 
interactions in the SCO. There, both sides would work 
through the issue in an iterative fashion, aiming to define 
a general baseline of permitted encryption on the basis of 
successive Soviet and U.S. flight tests without having to 
discuss particular data requirements in each case. In 
retrospect this strategy almost certainly represented the 
most reasonable —  or, more aptly, the least worst —  option 
available given the sensitive disclosure issues involved; 
but it was premised upon a fully functioning agreement and 
aggressive implementation discussions in the SCC, neither of 
which materialized.
®^ See, e.g.. Perle, "What is Adequate Verification?," 
63.
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During the early Reagan years any pretense of a common 
approach on verification quickly fell apart. With SALT II 
only being observed informally by the United States, the 
Soviets had few qualms about pressing the gray areas of the 
verification provisions to the maximum extent possible. They 
stepped up their encryption practices during flight-testing 
of their SS-N-20 SLBM, the SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs, and other 
systems. Some U.S. officials characterized this expanded 
effort as "nearly t o t a l . I n  response to U.S. complaints, 
the Soviets did not deny what they were doing but argued 
that the precise nature of the data denial was still not 
sufficient to impede verification or to undercut the 
informal SALT adherence regime. In a matter-of-fact way, 
they invited the United States to take a step which they 
knew quite well it was loath to take —  to specify which 
channels of telemetry should be broadcast unencoded. This 
stand-off effectively froze the situation until, as seen 
below, political relations began to improve after 1985.
Compliance Management; 
Data-Exchanae and Consultative Procedures
Controversial though it was, the concealment problem 
was not the only challenge facing verification-related 
diplomacy in the pre-alasnost era. The architects of 
SALT-era agreements also attempted to set up an
Weinberger, "Responding to Soviet Violations," p.
7.
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infrastructure of procedures for relating unilateral 
judgments on verification to a process of compliance 
management. Initially, the purposes and effects of such 
rules were not self-evident. There was no commonly 
understood requirement for any kind of cooperative action 
other than to make sure that NTMs could do their job 
effectively. Perceptions did begin to change, both during 
the SALT I negotiations and subsequently, in part as a 
result of compliance disputes. Even then, however, it was 
mainly the United States which took the diplomatic 
initiative; progress on cooperative action depended on how 
quickly the Soviets could be brought along.
Data-exchange represented an important aspect of 
cooperation, though not one that both sides agreed on, even 
in principle, early on. Throughout the SALT I negotiations 
and well into SALT II the Soviet side adamantly opposed 
providing any information on the size or disposition of its 
strategic forces. Soviet negotiators stated that NTMs 
sufficed for verification purposes and that any disclosures 
on their part were completely unnecessary. Their general 
attitude was that arms negotiations imposed no obligation on 
them to assist U.S. intelligence by confirming the accuracy 
of its estimates, and that it was illegitimate for the 
United States to exploit the talks for that purpose. So 
powerful was the Soviet internal requirement to avoid data 
disclosures that it forced them into some silly situations.
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for example, using U.S. numbers when force levels were 
discussed and even referring to Soviet weapons by their 
Western code names (e.g., Bear bombers, SS-9 missiles). If 
such behavior seems absurd by today's standards, it 
reflected the awkward facts that American diplomats of that 
era were more familiar with the details of Soviet weaponry 
than were many of their Soviet counterparts, and that the 
kind of information being discussed was highly classified 
inside the USSR. Aware of this situation, the U.S. side did 
not press the Soviets on their lack of candor, and indeed 
accepted it tacitly as the cost of doing business with them. 
The Soviets, after all, had taken the singularly important 
step of accepting NTMs; anything else paled in comparison to 
that.
As it turned out, however, the idea of relying solely 
on U.S. data did not go over well in the U.S. Congress. 
Senator Jackson was highly critical, citing the lack of 
declared figures as an egregious omission. He asked 
Secretary Laird: "How are you going to enforce, by our own 
verification means, a number of 1618 [the Soviet ICBM total] 
if you cannot point to any written document which says that 
the Russians have agreed to that number?" Repeated 
assurances by Laird and others that there was no 
misunderstanding with the Soviets on deployed force levels 
only spurred Jackson on: "Suppose they come back and say, 
'You think you have discovered silos constructed after July
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1 [the freeze date]. But those silos were under construction 
prior to July 1. Where is your evidence? '
Subsequent events during 1975-76 showed that Jackson's 
criticisms were not misplaced. Misunderstandings could have 
been avoided if the Soviets had been willing to offer 
clarifications. Some of the Soviet ICBM silos included in 
U.S. totals, as noted earlier, turned out to be the III-X 
launch control silos; and the ABM test range at Kamchatka, 
whose existence was neither confirmed nor denied by the 
Soviets in 1972, was nonetheless later asserted by them to 
be "already there" when the agreement was signed. Although 
neither of these matters posed substantial compliance 
problems, it irritated many in Washington to think that the 
Soviets had stood by in silence in the face of U.S. data 
which they knew contained inaccuracies. Such behavior 
plainly contradicted the cooperative spirit which many 
Americans thought SALT was supposed to exemplify.
Consequently, by the mid-1970s, substantial pressures 
were building up on the American side for some form of 
data-exchange in SALT II. It was especially important for 
domestic political reasons to remove the glaring one-sided 
reliance on U.S.-supplied data that had led to the 
cat-and-mouse game in SALT I. Substantively, there was a 
clearer need both to preclude genuine misunderstandings in
U.S. Congress, Militarv Implications of the Treatv 
on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, pp. 206-207.
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counting as well as to remove tempting opportunities to 
juggle the figures to one's own advantage. Seen this way, 
data-exchange thus was really more of a tool for compliance 
management than for verification per se. National 
verification was no less paramount because of data-exchange; 
it was still necessary to authenticate any information 
received through an exchange.
In spite of all this the Soviets remained hostile to 
any formal data-exchange until the advanced stages of SALT 
II. They treated the issue as little more than an annoying 
symptom of American litigiousness. Evidently, only flat-out 
political pressure applied by various U.S. congressmen 
during meetings with the Geneva delegations began to soften 
Soviet opposition.In 1978, the USSR floated an offer to 
release data in exchange for U.S. concessions on other 
issues. The U.S. side objected; it had no intention of 
conceding points on substance in return for legitimate 
verification needs. The Soviets then began to release 
information in small doses, first on the numbers of their 
heavy bombers, then ICBMs and, later on, MIRVed ICBMs. While 
haggling over the details the Soviets also agreed to an 
obligation to update periodically the information once the 
agreement came into force; and they declared the number of
The Soviets almost certainly took notice when a 
moderate pro-SALT Republican Senator, Charles Mathias, told 
Soviet negotiators that there was "no way" the Senate would 
vote for the SALT II Treaty without a data-base. See 
Talbott, Endgame, p. 96.
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MIRVs on each type of strategic missile, in accordance with 
the fractionation freeze, identifying missile types with 
their own code-names for the first time. This uncustomary 
display of openness stopped at the point of disclosing any 
data on missile performance which could have helped to 
clarify the effects of limits on new types and heavy 
ICBMs.Nonetheless, the achievement of a quantitative data 
base for SALT II was a highly consequential first step, for 
it signified not merely a new technique in compliance 
management but an important corollary to the data-collection 
principle —  specifically, that in addition to NTM 
monitoring there should be an agreed point of comparison, or 
a "baseline" count, against which to make determinations of 
compliance. This was a precursor to the dramatic cooperative 
steps that have been taken in recent years.
In contrast to data exchange, the evolution of rules
Under SALT II, the Soviets acknowledged the SS-19 
as the largest Soviet light ICBM, thus establishing it as 
the dividing line between light and heavy missiles, but 
would not confirm or refute U.S. estimates of the SS-19's 
launchweight or throwweight. U.S. officials argued that 
bilateral agreement on absolute values for performance 
parameters was not really necessary since the treaty only 
restricted changes in those parameters. See U.S. Congress, 
The SALT II Treatv. Part 6, p. 553. While this was true in a 
strict monitoring sense —  i.e., the United States could 
measure change without a clear knowledge of the precise 
value —  this was a weak argument in terms of compliance 
management, for an agreed baseline was still necessary in 
order for one party or the other to mount a challenge that 
some sort of change had occurred.
Former Ambassador Ralph Earle II makes this 
argument in greater detail in "The INF Treaty is not Really 
so Novel," The Washington Post. December 5, 1987, p. A25.
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governing consultative diplomacy prior to 1985 followed a 
different path; from initial agreement, to disputes, to 
stalemate. Initially, the bargaining focused on establishing 
a permanent consultative mechanism —  the SCC —  whose 
charter was spelled out in the ABM Treaty and the interim 
accord on offensive weapons. Under the agreements reached, 
both sides gave their representatives in the SCC authority 
to discuss compliance issues and ambiguous situations 
bearing on treaty obligations; to provide data on a 
voluntary basis as either party considered necessary to 
assure compliance; to consider questions involving 
unintended interference with NTMs; to discuss changes in the 
"strategic situation" which have a bearing on agreements; to 
elaborate procedures for dismantling of weapons; and to 
consider ways to increase the viability of existing 
agreements as well as further measures aimed at limiting 
strategic arms. Bilateral agreement on these functions was 
reached quite readily, generally on the basis of American 
proposals. In only one area —  alas, on the provision of 
data —  was there any real difference of view. The U.S. side 
sought a broad obligation to provide data pursuant to a 
particular request, but in the face of Soviet objections 
eventually agreed to the less binding formulation that such
The ABM Treaty, Article XIII, para. 1.
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data could be provided "on a voluntary basis.
Subsequently, both sides worked out a set of implementing 
regulations, specifying that the SCC would convene at least 
twice a year and that its deliberations would not be 
disclosed publicly except by mutual consent.
Although the SCC was acclaimed by both sides as a 
significant achievement of SALT I, neither had entered the 
talks with any specific design in mind for a consultative 
mechanism. Ambassador Gerard Smith has observed that the SCC 
emerged as a "creature of dynamism at lower levels" in the 
SALT delegations.^^ What surprised some was the broad scope 
of the SCC charter which went well beyond its declared aim 
"to promote the objectives and the implementation" of the 
SALT I and the ABM agreements. The Soviets appeared very 
keen on having a permanent body which would symbolize a 
continuous dialogue between the superpowers. Empowering the 
SCC to consider new types of strategic arms limitations and 
to discuss strategic trends relevant to agreements clearly 
accorded with this conception. U.S. negotiators tended to 
view the SCC as a non-polemical channel for experts to 
tackle the technical minutiae of treaty implementation, like
Author's interview with Sidney Graybeal, July 11,
1983.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "A 
Concise History of the Standing Consultative Commission 
(SCC)," June 30, 1980, pp. 1-2 (mimeo).
Author's interview with Gerard Smith, July 15,
1983.
427
weapons dismantling, which might either bog down more 
free-wheeling negotiations at higher levels or be glossed 
over to the detriment of both si d e s .While  this U.S. view 
suggested a somewhat different emphasis in SCC operations, 
it was not inconsistent with the idea of giving the 
institution a broad purview. To the contrary, the U.S. side 
thought it was very beneficial to develop a close, 
compatible linkage between the political symbolism and 
technical requirements of arms control diplomacy. 
Conceivably, the SCC could play both roles.
During the 1970s SCC representatives performed several 
important tasks, all in accordance with the charter, without 
much acrimony or fanfare. As noted previously, the SCC was a 
useful venue for the negotiation of dismantling procedures 
for SALT I and the ABM Treaty. A number of sensitive 
compliance matters were discussed in a non-confrontational 
way. In some of these cases the discussions were followed by 
a cessation or adjustment of activities of one side or the 
other; in other cases data were exchanged to clarify 
contentions or allay concerns. Not all such discussions led 
to a meeting of the minds or to more than perfunctory 
explanation and response. Yet compared to other negotiating 
fora, the Soviets were more forthcoming in the SCC in 
providing data to support specific contentions, for instance
Author's interview with Sidney Graybeal, July 11,
1983.
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on the purpose of their III-X launch control silos. Finally, 
although the SCC was not used to negotiate new limitations, 
its delegates were reasonably successful in elaborating 
agreed interpretations of practices like "testing in an ABM 
mode," which had not been fully defined in existing 
agreements.
Under SALT II, it was agreed that U.S. and Soviet SCC 
representatives would be given authority to negotiate 
FROD-like criteria for heavy bombers, to update the newly 
created data-base, and to look into concealment where the 
deliberateness of the activity in question was not fully 
established. This expansion of the SCC's jurisdiction, 
reflecting its growing reputation as a useful venue for 
problem-solving and technical consultation, never 
materialized once it was clear that SALT II would not be 
formally implemented. The failure of SALT II marked a 
downturn in the fortunes of the SCC. Quiet, sequestered 
deliberations soon gave way to acrimonious charges and 
countercharges of treaty violations. To a degree, the SCC's 
reputation was tarnished because it was the place where such 
matters were supposed to be discussed, and neither side was 
prepared to agree on how to deal with the issues on the 
agenda. But some argued that the SCC mechanism was not 
merely an innocent bystander; it inherently was a part of 
the problem. Several facets of the SCC's design heightened 
its vulnerability to the criticism of being "fatally
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flawed."
Without question, a key ingredient in the SCC's 
operational routine —  the confidentiality rule —  hampered 
efforts within the United States to maintain political and 
public confidence in its effectiveness. The fact that the 
imperatives of confidentiality and public confidence would 
conflict in such a direct way was not fully appreciated at 
the time the SCC was created. Indeed, a degree of 
compatibility had been presumed. American negotiators had 
strongly favored the idea of keeping SCC deliberations 
confidential as a way to promote frank discussions and to 
avoid kneejerk Soviet reactions when serious compliance 
issues were raised by the United States. If a degree of 
privacy could help SCC operations, they reasoned, it would 
necessarily promote confidence that agreements were 
operating as expected —  or so it seemed. Yet the way it 
turned out in practice was quite different. The privacy 
requirement not only impeded efforts to publicize the 
successful aspects of SCC work, it was portrayed by critics 
as a tool by which American policymakers could shield 
themselves from the political consequences of failing to 
close loopholes in agreements or to react more forcefully to 
alleged Soviet transgressions. Although it greatly 
exaggerated the actual situation, the "cover up" criticism 
gained a veneer of plausibility for two related reasons.
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First, the process of working intelligence judgments 
through the network of checks and balances within the U.S. 
executive branch proved frustratingly slow. In cases where 
the data were sparse or fell below a widely accepted 
evidentiary standard, U.S. moves in the SCC were delayed for 
a period of time until there was consensus on how to proceed 
and how much to reveal to the Soviets. Predictably, the 
critics branded this caution as a form of complacency that 
only encouraged the Soviets to test U.S. resolve. Second, 
there were decisions taken on several occasions by White 
House officials during the Nixon-Ford years to withhold the 
circulation of sensitive intelligence relevant to Soviet 
compliance from normal government channels. Ostensibly 
intended to prevent unauthorized leaks, this practice 
ultimately was self-defeating. Not only did it vastly 
complicate routine intelligence reporting within the 
government, it inspired enormous controversy and a lasting 
legacy of suspicion once it became known.
Overall, the SCC experience through the mid-1980s 
illustrated the intrinsic difficulties of attempting to 
decouple compliance management practices from the larger 
political context. While some privacy facilitated productive 
interaction, keeping the "products" of SCC discussions
A criticism of this practice was included in 
testimony by former U.S. intelligence official Ray S. Cline, 
to the U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on 
Intelligence, December 17, 1975 (mimeo).
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secret encouraged suspicions.^* While some degree of caution 
was essential to protect sources and to avoid needless 
challenges, too much of it incurred charges of delays and 
cover-ups.
Perhaps the larger issue in compliance management is 
the question of cooperation versus confrontation, of carrots 
versus sticks. Depending on circumstances, both approaches 
clearly have a place. But mechanisms like the SCC operate 
only in the cooperative mode. Because they can impose no 
sanction against, say, a failure to clarify ambiguous 
behavior or the stonewalling of legitimate concerns, 
mechanisms like the SCC offer few tangible benefits unless 
each party is committed to affirmative action in support of 
a treaty regime. Thus, while the SCC was well suited to 
engage in implementing rules and clarifying ambiguities, as 
was the case in the 1970s, it had nothing special to 
contribute in resolving the major compliance problems that 
dominated the dialogue in the 1980s. Indeed, as a matter of 
tactics, it has probably been more efficacious not to try to 
shelter ongoing negotiations from compliance issues, but 
rather to use these negotiations as a vehicle for 
problem-solving, especially when the resolution of 
outstanding issues has become a prerequisite to new
Some useful suggestions for disclosing the 
products of SCC work have been made by Graybeal and Krepon, 
"Making Better Use of the Standing Consultative Commission," 
pp. 197-198.
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agreements in any event.
This experience goes some way toward explaining why 
consultative mechanisms have been downplayed in recent 
years. Under the INF Treaty, a new special verification 
commission (SVC) was created, quite separate from the SCO, 
and given a comparatively narrow mandate —  to resolve 
compliance questions and to agree on additional measures to 
improve agreements. Perhaps to avoid parallels to the SCO, 
the United States was disinclined to give the SVC broad 
authority to negotiate implementing procedures or to 
consider changes in the strategic situation bearing on 
obligations, and it has taken the view that under INF and 
START many of the implementing provisions should be worked 
out as part of the formal negotiation, not delegated to a 
consultative body after the fact
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GLASNOST
As the foregoing suggests, verification rule-making 
prior to the mid-1980s did not live up to its promise. If 
measured by commitments hammered out at the bargaining table
In fact, however, while the INF Treaty did include 
unprecedented detail it its rules governing weapons 
dismantling, etc., both sides nevertheless found it 
necessary to delegate a substantial number of technical 
issues to a post-treaty negotiation, which eventually 
resulted in a massive memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 
verification issues. Some of those issues, such as the 
instrumentation for the portal monitoring systems, proved 
very contentious. Some might argue that pressures to reach 
final agreement on the MOU would have been greater had it 
been negotiated prior to actually signing the INF agreement
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and the greater provision of data in consultative channels, 
there was a gradual relaxation in Soviet opposition to 
intelligence collection for arms control purposes. On the 
other hand, however, NTM monitoring in general was becoming 
more costly and difficult in the face of Soviet concealment 
efforts, a portion of which either stepped over treaty-drawn 
lines (e.g., encryption) or were justified on the narrowest 
possible construction of verification rights. The U.S. 
decision not to ratify SALT II, whatever its other merits, 
forfeited any opportunity to press the USSR on strict 
compliance and to give prompt effect to SALT II's statement 
of principles calling for negotiation of cooperative 
measures to enhance the effectiveness of NTMs under 
follow-on agreements. It is against this background that we 
should evaluate the significance of Soviet-American 
negotiations since the rise of Gorbachev and the onset of 
glasnost policies.
Anatomy of a Breakthrough
By the early 1980s both sides had recognized that 
future arms agreements would require not only firmer NTM 
commitments but additional cooperative measures to improve 
data-collection. SALT II had foreshadowed this trend; and a 
combination of pressures from both sides to expand the scope 
of agreements to include INF forces, aircraft, sea-launched 
cruise missiles, and possibly non-deployed weapons.
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virtually assured it. The contentious issue was how to 
balance prospective approaches against past ones. American 
statements consistently stressed the need for intrusive 
alternatives to NTMs, and that acceptance of such measures 
would be an important litmus test of Soviet sincerity in 
arms reductions. Then ACDA director Eugene Rostow spoke of; 
"new and creative ideas...that go beyond NTM. Maybe on-site 
inspections; maybe television cameras. There may be 
challenge inspections...to go and inspect the plant at 
such-and-such a p l a c e . T h e  Soviets, however, stuck 
closely to the SALT II formulation on cooperative measures 
—  whose aim was to contribute to NTMs, not to substitute 
for them —  and spoke only vaguely of "other forms" of 
inspection.The true dimensions of these differences were 
never fully probed at the time, given that both sides were 
totally at odds over the structure of INF and START 
agreements.
Throughout the early 1980s Soviet spokesmen made 
frequent reference to a number of guidelines or "basic 
principles" when discussing the verification question. Four 
of these were cited most often: that verification should not
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Review of Administration Initiatives on Strategic. Theater, 
and Conventional Arms Control. 97th Congress, 1st sess., 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1982), p. 9.
Interview with President Leonid Brezhnev, Per 
Spiegel, November 2, 1981 reprinted in Survival. Vol. XXIV, 
No. 1 (January/February 1982), p. 37.
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prejudice the sovereign rights of states or permit 
interference in their internal affairs; that the scope and 
forms of verification should be commensurate with the 
character and scope of agreements; that the elaboration of 
verification provisions is only possible after an agreement 
on the scope of the substantive prohibition has been mapped 
out; and that international forms of verification like a 
multilateral satellite agency, etc., should be limited.
None of these principles absolutely precluded any form of 
on-site monitoring or other cooperative measure. Hence, if 
START or INF were to impose production controls on missiles, 
OSI might flow logically from the proportionality principle 
(i.e., that verification be commensurate with an agreement). 
Nonetheless, the clear implication of the Soviet approach 
was to explicitly underscore that OSI was something to be 
considered only in the context of specific needs, not to be 
agreed upon a priori. And the primacy of NTM was invariably 
stressed.
Within the first year or so after Gorbachev's elevation 
to leadership in March 1985, even before the glasnost 
campaign was fully promulgated, Soviet statements underwent 
a marked restructuring. The usual limiting guidelines on 
verification were downplayed; new alternatives were
The most complete exposition of these principles 
was presented by Soviet Ambassador Viktor Israelyan at the 
Conference (formerly committee) on Disarmament in Geneva. 
See Document CD/PV.119, Committee on Disarmament, March 31, 
1981, pp. 16-17.
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stressed; and international means were given a new status.
In his proposal for a phased elimination of nuclear weapons 
by the year 2000, Gorbachev spoke of verification by 
"national technical means, on-site inspections, and any 
other additional verification m e a s u r e s . A  few days later, 
foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet 
Union was prepared to agree to "any forms" of verification 
and that bilateral problems on this issue were "non-existent 
n o w . T h e  most detailed statement came from deputy defense 
minister Shabanov several weeks later: "The experience 
of... existing strategic arms accords...confirms the 
indisputable priority of national technical means of 
verification. The potential of these means is constantly 
increasing. At the same time the Soviet Union is flexible on 
this question.... [Other] measures may be adopted up to and 
including on-site inspection. The only important thing is 
that those measures should not serve as a tool for 
interfering in states' internal affairs and should not 
damage either s i d e . I n  other words, verification was not
"Excerpts from the Soviet Leader's Statement on 
Arms Control Proposals," The New York Times. January 17, 
1986, p. A3.
Cited in Stuart Goldman, Paul E. Gallis, and 
Jeanette M. Voas, Verifvina Arms Control Agreements: A 
Soviet View. Congressional Research Service (CRS Report No, 
87-316F), April 10, 1987, pp. 22-23.
V. Shabanov, "A Most Important Element in the 
Disarmament Process," Izvestiva. March 24, 1986, reprinted 
in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Dailv Report: 
Soviet Union. April 1, 1986, p. AA9.
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to be open-ended, and measures with interfering or damaging 
effects would still be opposed. But the shift toward 
flexibility was unmistakable.
While explicit references to inspection were not 
unprecedented for the Soviets, the evolution of views marked 
by these statements and expanded in subsequent commentary 
did contain a truly novel element: a desire to make 
cooperation on treaty verification the hallmark of a new 
spirit of openness in strategic relations between the 
superpowers and in international affairs more generally. In 
previous negotiations, Soviet willingness to accept 
verification proposals typically had been offered in a 
stingy, begrudging way —  not to meet their own verification 
needs or even to improve mutual confidence, but often simply 
to pacify unreasonable U.S. anxieties "in the interests of 
achieving agreement."^® Under Gorbachev's direction, 
however, Soviet statements were beginning to attribute 
intrinsic value to verification, heralding it in 
surprisingly Western terms as a way to lessen suspicion, to 
enhance stability, and to create an atmosphere conducive to 
harmonious relations.^' Remarkably, this change enabled the
This has been a commonplace formulation in Soviet 
test ban policy, see Warren Heckrotte, "A Soviet View of 
Verification," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. October 
1986, p. 14.
For a thorough discussion, see William C. Potter 
with Leonid Belyaev and Mark Lay, "The Evolution of Soviet 
Attitudes Toward On-site Inspection," in Lewis A. Dunn with 
Amy E. Gordon, eds., Arms Control Verification and the New 
Role of On-Site Inspection (Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Books,
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Soviet Union to seize the political high ground on 
verification for the very first time, not only to shed the 
burdens associated with old habits of naysaying but to force 
the United States to ponder the reciprocal implications of 
its own monitoring demands and thus to shift the onus of 
cautious hesitation to the U.S. side. Viewed in this light, 
verification alasnost-stvle was far more a function of 
diplomatic than security imperatives in the way it projected 
major political payoffs in return for manageable costs in 
secrecy and (counter)intelligence terms. It is very hard to 
imagine this kind of calculation ever working its way 
through the Soviet bureaucracy —  or indeed, any bureaucracy 
—  without direct pressure from above.
The post-Reykjavik INF negotiations provided the first 
opportunity to test the new Soviet rhetoric. The draft INF 
agreement was then structured around a ban on 
intermediate-range weapons in Europe with low residual 
forces stationed elsewhere. In March 1987, the United States 
tabled its long awaited verification protocol, the main 
elements of which included data-exchanges and NTM safeguards 
not unlike those in SALT II, a ban on concealment measures 
with impeding effects, including all telemetry encryption, 
and a requirement to declare areas and facilities associated 
with treaty-limited systems and not to locate such systems 
outside those areas. A variety of on-site inspection
1990), pp. 185-206.
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measures were also proposed, including inspections on short 
notice at both declared facilities and "other areas in the 
event of compliance concerns" (or, in arms control parlance, 
"suspect site" inspections)
While not responding directly, the Soviets accepted 
these proposals as a basis for negotiation and, within a few 
weeks, sought to up the ante. In April, Gorbachev told 
Shultz: "We shall be demanding verification and inspection 
everywhere: on the sites of missiles' dismantling...at 
ranges and military bases, including those in third 
countries, at depots and plants, whether private or state 
owned.Foreshadowing some of these points, Soviet 
negotiators in Geneva had already talked about "ordering our 
factories to open their doors" on the expectation that the 
Americans should do the same.^^ The idea of granting 
extensive access rights inside production plants and basing 
facilities on allied territory on short notice plainly made 
Washington and allied capitals uneasy, and Soviet commentary 
delighted in the spectacle of U.S. efforts to limit the 
reach of inspections. Such commentary conveniently omitted 
any mention of the point that in some areas the Soviets had
U.S. Department of State, Statement of the U.S.
INF Delegation, March 12, 1987 (press release).
Cited in Michael Krepon, "High Stakes in INF 
Verification," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. June 1987, 
p. 15.
Cited in Goldman, et al., Verifvina Arms Control 
Agreements. pp. 99-100.
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left out provisions that U.S. negotiators regarded as 
essential.Ultimately, though, the negotiations were 
greatly simplified by Soviet agreement on extending the INF 
ban to systems located anywhere outside Europe —  a step 
which the United States had advocated in part on 
verification grounds —  and also on banning shorter-range 
missiles. With no requirement to monitor residual force 
levels and no reason to retain the basing infrastructure, 
the last remaining challenges to an INF agreement were 
pushed aside.
Given the momentum of these events, the 
Reagan-Gorbachev summit of December 1987 was certain to mark 
a major watershed in rule-making for verification. Under the 
INF Treaty both sides unveiled a new regime of on-site 
data-collection techniques, notifications, data-exchanges, 
and cooperative measures designed to enhance data-collection 
through NTM. But both sides also went further than expected 
by announcing the basic elements of a verification regime 
for a phase 1 START agreement which contemplated even more 
extensive arrangements than those adopted under the INF ban. 
Since 1987, negotiations on verification in START have
For example, the initial Soviet proposal 
apparently omitted any mention of baseline inspections, see 
remarks by U.S. Ambassador Maynard Glitman in U.S. Congress, 
The INF Treatv. Part 1, p. 115.
The United States dropped requirements for 
unencrypted telemetry broadcast, for suspect-site 
inspections, and for continuous monitoring of repair and 
storage facilities.
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concentrated on fleshing out these basic elements.
The main features of these two regimes are set out in 
Table 7-1. The common areas are three-fold. First, there is 
an obligation to set up a comprehensive data-exchange on the 
number and location of treaty-limited items (e.g., 
launchers, missiles, launch canisters, etc.) and their 
associated facilities, and on the technical characteristics 
of the systems. Second, there are cooperative measures to 
enhance the observation of various activities by NTMs 
(specifically satellites), some of them at a time and 
location chosen by the inspecting party. Third, there is a 
set of on-site data-collection procedures to be used at 
declared locations to verify the "baseline count" provided 
by the data-exchange; to confirm the elimination of 
treaty-limited items; to verify the "close-out" of 
facilities slated for elimination; to verify, on short 
notice, the numbers of treaty-limited items subsequent to 
the baseline count; and to detect or to count such items as 
they pass through designated "portals" at certain key 
facilities, such as production sites.
Several areas of divergence between INF and START are 
also evident. The verification coverage is broader under 
START, reflecting not only the greater diversity of forces 
involved but also the fact that START data-collection must 
be good enough to verify compliance with non-zero limits. 
Specifically, START imposes some monitoring requirements
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T a b l e  7-1
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS: APPLICATION TO INF & START
INF TREATY START TREATY
Type of Measure:
Declarations, 
Data Exchange
MOBs**; production, support, and 
repair facilities; numbers and locations 
of missiles, launch equipment, technical 
performance data
MOBs; ICBM deployment areas; bomber 
bases; submarine ports; production, 
final assembly, repair, storage sites; 
missile inventories, mobile missiles
Baseline Inspections all the above categories all the above categories
Elimination Inspections weapons, equipment at designated 
elimination sites
weapons, equipment at elimination 
sites, scope to be determined
Close-out Inspections MOBs; missile support facilities, 
except production
scope to be determined as of 12/89
Short-notice 
Inspections, 
declared areas
all facilities in data-exchange 
except production, elimination sites; 
all former sites (even if used for 
non-treaty systems)
all facilities in data-exchange, 
including sites for residual forces 
and formerly declared sites; numbers 
of warheads on ballistic missiles
Short-notice 
Inspections, 
suspect sites
none areas where covert production, storage 
or repair of systems may be occurring; 
precise scope to be determined
Continuous Portal 
Monitoring
former SS-20 and current SS-25 
final assembly facility; former 
Pershing production plant; and 
future final assembly site for 
missiles outwardly similar to INF
ICBM production, final assembly, storage 
depot-level repair facilities; addi­
tional scope criteria to be determined 
as of 12/89
Cooperative Measures 
for NTM
open display of road mobile ICBMs 
at selected sites, six times per year, 
1 site per request, for 3 years
telemetry encryption ban; open display 
of treaty-limited items at MOBs, bomber 
bases, sub ports, upon request
♦ As agreed at the 1987 Washington summit and reaffirmed subsequently. *♦ Missile Operating Base
Sources; U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement, December 10, 1987 (mimeo); U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, The INF Treaty, p. 134; The New York Times. June 2, 1988, p. A17; James Blackwill, Meridian 
corporation, presentation on INF/START verification, May 2, 1988.
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that are not paralleled in INF: to collect flight-test 
telemetry on designated ballistic missiles; to verify limits 
on certain types of non-deployed ballistic missiles, held in 
reserve, which could be used in breakout scenarios; and to 
check that missiles which are being tested or repaired at 
designated sites are "legal" missiles (i.e., duly declared 
and counted), not part of some covert stockpile. Finally, 
the scope of OSIs is broader in START. The most notable OSI 
feature under START may be the verification of warhead 
numbers on deployed ballistic missiles. Using agreed 
techniques, both sides will have the right to check 
individual ballistic missile loadings to establish the 
accuracy of the warhead declarations and to monitor 
subsequent compliance on a short-notice basis. There will 
also be a qualified right to a number of short-notice 
inspections at suspect sites, again, subject to agreed 
procedures.^
Having inherited these general guidelines from its 
predecessor, the Bush Administration in June 1989 proposed 
that a number of "verification and stability" measures be 
negotiated and implemented prior to completing a START
The formulation on suspect site inspections agreed 
to at the Washington summit was quite broad. "The right to 
implement, in accordance with agreed procedures, 
short-notice inspections at locations where either side 
considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair 
of strategic offensive arms could be occurring." See "Joint 
Communique Lays Out Talking Points," Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report. December 12, 1987, p. 3065.
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agreement. U.S. officials argued, in the face of criticism 
that they were seeking to stretch out negotiations, that the 
resulting START accord would be much easier to implement if 
both sides could first "work out the bugs" associated with 
untested verification procedures.^' The Soviets accepted 
this approach in principle in September, and made some 
proposals of their own on how to proceed.During the next 
five months, both sides conducted a joint demonstration on 
"tagging" technologies for non-deployed missiles; they also 
agreed to trial inspections at bomber bases aimed at 
distinguishing ALCM from non-ALCM carrying bombers, and 
finalized a demonstration of each sides' ideas for
"Ambassador Richard Burt on the State of START," 
Arms Control Todav. Vol. 20, No. 1 (February 1990), p. 7.
The initial U.S. package of verification and 
stability measures included: reciprocal establishment of 
perimeter and portal monitoring of certain ballistic missile 
production facilities; an exchange of data on nuclear forces 
falling within START; cessation of ballistic missile 
telemetry encryption; practice inspections to verify numbers 
of warheads; technical exchanges on "tagging" technologies 
and practices; discussions on the problem of SLBMs with 
short times of flight (or "depressed trajectories"); and 
implementation of a scheme for notifying strategic 
exercises. In accepting this general approach, the Soviets 
departed from their long-standing principle that 
verification arrangements could only be elaborated once the 
substantive provisions have been mapped out; in practice, 
however, this departure is not quite so radical, for they 
have been careful to proceed only on those measures, like 
ballistic missile inspections, which related to treaty 
provisions that are already agreed. Progress on verification 
measures relating to substantive issues that are still 
outstanding has been appreciably slower.
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inspecting warheads on ballistic missiles/® Apart from 
these steps, they also agreed to advanced notification of 
one strategic exercise per year involving strategic bombers, 
as a confidence-building measure/’ The expectation was that 
these and other initiatives would be worked out by the June 
1990 Washington summit.
Assessing Cooperative Verification Measures
Taken as a whole, these cooperative measures signify a 
major enlargement in the scope of rule-making in support of 
verification and compliance problem-solving. That they exist 
at all is a testament to a convergence of U.S. and Soviet 
interests in making verification the centerpiece of progress 
in nuclear arms reduction. Just as the Soviet stance on 
verification could not have changed without the top-down 
imposition of a wholly new set of cost-benefit calculations,
®^ U.S. ACDA, "Nuclear and Space Talks; U.S. and 
Soviet Proposals," Issues Brief. January 22, 1990, p. 2 
(mimeo).
Evidently, agreement on this CBM was the result of 
earlier negotiations, and reflected a long-standing Soviet 
preferences to include bombers in strategic exercise 
notifications. At the June 1988 summit, both sides agreed to 
notify each other of ballistic missile launches. Under this 
plan, notification is now provided no less than twenty-four 
hours in advance on the planned date, launch area, and area 
of impact for any launch of a strategic ballistic missile. 
During discussions at the June 1988 summit, the Soviets 
insisted for a while that the arrangement also include the 
notification of massed bomber flights, but finally dropped 
this idea in return for a U.S. commitment to study the 
further measures. See Arms Control Todav. Vol. 18, No. 6 
(July/August 1988), pp. 20-21.
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so it is highly implausible that such a detailed set of 
treaty provisions could have emerged in business-as-usual 
bargaining between the Soviet and American security 
establishments without direct intervention by the political 
leaderships of both sides.
From the methodological standpoint, however, it is 
important to ask how much "value-added" these new provisions 
offer to verification and compliance management over and 
above existing capabilities. Value-added is an essential 
calculation because, unlike the decision to legitimize NTM 
monitoring, which was essentially a passive act (i.e., to 
accept what already existed), intrusive measures require 
affirmative implementing steps by parties who have little 
previous experience in such matters. Thus, whatever value is 
assigned to various OSI measures must be weighed against any 
offsets due to new operational routines which may be costly 
and complex, and which present some prospect for 
misunderstanding or abuse.
Clearly, one important rationale behind some of these 
measures is to put on a firmer footing past practices that 
have not worked as well as expected. Rules to assist NTM 
monitoring fall into this category. Notwithstanding the 
public attention given to novel forms of OSI, the greatest 
contribution to verification under INF and START may be 
provided by NTM-assisting measures. Under the INF Treaty the 
prohibition against concealment has been decisively expanded
447
to encompass any acts which impede verification, not simply 
those assessed as being " d e l i b e r a t e . N o w  that effect 
rather than intention is the recognized yardstick for 
measuring the compliant aspects of concealment, the legal 
basis for challenging concealing activity is much increased. 
In addition, the undifferentiated exemption formerly given 
to "current" construction, assembly, conversion, and 
overhaul practices has been sharply pared back and refocused 
to apply only to those practices occurring within a missile 
deployment area that are associated with normal training, 
maintenance, and field operations.The clear intention 
here is to strike a better balance between verification 
needs in general and the survivability requirements of 
mobile systems by attempting to isolate concealment to areas 
where it has the most clearly legitimate uses.
The full carry-over effect of these provisions into the 
START process remains to be seen. Because the INF Treaty 
calls for the complete elimination of systems, all weapons 
and supporting infrastructure within its scope are 
eventually expendable. Not so in START. Logically, it would 
be harder to apply anti-concealment measures with equal
The INF Treaty, Art. XII, para. 2b.
Ibid. It is worth noting that the use of 
environmental shelters "to protect missiles and launchers" 
is explicitly allowed under this provision, an apparent 
reversal of the specific provision in SALT II barring the 
use of shelters over ICBM silo launchers that impede 
verification.
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effectiveness to non-zero agreements, where the incentives 
to deny data during the R&D, testing and assembly phases of 
the weapons life-cycle would be greater. Nonetheless, by 
mid-1988, both sides had stated that a phase 1 START 
agreement would include a broad-based ban on concealment.^^ 
Both also agreed (see Table 7-1) in principle to "full 
access to all telemetric information broadcast during 
missile f l i g h t . F r o m  outward appearances, this 
formulation suggests that both sides agreed to drop the 
tortured effort to define permissible forms of encryption 
which created so much tension in SALT 11.^^
The other set of NTM-enhancing measures which have 
relevance in START are those that provide for the open 
display of certain ballistic missiles in their deployment 
mode. As noted in Table 7-1, each side under the INF Treaty 
has the right over three years to designate a time and place
See statement from the Moscow summit of June,
1988. "Joint Document: 'Realistic Approach' to Reducing
Nuclear Risk," The New York Times. June 2, 1988, p. A17.
” Ibid.
In fact, however, tendencies to seek exemptions 
were still in evidence. Both sides spent much time in late 
1989 and early 1990 bargaining over whether the "full 
access" rule would cover data on warhead performance in 
testing, as well as data generated during tests but 
collected by means other than direct broadcasts from missile 
test vehicles (e.g., flight-data recorders). See Michael R. 
Gordon, "U.S. May Revise Its Position on Concealing Missile 
Data," The New York Times, January 13, 1990, p. A8. It was 
reported that workable arrangements were agreed at the 
Baker-Shevardnadze meetings in Moscow in early February. See 
"Joint Soviet-American Statement," TASS (trans.), February 
10, 1990 (mimeo), p. 2.
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for such displays, subject to a quota and a requirement that 
the display procedure be performed at only one location at a 
time. The timeline for this procedure is extremely 
compressed to enhance its value as a deterrent to cheating. 
Upon receiving a request, a party must within 6 hours remove 
all its road-mobile ICBMs and launchers at a given base from 
garages, open the roofs of garaging structures to confirm 
removal, and leave its systems in the open for satellite 
observation for up to 12 hours after the initial request. 
Although these provisions are framed in neutral terms, the 
United States currently has no road mobile ICBM; the real 
purpose of those provisions, therefore, is to confirm the 
absence of covert Soviet SS-20 deployments among road-mobile 
SS-25 ICBM regiments. While this procedure will result in 
better data-collection on SS-25 regiments, the actual 
monitoring task is the detection of prohibited INF missiles 
and launchers rather than counting per se. By contrast, in 
START, where both sides have already agreed in principle to 
the same open display concept, systems counting will be the 
specific task.
The idea of assisting NTMs through affirmative behavior 
was seen over a decade ago as a logical step for the SALT 
process. In the INF context, however, this particular 
display measure was quite significant because it focused on 
an element of force posture —  road-mobile ICBM regiments —  
which is not covered by the treaty. Consequently, the effect
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of this provision is to reinforce the legitimacy of 
gathering information on non-restricted forces which pose 
some risk of serving as a base or infrastructure for covert 
prohibited capability. Prior to the INF Treaty, the Soviets 
were always extremely reluctant to acknowledge in any formal 
way that such intelligence gathering had any justification 
for treaty verification purposes and, as seen in the SAM 
upgrade case, often dismissed such demands as fishing 
expeditions for intelligence purposes. Thus, to acknowledge 
it as justified in this case through the vehicle of a 
cooperative measure signifies a relaxation of their previous 
stance.
Overall, the value-added of these NTM-assisting 
measures is likely to prove substantial. If properly 
implemented in the years ahead, the broader anti-concealment 
obligations and the telemetry encryption ban will help build 
a greater degree of transparency into weapons development 
and flight-testing than now exists. Open display of weapons 
should generally improve confidence in monitoring of 
deployed forces in a way that would not appear to impinge 
unduly upon operational flexibility or survivability 
criteria; and the costs of these procedures would appear to 
be modest because they are not overly complex and mainly 
involve prompt notification and strict adherence to short 
timelines. Moreover, the application of these measures in 
the INF context has a high carry-over potential for START.
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Finally, as a singular gesture toward greater openness, the 
INF data exchange is a positive expansion of SALT II 
principles, covering as it does several thousand 
treaty-limited items (TLIs), their locations, and certain 
physical characteristics, such as the length, diameter, and 
weight of missile boosters and launchers.
The Value of On-Site Inspections
With respect to on-site inspection techniques, 
value-added calculations are more complex. The justification 
usually given for OSI measures is that they can collect data 
on TLIs whose small size, multipurpose uses, or mobility 
render monitoring through NTMs very difficult or impossible. 
In so doing, it is argued, on-site measures can both 
increase general confidence that treaty provisions are being 
implemented and heighten the costs and risks associated with 
using declared facilities (or even undeclared facilities, in 
the case of suspect site inspections) to hide illegal 
forces. In the INF/START context the requirements for such 
measures are a function of the range of items subject to 
limitation —  missile stages and canisters, mobile 
launchers, and support equipment. NTM systems are clearly 
insufficient for high-confidence counting of declared 
missiles located inside storage facilities, for monitoring 
the departure or arrival of missiles or launchers at key 
locations, or for confirming the elimination of declared
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weapons and their components.
In these cases, OSIs are highly valuable. Without them, 
verification judgments on these activities necessarily would 
be vague and highly inferential. Still, it is important to 
exercise care in generalizing about OSIs. Their 
contributions are best understood as a solution to special 
needs. Moreover, the utility of all these measures is 
qualified in one fundamental way: they provide little 
confidence in detecting what is not declared (i.e., 
inadvertently or deliberately omitted from the data- 
exchange) . With OSIs, the existing knowledge base defined by 
the data exchange becomes clearer. (We can know, for 
example, that weapons being eliminated are the real ones, 
not mock-ups.) Ultimately, however, there is no alternative 
to NTMs in detecting indications of covert basing, 
production, or storage outside agreed areas. NTM data can 
act as a helpful cue for OSIs; indeed, without them 
inspectors would not know where to look or what to look for. 
This detecting function is easier for NTM to perform under 
the conditions of zero-threshold limits, which is the 
primary reason why the United States advocated a complete 
ban in the INF case.
What about the drawbacks? One clear burden is the 
complexity and financial cost which inspections have 
injected into the verification process. Consider, for 
example, how the baseline, close-out, and short-notice
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inspections are carried out under the INF Treaty.
Both sides have set up points of entry (POEs) , which 
are designated airport facilities equipped to handle the 
arrival and departure of the other side's inspectors. Lists 
of inspecting and support personnel have been screened in 
advance. When a party makes a decision to inspect, it 
charges its inspection against an agreed quota.
Notification of the arrival of an inspecting team at the POE 
must be given at least 16 hours in advance. Upon arrival, 
items of inspecting equipment (e.g., cameras, radiation 
detectors, measuring devices), whose specifications have 
been agreed in advance, are subject to examination by escort 
personnel in the presence of the inspectors. If storage is 
required, such items must be kept in a secure dual-key 
facility so that neither escorts nor inspectors have sole 
access to inspecting equipment. The inspecting team then has 
a time window of between 4 and 24 hours to announce the site 
it wishes to inspect. Once the announcement is made the
U.S. Congress, The INF Treatv. Report of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, article-by-article 
analysis of the treaty, pp. 156-164.
Whereas the number of close-out and baseline 
inspections is determined by the number of sites, 
short-notice inspections are charged against a quota of 2 0 
annually over the first three years, 15 annually for the 
next five, and 10 annually for a successive five years. 
After that, short-notice inspections are no longer 
permitted. The rationale for their eventual phasing-out is 
that they become less necessary as the military 
effectiveness of any covert weapons fades without the 
ability to test over time.
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inspected party has one hour to implement movement 
restrictions at the declared site, so that missiles, etc., 
may not be removed, and up to nine hours to transport the 
inspecting team to the site. There, after a pre-inspection 
briefing, inspectors have a specified period of time (24 
hours, with some wiggle room, in the case of short-notice 
inspections) to conduct the inspection, which may include 
internal observation of any structures deemed large enough 
to house treaty-limited items. Escorts are always present. 
Cameras may be operated only by escorts at the direction of 
the inspecting side, and both sides get copies of the 
photographs. There are procedures to govern the inspection 
of shrouded objects large enough to be treaty-limited items. 
Once the work is completed, a post-inspection report must be 
prepared on site by the inspecting team and provided to the 
escorts for review within two hours after the report is 
completed. To the fullest extent possible any ambiguities 
are to be resolved and noted in the report. The inspecting 
team then must return promptly to the POE through which it 
came, and leave the country within 24 hours.
As this example illustrates, there is nothing very 
impromptu about these inspections. The time phasing, 
equipment specifications and security, site location, and 
the modalities of inspection, transport, reporting, and 
other matters are all subject to agreement in advance. In 
spite of all this finegrained detail —  or perhaps, in part,
455
because of it —  procedures have run fairly smoothly thus 
far under the INF Treaty. Ninety-six Soviet and 244 U.S. 
inspections were carried out, including a full quota of 20 
apiece on a short-notice basis, within the first year of the 
INF Treaty's operation.These inspections have been 
characterized as successful because they revealed no major 
discrepancies in the data provided under the treaty. In the 
absence of major procedural problems thus far, the major 
costs incurred have been mainly financial, manpower, and 
operational. On the U.S. side, inspection requirements have 
stressed military airlift capability to an unprecedented 
degree in peacetime, and the overall annual costs incurred 
by INF inspections may run to about $100 million annually 
for some years.
Given this experience, the extra benefits of suspect 
site inspections are hard to measure. In general, a rule to 
allow short-notice inspections of multipurpose or otherwise 
undeclared facilities could be a useful tool for compliance 
management. Armed with such a procedure, a party could act 
upon circumstantial evidence from other sources (presumably
U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency, "First Year of 
On-Site Inspections," Fact Sheet. May 31, 1989 (mimeo).
One American official involved in managing the 
inspections observed that the U.S. Military Airlift Command 
(MAC) in the first several months of the INF Treaty was 
operating on a scale normally associated with a full-scale 
nuclear alert. Cost figures cited in Lewis A. Dunn, with Amy 
E. Gordon, On-Site Inspection for Arms Control Verification: 
Pitfalls and Promise. CNSN Paper, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May 1989), 
p. 37.
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NTMs) of covert activity in a prompt fashion. Perhaps 
equally important, a party under suspicion might have a 
strong stake in proving itself innocent, and could find such 
a procedure helpful in allowing the other side to clarify 
ambiguities that might otherwise have a corrosive effect on 
confidence. The main value of suspect site inspections, 
however, is not really improved detection of violations. It 
seems very unlikely that such a procedure would ever expose 
a "smoking gun" violation. Barring some slip-up, a party 
under suspicion would almost certainly have planned in 
advance to cover up offending activity prior to allowing 
inspectors on-site. Indeed, from the data-collection 
standpoint, the only real value of such inspections is to 
know that nothing illegal is going on at the precise place 
and time when inspectors are present. What happens prior to 
or after the visit is not generally knowable except through 
NTM monitoring.^’
Rather than monitoring, then, it would appear that the 
putative value of suspect site inspections is chiefly 
deterrence of cheating. Deterrence, of course, is a 
fundamentally non-empirical concept. One can never fully 
prove whether it works or not. But with suspect site OSIs 
lurking in the background, a party arguably would be more
An exception would be the use of seals at certain 
deactivated facilities, so that inspectors returning to the 
same facility at a later date could have confidence that no 
activity had taken place in the intervening time.
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reluctant to engage in certain types of large-scale covert 
activities which could not be covered up without delaying 
the arrival of inspectors and thus violating a treaty's 
verification procedures. The relevant question, however, is 
whether appropriate procedures can be devised which protect 
each party's interests.
Concretely, it is logical that each side will want 
suspect site inspections to satisfy three criteria. The 
first is timelv access to anv site where concerns mav arise. 
Clearly, the inspecting party wants to minimize the elapsed 
time between the transmittal of a request or notification 
and the arrival of its inspecting team. Based on procedures 
now in place for baseline, close-out, and short-notice 
inspections at declared and former INF facilities, it is not 
implausible to imagine that inspectors already at a point of 
entry could be dispatched to a target site within a 7-9 hour 
period from the moment they notify their hosts of their 
intended destination.^* The imposition of restrictions on 
certain traffic into and out of a suspect site, if 
coordinated with NTM observation, could make quick cover-ups 
more difficult prior to the arrival of inspectors.
The second criterion is assurance of equipment securitv
This time frame may only apply to those target 
areas served by a designated point of entry. Under the INF 
Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union have two POEs 
apiece, each serving the eastern and western portions of 
their respective continental territories. Inspectors are 
required to use the POE closest to their intended 
destination.
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and data integrity. Both sides have a stake in this. While 
the inspecting party needs to assure itself that sensing 
equipment or the data collected cannot be spoofed into 
showing false evidence of compliance, the inspected party 
wants to be sure that the equipment will not provide false 
evidence of violations. Here, too, INF Treaty procedures —  
providing as they do for escort personnel, pre-inspection 
examination of equipment, secure storage, and on-site 
validation of inspection reports —  would seem applicable to 
a suspect site situation.
Finally, there must be safeguards against the improper 
use of inspections for harassing or intelligence gathering 
purposes. It stands to reason that neither side would want 
to be held hostage to unreasonable inspections which appear 
inspired more by an interest in collecting military secrets 
and proprietary information than in verifying compliance. On 
this point, however, the INF Treaty has little useful 
guidance to offer. Its ultimate safeguard on the improper 
use of short-notice inspections is to restrict them to 
declared facilities.
The abuse potential of suspect site inspections, and 
thus the need for safeguards, has long been a matter of much 
speculation and debate, even in the Gorbachev era. Within 
the United States one school of thought holds that the 
incentives for the Soviets to improperly use inspections 
have been greatly overstated. A group of congressmen argued:
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"The USSR is unlikely to issue flagrantly irresponsible or 
frequent challenges because the U.S. would retaliate along 
similar lines, and the closed Soviet society, with its 
well-kept secrets, has far more to lose than we do. It is 
conceivable that such a tactic might be used in rare cases 
if the advantages were very great, h o w e v e r . Y e t  a 
contrasting viewpoint holds that fears of U.S. retaliation 
might not actually deter the Soviets very much in most 
cases. Since the USSR operates from a much better relative 
knowledge base, it may be better able to target inspections 
to achieve maximum intelligence value and thus would come 
out ahead in any tit-for-tat exchange. Moreover, the much 
larger size of the Soviet Union relative to the United 
States, as CIA director William Webster has argued, may be 
like competing on an "uneven playing field" in a situation 
of "total reciprocal inspections."^^
Waged at this level of generality, it is doubtful 
whether the debate over the risks of suspect site 
inspections is very relevant to practical policy choices. 
Notwithstanding public gestures toward greater openness, 
each side has long recognized the dangers to itself of
See dissenting views of Representatives Hyde, et. 
al., in U.S. Congress, Report by the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, 
Intelligence Support to Arms Control. 100th Congress, 1st 
sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1987), p. 57.
David Ottaway, "CIA Warns of Arms Verification 
Scheme," The Washington Post. April 7, 1989, p. A9.
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open-ended "anywhere/anytime” inspections, and both have 
sought to impose some scope-like limitations. Throughout 
1989, the publicly stated Soviet position was that suspect 
site inspections would apply at "installations or sites 
where one side could suspect the other of secretly 
deploying, manufacturing, or storing or repairing mobile 
ICBM or their launchers," including "any train" to establish 
that it did not contain railroad mobile ICBMs.^^ While this 
covers a range of useful locations, it would presumably 
exclude others like airbases or ports with no explicit 
connection to the mobile ICBM infrastructure or normal 
deployments. The U.S. formulation is much narrower in 
comparison, including only sites where solid rocket motors 
(the key for ICBM mobility) could be produced. However, the 
U.S. position also would allow inspections elsewhere with a 
right of refusal/*
Clearly, without a right of refusal, there is a real 
problem in formulating exclusions which might be granted to 
various facilities. To characterize exclusions in generic 
terms is conceptually hard and raises the risk of sparking 
debate over whether a particular facility meets the 
specified criteria. On the other hand, to develop a
Letter to the editor by Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, 
The Washington Post. April 6, 1989, p. A22.
^ See U.S. ACDA, Fact Sheet. January 22, 1990, p. 2; 
see also Michael Gordon, "Reagan Approves Limited Inspection 
of Weapons Sites," The New York Times. October 26, 1988, pp. 
Al, A12.
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comprehensive list of restricted locations would require one 
side or the other to draw unwanted attention to certain R&D 
and intelligence facilities which have been too sensitive in 
the past even to acknowledge. Presumably this is the kind of 
problem that the United States would want to finesse through 
a right of refusal.
The financial costs associated with thwarting the abuse 
of inspections also has been a major consideration. Under 
open-ended inspection rules, an enormous number of defense 
production, intelligence and R&D facilities in the START 
context would have to certify that they could protect 
technologies and information not needed for verification. 
Such costs, which in the United States already have run into 
the millions of dollars for the small scale inspections 
under the INF Treaty, would ultimately be borne by the 
governments involved.
Ultimately, unqualified inspection rights at 
unspecified locations is simply not a real option for either 
side, even if the USSR were to become a more democratic 
society in the next decade. The antagonism between the
In the United States, defense contractors have 
expressed concern over a possible loss of competitiveness 
arising from operational disruptions associated with 
inspections and from the perception (or the fact) that 
sensitive technologies might be compromised, which would 
inhibit the Department of Defense from contracting with 
specific companies. For some discussion, see Lewis A. Dunn 
with Amy Gordon, "Striking a Balance: Toward an On-Site 
Inspection Strategy," in Dunn and Gordon, eds.. Arms Control 
Verification, pp. 245-247.
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timely access and the safeguarding criteria appear 
fundamental in the sense that one cannot fully optimize for 
one without defeating the other. With a right of refusal a 
suspect site inspection procedure could still be used to 
build confidence and clarify ambiguities. But its 
value-added to deterrence would then depend mainly on how 
damaging a potential violator might view the suspicions 
arising from a refusal to grant an inspection. It would be 
ironic indeed if a reasonable refusal ended up generating 
the kind of suspicions that verification procedures were 
supposed to allay.
SUMMING UP
Since the breakthroughs inspired by alasnost. it has 
been fashionable to characterize Soviet-American rule-making 
on verification as having come full circle: from the focus 
on on-site inspections in the 1960s, to NTM data-collection 
in the 1970s, and back again to the on-site inspection 
techniques now emerging under the INF and START agreements.
A cyclical interpretation, however, belies a secular 
progression in rule-making methodology over this period 
which encompasses but is not limited to the recent shift 
toward on-site inspections.
The 1970s was the decade in which most of the basic 
treaty principles for verification were established. The 
most basic of all of these was that agreements legitimize
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the unimpeded collection of data on treaty-limited forces. 
The safeguarding of remote sensing systems and the 
non-concealment provisions of successive agreements flow 
directly from this principle. A second principle is that the 
characteristics of forces (e.g., numbers, etc.) subject to 
limitation must be expressly agreed through the vehicle of a 
data exchange. SALT II's data base was the first step in 
this direction. A third and related principle, as seen in 
the last chapter, is that differentiations between classes 
of systems must be based on observable differences; 
otherwise, systems that look alike are counted alike. A 
fourth principle is that compliance management requires that 
a party facing legitimate questions about its behavior must 
supply proof of its compliance, or else alter its behavior, 
to allay the concerns of the other party.
Throughout the SALT era, the paramount problem was not 
with basic principles, but rather that implementation of 
them lagged way behind reasonable expectations of progress. 
Recurring tensions over concealment —  most, though not 
wholly, Soviet practices —  and other problems provided 
grist for compliance disputes. True, there were some modest 
adjustments, such as the provision of data under SALT II. 
Yet, until Gorbachev, the Soviets found it hard to reconcile 
their willingness to accept NTM monitoring as a basis for 
verification with their traditional opposition to any 
intelligence gathering, especially if justified on the
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grounds of a potential circumvention problem. There also 
appeared to be very few internal checks on overzealous 
secrecy and reflexive opposition to meeting American demands 
amidst the tensions of the late 1970s and early 1980s. As a 
consequence, compliance problem-solving languished during 
this period.
Against this background, Gorbachev's pursuit of 
alasnost in superpower relations has been a singular event 
in two decades of verification diplomacy, one which provides 
opportunities to apply past principles with new methods. The 
old Soviet practice of using verification as a bargaining 
chip to obtain U.S. concessions on substance has been 
curtailed. Gorbachev has jettisoned a generation of Soviet 
rhetoric by explicitly acknowledging the right of parties 
under agreements to monitor residual forces.^ Indeed, as 
noted earlier, this is not "diplomacy" in the normal sense
^  Gorbachev stated: "The appropriate verification 
measures, including on-site inspections, must encompass the 
missiles and launchers remaining after the reductions, 
including those on combat duty and at other facilities: 
testing grounds, manufacturing works, training centers.... 
This is necessary in order to be absolutely certain that the 
agreement is really being observed all the way." Speech in 
Prague of April 10, 1987, reprinted in News and Views From 
the U.S.S.R. , Soviet Embassy, Information Department, 
Washington, B.C., April 13, 1987. Although SALT verification 
had proceeded on the same principle applying NTMs, the 
Soviets had never actually acknowledged a specific right to 
monitor residual forces. U.S. attempts to formalize a 
bilateral understanding on this point in the 1960s during 
the disarmament discussions had been rejected by the Soviets 
as espionage. See R.M. Timerbayev, Control of Arms 
Limitation and Disarmament (Moscow: International Relations 
Publishing House, 1983), p. 20.
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of bargaining, for the degree of common ground achieved 
since 1985 could hardly have come about through the 
incremental give-and-take of negotiations. In virtually 
every major issue area —  concealment, encryption, 
inspections —  the Soviet Union has moved to adopt previous 
U.S. positions as their own and even to push somewhat 
farther.
Although alasnost has been a boon for verification 
rule- making, the suddenness of the sea-change in Soviet 
attitudes also has generated some unsettling effects for the 
bargaining relationship. In a very short span of time, a new 
array of tools for on-site monitoring has come into 
existence well before their operational consequences for 
verification have fully been assessed. Since coming into 
operation in 1988 under the INF Treaty, some of these 
measures, in particular the baseline inspections, continuous 
monitoring of missile production, and the on-site 
observation of weapons elimination, have provided new and 
hitherto unavailable windows into important aspects of 
Soviet production and deployment activity. Though expensive, 
they have improved confidence in the implementation of the 
INF Treaty.
Other measures, such as suspect site inspections, have 
yet to be fully developed, and their costs in terms of 
resources, procedural complexity, and lingering 
uncertainties will not be fully known for some years.
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However, assuming a continued basic willingness to work out 
problems cooperatively, both sides may be within reach of a 
new stage in verification: one where the outer frontiers of 
the possible are defined less by the historic Soviet 
penchant for secrecy than by the operational and cost 
burdens that are inherent in the monitoring tools available
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8.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The United States and the Soviet Union have progressed 
a long way in their strategic arms diplomacy since 1972. The 
first phase of arms reductions under START is about to 
begin. Public attention has begun to focus on what kinds of 
further cuts might follow. Political change and upheaval 
inside the USSR may alternately accelerate or brake ongoing 
negotiations, depending on the success of Gorbachev's reform 
program and the durability of his leadership or that of his 
successors. If the initial START reductions are successfully 
implemented, both sides will have begun to remove excess 
capacity from their respective strategic ballistic missile 
arsenals. That, almost certainly, is the easy part. START II 
negotiations will wrestle with more fractious issues, such 
as the deMIRVing of land- and perhaps sea-based missiles; 
qualitative controls on new weapons; sea-launched cruise 
missiles; more stringent counting rules for bombers ; 
strategic defenses; and the proper relationship between 
declining superpower force levels and those of third 
parties. By any measure, this is a difficult and challenging 
agenda. A lot of business remains unfinished.
Whatever the precise form of new agreements in the 
START era and beyond, they will bear the markings of certain 
cumulative effects, not simply from the Reagan-Gorbachev era
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of negotiations, but from the strategic bargaining process 
as it has emerged since the early 1970s. To be sure, 
enormous changes have occurred during this period. Political 
leaderships on both sides have come and gone; bilateral 
relations have oscillated between harmony and deep tension; 
and U.S. and Soviet strategic force postures have grown more 
complex and technologically sophisticated. Amid such 
dramatic changes, it is easy to lose sight of the underlying 
continuities in the negotiating process. The factors of time 
and experience have ushered in important, identifiable 
refinements in bargaining behavior and its output. A degree 
of mutual learning has taken place. Indeed, in examining the 
record presented in the preceding chapters, one could hardly 
conclude otherwise.
When Soviet and American negotiators began negotiations 
that led to the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on 
Offensive Weapons, they were drawing upon essentially a 
clean slate.^ It was a rare moment in contemporary history. 
Prior to that time, controlling strategic forces had not 
been a high priority on either side's agenda. In the wake of 
the initial SALT agreements, however, every negotiation 
thereafter became a follow-on negotiation. At every 
subsequent stage, each side sought to come to terms with the 
consequences of preceding agreements in a new and different
With one slight exception: the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty of 1963 did provide the basis for the withdrawal 
clause used subsequently in the SALT and ABM treaties.
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context. The overall process itself generated an imperative 
to move on as the result of prior output. This momentum 
produced somewhat contradictory tendencies: on the one hand, 
a heightening of disagreements over issues left unresolved; 
but on the other hand, an attenuation of sharp 
discontinuities in the bargaining process which might 
otherwise have occurred had either side tried to terminate 
or to alter radically the dialogue.
In the political realm, one can hardly miss the quality 
of ambivalence that these competing tendencies have 
produced. Although at times policymakers on both sides 
disavowed the perceived shortcomings of past accords or 
bargaining approaches, the centrifugal force exerted by the 
process inhibited major departures in actual government 
policy. President Carter, for example, disavowed the 
Vladivostok guidelines in 1977 only to embrace them in 
modified form later on. President Reagan disavowed SALT II 
in 1981 only to observe it informally for 6 years 
thereafter. Early in START, Reagan Administration officials 
assiduously refused to include U.S. bomber and ALCM 
capabilities as carrots to induce Soviet reductions in 
ballistic missiles; yet they changed course in 1986-88 and 
adopted a bargaining approach more characteristic of earlier 
U.S. administrations. Also, despite the Reagan 
Administration's efforts to reinterpret the ABM Treaty, U.S. 
policy on the testing of non-fixed exotic defensive weapons
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was stayed by a skeptical Congress.
On the Soviet side, the idea of modest cuts in force 
levels which Soviet officials had scoffed at in 1977 became 
part of their START proposals during the early 1980s. Soviet 
negotiators walked out of the INF and START negotiations in 
1983 only to return eighteen months later. And the Soviets 
finally disavowed the Krasnoyarsk radar in 1989, jettisoning 
with it an ominous justification for large radar 
installations that would have only further undermined the 
ABM treaty regime. In these and other instances, one side or 
the other perceived that significant penalties would attach 
to sustained deviations from established behavior.
In the realm of bargaining methodology, the same kind 
of ambivalence has been broadly visible. While the 
particular unsettled issues of one negotiation —  heavy 
ICBMs, MIRVs, cruise missiles, concealment practices, etc.
—  predictably became focal points for disagreement in the 
next phase, the development of rules for dealing with such 
problems generally took the form of extensions or 
modifications of existing practices. If these rules operated 
according to expectations, they developed a certain staying 
power, sometimes beyond their usefulness. Correspondingly, 
if the rules proved inadequate, or became embroiled in 
compliance problems, they were expanded, adjusted, or, in a 
few cases, thrown out entirely. Even so, radical departures 
in methodology were rare, and those which seemed possible at
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various points —  for example, expansion of the scope of 
SALT to include FBS in 1974 or 1986, or adoption of 
throwweight as a primary unit of account in the early 198 0s 
—  generally failed to materialize. Where new rules were 
created —  such as warhead counting, or sublimits on 
particular weapons, or collateral limits on throwweight —  
they were tacked on to a pre-existing framework.
In preceding chapters we have seen how pressures 
alternately favoring continuity and change have played out 
within the various rule-making areas which define the 
substantive contours of agreement. With regard to framework 
rules, the issue of restricting ballistic missile force 
concentrations has dominated all others. This is in part 
because the United States consistently has sought to attach 
penalties to highly-MIRVed ICBMs —  the Soviets' comparative 
advantage —  through sublimits on ICBMs, limitations on 
freedom to mix, fractionation caps, and, finally in START, 
the direct counting of RVs. The rules adopted for all of 
these purposes represent an element of continuity with the 
use of innovative adaptations (e.g., class counting rules 
for ICBMs) to meet particular problems. Force concentration 
rules also have served as a surrogate of sorts for 
qualitative restraints, like the silo-size restrictions and 
the new-types rules, which failed to achieve their expected 
results and were modified or dropped in later stages.
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w ith  regard to scope issues, the dominant concern has 
been how to maintain operational flexibility while expanding 
the reach of negotiated controls to cover aerodynamic 
systems and multi-mission weapons with inherent strategic 
potential. As we saw in Chapter 6, the response to this 
problem has been a consistent two-pronged emphasis in 
rule-making methodology since the 1970s: to condition 
exclusion choices upon some form of "strings attached" 
guarantee (e.g., testing restrictions) to prohibit 
upgrading; and to negotiate individuating procedures for 
exempting long-range aircraft and other weapons with 
legitimate non-strategic or non-weapons uses. Long-range 
cruise missiles, however, may defy such treatment, requiring 
hard choices by both sides on inclusion rules which forfeit 
certain non-strategic missions in the greater interests of 
bilateral restraint.
Finally, with regard to verification rules, the main 
problem has been to define the extent of permissible data 
collection, which was jointly acknowledged in SALT I, and to 
fence-in concealment to reasonable levels. Here, there has 
been considerable innovation since the mid-1980s, as seen in 
Chapter 7, mainly because the Soviet Union under Gorbachev 
has developed a strong political stake in openness and 
verification. Reflecting the change in Soviet attitudes, the 
main innovation in the rules has been to build greater 
transparency into treaty-limited activities (e.g., with
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on-site monitoring, a telemetry encryption ban, etc.) and to 
recast the concealment provisions to cover a broader range 
of potentially troublesome activity.
BARGAINING DYNAMICS IN PERSPECTIVE
With major new agreements on the horizon, it might be 
tempting to interpret the progression of rule-making in all 
these areas as the product of some inherent strategic logic. 
Alas, it has not been so. The evolution of rules has been 
shaped throughout by a pattern of self-interested 
bargaining, which in turn has forced both sides into 
recurring choices over time.
Certainly the choice of equalitv over other plausible 
negotiating goals should be understood in this context. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s we saw consistently a 
tendency toward very rigid formulations of equality, not 
only in terms of numbers within various categories of 
weapons, but in rights, obligations, and in the number of 
concessions necessary in order to reach agreement. Whenever 
either side faced a choice of basic objectives, equality 
usually won out, even when other goals, such as lower force 
levels or strategic stability, might have been more 
desirable from the standpoint of achieving arms control's 
oft-cited goals of reducing the risks of war and the costs 
of preparing for it.
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Thus, Presidents Ford and Brezhnev chose to pursue 
equal aggregate launcher limits at Vladivostok even though 
this choice resulted in high ceilings for both sides and 
precluded any approach aimed at balancing inequalities. In a 
similar vein, the Carter Administration insisted on the 
right to test and deploy the MX with a 10 warhead package as 
a match for the SS-18, even though it effectively precluded 
any possibility of holding newer Soviet ballistic missiles 
to numbers of warheads less than that figure. It is also 
true that inequalities which were probably acceptable in the 
context of overall strategic relations tended to become less 
tolerable in the context of formal agreement. The Soviets 
showed little interest in defending ICBMs with strategic 
defenses but insisted on a right to do so during the 
negotiations on permitted deployment areas. And, at 
Vladivostok, when Kissinger ceded de jure inequality in 
heavy ICBMs in return for getting the Soviets to drop 
insistence on compensation for U.S. FBS, he was harshly 
criticized for having traded away an option that the 
Pentagon never planned to exploit.
Other patterns of choice also can be traced to 
bargaining dynamics. When both sides appeared serious about 
achieving agreements, each tended to gravitate toward units 
of account that were ceteris paribus the easiest to 
negotiate. Strategic launchers met this criterion in SALT I 
and II because they could be counted with NTM-derived data.
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because differentials in numbers were small relative to 
other measures, and because they did not entail any 
extensive force restructuring on either side. Warheads 
failed to meet the negotiability criterion in SALT I but 
became more negotiable in the early 1980s, as RV numbers on 
each side more nearly equalized and as both sides became 
more comfortable with the idea of determining force loadings 
on individual delivery systems with standardized counting 
and attribution rules. Moreover, by the late 1970s, the 
MIRVing phenomenon was undermining the relevance of launcher 
limits in any event; warheads had to be counted in some 
fashion. Missile throwweight was the least attractive option 
from the negotiability standpoint, but has now become 
incorporated indirectly into the START framework as a 
consequence of changing strategic conditions which 
increasingly have given both sides a clear interest in such 
limits.^ Meanwhile, strategic launchers have been retained 
as a unit of account although the arms control rationale for 
doing so is less than compelling. This is an apt 
illustration of the inertial effects of the process.
Perhaps the clearest illustration of recurring choices 
in successive negotiations concerns the issue of flexibility 
versus forbearance. Whenever the two sides perceived a
 ^To improve the survivability of their reserve forces, 
each side seems interested in constraining the barrage 
attack potential of the other. In addition, the trend on the 
U.S. side toward larger throwweight SLBMs may be a 
particular source of concern for the Soviet Union.
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direct trade-off between retaining options for themselves 
versus restricting options of the other side, both have 
tended to choose flexibility. In SALT I, both sides placed 
more value in acquiring MIRV than in cashing-in that 
capability in a parallel fashion. The Soviet leadership 
under Brezhnev could have zeroed-out the MX missile by 
accepting the Carter Administration's invitation to 
negotiate deep cuts in 1977, but it was not prepared to 
sacrifice its own force structure. Subsequently, when the 
Soviets counterproposed a ban on new ICBM types as part of a 
modified Vladivostok framework, the Carter Administration 
insisted on going forward with the MX even though it knew 
the Soviets would thereby gain a comparable degree of 
flexibility; and it also insisted on a 10 RV package for a 
new U.S. type —  the MX —  even though it might have been 
possible to hold the Soviet new type —  the SS-24 —  to less 
than that number. Finally, the United States held out for 
the right to encrypt at least a portion of missile telemetry 
rather than to press for a complete ban.
In this respect, the ABM Treaty is an interesting 
exception which nevertheless tends to prove the rule. Both 
sides elected mutual forbearance in this case because 
neither placed much value in its own ABM option at the time 
while each worried that the other side's efforts might 
complicate its offensive targeting plans and accelerate 
pressures for competitive deployments.
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In a two-sided bargaining situation, the tendency to 
preserve a free hand at the cost of forfeiting restraints on 
the other side will shape rule-making in certain ways. The 
prospects for radical steps are narrowed. The options to be 
banned generally are those which neither side really 
intended to pursue anyway. The force levels to be balanced 
are generally "topped up" rather than bargained down. And 
the limits tend to be those which are congruent with 
existing procurement plans, perhaps with minor adjustment at 
the margin.
In this sense, a START 1 agreement may represent a move 
away from the normal dynamics of bargaining; the Soviet 
Union is making substantial cuts in its heavy missiles 
without getting much in return from the United States. At 
the same time, how dramatic a departure START really is 
remains to be seen. For SALT and START both share one 
important trait: in each case, both sides have coordinated 
their choices on numerical ceilings and counting rules in 
ways that soften inconvenient programmatic constraints. In 
SALT 11, for example, the Soviets were penalized by having 
to count their single-RV SS-18s along with their MlRVed 
SS-18s against the MIRV subceiling; the United States 
insisted on this for verification reasons. But the 
subceiling on MlRVed missiles was set fairly high so as to 
soften the overvaluating effects of the MIRV counting
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rules.^ Correspondingly, in START, the warhead counting 
rules are deliberately designed to understate the potential 
value of highly fractionated delivery platforms (e.g, 
bombers and submarines) so as to soften the constraining 
effect of low ceilings on overall force structure. The 
discounts given through such counting procedures will enable 
both sides to keep more SLBMs at sea than would be the case 
if SALT counting rules were used. Thus, in this mix of 
interconnected ceilings and counting rules, we see a common 
tendency to preserve flexibility under quite different 
conditions of control.
Much the same can be said for the manner in which both 
sides have pursued interactive adjustments between framework 
and scope rules more generally. In instances where one side 
or the other wanted to broaden the scope of a particular 
agreement —  to include SLBMs in the SALT I freeze, to 
include bombers in SALT II, or to include ALCMs in the 
warhead limit under START —  the quid offered by the side 
wanting such inclusions generally took the form of high 
subceilings or permissive counting rules. The only obvious 
deviation from this pattern was the inclusion of Soviet 
short-range missiles in the INF ban. In this case, however,
The sequence of proposals and counterproposals on the 
MIRV sublimit in the 1977-78 time frame leaves the clear 
impression that the Soviets saw a connection between a high 
MIRV sublimit and their concession to count their single-RV 
systems within it. See U.S. Congress, The SALT II Treatv. 
Part 5, p. 280.
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Gorbachev saw a distinctive advantage in mutual forbearance: 
he actively sought to include shorter-range missiles in this 
ban without compensation, both to preclude the United States 
from retaining a right to match these systems and to foster 
the trend favoring the eventual denuclearization of Europe.
While the imperatives of equality, negotiability, and 
flexibility have shaped bargaining behavior in certain ways, 
other recurring choices can be traced to the intrinsic 
difficulties of controlling weapons capability through 
controls on qualitative performance. The Vladivostok accord, 
SALT II, and START all bear witness to an enduring tendency 
to attempt to address technical innovation through 
quantitative thresholds and force concentration rules rather 
than through constraints on innovation or hardware 
development. Thus, from SALT I through Vladivostok,
Kissinger sought to forestall Soviet MIRV capability through 
low subceilings on MlRVed missiles rather than limits on the 
fractionation of individual missiles or other qualitative 
measures; Carter managed to add further sublimits on MlRVed 
ICBM and on ALCM-equipped bombers; and START continues this 
trend with a combination of launcher and warhead ceilings. 
The result of this process, as we have seen, has been an 
increasingly complex framework of ceilings and subceilings 
coupled with limits on the freedom to mix forces which is 
biased against highly-MIRVed missiles. However, even under 
START, the key ceilings have never been set low enough to
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provide a unique solution to the land-based missile 
vulnerability problem posed by the combination of MIRV 
technology and Soviet throwweight potential; at best, such 
sublimits have been a partial solution to be used in concert 
with unilateral steps, such as deploying mobile missiles.
It is also instructive to note that when restraining 
effects on qualitative innovation were sought, the 
consistent pattern was one of choosing indirect rather than 
direct forms of restraint. SALT I attempted silo-size 
restrictions as a way to limit MIRV capability. SALT II's 
new-types provisions applied constraints on certain ICBM 
dimensions and weights rather than on engine thrust, 
acceleration, guidance accuracy, or other measures of 
performance. Indeed, with the notable exceptions of 
fractionation limits in SALT II, which barred certain test 
simulations, and the radar power restrictions in the ABM 
Treaty —  each of which was extremely difficult to negotiate 
—  both sides to date have abjured direct controls on 
systems performance in strategic arms negotiations. This 
reluctance has been due in part to a natural disinclination 
on both sides to intrude into systems R&D in areas where 
technical uncertainties were great.^ Thus, the USSR
 ^Even where technical uncertainties have been less 
burdensome, such as in the R&D on new missile types, there 
has been a reluctance to prematurely freeze designs. SALT 
II's new- types provisions attempted to balance this concern 
against the desire for controls with a complex set of 
guidelines to allow for minor adjustments to designs during 
flight-testing.
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initially resisted negotiating specifications on permitted 
silo defenses in the ABM Treaty on the grounds that Soviet 
planners had not yet designed such a system; and the 
Pentagon successfully lobbied for exclusion of RV parameters 
from the new-types criteria in SALT II because of reluctance 
to constrict new technologies for MaRVs. Verification 
concerns have also weighed heavily in favor of the indirect 
approach, mainly because the Soviets, until recently, were 
painfully slow in giving the Americans any kind of claim to 
collect data on systems performance.
As these examples indicate, bargaining incentives can 
act to narrow the range of negotiating options and lead to 
suboptimal results. Yet it is not always the case that the 
competitive aspect of bargaining will inevitably produce 
this outcome. On the contrary, from 1986 to 1989, the 
Soviet-American bargaining dynamic mainly was one in which 
each side tried to outbid the other. This tendency had the 
effect of broadening options, and it reflected a curious 
convergence of interest between Gorbachev and Reagan in 
prodding their respective bureaucracies into action on ways 
to agree to deep reductions. Thus, suddenly, it became 
possible to contemplate highly one-sided cuts in order to 
reach parity, to balance off-setting asymmetries, and to 
adopt on-site inspections and other techniques which simply 
had not been real options a decade earlier.
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Even in this new situation, however, some old patterns 
have reasserted themselves. Since the breakthroughs of the 
Reagan-Gorbachev summits, the progress in START has mainly 
come about through the deferral of hard issues, such as the 
fate of strategic defensive limitations, and through accord 
on permissible counting rules to soften the magnitude and 
the effects of the cuts, at least in the first phase of 
START.
COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR AND RULE DEVELOPMENT
Throughout the period from SALT to START, we have seen 
numerous examples of the pressures and tensions that 
compliance disagreements have created for on-going 
bargaining. As we saw in Chapter 3, however, compliance is a 
far more complex issue than a simple litmus test of whether 
one side or the other has cheated in some significant (or 
insignificant) way. Indeed, the deeper significance of 
compliance problems is to be found in their relationship to 
rule-making activity over time. Not only has compliance 
served as a rough barometer of the effectiveness of 
particular treaty provisions, but compliance problems have 
acted as a catalyst in the evolution of bargaining 
methodology more generally. The kinds of general refinements 
which such problems have prompted are five-fold.
First, the amount of precision and complexity built 
into treaty obligations has grown enormously. This trend is
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seen not only in the development of a more elaborate treaty 
lexicon, which can itself require lengthy descriptions of 
terms that do not lend themselves to self-definition (e.g., 
"missile support facility," missile "transits," etc.), but 
also in the more precise characterization of core activities 
like "testing in an ABM mode" which are set-up as criteria 
for delineating permissible from prohibited conduct. A 
common problem underlying many of the issues that plagued 
arms control during this period —  including the SS-19 
development, SA-5 testing, telemetry encryption, and SDI 
testing —  was the tendency of one side or the other to fill 
in the blanks of a treaty with its own self-validating 
interpretations of what was permitted. In contemporary rule- 
making, the scope for unilateral interpretation has been 
narrowed.^
Second, the degree of data exchanged in connection with 
treaty implementation has increased substantially, 
reflecting a slow but steady change in Soviet attitudes over 
the past two decades. It has now become standard practice to 
reach agreement on the "baseline" of weapons, facilities, 
and activities to be subject to treaty limitations prior to 
the imposition of those limitations. This trend is a direct 
result of disputes over ABM test ranges and the general
 ^As noted earlier, however, there are some unusual 
exceptions where the absence of explicit definitions has 
worked fairly well, as in the use of the term "national 
technical means of verification."
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unwillingness of the USSR to confirm its force levels in the 
early 1970s. The requirement for full disclosure of such 
information is no longer seen as superfluous; rather, it is 
a precondition for agreement.
Third, both sides have refined their approach to 
verification safeguards, in particular to those pertaining 
to non-concealment. Since the SALT II agreement, the trend 
has been to disconnect the issue of intention from the 
question of whether concealing activity is objectionable. 
Thus, under the INF Treaty, concealing activity no longer 
need be demonstrably "deliberate" in order to be subject to 
challenge. Furthermore, the range of exceptions to the non­
concealment requirement has been pared way back to cover 
only those activities associated with the maintenance and 
operation of systems in their deployment mode; and, even 
here, such exemptions are offset somewhat by the greater use 
of negotiated requirements to display items for observation 
by NTMs. Through such adjustments, both sides have moved 
toward striking a better balance between verification rights 
and the legitimate uses of concealment.
Fourth, the methodology for scope choices has evolved 
toward the use of objective criteria tied to systems 
capability, based mainly on the application of 
functionally-related distinguishing characteristics. The 
commonsense proposition that choices should err on the side 
of inclusion in the absence of FROD-like characteristics was
485
tested early on in the SALT era (i.e., in the III-X silo 
case) but was not consistently applied. Now, however, the 
drawbacks of granting exclusions on the basis of mission 
criteria (e.g., that a radar is for space-tracking, not 
early-warning) are widely recognized, and the need for 
agreement on objective measures of capability more clearly 
understood.
Fifth, compliance disagreements have lowered 
expectations regarding the capacity of formal rule-making to 
restrict the modernization of strategic forces. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, techniques that were tried during the SALT 
era, such as the "new-types" rules, generally failed to 
achieve their sought-after effects, in no small part because 
there was never a common view on what the desired effects 
were supposed to be. In a period of strategic force 
reductions, the leaderships on both sides may have more 
latitude to constrain qualitative improvement through 
coordinated unilateral initiatives, and in this context to 
develop selected measures like flight-test restrictions and 
limited data-exchanges on R&D practices in order to enhance 
confidence. More than likely, however, strategic arms 
diplomacy will continue down its present path of using 
warhead counting and force concentration rules as a way to 
limit overall destructive capacity and to shape incentives 
favoring the deMIRVing of land-based weapons. If both sides 
can do this, they will have gone a long way toward
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addressing precisely the kind of instabilities that 
qualitative controls were meant to deal with in the first 
place.
These five trends are indicative of the general 
directions in which compliance issues have steered the rule- 
making process. It would be short-sighted to argue that 
these trends define the outer boundaries of the kinds of 
adjustments that are possible, or that adjustments even 
within these areas noted have run their course. If, as many 
expect, the START era does codify a process of mutual 
reductions, both sides will have to learn to live with far 
more regulation and greater transparency in their R&D, 
acquisition, and deployment activities than would have 
seemed possible a decade ago. In a situation of adapting to 
new procedures, future frictions over compliance, and future 
adjustments to contain these frictions, are inevitable.
THE QUESTION OF RELEVANCE
What kind of role will strategic arms control diplomacy 
play in the 1990s and beyond? It is possible, though by no 
means certain, that the United States and the Soviet Union 
may someday reach a stage at which the reasons for being 
adversaries no longer exist. They are not at that stage yet. 
Already, however, deterrence as we have known it is 
declining in its importance as an ingredient for stability 
in day-to-day relations, not only in Europe but in the
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central strategic sphere.
The diminution of military threats, of course, is not 
the same thing as a stable peace. It is very hard to imagine 
any future circumstances in which both sides would not 
retain strategic capability in some form; and until both can 
achieve a strategic arms balance that is mutually 
acceptable, the incentives to engage in strategic arms 
diplomacy are bound to continue. The bargaining dialogue 
that has become institutionalized over the past two decades 
lacks any historical precedent in terms of the length and 
intensity of the diplomacy or in the number of arms control 
rules agreed. Yet it is not, and probably can never be, a 
dialogue without struggle or disagreement.
E.H. Carr understood this problem well. Politics, he 
once wrote, plays out in a never-ending clash between ideals 
and institutions. Once a vision of international order 
"crystallizes into concrete political form," it becomes 
"tainted with self-interest" and "a tool of vested 
interests" in its institutional manifestation, and thus is 
subject to attack in the name of a new ideal.* Arms 
diplomacy is not immune to this tension. In its ideal form, 
it has always stood for the proposition that states should 
cooperate in reducing the costs and risks of competition 
when the penalties of unwanted conflict are very great. But
* E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939 (New 
York: Harper and Row, 2nd ed., 1964), pp. 93-94.
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as an institution, arms diplomacy has been at best a blurry 
reflection of the ideal. Rule-making has turned out to be an 
incremental, conservative process; and political leaders on 
both sides have proved far more adept in proclaiming new 
goals for the dialogue —  to achieve parity at high levels, 
to reduce by 50 percent, to cap first-strike potential, and 
so forth —  than negotiators have been in developing 
effective methods to achieve these goals. For this reason, 
the process has been attacked routinely by idealists and 
realists alike for failing to live up to expectations or to 
keep up with political change. Such criticisms no doubt will 
persist for a long time to come. What they cannot call into 
question, however, is the overwhelming impulse that, for 
better or worse, compels leaders on each side to try to 
influence the other's strategic force planning decisions 
through explicit bargaining. Not to engage in such 
bargaining is to ignore the political essence of what is 
admittedly a highly stylized, bureaucratic process of 
give-and-take.
Thus, in the final analysis, the hardest question that 
both countries face is whether they can soften the inherent 
tensions between the ideal and the institutional aspects of 
their strategic arms diplomacy through creative adaptations 
—  that is, to produce innovative techniques for managing 
the relationship which, if not perfect, are at least less 
imperfect over time. If past experience is any guide, one
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might reasonably conclude that constructive innovation is 
possible, given a healthy dose of convergent self-interest 
on the part of both sides to keep the dialogue going.
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